The Role of the State and Episodes of Growth and Stagnation in the Indian Economy, 1951-2004. by McCartney, Matthew
The Role of the State and Episodes of 
Growth and Stagnation in the Indian 
Economy, 1951 to 2004
M atthew M cCartney
SOAS, University of London
ProQuest Number: 11010485
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 11010485
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
This thesis begins my making a critique of the orthodox approach to analysing 
economic growth. In particular using medium-run averages hides an important 
empirical reality of growth in developing countries. These are the episodes of growth 
and stagnation that actually characterise such growth. In addition there are severe 
empirical and theoretical problems with uncovering any such link through cross­
country regressions. This thesis makes the case for using case-studies and looks at the 
specific case of India since independence. The thesis uses an empirical approach to 
define a number of episodes of growth or stagnation. The quantitative aspects relate 
to changes in average growth of GDP or its components, agriculture, industry or 
services, or at an even more disaggregated level such as heavy industry. The 
qualitative aspects relate to issues relevant for the sustainability of growth and 
stagnation, these include productivity, and the diversification and volatility of output 
growth. Episodes of growth or stagnation are here defined as a significant change in 
both the quantitative and qualitative nature of growth relative to a developing 
country’s (India’s) own history. This thesis finds that there are four aggregate 
episodes of growth and stagnation in post-Independence India. These are, the break 
in economic growth from colonial stagnation after 1951, industrial stagnation from 
1965 to 1980, the increase in economic growth after the late 1970s/ early 1980s, and a 
continued episode of growth after reforms beginning in 1991. These are the four case 
studies focused on in the main empirical section of this thesis. In order to analyse 
these four episodes of growth and stagnation this thesis makes a case that there is a 
crucial role for the state either in promoting and sustaining an episode of growth, or 
the constraints on it leading to an episode of stagnation. These are firstly, the 
financial role of the state is in allocating the economic surplus to those able to invest 
productively. Secondly, the role of the state with regard production is to ensure 
financial resources so allocated are used productively, to either raise productivity in 
an existing market niche (learning) or upgrade to a higher technology market niche. 
Finally there are the institutions necessary to mediate the relationship between 
conflict and economic growth. In this thesis a broad institutional perspective is 
considered. A repressive state, an inclusive state or an ideological state can help 
reduce the negative implications of conflict on development. These three factors, the 
financial and productive roles of the state and institutions are used to frame the 
analysis of each of the four episodes of growth and stagnation in the post­
independence Indian economy.
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Chapter I: Introduction
1. Hypotheses and the Research Approach
1.1. Hypotheses to be Tested and Justification for the Research Project
The study of economic growth has focused mainly on the short and long-terms. This 
thesis investigates the hypothesis that this methodology has led to profound empirical 
problems because it ignores divergent patterns of developing country growth over the 
medium-term. This thesis divides the post-Independence Indian economy into four 
episodes of growth and stagnation and tests whether this is a better and more useful 
empirical division than existing efforts. This thesis builds a theoretical political economy 
framework to understand the role of the state - regarding its financial, productive and 
institutional roles - to explain the conditions that allow the state to create productive rents 
to promote economic growth. This thesis tests whether this framework provides a better 
explanation for growth than existing frameworks.
There are many justifications for this research project. Understanding the drivers and 
inhibitors of economic growth is important for human welfare, in India in particular. 
Economic growth has a significant negative link with income-poverty in India and India 
remains mired in extremely high levels of absolute deprivation (Datt and Ravallion 
2002). Economic growth has a close association with improvements in social indicators 
(Pritchett and Summers 1996). Existing empirical studies of economic growth have 
generated very poor results (Chapter III) and hence the analytical and policy conclusions 
drawn from such studies cannot be relied upon. This thesis attempts to build a theoretical 
framework that can cope with these theoretical and empirical problems and better explain 
growth as it has occurred in India since Independence. This thesis also contributes to a 
long-running debate on the proper role of the state in promoting economic development. 
An important justification of this thesis is to provide a critique of Neo-classical 
economics generally and in particular its emphasis on the desirability of a minimal state. 
This is very timely, the policy space available to LDC governments continues to shrink
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under a dominant neo-liberal globalisation paradigm while other researchers attempt to 
promote and disseminate a viable alternative (Chang and Grabel 2004).
1.2. The Case of India
Studies of the Indian economy after 1951 have typically been structured around the 
nature of the overall policy regime; the colonial period until 1951, planning and state-led 
industrialisation 1951-1991, and liberalisation after 1991. Using this framework 
commentators have been prone to dramatic evaluations. K.N.Raj dismissed the entire 
planning period from the 1950s to the 1980s as the ‘Hindu Rate of Growth’. Relative to 
high hopes prevailing in 1951 Herring argued that “India must be the most dramatic case 
of a failed developmental state” (1999:1).
This thesis begins instead with an empirical approach to define of episodes of growth or 
stagnation. This thesis looks beyond simple averages of GDP growth or rigorous 
statistical criteria when defining episodes of growth or stagnation. The difference for 
example between growth (1951 to 1965) and stagnation (1965 to 1980) is not 
distinguished by a change in GDP growth or policy regime. There was a structural break 
downwards in industrial growth and a decline in the ability of the state to effectively 
allocate the economic surplus to promote long-term sustainable growth. Several criteria, 
both quantitative and qualitative are used here in defining episodes. The quantitative 
aspects relate to changes in average growth of GDP or its components, agriculture, 
industry or services, or at an even more disaggregated level such as heavy industry. The 
qualitative aspects relate to issues relevant for the sustainability of growth and stagnation, 
these include productivity, and the diversification of output growth. Episodes of growth 
or stagnation are here defined as ‘a significant change in both the quantitative and 
qualitative nature of growth relative to India’s own history’. A number of alternative 
methodologies are introduced and contrasted to the method used here.
This thesis finds that there are four aggregate episodes of growth and stagnation in post -
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Independent India. These are, the break in economic growth from colonial stagnation 
after 1951, industrial stagnation from 1965 to 1980, the increase in economic growth 
after the late 1970s/ early 1980s, and a continued episode of growth beginning in 1991. 
Growth is analysed at a disaggregated level and the sustainability of growth and 
stagnation considered. These are the four case studies focused on in the main empirical 
section of this thesis.
1.3. The Historical Case Study Approach
A basic problem with cross-country growth regressions is their implicit assumption that 
economic growth operates according to universal laws. There is evidence that the growth 
process differs significantly between different regions and countries and over time. The 
case study approach is justified in this thesis in part on the assumption that growth 
processes are not universal.
Chapter II shows that the growth experience of a typical developing country was one 
characterised by episodes of boom, bust and stagnation. Case studies are a better means 
than econometrics to identify and explain such episodes. Case studies are also a better 
mechanism to examine the effect of sharp shifts in economic policies and exogenous 
shocks. This is the lesson drawn from Rodrik (2003) who argues for a methodology that 
emphasises a general understanding of the approaches that generate growth rather than on 
the relationship between specific policies and economic growth.
Despite growth being an event that takes place over time most models of growth are 
ahistorical. Comparative historical research allows us to deal with multiple causal paths 
leading to the same outcome and different outcomes arising from the same factor/ factor 
combination. Historically informed case studies allow researchers to question the 
assumption of universality rather than be forced to assume it true a priori. Chapters V 
and VI show that in both 1951 to 1965 and 1979/80 to 1991 rapid public investment was 
in large part responsible for rapid economic growth. In 1951 to 1965 the presence of a
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functioning Congress party enabled the state to mobilise and allocate domestic resources 
efficiently by overcoming the potential conflict inherent in such a development strategy. 
After 1979/80 the state was able to increase public investment only at the expense of the 
unsustainable growth of external and domestic debt. No such institution as the 1950s 
vintage Congress party then existed to enable the state to impose the burden of financing 
higher public investment on any particular group(s) in society. This reveals a 
superficially similar process (public investment led growth) had very different 
implications for sustainability. After 1991 public investment was sharply reduced but 
economic growth continued at a relatively rapid rate. The state after 1991 (Chapter VIII) 
was fairly successful in facilitating the private sector to mobilise resources for 
investment. This example shows a very different starting point in 1991 (reduced public 
investment-led growth) as compared to 1951 (increased public investment-led growth) 
leading to a very similar outcome in term of growth. Such examples would be missed by 
cross-country growth regressions, uncovering them is a task better left to case study 
evidence.
2. Key Theoretical and Empirical Contributions of this Thesis
This section briefly reviews some of the key theoretical and empirical contributions of 
this thesis. These are a focus on the medium-term, problems with cross-country growth 
regressions, complementarity and hysteresis in policy, the economic and political roles of 
the developmental state, the role of the state in finance, production and institutions, the 
role of conflict in economic development, measures/ descriptions of state capacities for 
conflict resolution and a new empirical means of classifying growth in post- 
Independence India.
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2.1. Focus on the medium-term and Methodological Problems with Cross-country 
Growth Regressions
This thesis focuses on growth over the medium-term, something neglected by much 
analysis of growth. The medium-term is a longer period than either Keynesian models of 
stabilisation/ Solow growth models and a shorter period than for example the analysis of 
growth and colonialism, institutions, integration and geography.
This thesis opts for a case-study methodological approach in part as a consequence of 
theoretical and empirical problems with work currently being done on economic growth. 
The use of long-run averages typical of cross-country growth regressions since Barro 
(1991) hides an important empirical reality of the growth process in contemporary 
developing countries. Growth averages over a 25-30 year spell conceal the periods of 
stagnation, growth spurts, structural breaks, volatility and instability that actually 
characterise growth experiences in developing countries. The overall average is not a 
good summary indicator of growth performance when countries show clear episodes of 
growth and stagnation. Endogenous growth models demonstrate a clear theoretical link 
between policy and economic growth/ stagnation, in practise empirical results are very 
poor and not robust. This thesis shows that there are severe empirical and theoretical 
problems in uncovering any link from policy to growth through cross-country regression 
analysis. These include problems with the complementarity among policy variables, the 
relation between different theories of growth, the question of growth itself as an 
endogenous process, hysteresis effects, growth regressions and dynamics, and the 
assumption of universalism.
2.2. Complementarity and Hysteresis
This thesis emphasises that both complementarity and hysteresis are potentially important 
processes at work in the policy-growth relationship. There has been little discussion of 
hysteresis in econometric or qualitative work on economic growth. What studies that do
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exist tend are dated, about developed countries and primarily concerned with 
unemployment not growth. This thesis proposes a more general model in which 
hysteresis effects can potentially play an important role. This thesis argues that there are 
three variables that must be in place to initiate and sustain an episode of growth. These 
variables relate to cmcial roles for the state in finance (mobilising and allocating the 
economic surplus to those wishing to invest productively), and in production (ensuring 
the surplus is invested productively) and to institutions that are necessary to overcome the 
conflict inherently associated with economic development. Complementarity is an 
important explanation why none of these variables alone is likely to have a consistently 
significant causal impact on economic growth.
The importance of complementarity between these three variables means that hysteresis 
effects can have a very significant impact. If any of these variables fails an episode of 
growth can quickly turn into an episode of stagnation. In chapter VI we will see how the 
Indian droughts of the mid-1960s led to the electoral disintegration of the Congress party. 
This removed an important institution that was hitherto managing conflict in the Indian 
polity by incorporating dissent, providing mediation and allocating (political) rents 
relatively efficiently. Constraints on the subsequent ability of the state to allocate 
efficiently the (still substantial) resources that were mobilised throughout the 1970s 
locked India into a political economy of stagnation.
2.3. The Economic and Political Schools of the Developmental State
This thesis takes as a basic assumption that the state is crucial in promoting economic 
development and attempts to construct a more coherent political economy framework 
than currently exists. Most of the existing literature on the role of the state in economic 
development falls into two schools, the economic and the political. The weaknesses of 
the economic school include the limited scope of analysis, the lack of a political 
economy, and the (neglected) importance of complementarity. Weaknesses of the 
political school include the limited analysis of what the state should do, the relation
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between different theories, and the lack of dynamics. A number of efforts have emerged 
to integrate these two schools; a critical review is made of some of these. An important 
drawback of some of these efforts is their very stylised and mathematical approach. This 
thesis attempts to make an integration focusing on the role of the state. The state has 
crucial economic roles in finance and production. The political context focuses on those 
institutions that can allow the state to overcome the conflict associated with economic 
growth.
2.4. The Theoretical Framework: The Role of the State (Finance)
This thesis provides a theoretical critique of the orthodox analysis of the role of finance 
in economic development. The case-studies of India later provide empirical support for 
this theoretical critique. Neo-classical economics holds there is no problem in 
transferring the surplus. Profit maximising firms will compete for savings and ensure 
they are allocated efficiently to an optimal portfolio of investment projects. The surplus 
will be automatically allocated to those best able to use it via the pursuit of self-interest 
among relevant actors. The neo-classical theory is of limited relevance in a developing 
economy where surplus allocation is a profound political question. Those to whom the 
surplus is allocated will continue to accumulate and become future capitalists, those 
saving from income will be left behind. The current allocation of the surplus will have 
long-term path dependency in class formation. A further critique of the neo-classical 
model is the black box at the centre of its analysis, the model assumes financial 
intermediaries automatically emerge. In developing countries the state is likely to play 
the most important role in facilitating the transfer of the surplus. The surplus can be 
transferred through the banking system, taxation/ subsidies, influencing the rate of profit 
and hence retained earnings and influencing patterns and levels of the flow of 
international capital. An ‘efficient’ allocation of the surplus by the state is unlikely once 
we consider political economy factors. Groups may block the mobilisation and allocation 
of the surplus to a capitalist class even if as in neo-classical theory they are maximising 
their interest income and capitalists maximising profits and growth. The state may tax
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individuals and use the money to subsidise emerging capitalists, but there can be no 
credible contracts or enforceable commitments that the state will then be able to tax those 
capitalists to the benefit of the original taxpayers. Existing powerful interest groups may 
block the introduction of ‘efficient’ transfers because it may simultaneously affect the 
distribution of political power. The prospect of the state being able to tax a newly created 
capitalist class may even be reduced once they have accumulated and gained added 
political leverage over the state and other classes in society.
These various complementary roles of the state in terms of finance cannot be measured or 
analysed using cross-country regression analysis. To transfer resources the state could 
utilise subsidies (which indicate an enlarged fiscal role for the state), by tax incentives 
(which imply a reduced fiscal role for the state) and/ or by policies that raise the 
profitability of private sector firms such as labour repression (which implies no fiscal role 
for the state). Such polices are complementary ways of achieving the same fiscal 
outcome and hence there is no reason to assume why for example the ‘share of 
government expenditure in GDP’ should have any particular sign or significance in a 
cross-country growth regression.
2.5. The Theoretical Framework: The Role of the State (Production/ Learning)
This thesis provides a theoretical critique of the orthodox analysis of the role of 
production/ learning in economic development. The case-studies of India later provide 
empirical support for this theoretical critique. The state has a crucial role ini production 
because of market failures that exist in learning. Neo-classical economics assumes 
innovation takes place in advanced countries and learning in LDC’s is no more difficult 
than selecting the most appropriate among innovations. Neo-classical analysis of 
technology transfer assumes all firms operate with full knowledge of all possible 
technologies, to which they have equal access through imports based on a known market 
price. There are assumed to be no tacit elements in the transfer, no learning costs or need 
to make adaptations. This thesis assumes that much technology is tacit and to effectively
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master it extensive experience in using it is necessary. The process of learning to reach 
the efficiency frontier is slow, risky, and costly. Learning by doing may imply a lengthy 
and unpredictable period of losses as firms learn and adapt technology to make it more 
appropriate to developing country conditions. In theory private capital markets could 
fund firms through the period of learning. In practise uncertainty, risk and illiquidity 
mean private capital will be reluctant. This is especially relevant when economies are 
industrialising and the economy is undergoing profound structural changes, where past 
history is a poor guide to the future.
These various market failures may generate a need for intervention in both factor and 
product markets. In factor markets deliberate government efforts to direct resources to 
particular activities creates rents that may both induce and facilitate learning by private 
actors. There are important pre-conditions for rents to promote learning. Rents must be 
allocated in a contingent manner, withdrawn from those firms failing to learn, export or 
reduce costs. The bureaucracy must be competent enough to allocate rent ex-ante to 
potentially dynamic capitalists or ex-post strong enough to withdraw them from failing 
capitalists. The relation of the state to various classes is important. To capitalists to 
enforce discipline, and ensure rents are contingent on desired performance. The relation 
of the state to other non-capitalist classes must be such that they don’t mobilise and 
dissipate efficient rents towards non-productive areas.
2.6. The Theoretical Framework: The Role of the State (Institutions)
This thesis provides a theoretical critique of the orthodox analysis of the role of 
institutions in economic development. The case-studies of India later provide empirical 
support for this theoretical critique. This thesis takes as a starting point that economic 
growth is an inherently conflictual process, involving unprecedented changes in the 
pattern of property rights and income distribution. There is a good deal of existing 
literature looking at the effect of institutions on promoting economic growth. This thesis 
looks at the related but under-researched topic of how institutions can mediate the
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(negative) relationship between conflict and economic growth. The existing literature is 
very limited and biased towards looking at those institutions compatible with neo-liberal 
economic theory, in particular property rights and democracy. Some scholars have 
argued that a repressive state is able to exclude (insulate the state) or crush groups that 
would oppose growth and industrialisation. This thesis agrees but goes further and 
argues a more inclusive institution building strategy is also possible. An important means 
of securing legitimacy for a given (re)allocation of rights may be in compensating the 
(potential) losers rather than repressing them. Identifying those requiring compensation, 
minimising the transaction costs associated with such transfers, and minimising rent- 
seeking by other entities requires a state that is more ‘embedded’ than ‘autonomous’.
This thesis departs from authors such as Evans (1995) who argue that the concept of 
embedded autonomy implies dense links with industrial capital and an exclusionary 
arrangement with other groups. This is insufficient, there are many other potentially 
influential groups in society whose opposition may at least have to be neutralised to 
permit a policy of sustained industrialisation. A dominant political party may provide 
just such an inclusive and embedded institution. This thesis examines the roles of the 
Congress party (particularly in its Nehruvian years, 1951-64) as an institution that was 
able to incorporate, mediate and buy-off opposition. A third institution to overcome the 
conflict associated with economic development is ideology. Even groups excluded from 
development or suffering from rising levels of inequality may acquiesce in their own 
exclusion for ideological reasons.
2.7. Development and conflict
Conflict is widely ignored in Neo-classical analysis of economic development. This 
thesis takes as a basic assumption that economic development is a conflictual process. 
Economic development is concerned with shifting resources from low to high 
productivity areas. The mobility of some assets will be limited, owners will then face 
problems of obsolescence and unemployment. Those having sunk investments in 
physical capital, skills, contractual relationships, and political patronage are likely to
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resist change. Work by several authors has shown conflict to be bad for economic 
growth. This thesis critiques and expands on work by Easterly and Rodrik that the 
institutions of property rights and democracy can reduce conflict. Chapter VI shows how 
increased conflict after the mid-1960s forced the government to politicise previously 
productive subsidies. The attempt to manage conflict locked India into a political 
economy of stagnation after 1965.
2.8. Measures/ Descriptions of State Capacities
This thesis proposes an objective measure of measuring the conflict resolution capacities 
of the state. In doing so it draws on a range of sources. From Rowthom (1977) the idea 
that conflict between labour and capital and the role of profits/ income distribution is 
important. From Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) that conflict can be society-centred and be 
manifest through demand groups. And from Kohli (1990) that the capacity of the state to 
govern is both influenced by and in turn influences conflict. We need a more 
encompassing measure of the conflict resolution capacity of the state than these efforts. 
This measure is provided by state budgets. Budgetary allocations in which investment, 
tax revenue, national savings are rising are an indication that conflict is being 
successfully managed. Section 2.6 has argued discipline is necessary to induce learning; 
hence diversification and productivity growth are also signs that conflict is being 
successfully managed.
Potentially the most important form of conflict is latent. This may not erupt into street 
protest or political turmoil but may induce the government to manage it through the 
budget. High levels of expenditure, subsidies, over-manning in state enterprises, stagnant 
savings and tax revenue, declining levels of investment and few signs of learning are 
objective signs the state is paying more attention to conflict management than to 
development. Chapter VI shows that conflict in India erupted in the mid-1960s and can 
be measured by conventional indices -  strikes, demonstrations, and political violence. In 
response there were drastic changes in the state budget, higher subsidies and transfers at
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the expense of investment, tax revenue and savings. By contrast a massive increase in 
state fiscal deficits, subsidies and unproductive transfers partly funded by the growth of 
external debt was managing latent conflict during the 1980s (see Chapter VII). The state 
was unable to control conflict through inclusive, repressive or ideological means so 
bought it off through the state budget. The budget for this period captures an upsurge of 
latent conflict that would be missed by more conventional measures such as strike 
activity or demonstrations.
2.9. Empirical Contributions to the Study of Post-Independence India
Chapter II shows that an analysis of the medium term is crucial in understanding growth 
in developing countries. This chapter shows that the growth experience of a typical 
developing country is one characterised by episodes of boom, bust and stagnation. Such 
patterns are inevitably missed by the short or long-term perspectives typical of empirical 
growth studies. Chapter III shows that there are four distinct episodes of growth and 
stagnation in post-independence India and uses both qualitative and quantitative criteria 
to define an episode of stagnation. This goes beyond existing research which tends to use 
more rigorous statistical techniques and hence misses this fourfold division. Existing 
research on India has focused unevenly on certain of these episodes, emphasising either 
the factors generating growth or stagnation and to a lesser extent whether such growth/ 
stagnation is likely to be sustainable (see Chapter III). There is big and varied literature 
looking at the episode of stagnation after 1965. The episode of growth after 1979 as yet is 
mainly a statistical exercise though there are some signs of scholars attempting to explain 
and draw wider conclusions. There is a huge literature on the reforms of 1991, much of 
this assumes not explains why 1991 was significant and simply amounts to a before and 
after study. There is also though a growing recognition that aggregate growth didn’t 
change and productivity growth slowed after 1991. There are few attempts to integrate 
these two approaches. There are other specific topics which have attracted the attention 
of researchers looking at episodes of growth and stagnation. These notably include the 
effect of the Green Revolution on growth in agriculture and the reasons for a sharp
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upward jump in agricultural growth in West Bengal in the 1980s. There is a small 
literature looking at episodes of growth and stagnation and its likely sustainability at state 
level, the break from stagnation in Kerala during the 1990s being the most prominent 
example. There is no existing literature in India which examines all four of the episodes 
identified here in a coherent framework. The unified theoretical and empirical approach 
in this thesis allows us to make a useful comparative analysis on factors such as the role 
of the state, foreign capital, public investment and so on.
3. Structure of Thesis
Chapter II examines the inherent problems associated with using cross-country regression 
analysis to examine the determinants of economic growth, the causes of this problem and 
finally outlines the proposed model to be used in this thesis, relating its advantages to the 
problems outlined in previous sections. Chapter III outlines the definition of an episode 
of growth or stagnation used in this thesis and then presents the quantitative and 
qualitative data that is used to define and illustrate the three episodes of growth and one 
episode of stagnation analysed here. Chapter IV argues that there are three 
complementary roles for the state in promoting economic development. These are the 
financial, productive and institutional roles. Chapter V analyses the episode of growth^ 
between 1951 and 1964, Chapter VI the episode of stagnation between 1965 and 
1979/80, Chapter VII the episode of growth between 1979/80 and 1991, and chapter VIII 
the (continuing) episode of growth after 1991. Chapter IX concludes with an 
examination of the implications for economic principles and policy of this thesis, 
examines possible extensions of this research agenda, and justifies areas that the thesis 
didn’t explore.
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Chapter II: A Methodological Critique and Framework
1. Introduction
This chapter makes a critique of orthodox investigations of economic growth. Firstly, it 
shows that the use of averages hides an important empirical reality of the growth process 
in developing countries. These are the periods of stagnation, growth, structural breaks, 
volatility and instability that actually characterise growth in developing countries. The 
second section notes that policy provides the most straightforward explanation for 
episodes of growth and stagnation. If the policy-growth hypothesis were true we would 
expect to see that episodes of growth and stagnation were strongly correlated with 
changes in policy and that the results were causal. In practise there are severe empirical 
and theoretical problems with uncovering any link from policy to growth through cross­
country regressions. These include complementarity among policy variables, the relation 
between different theories of growth, the question of growth itself as an endogenous 
process, hysteresis effects, growth regressions and dynamics, and the assumption of 
universalism in cross-country regressions. The final section outlines an alternative model 
to explain episodes of growth and stagnation emphasising the role of the state and 
relating it to these theoretical and empirical problems.
2. Episodes of Growth and Stagnation in Developing Countries
The analysis of growth in developing countries suffers from a theoretical vacuum and an 
empirical problem. Theoretical perspectives on growth either tend to look at the very 
long-term, differences in average growth rates over fifty or a hundred years or the short­
term, to explain changes/ volatility in growth over less than five years. Long-term 
growth frameworks include (among many) the nature of the colonial state (Acemoglu et 
al 2001), factor endowments (Sokoloff and Engerman 2000), malaria (Gallup and Sachs
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2000), geography (Gallup and Sachs 1999), the organisation of distributional coalitions 
(Olson 1982), and ethnic divisions (Eastlery and Levine 1997). Short-term frameworks 
include (among many) volatility in the terms of trade (Lutz 1994), international capital 
flows (Wade 1998) and fiscal policy (Easterly and Rebelo 1993). There is an empirical 
problem generated by this theoretical vacuum. This section shows that using the 
averages typical of cross-country growth regressions since Barro (1991) hide an 
important empirical reality of the growth process in contemporary developing countries. 
Growth averages over 25-30 years conceal the periods of stagnation, growth spurts, 
structural breaks, volatility and instability that actually characterise growth experiences in 
developing countries.
2.1. The Historical (Long-run) Experience of Developed Countries
Long-run averages of growth are a reasonable approximation of historical patterns of 
growth in the now developed countries. The steady-state assumptions of Solow (1957) 
for example are a good guide to the historical experience of the US. The US has 
experienced steady growth (Great Depression aside) since 1870 despite large shifts in 
policy (Kenny and Williams 2001). A simple linear trend to the natural log of per capita 
US GDP between 1880 and 1929 gives a forecast for 1987 that is off by only 5%. Output 
is captured well by a growth process with a constant mean (Jones 1995a). The idea of 
convergence to steady-state growth also makes sense when looking at the small set of 
now developed countries whose historical growth performance showed strong (club) 
convergence (Maddison 2001). Despite large differences in policy within the OECD 
between 1870 and 1989 two-thirds of the present high-income countries had GDP growth 
rates within 0.2% of the US.
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2.2. The ‘Take-off into Modern Economic Growth: An Insufficient Theoretical 
Concession
Within traditional theorising about growth in developing countries the only concession to 
the universal applicability of growth theory has been the idea that growth is dichotomous. 
This is the explicit notion of much literature concerned with the ‘Big-Push’ or ‘Take-Off 
into self-sustained modem growth. A relevant practical example is the heterodox verses 
orthodox debate over how the Korean government launched its economic miracle in the 
early-1960s1. There has been a great deal of research on the political, economic and 
social conditions of what generated the economic take-off but very little on what then 
sustained growth. One strand of the debate revolves around why the state became 
developmental in the early-1960s and the literature assumes that this same state was the 
one able to launch later initiatives such as the Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation 
programme in the late-1970s that sustained growth. Another strand of the debate argues 
that the state made a decisive shift towards outward-orientation in the early-1960s and 
this then sustained subsequent growth. The implicit assumption in this literature is that 
growth is something that has to be started then is automatically sustainable. In practise 
growth must also be sustained (potentially a different question) and can come to a 
grinding halt.
2.3. The Historical Experience of Developing Countries
Since Barro (1991) theoretical and empirical research on growth has focused on averages 
over 25-30 years. A decade of ten-percent growth followed by another of zero-percent 
drops into Barro-type regressions with the same average as two decades of five-percent 
growth. This problem has very real implications for the analysis of growth in developing 
countries. Brazil enjoyed growth of over four percent between 1965 and 1980, and 
stagnated during the 1980s. An average doesn’t distinguish between average growth in
1 E.g. the legacy of Japanese colonialism (Kohli 1994), the class structure (Khan 200d), a shift to outward 
orientation etc (World Bank 1993).
16
Brazil of 3.1% between 1960-92 and the importance of the structural break. Per capita 
GDP in Cote D’Ivoire increased by 3.1% p.a. between 1960 and 1980 and declined by an 
average of 4.1% p.a. between 1980 and 1992. Ignoring the structural break average 
growth was 0.22%, almost the same as Senegal (0.18%) which stagnated throughout the 
whole period (Pritchett 2000).
Growth averages conceal the periods of stagnation, growth spurts, structural breaks, 
volatility and instability2 that actually characterise growth experiences in developing 
countries. The overall average is not a good summary indicator of growth performance. 
Countries show shifts in growth rates, often in clear episodes, such as the slowdown in 
Latin America in the 1980s. Pritchett (2000) finds that GDP growth is not well 
characterised by a single exponential trend. For forty percent of LDC’s the R on such a 
trend is less than 0.5, suggesting that shifts and fluctuations are the dominant feature of 
the evolution of per capita GDP. Pritchett (2000) finds six distinct patterns of growth, 
before and after statistically chosen structural breaks, steep hills, hills, plateaus, 
mountains, plains and accelerations. The correlation of per capita growth in 1977-92 and 
in 1960-76 across 135 countries is only 0.08 (Easterly and Levine 2001: 195). A 
regression of growth in 1975 to 1989 against growth in 1960 to 1975 produces an R2 of 
only 0.12 (Easterly et al 1993). Temple (1999:116) finds a similar patter for developing 
countries between 1960-75 and 1975-90. For the twenty-five countries with data, 
Maddison (1995) finds the correlation of growth between 1820-70 and 1870-1929 is only 
0.097.
Growth rates in developing countries are higjily volatile whereas many of the causal 
factors (policies and institutional factors) change only slowly. The correlation of 
investment share in GDP in 1977-92 with investment share in 1960-76 is 0.85. The 
variance of per capita GDP growth within country is 0.73, in contrast for other growth 
determinants the within country variance is very low, only 0.22 for investment rates, 0.07 
for level of education and 0.02 for population size. The correlation across 1960-76 and
2 (Solow 2001:286) argues this is not a problem, growth theory should be more explicitly concerned with 
the supply side of the macroeconomy (potential output) while deviations are demand driven (actual output).
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1977-92 for primary enrolment is 0.82, for secondary enrolment is 0.91 (Easterly and 
Levine 2001). Other growth determinants have strong persistence such as measures of 
democracy and civil liberties (Barro 1999:166; Przworski et al 2000) and inequality, 
(Deininger and Squire 1996).
Rodrik (1999a) focuses on the growth instability of LDC’s over the last couple of 
decades. Some countries he finds were hardly affected by the volatility in their external 
environment during the second half of the 1970s others suffered negative impacts out of 
all proportion to the direct economic consequences of these shocks. Between 1960 and 
1973 the growth performance in Latin America and the Middle East was equal to and 
superior in some respects to East Asia. Latin America for example surpassed East Asia 
in terms of TFP. The East Asian miracle therefore rests on the collapse in productivity 
and output growth in the Middle East and Latin America after 1973, while growth in East 
Asia was sustained.
There are very striking instances of growth accelerations and growth collapses among 
developing countries. Rodrik (2003) finds 64 cases of growth accelerations since the 
1950s. These he defines as an increase in per-capita growth of 2.5% relative to the 
previous five years sustained over at least ten years. Such accelerations include the well- 
known cases, Taiwan 1961, South Korea 1962, Botswana 1966, Brazil 1966, Singapore 
1968, Mauritius 1969, China 1978, and Chile 1985, and also less well-known cases such 
as Egypt 1976, and Pakistan 1977. Berthelemy and Soderling (2001) find 14 examples of 
episodes of growth in Africa between 1960 and 19963. Examples include South Africa 
between 1960 and 1974 (5.1%), Cote D-Ivoire 1960 to 1978 (9.5%), Gabon 1965 to 1976 
(13.1%), and Namibia 1961 to 1979 (6.4%). Mkandawire (2001) notes that ten countries 
in Africa between 1967 and 1980 had growth of more than 6% p.a. These include 
Gabon, Botswana, Congo, and Nigeria and those without mineral resources such as 
Kenya and Cote D’Ivoire. These fast growers were outperforming both Malaysia and 
Indonesia.
3 Defined as a ten plus year period in which the five-year moving average of annual GDP growth exceeds 
3.5%.
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Hausmann et al (2004) conducted a very broad empirical test to locate episodes of 
growth. They locate an episode of growth by finding the year that maximises the F- 
statistic of a spline regression with a break at the relevant year. For countries with a 
number of consecutive years for which these criteria of growth are met they choose the 
best fit for a single starting date. Countries can have more than one instance of growth 
acceleration as long as the dates are more than five years apart. This filter yields 83 
growth accelerations. They find this method captures the most well known episodes4 
such as China in 1978, Argentina 1990, Mauritius 1971, Korea 1962, Indonesia 1967, 
Brazil 1967, Chile 1986, and Uganda 1989. They find the magnitude of accelerations to 
be striking. Their definition is conditional on a growth acceleration of at least 2% p.a.; 
the average acceleration though was 4.7% p.a. There are many episodes with growth of 
7% or more such as Ghana in 1965 (8.4%), Pakistan 1962 (7.1%), and Argentina 1990 
(9.2%). The occurrence of an episode is quite common; of 110 countries in their sample 
between 1957 and 1992 54.5% had at least one episode of growth and 20.9% two. The 
occurrence is also common across space 21 episodes occurred in Asia, 18 in Africa, 17 in 
Latin America, 12 in Europe and 10 in the Middle East and North Africa.
3. Public Policy, Endogenous Growth Models and Empirical Problems
This section shows there is a strong theoretical link between policy change and episodes 
of growth and stagnation. The empirical evidence for the link is however very weak.
This holds in a general sense and also for four specific examples, fiscal policy and the 
role of the state, investment, education, and R+D.
Policy provides the most straightforward explanation for episodes of growth and 
stagnation. If the policy-growth hypothesis were true we would expect to see firstly, that 
episodes of growth and stagnation should be strongly correlated with changes in policy 
and the result be causal. A typical example is from the World Bank (1994), which
19
purports to show that ‘strong adjusters’ (policy) in Sub-Saharan Africa during the 1980s 
experienced increased rates of economic growth (an episode of growth).
The supposed empirical link between policy and growth has been enhanced by theoretical 
developments, in particular endogenous growth models. The preceding Solow growth 
model had predicted that policy (investment) would impact on the level not the long-run 
rate of growth, so would have at most only a transitional effect5. Endogenous growth 
models by contrast were motivated by the lack of convergence to steady-state among 
developing countries and the inability of traditional models to account for differences in 
income and growth rates across countries (Romer 1986:1008-13; Pritchett 1997). “A 
theory of economic development needs mechanics that are consistent with sustained 
growth and with sustained diversity in income levels.” (Lucas 1988:41).
Arrow (1962) modelled the productivity of a given firm as an increasing function of 
cumulative output in the industry. Romer developed an equilibrium model of 
technological change in which optimising agents drove long-run growth through the 
accumulation of knowledge. In his model the creation of knowledge by one firm has a 
positive external effect on the production possibilities of other firms (1986:1003).
Adding to capital and labour a third input6 generates externalities, allows constant returns 
to scale at the level of the individual firm and rewards factors4 with their marginal 
productivity (i.e. preserves the competitive solution). Due to the externality these models 
yield a sub-optimal equilibrium/ market solution. This in turn generates a potential role 
for the state. Policy is shown to effect growth through its impact on the incentives to 
accumulate capital and knowledge and so generate technological change.
4 The dates differ slightly from Rodrik (2003).
51 am not aware of any study that models episodes of growth and stagnation as transitional Solow growth 
paths.
6 Often education (Romer 1986; Lucas 1988).
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3.1. The Robustness of Empirical Results
While the link between episodes of growth and stagnation and changes in policy seems 
intuitively reasonable and is supported by recent economic theorising there is very little 
empirical evidence for this proposition. Levine and Renelt (1992) took a number of 
variables commonly used in econometric growth analyses and ran them in thousands of 
regressions with different conditioning sets of other variables -  judging them robust if 
they remained significantly related to growth. Their tests excluded variables that are only 
correlated with another factor that has a causal relationship with growth, i.e. those factors 
with an indirect impact on growth. They found only investment was robustly related to 
economic growth. This analysis is perhaps unnecessarily pessimistic. There will be a 
natural tendency for the sign of a coefficient to not be robust across a set of regressions 
representing different combinations of other variables if the coefficient is collinear with 
variables suggested by other growth theories7. Allowing for this problem Sala-i-Martin 
(1997) ran two million regressions and found 21 robust variables. Among variables 
surviving are region (Africa), primary goods orientation (including agriculture and 
mineral exporting), latitude (near equator), political and civil rights, the rule of law, war, 
revolutions and coups, investment, foreign exchange variables, country’s degree of 
capitalism, and number of years the economy can be classified as open. There is limited 
relevance of this finding for the growth-policy hypothesis, many of these variables can be 
considered structural. This reduces the potential role of economic policy and implies the 
growth process will be something of a random walk around a mean, with the mean set by 
those structural factors8.
Even those factors many would accept as self-evidently related to economic growth, the 
role of the state, investment, education and R+D have an ambiguous empirical relation to 
economic growth within cross-country regression analysis. The relevant theory and
7 Also (Brock and Durlauf 2001:235).
8 See (Easterly and Levine 1997; Kenny 1999). The meaning of structural refers to a continuum from 
country-specific time-invariant variables such as latitude (Hall and Jones 1999), geography (Lai 1998), 
access to the sea (Gallup and Sachs 1999) initial conditions, (Kenny 1999) to quantities that evolve slowly 
such as population size and human capital (Barro 1991) and trust (Knack and Keefer 1997), and finally to 
highly volatile series such as black market premia, capital inflows, and terms of trade.
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empirical results concerning these four policy variables are analysed in turn.
3.1.1 Fiscal Policy and the Role of the State.
Theory linking fiscal policy to economic growth is very clear. King and Rebelo (1990) 
developed a model where modest variations in tax rates are associated with large 
variations in long-run growth rates, with both stagnation and growth miracles. Barro
(1990) extended a simple production function to include productive government 
expenditure. Production here involves decreasing returns to private inputs if 
complementary government inputs (such as enforcement of property rights) do not 
expand in a parallel manner. There is an optimal level of government expenditure that 
maximises the growth rate. With a distortionary source of revenue such as an income 
rather than a flat rate tax decentralised choices of consumption and savings lead to sub- 
optimal growth. Rebelo (1991) developed a model showing that an increase in the tax 
rate lowers the return to private investment and hence permanently lowers the rate of 
investment and economic growth.
Barro (1991) measured government intervention as the ratio of real government 
consumption less spending on education and defence to real GDP. He found a significant 
negative association between this variable averaged over 1970-85 and real growth 1960- 
85. More generally as estimated by Levine and Renelt (1992) there is no robust relation 
between growth and the ratio of total government expenditure to GDP, government 
consumption expenditure, capital formation, or educational expenditure. The coefficient 
in Barro (1991) measure becomes insignificant when Levine and Renelt (1992:951) 
include the ratio of exports to GDP in the conditioning set9. There is good theoretical 
reason for the relation between government expenditure and growth to become more 
complex once trade openness is considered. Openness may increase the cost of 
government intervention by raising the elasticity of taxed factors (Slemrod 1995:405). 
Rodrik (1998) finds a positive correlation between a country’s exposure to international
9 Also the standard deviation of domestic credit growth.
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trade and the size of its government. A possible explanation he suggests is that the 
government plays a risk-reducing role in economies exposed to a significant amount of 
external risk.
There are severe empirical problems with any attempt to quantify the role of the state. 
Cross-country growth regressions typically regress the rate of economic growth on the 
level of government expenditure. Keyensian demand management and automatic 
stabilisers imply that government expenditure will increase with poor economic 
performance. This will generate a spurious negative relation between the ‘size’ of 
government and economic growth. Governments also influence the economy in many 
ways that do not involve expenditure, such as regulation. Tax exemptions and fiscal 
transfers may have identical effects but have different implications for the measured size 
of government. The demand elasticity for government services is typically greater than 
one (Wagner’s Law), the level of government expenditure would then be determined 
endogenously (Slemrod 1995).
3.1.2. Investment and Economic Growth
Investment Was the one factor Levine and Renelt (1992) found robustly related to - 
economic growth. The average investment rate is frequently used as an independent 
variable in growth regressions though there remain severe theoretical problems in 
identifying causality.
De Long and Summers (1991) found a positive correlation between investment, 
specifically in machinery and equipment and productivity. They argue that studies using 
aggregate measures of investment (including structures) underestimate the contribution of 
investment to growth. The positive relationship they show holds for countries with 1960 
levels of GDP per worker greater than 25% of the US level, for the period 1960 to 1985. 
They argue the result is causal, robust, strong and statistically significant. While 
transport investment reflects differences in need caused by urbanisation, geography and
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population density the equipment aggregate (comprising electrical and non-electrical 
machinery) is more directly correlated with the manufacturing sector10. De Long and 
Summers (1991:470) find a strong and negative correlation between equipment prices 
and growth, and argue the association of growth with high quantities and low prices of 
capital equipment is strong evidence that equipment investment drives growth. If high 
rates of investment were a consequence it should be the case that because of increasing 
demand the price of equipment would be high in rapid growth economies (1991:473). 
Lee (1995) finds a positive and significant relation between the ratio of imported to 
domestically produced capital goods for a large cross-country regression between 1960 
and 1985....................
Between 1950 and 1988 the composition of investment in the OECD shifted sharply.
The increase in the share of investment in producer durables is especially marked, from 3 
or 4% to more than 7% of GDP in France, Germany, the US and the UK and in Japan 
from 3.5% to 9%. Growth in OECD countries however shows no equivalent upward 
trend over this period. Blomstrom et al (1996) find an inverse causal relation between 
growth and investment that is robust to the inclusion of other determinants of growth. 
Growth they find induces subsequent capital formation for a sample of 101 countries 
between 1965 and 1985. This finding is supported by Rodrik (1997). The traditional use 
of instruments as absolution’ to issues of causality is problematic. “In general there is a 
shortage of good instruments. So many variables could be used to explain growth that it 
is difficult to find variables that are not only highly correlated with the endogenous 
variable but can also be plausibly excluded from the regression.” (Temple 1999:128).
A particular theoretical development relevant for the policy-investment relation is that of 
‘credibility’. Rodrik (1989) argues it is not policy so much as ‘credible’ policy changes 
that will be likely to promote growth in the private sector. Credibility though is a very 
difficult concept to test using cross-country regression techniques. Athukorala and Sen 
(2002) agree that theoretically credibility was an important influence on the outcome of
10 Variation in relative equipment prices gives a distorted measures of the investment share in GDP. The 
tendency for the relative price of equipment to fall with rising productivity may generate a spurious
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reform in India after 1991. They are unable to construct any viable proxy measure and 
instead add a dummy variable for post-1991 to gauge if reforms have influenced 
investment/ growth beyond those variables included in their regressions. The dummy is 
positive and significant. The exact mechanism remains un-theorised and the coefficient 
captures everything specific to the 1990s not just credibility. Disaggregated components 
of what comprises credibility, particularly uncertainty, have received more attention. 
Uncertainty has been widely theorised as having an influence on the growth rate through 
its effect on investment (Rodrik 1991). In an uncertain environment entrepreneurs may 
be reluctant to commit resources to projects characterised by large, sunk costs (Dixit and 
Pindyck 1994). Measuring uncertainty remains a problem; various proxies have been 
used by scholars all of which remain unsatisfactory. Barro (1991) used the number of 
coups and revolutions Easterly and Rebelo (1993) the standard deviation of inflation and 
Ojo and Ashikoya (1995) the mean and variance of inflation and exchange rate 
instability. Dollar (1992) showed that real exchange rate instability has a significantly 
negative coefficient on growth between 1976 and 1986 for 95 developing countries. Lutz
(1994) found volatility in the terms of trade for developing countries had no effect on the 
average growth rate of GDP. Bleaney (1996) uses measures of poor macroeconomic 
management as proxies for uncertainty. Inflation, persistent budget deficits, and poor 
exchange rate policies he argues will create uncertainty about absolute and relative prices 
and the real interest rate; so discourage investment by increasing the option value for 
delaying investment projects. Brunetti et al (1998) proxied for uncertainty by the 
reliability of contract enforcement, the extent of bureaucratic corruption, the danger of 
policy reversals, and the predictability of changes in laws and policies. The indicator 
they found to be significant in a standard regression model, controlling for the usual 
variables. Specifically for India Athukorala and Sen (2002) use the three-year moving 
average of standard deviations of changes in output and the rental cost of capital as 
measures of uncertainty and as determinants of investment. Neither is significant and 
both variables are dropped from their final equation.
All these studies are testing proxies that are at best weakly correlated with uncertainty,
correlation unless corrected for.
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There is no particular reason why for example exchange rate or interest rate instability 
should be associated with uncertainty if agents can hedge foreign currency dealings, 
insure themselves or pool risk. These measures may capture at most contemporaneous 
uncertainty but uncertainty is more properly considered a forward-looking concept. 
Studies using proxies for the security of property rights or corruption focus on a very 
narrow aspect of uncertainty. Such proxies may reflect the more narrow concerns of 
(foreign) experts but not give an overall indication of uncertainty relevant for (local) 
entrepreneurs. Unpredictable changes in laws may be irrelevant if such laws are not 
implemented. Discretionary and easily corrupt bureaucracies may reduce instability if 
they enable entrepreneurs to bribe their way around inconvenient changes in laws: - to 
grease the wheels of the administration, (Leys 1965).
3.1.3 Education and Economic Growth
Intuitively education has an evident link with economic growth; again there is no clear 
empirical link. Pritchett (1999) finds a robust and negative correlation between higher 
school enrolment and educational attainment and TFP growth in developing countries. 
Between 1960 and 1985 educational capital grew faster in sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Asia than in East Asia (1999:3) even though the latter region grew more rapidly. The 
failure of micro and macro evidence to show a positive return is he argues due to an 
institutional environment that ensured new skills were devoted to privately remunerative 
but socially wasteful activities (1999:38), and to policies that retarded the demand for 
skilled labour (such as protectionism that slowed down technological diffusion from 
abroad). Bils and Klenow (2000) find only a weak relation between initial schooling and 
subsequent economic growth, even allowing for the indirect effects of schooling in 
permitting greater technology absorption. They find that the relation is either largely 
spurious, the expected return and incentive to acquire education increases in an 
expanding economy when the skilled wage is growing rapidly, or reflects omitted 
variables related both to initial schooling rates and subsequent economic growth rates.
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A particular problem for regression analysis is finding a satisfactory measurement of 
human capital (Mankiw et al 1992:418-9). A large part of investment in education takes 
the form of forgone earnings by students (which vary positively with the student’s initial 
level of human capital). In addition explicit spending on education takes place by the 
individual, family and state. Another problem is that not all expenditure on education is 
intended to generate productive human capital (for example the teaching of philosophy 
verses literacy). The typical proxy used in many cross-country regression equations is 
the share of the working-age population in secondary school. This fails to measure the 
quality of education, and the leaming-on-the-job that takes place in the workforce11. 
Education could be treated as being relevant to facilitate technological transfer and 
learning which would suggest that the stock, rather than growth rate of ‘education’ is the 
important variable driving economic growth. Sachs and Warner (1997:185) argue there 
is a positive and causal economic relation between education and economic growth but 
argue it will be intrinsically hard to measure and test using econometrics. They suggest 
that human capital development is a result of positive externalities in the family and 
community - literate parents are more likely to raise literate children. The growth of 
human capital is likely to be related to the initial stock of human capital so there is a 
possibility of a low-level poverty trap, where one low human-capital generation succeeds 
another. Growth will be high in countries with an intermediate, rather than high or low 
stock of human capital. This non-linear relationship is likely to be missed by orthodox 
cross-country regressions.
3.1.4. R+D and Economic Growth
Theoretical work such as Romer (1986) and intuition suggest there is a clear link between 
R+D and economic growth. Again, this link has not been uncovered by orthodox 
empirical analysis. Between 1950 and 1988 the total number of scientists engaged in 
R+D in the US increased from 200,000 to over 1,000,000. A similar pattern is evident in 
Germany, France and Japan. Measured by R+D expenditure the results are similar (Jones
11 The latter forms the centrepiece of Arrows’ (1962) model of growth.
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1995:13). Despite this extra R+D there has been no permanent increase in growth. 
Between 1900 and 1987 US growth rates fluctuated around a constant mean for the entire 
period, in Japan growth fluctuated around a constant mean until post-1945 after which it 
jumped upwards then slowly declined. In other OECD countries growth showed little or 
no persistent increase between 1950 and 1988, for some countries there was even a 
downward trend.
4. And Theoretical Problems...
Recent theorising on endogenous growth models is clear that there should be a strong link 
between policy and growth. This section shows that any empirical link between changes 
in public policy and changes in growth rates will be intrinsically difficult to isolate using 
traditional cross-country regression analysis. There are severe theoretical problems.
These include complementarity among policy variables, the relation between different 
theories of growth, the question of growth itself as an endogenous process, hysteresis 
effects, growth regressions and dynamics, and the assumption of universalism.
4.1. Complementarity among Policies
There is very little empirical work on the relation between variables in the same 
regression. Cross-country regressions have become theoretical melting pots, containing 
level (e.g. infrastructure proxies) and growth (e.g. investment) indicators. The same 
regressions are crowded with both the deeper causes of economic growth (institutions and 
geography) and the proximate causes (accumulation and productivity) without any clear 
indicator of how the former affects growth through the latter. Policy variables typically 
enter the right hand side of regressions separately without diagnostic tests allowing for 
any but very limited interaction among them. Theory does however suggest 
complementarity is important. For example investment may be only causally related to 
growth in the presence of strong property rights, reforms to growth if considered credible
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or when correctly sequenced. There is some limited empirical support for the importance 
of complementarity between policies. Mosley (2000) finds little evidence of 
complementary effects on growth of inflation, openness and the government share, but 
when corrected for sequencing the coefficient(s) increases and becomes significant12. 
Such concerns motivated Easterly (2001a) to argue for a renewed emphasis on aid 
conditionality, dispersing aid only to those countries implementing a complementary and 
concurrent cluster of ‘good policies’.
Econometrics has coped with this theoretical problem in an ad-hoc manner, splitting 
country samples by region or income level to look for changes in the strength and 
direction of causal relations or including occasional ad-hoc interaction effects between 
two variables. It would in theory be possible to add all possible interaction effects by 
adding multiplicative relations in a regression between all combinations of variables and 
adding a welter of dummy variables for all possible structural breaks and geographical 
regions. The resulting loss of degrees of freedom though would render the regression all 
but meaningless.
4.2. The Relation between Different Theories of Growth
There are numerous cross-country econometric studies finding some policy variable to be 
linked with economic growth. These include investment (positive), education (positive) 
and government consumption (negative) (Barro 1991). Openness to international trade 
(Frankel and Romer 1996), fiscal policy (Easterly arid Rebelo 1993), finaricial 
development (King and Levine 1993), macroeconomic policies (Fischer 1993) and 
human capital (Pio 1994). There is no consensus on which of these policy variables to
include in cross-country regression analysis. Over ninety variables have been proposed
1as potential growth determinants (Brock and Durlauf 2001:234) . Economic theory
12 Adding a premium for example when reforms were conducted in the correct sequence, deflation before 
devaluation, liberalisation of the current before capital account etc.
13 Sala-I-Martin (2001:281) argues this is really a problem of small samples, if the sample were large 
enough all potential variables, with particular slopes/ intercepts for each set of countries for all potential
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rarely generates a complete listing of variables to be held constant when trying to gauge 
the impact on the relation between the dependent and independent variable. Mauro
(1995) for example adds measures for corruption and Knack and Keefer (1997) likewise 
add proxies for trust to standard Barro-type regressions. There is no means to compare 
the merits of these two approaches and the relationship between these and other theories 
remains confusing. A causal relation between two variables (e.g. trade and growth) does 
not imply the falsity of another (e.g. democracy and growth). Levine and Renelt find 
“statistical relationships between long-run average growth rates and almost every 
particular policy indicator considered by the profession are fragile: small alterations in 
the ‘ other’ explanatory variables overturn past results” (1992:943).
4.3. Growth as an Endogenous Process
When growth is an endogenous process it implies there is a stronger link between policy 
change and growth outcomes but paradoxically it will mean the process is less amenable 
to analysis using standard cross-country regressions. Abramovitz (1986) argued that a 
country being backward in productivity levels has a potential for rapid growth and 
convergence. Less appreciated is his argument that the process is often self-limiting, as 
an economy converges its speed of convergence is likely to slow14, growth is an 
endogenous process. The relationship is a non-linear one and not suited for analysis by 
OLS in regressions. One of the most pressing issues in more recent discussion of growth 
has concerned the role of institutions, “Much of the cross-national empirical work on 
institutions has been plagued by the endogeneity of institutional quality: are rich 
countries rich because they have high quality institutions or the other way round” (Rodrik 
2002:8).
Once we accept that growth is in part endogenously determined we must consider growth 
as a historical process. Econometrics does not deal well with historical change.
non-linearities could be fitted into a regression.
14 Countries may also forge ahead, such as the U.S. after 1870.
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Endogenous growth theory is heavily implicated in the microeconomic foundations of 
neo-classical economics, “the content is stripped of its broader historical and social 
framework in deference to the requirements of the axiomatic and model-building 
associated with methodological individualism.” (Fine 1998:3). Very special assumptions 
are typically made such as Cobb-Douglas production functions and constant 
intertemporal discount rates for preferences. Such assumptions are made to rule out 
problems of instability and multiple equilibria. The assumptions of homothetic 
preferences and neutral technical change employed by most growth economists rule out 
any possibility of structural change. Many models assume a constant and exogenous rate 
of population growth whereas the demographic transition is endogenously related to 
economic growth. Interestingly Przworski et al (2000:216) found that population growth 
was endogenously determined by the type of political regime, growing more rapidly in 
dictatorships. Income distribution and poverty are also conspicuous by their absence 
from growth models. There is no technological, institutional or social evolution. The 
reasons focus on the desire for analytical and model tractability, the constraints implied 
by steady state growth models, and obsession with the conditions for convergence or 
divergence. Path dependence is a solution in which the outcome is determined solely by 
initial conditions and parameters of the model. Once started the model has a life of its 
own and can only be changed by random shocks. History ends when the new 
equilibrium is reached. History is metaphorical, “the ghosts of maximisation and 
equilibrium still lurk in the background.” (Martin, 1999:76).
4.4. Growth and Hysteresis Effects
Hysteresis effects are likely to exist in the process of economic growth. Hysteresis 
implies that a temporary economic shock can have a permanent impact on future growth. 
Most of the research on hysteresis is now somewhat dated and applies principally to the 
case of unemployment or exchange rate changes in developed countries (Lindbeck and 
Snower 1986, 1988a+b, 2001; Blanchard and Summers 1986, 1987, 1988; Baldwin 1988; 
Baldwin and Krugman 1989; Begg 1988; Dixit 1989, 1991, 1992; Brunello 1990;
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Krugman 1991; Layard et al 1991). The implication being that growth is not a linear 
process and regression analysis will have trouble analysing capturing this effect. More 
relevant examples to developing countries include Easterly (2001a) who argues there are 
virtuous and vicious circles at work in the process of growth connected with threshold 
effects. Green revolution technology for example depends on the availability of both 
seeds and fertilisers through access to adequate credit (and hence collateral). Households 
with enough collateral can invest in the necessary skills and technology to get the 
virtuous circle going. The option is not open for poor households without collateral. In 
the case of exogenous shocks there is the potential for hysteresis effects. A disaster can 
wipe out the liquid assets of a household and leave the household thereafter in a poverty 
trap and unable thereafter to invest in green revolution technology. Potential poverty 
traps make households and an entire economy more vulnerable to shocks (Easterly 
2001a:Chl0). A terms-of-trade shock that rendered part of a country’s capital stock 
useless might shift some countries near the critical mass level of capital below the critical 
line, shifting a country from strong growth to decline. The same shock may have little 
effect on a country far from the threshold. Other examples include Murphy et al (1989) 
who formalise the concept of the Big-Push (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943; Nurkse 1953; 
Scitovsky 1954). The size of the domestic market may be a constraint on growth in 
LDC’s. Firms may not be able to generate enough sales to make adoption of increasing 
returns technologies profitable and hence industrialisation is stalled:' If various sectors of 
the economy adopted IRS technology simultaneously they could each become a source of 
demand for output in other sectors. Simultaneous industrialisation could be self- 
sustaining even if no sector could break even industrialising alone. The big-push is 
associated with multiple equilibria, a non-linear effect from investment to growth. These 
examples show that variables have a large and robust effect on certain countries at certain 
times and are insignificant/ negatively related at other times. Neat econometric models 
with fixed coefficients will by definition be impossible to find.
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4.5. Cross-Country Growth Regressions and Dynamics
Theories of cyclical and adjustment dynamics of output are not well developed within 
growth theories. Starting with Barro (1991) reliable data sets for many traditional growth 
determinants (inflation, government expenditure, tariffs, inequality etc) typically ran for 
twenty-five plus years. Averages over this sample length are too short for history and too 
long to model macroeconomic policy changes and short-run dynamics. In cross-sectional 
regression analysis it is not clear whether variables affect long-term growth or the steady 
state, or both. Some growth effects are contemporaneous (macroeconomic and cyclical 
factors), others could take several years (transitional dynamics due to changed investment 
incentives), others even decades (incentives effecting the rate of technical change). Some 
right-hand-side variables may have output/ growth effects at all horizons: - cyclical, 
transitional and steady state. There is no reason to assume these are of the same 
magnitude or even of the same sign (Temple 1999:124).
What little ad hoc empirical work has been carried out finds it is common for regression 
parameters over time to be unstable. Knack and Keefer (1997) find that social variables 
have different signs on growth before and after 1980. To make assertions about time 
varying relationships between growth determinants and outcomes requires theory to 
specify not only what these relationships are but also how they shift over time.
4.6. Universalism in Cross-Country Growth Regressions
In order to run large cross-country regressions researchers are tightly constrained to the 
assumption of universalism. Conventional growth analysis assumes parameter 
homogeneity - parameters describing growth are identical across countries. Each 
individual country provides evidence that can be used to elucidate this one underlying 
universal economic relation. An increase in openness for example is hypothesised to 
have the same effect on growth in all countries. There are a small number of exceptions. 
Islam (1995) and Gordon and Gupta (2004) allow the constant term to differ across
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countries (controls for fixed effects) using panel data. More commonly an occasional 
dummy variable is added for regions and notable events such as the 1973 oil crisis or 
1982 debt crisis. In practise there is evidence to suggest the processes and components of 
growth do work differently over time and space. The implication being that cross­
country growth regressions are an intrinsically poor mechanism to analyse growth and 
each growth experience should be treated as potentially unique i.e. as a case study.
Many studies explain Africa’s slower growth as a function of different levels of 
explanatory variables (Easterly and Levine 1997; Sachs and Warner 1997; Bloom and 
Sachs 1998). They seek to explain growth as the result of a common growth process that 
begins from different levels of the same explanatory variables. However significant 
regional dummies remain common in much of the empirical literature, particularly for 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The usual assumption is that significant dummy variables are 
capturing the influence of missing variables, which must then be unearthed. This has led 
researchers to propose ever more variables in the hope that the dummy variable will be 
rendered insignificant and growth in sub-Saharan Africa will finally be ‘explained’. The 
alternative methodology is to drop the assumption that only the levels of explanatory 
variables are different and explore the idea that the growth process in sub-Saharan Africa 
works differently. There are a limited number of studies that suggest this latter idea may 
be true.
Block (2001) conducts a flexible analysis and allows for the slope coefficients to differ. 
Block finds openness15 in Sub-Saharan Africa has a much stronger effect on growth than 
his sample average. This he hypothesises is due to African economies being smaller and 
subject to more stringent trade restrictions. Block also finds that growth is less 
responsive to fiscal policy, implying that Africa does not so clearly benefit from the 
reduction of fiscal deficits. Block uses a further series of auxiliary regressions to test 
why Africa differs in the operation of its growth determinants. The determinants of 
institutional quality16 and population growth he finds operate differently in Africa.
15 Measured by Sachs and Warner (1995) index or the trade share in GDP.
16 Ethnoliguistic fragmentation, education and raw material abundance have a different causal relation with
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Growth determinants have different marginal impacts in Africa (2001:456). Block 
concludes that homogenous adjustment policies are unlikely to work where the growth 
process is heterogeneous, when the mechanisms of growth differ in Africa from 
elsewhere. Brock and Durlauf find “the operation of ethnic heterogeneity on growth is
different in Africa, not just the levels of ethnic heterogeneity a comparison of the other
regressor coefficients for Africa with those of the rest of the world makes clear the 
growth observations for African countries should not be treated as partially exchangeable 
with the growth rates of the rest of the world.” (2001:264). Asiedu (2002) finds that for a 
given level of trade openness, infrastructure and return on capital, sub-Saharan Africa 
receives less FDI. Mosley (2000) finds that financial repression is a significant influence 
on growth in Asia, and inequality only has a negative impact on growth in regions other 
than sub-Saharan Africa. He argues that good policy “should be seen as relative to the 
economy’s resources and state of development, and not as absolutes. Just as the high 
levels of (performance-based) protection and financial repression were appropriate for the 
East Asian countries in the 1960s and became less appropriate once these economies had 
become more internationally competitive in manufactures in the 1980s...the same may be
true of sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s highest level of endogenous distortions,
policies which effectively compensate for those distortions are more important as a 
complement to prudent macroeconomic policy than in an environment with better 
infrastructure and worse macroeconomic fundamentals such as Eastern Europe....” 
(2000:632). Mosley (2000) conducts limited econometric evidence (Chow tests and 
splitting his sample) on contextual dependent policies, specifically finding different 
impacts of both orthodox and heterodox policies17 by region and income level.
5. The Proposed Model
The first part of this chapter outlined the various empirical and theoretical reasons why 
cross-country growth regressions are unlikely to yield good empirical results. This
institutional quality in sub-Saharan Africa.
17 Financial repression, agricultural subsidies, performance related protection, policy stability etc.
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section outlines the alternative model that shall be used in this thesis and shows how it 
relates to these theoretical and empirical problems.
5.1. Complementarity is Important
Chapter IV will show that there are three variables that must be in place to initiate and 
sustain an episode of growth. If any one of them is missing the economy will be stuck in 
an episode of stagnation. The first two variables relate to crucial roles for the state in 
finance (mobilising and allocating the economic surplus to those wishing to invest 
productively), and in production (ensuring the surplus is invested productively). The 
third variable relates to institutions that are necessary to overcome the conflict inherently 
associated with economic development. None of these variables alone is likely to have a 
consistently significant causal impact on economic growth. The various complementary 
roles of the financial role of the state cannot be measured or analysed using cross-country 
regression analysis. To allocate resources the state could utilise subsidies (which indicate 
an enlarged fiscal role for the state), by tax incentives (which imply a reduced fiscal role 
for the state) and by policies that raise the profitability of private sector firms such as 
repression of labour mobilisation (which implies no fiscal role for the state). Such 
polices are complementary ways of achieving the same outcome. There is no reason to 
assume why for example the ‘share of government expenditure in GDP’ used by Barro
(1991) should have any particular sign or significance in a cross-country growth 
regression.
5.2. Hysteresis is (potentially) Important
The importance of complementarity between these three variables means that hysteresis 
effects can have a very significant impact. If any of these variables fails an episode of 
growth can quickly turn into an episode of stagnation. In chapter VI we will see how the 
Indian droughts of the mid-1960s led to the electoral disintegration of the Congress party.
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This removed an important institution that was hitherto managing conflict in the Indian 
polity by incorporating dissent, providing mediation and allocating (political) rents 
relatively efficiently. Constraints on the subsequent ability of the state to allocate 
efficiently the (still substantial) resources that were mobilised throughout the 1970s 
locked India into a political economy of stagnation.
5.3. The State is Important (Finance)
Section 3 noted that there is little empirical evidence that the state has an important role 
to play in economic growth. In practise the state is crucial to economic development but 
not in a way that can be captured by one crude regression variable. The various roles of 
the state are complementary (see above). A crucial (financial) role of the state is in 
allocating the economic surplus to those wishing to invest productively. In a developing 
economy there is no particular reason why the surplus should naturally find its way into 
the hands of those wishing to invest. This idea is distinct from neo-classical economics 
which holds that the surplus will be automatically transferred from those wishing to save 
to those (firms) able to offer the highest return investment projects. The neo-classical 
theory is of very limited relevance in a developing economy where the allocation of the 
surplus will have long run implications for class formation. Those to whom the surplus is 
allocated will continue to accumulate and become future capitalists and those saving from 
income will be left behind. A further critique of the neo-classical model is the 
assumption that financial intermediaries automatically emerge to facilitate the transfer of 
the surplus. In developing countries in practise the state is likely to play the most 
important role in facilitating the transfer of the surplus. Through promoting the banking 
system, through taxation/ subsidies, influencing the rate of profit and hence retained 
earnings and influencing patterns and levels of the flow of international capital. Together 
these imply that the role of the state in allocating the surplus must be analysed as a 
question of political economy. Chapter IV will explore these issues in more detail.
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5.4. The State is Important (Production)
Investment has a robust presence in cross-country growth regressions. Investment is not 
sufficient; important as well is the productivity of that investment. The second 
complementary role for the state is with regard to production, to ensure that investment 
resources allocated to private sector or utilised directly by the state either raise 
productivity in an existing market niche (intensive growth or learning) or upgrade to a 
higher technology market niche (extensive growth).
The state has a crucial role in promoting learning because of the prevalence of market 
failures. Neo-classical economics assumes innovation takes place in advanced countries 
and learning in LDC’s is no more difficult than selecting the most appropriate among 
innovations (Lall 1995, 1999). In practise there is less difference between innovation in 
developed countries and industrialisation based on learning already commercialised 
technology. Much technology is tacit and to effectively master it requires extensive 
experience and experimentation. The process of learning to reach the efficiency frontier 
is slow, risky, and costly. Learning by doing may imply a lengthy and unpredictable 
period of losses as firms leam and adapt technology to make it more appropriate to 
developing country conditions. In theory private capital markets could fund firms 
through the period of learning. In practise uncertainty, risk and illiquidity mean private 
capital will be reluctant.
It is important that rents created by the state to induce learning be conditional. There is a 
good chance learning rents will fail to generate growth. Numerous infant industriies 
protected from international competition have not become dynamic and have instead 
rested in pleasant lethargy on guaranteed profits. There are important pre-conditions for 
rents to be used to promote learning. Rents must be allocated in a contingent manner, 
withdrawn from those firms failing to leam, export or reduce costs. The bureaucracy 
must be competent enough to allocate rent ex-ante to potentially dynamic capitalists or 
strong enough to withdraw them ex-post from failing capitalists. The relation of the state
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to these various classes can only be explored as a political economy question. Chapter IV 
will explore these issues in more detail.
5.5. Institutions are Important for Episodes of Growth and Stagnation
This chapter has shown that the typical growth experience of a developing country is 
characterised by episodes of stagnation, growth spurts, structural breaks, and instability.
A research agenda on geography and institutions has stepped back from this problem 
seeking to explain differences in average growth rates over the long-term, over fifty or a 
hundred years. Such explanations include the nature of the colonial state (Acemoglu et al 
2001), factor endowments (Sokoloff and Engerman 2000), malaria (Gallup and Sachs 
2000), and geography (Gallup and Sachs 1999). This thesis seeks to explain the distinct 
episodes of growth and stagnation existing over the medium-term, more like a decade 
than a century. It would be difficult for example to envisage how the nature of the 
colonial state or geography could explain the sudden lurch to stagnation in Cote D-Ivoire 
after 1978 after several decades of rapid growth. Likewise how factor endowments or 
income inequality could account for rapid economic growth in China after 1978. This 
thesis does argue that institutions are important in explaining episodes of growth and 
stagnation. While there is a good deal of literature looking at the effect of institutions in 
promoting economic growth this thesis looks at the under-researched topic of how 
institutions can mediate the (negative) relationship between conflict and economic 
growth.
Economic development is concerned with shifting resources from low to high 
productivity areas which is an inherently conflictual process. The mobility of some 
assets will be limited; owners will then face problems of obsolescence, unemployment 
and inequality. Those having sunk investments in physical capital, skills, contractual 
relationships, and political patronage are likely to resist change (Chang 1999). The 
financial role of the state in allocating resources to those wishing to invest productively 
and the production role of the state in ensuring those resources are used productively are
39
not sufficient. Such an allocation and use of resources could be undone for example by 
groups mobilising who wish to obtain resources for the purposes of consumption rather 
than investment.
Those institutions that have been widely tested in regressions are mainly those theorised 
as being important in neo-classical economic theory. In particular analysis in work such 
as Easterly (2001c) and Rodrik (1999a) has focused on property rights and democratic 
political institutions. Chapter IV will provide a critique of the view that these are the 
only institutions able to mediate the conflict inherent in economic growth. There are 
other institutions that may reduce the impact of conflict on economic growth, those 
discussed here are i) a repressive state, ii) inclusive institutions, iii) ideological 
institutions.
Leftwich (1995, 2000) focused on the autonomy of the state as being important in 
allowing the state to implement distributionally non-neutral policies. This view is too 
narrow; a more inclusive institution building strategy is also possible. An important part 
of securing legitimacy for a given (re)allocation of rights may be in compensating the 
(potential) losers rather than repressing them. Identifying those requiring compensation, 
minimising the transaction costs associated with such transfers, and minimising rent- 
seeking by other entities requires a state that is more ‘embedded’ than ‘autonomous’.
The Congress party in India between independence and the mid-1960s provided an 
inclusive and embedded institution that could perform this role. The party developed an 
elaborate system of factions at every level of political and governmental activity that 
provided a system of co-ordination between the various levels of the party. It provided a 
well-defined network for the distribution of the spoils of office, institutionalised 
procedures of transaction and absorbed dissent by co-opting leaders of subordinate 
classes.
Even groups excluded from development or suffering from rising levels of inequality 
may acquiesce in their own exclusion for ideological reasons. A political party that can 
subordinate members’ individual aspirations to a collective ideology, and exclude
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opponents can be an important institution to manage conflict and facilitate economic 
reform. In India there is some evidence tightly organised ideological parties have been 
better able to implement reform. An example is the BJP after 1980. The BJP is a cadre 
based, ideological political party relying on a network of activists owing allegiance to the 
BJP and the wider Hindu nationalist organisation (the Sangh Parivar). The BJP has 
functioned (since its formation in 1980) as a highly successful, disciplined political party, 
characterised by mass membership, high levels of ideological commitment, and a tightly 
knit party structure that has endured without splits since its formation (Basu 2001).
The impact of institutions on episodes of growth and stagnation will not be captured by 
long-run cross-country growth regressions. The Congress party was crucial in mediating 
the negative consequences of growth between 1951 and 1965 (Chapter V) and its absence 
an important factor behind stagnation after 1965 (Chapter VI). The return of growth after 
1979/80 was not due to the restitution of an inclusive institution but to the easy 
availability of (international) capital. This allowed the state to meet the rent-seeking 
aspirations of enough interests in society to maintain political stability as well as fund 
large increases in public investment (Chapter VII). These dynamics would be missed by 
a crude regression of growth on some proxy of the inclusionary capacity of political 
parties.
5.6. The Relation between Different Theories
It was noted in section 4.2 that there is an ambiguous relation between different theories 
of growth. Numerous cross-country growth regressions find various indicators of policy 
to be positively related to economic growth. There is no clear way to reconcile these 
findings. Using the framework here this is no longer a dilemma. There are 
complementary/ alternative means in which the state can mobilise and allocate resources 
and ensure learning and complementary/ alternative institutions that can mitigate the 
problems of conflict. These can and do shift over time. For example, the role of public 
investment was crucial in promoting economic growth in India between 1951 and 1965
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(Chapter V) and also between 1979/80 and 1991 (Chapter VII). In both cases such 
investment was productive and growth promoting. Between 1965 and 1980 public 
investment had little impact on economic growth because much of it was unproductive 
(Chapter VI). By contrast after 1991 sharp cuts in public investment were associated 
with relatively rapid economic growth (Chapter VIII). This apparently contradictory 
finding would spoil any long-run cross-country growth regression but can be easily 
explained in this framework. The state after 1991 had switched its efforts from 
mobilising and allocating resources directly through its own budget to facilitating the 
mobilisation and allocation of resources by the private sector through liberalising the 
domestic financial sector and international capital.
5.7. The Case-study Approach: Growth as a Historical Process
Cross-country growth regressions assume that economic growth operates according to 
universal laws and statistical regularities that operate across all economies across time 
and space. There are only a few exceptions and the occasional dummy variable for 
regions and notable events. Discussion in this chapter demonstrated that there is 
evidence the growth process differs significantly between different regions and countries 
and over time. The fragility and heterogeneity of regression coefficients by region and 
country is only a beginning. Opening up of the assumption of universalism to greater 
scrutiny leaves us asking why the growth process may differ. Output responses to policy 
changes could for example depend on timing, expectations, and history (Pritchett 
2001:274). This thesis will go on to isolate another specific historical case study, that of 
India in the post-independence period. The case study approach is justified in this thesis 
in part on the assumption that growth processes is not universal. The comparison of 
episodes of growth and stagnation in the post-Independence Indian economy allows us to 
focus on the factors that influence growth and how their impact has altered over time.
The case studies are periods across time in the same country rather than different 
countries at a single moment in time.
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The first pressing problem is how to define and categorise an episode of growth or 
stagnation. Chapter III will establish that there was one episode of stagnation (1965 to 
1980) and three episodes of growth (1951 to 1965, 1979 to 1991 and 1991 to 2004) in the 
post-independence Indian economy. There are various ways of categorising an episode 
of growth/ stagnation and various will be considered, this thesis takes a mix of both 
quantitative and qualitative factors. The definition of an episode of growth and 
stagnation is not made purely on the basis of average rates of GDP growth. This allows 
us to draw a distinction between 1950 to 1965 and 1965 to 1980 and identify a crucial 
difference in the sharp fall in industrial (not overall GDP) growth and the collapse (after 
1965) in the governments’ ability to efficiently allocate the economic surplus to promote 
sustainable medium-term growth. Similarly there is no clear change in average growth 
rates of GDP or industry between 1979 to 1991 and 1991 to 2004. The difference lies in 
the question concerning the sustainability of the two episodes. Firstly, whether the 
episode of growth between 1979 and 1991 faced inherent limitations due to the 
accumulation of debt. And secondly, whether the episode of growth after 1991 is 
unlikely to be sustained due to the failures to upgrade and learn in domestic industry and 
to increase value-added and shift to more up-market niches in export markets.
Despite growth being an event that takes place over time most models of growth are a- 
historical. Historical case studies are far richer in theoretical argument and analysis than 
macro-quantitative studies. The analysis of historical sequences allows us to “bring to 
bear a much deeper conception of the social, political, institutional and technological 
sources of growth than theoretical and empirical economists are usually able to 
incorporate in formal models/’ (Temple 1999:120). The strength of comparative 
historical research is its ability to deal with multiple causal paths leading to the same 
outcome and different results arising from the same factor/ factor combination18. 
Comparative and historically informed case studies allow researchers to question the 
assumption of universality rather than be forced to assume it true a-priori. A historical 
analysis enables close attention to be paid to issues of dynamics rather than trying to
18 Moore (1967) in his case studies of six countries, found three paths to political modernity, Rueschemeyer 
et al (1992) argue this helped transform the social sciences by re-establishing the comparative historical
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shoe-horn them into a cross-country growth regression. Chapters V and VII show that in 
both 1951 to 1965 and 1979/80 to 1991 rapid growth in public investment was in large 
part responsible for rapid economic growth. In 1951 to 1965 the presence of a 
functioning Congress party enabled the state to mobilise and allocate domestic resources 
efficiently by overcoming the potential conflict inherent in such a development strategy. 
After 1979/80 the state was able to increase public investment only at the expense of the 
unsustainable growth of external and domestic debt. No such institution as the 1950s 
vintage Congress party then existed to enable the state to impose the burden of financing 
higher public investment on any particular group(s) in society. This reveals a 
superficially similar process (public investment led growth) had very different 
implications for sustainability. After 1991 public investment was sharply reduced but 
economic growth continued at a relatively rapid rate. The state after 1991 (Chapter VIII) 
was fairly successful in facilitating the private sector to mobilise resources for 
investment. This example shows a very different starting point in 1991 (reduced public 
investment-led growth) as compared to 1951 (increased public investment-led growth) 
led to a very similar outcome in terms of growth. Such examples would be missed by 
cross-country growth regressions.
Section 2.3 showed that the growth experience of a typical developing country was one 
characterised by episodes of boom, bust and stagnation. Case studies are a-better means 
than econometrics to identify and explain such episodes. The analysis in section 4 
showed that cross-country growth regressions are a particularly inappropriate means of to 
test for such effects. Closer studies of episodes of growth, such as Indonesia after 1966, 
Korea in the 1960s, Chile after 1988 can be usefuf in establishing the conditions that 
initiate episodes of growth. Also interesting are the comparative performances of 
countries experiencing the same exogenous shock, Chile and Zambia to declines in the 
price of copper in the mid-1970s, Indonesia and South Korea to the 1997 Asian crisis, 
and Korea and Brazil to the 1980s debt crisis. In this thesis there are similar interesting 
points of comparison thrown up by a time-wise case-study analysis. For example, the 
comparative experience of exogenous shocks such as the 1965 drought which initiated an
mode of research.
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episode of stagnation and the 1979 oil price shock which heralded an episode of growth. 
This is the lesson drawn from Rodrik (2003) who argues for a methodology that 
emphasises a general understanding of the approaches that generate growth rather than 
the relationship between specific policies and economic growth highlighted by growth 
empirics. The theoretical part of this thesis (chapter IV) will identify the state as a crucial 
institution in initiating and sustaining an episode of growth.
The use of historical case studies in analysing growth would be a return to quite a recent 
tradition of using case studies. Much of the intellectual artillery for the Neo-classical 
counter-revolution in economics was derived from close case studies of the experience of 
countries that had pursued strategies of import substitution in the post-independence 
period19. Industry was argued to be high-cost, capital-intensive and generating little 
employment. Far from achieving self-sufficient industrialisation such countries 
continued a dependence on imports of capital goods and inputs. This type of analysis 
provided important antecedents for the shift to strategies of outward orientation often as 
intrinsic parts of structural adjustment programmes from the 1980s onwards.
19 For the case of India see Bhagwati and Desai (1970) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1975).
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Chapter III: Empirical Framework
1. Introduction
This chapter develops an empirical framework based on the methodological critique in 
chapter II. We use the case study of post-independence India. This chapter begins by 
outlining the definition of an episode of growth or stagnation used in this thesis. This 
thesis looks beyond simple averages of GDP growth and rigorous statistical definitions of 
episodes of growth or stagnation. Several criteria, both quantitative and qualitative are 
used here in defining episodes. The quantitative relate to changes in average growth of 
GDP or its components, agriculture, industry or services, or even more disaggregated 
indices such as heavy industry. The qualitative relate to issues relevant for the 
sustainability of growth/ stagnation, these include changes in productivity and the 
diversification of output. Episodes of growth or stagnation are here defined as ‘a 
significant change in both the quantitative and qualitative nature of growth relative to 
India’s own history’. A number of other potential methods are introduced and contrasted 
to the method used here. The second part of this chapter presents the quantitative and 
qualitative data that is used to define and illustrate the three episodes of growth and one 
episode of stagnation analysed in this thesis. Section 3 outlines the broad characteristics 
of the episode of growth between 1951 and 1965. In quantitative terms there was a sharp 
upward break in growth of GDP and industry compared to the pre-independence period.
In qualitative terms diversification increased rapidly. Section 4 outlines the episode of 
stagnation between 1965 and 1980. In quantitative terms the rate of GDP growth showed 
no statistically significant change relative to 1951-65. The rate of industrial growth 
however slowed in particular the growth rates of heavy industry. In qualitative terms 
growth of productivity and diversification of industrial output slowed sharply. Section 5 
outlines the episode of stagnation between 1980/81 and 1991. In quantitative terms GDP 
growth and industrial growth increased sharply. In qualitative terms productivity growth 
showed a sharp increase. The economy as a whole grew by about three and a half/ four 
percent from Independence to 1980 and by over five percent until 1991. The final section
4 6
outlines the episode of growth between 1991 and 2004. In quantitative terms there was 
no change in the rate of GDP growth and a slowdown of industrial/ manufacturing 
growth, the latter was especially marked after 1996. In qualitative terms the rate of 
productivity growth slowed. Though more sustainable that 1979/80 to 1991 in purely 
financial terms there are qualitative doubts about the sustainability of growth after 1991 
due to questions of learning and diversification.
2. Methods of Measuring Episodes of Growth and Stagnation
This section outlines the definition of an episode of growth or stagnation used in this 
thesis. Episodes are measured in both quantitative and qualitative terms. A number of 
other methods that have been used by other scholars are reviewed to gauge whether they 
add anything useful to this method.
2.1. Episodes of Growth and Stagnation
This thesis looks beyond simple averages of GDP growth and rigorous statistical criterion 
when defining episodes of growth or stagnation. Several criteria, both quantitative and 
qualitative are used here in defining episodes. The quantitative aspects relate to changes 
in average growth of GDP or its components, agriculture, industry or services, or even 
more disaggregated indices such as heavy industry. The qualitative aspects relate to 
issues relevant for the sustainability of growth or stagnation, these include changes in 
productivity and the diversification of output. Episodes of growth or stagnation are here 
defined as ‘a significant change in both the quantitative and qualitative nature of growth 
relative to India’s own history’.
This thesis finds that there are four episodes of growth and stagnation in post -  
Independence India; the break from colonial stagnation after 1951, industrial stagnation 
from 1965 to 1980, an increase in economic growth after the late 1970s/ early 1980s, and
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a continued episode of growth after reforms in 1991. The comparison of the periods 
1951 to 1965 (growth) and 1965 to 1980 (stagnation) is a good example of how 
judgement rather than precise statistical criteria is used to distinguish episodes of growth 
and stagnation. The difference between the two periods is not distinguished by a change 
in GDP growth. There was a structural break (decline) after 1965 in the average rate of 
industrial growth, in particular the growth of heavy industry. There was also a collapse 
in the ability of the government to efficiently allocate the economic surplus to promote 
long-term sustainable growth leading to a decline in the efficiency of resource allocation.
Existing analytical attention devoted to the various episodes of growth and stagnation in 
post-Independence India is inconsistent. The post-1965 slowdown in industrial growth 
while being hotly debated in the 1970s is now forgotten (Bagchi 1970, 1975, 1977, 1981, 
1988; Sau 1974; Mitra 1977; Srinivasan andNaryana 1977; Nayyar 1978, 1981; Shetty 
1978; Chakravarty 1979; Patnaik 1981, 1984; Rangarajan 1982; Bardhan 1984; Varshney 
1984; Ahluwalia 1985; Chandrasekhar 1988). The episode of growth after 1979 is 
primarily treated as a statistical question (Nagaraj 1990a; Bhargava and Joshi 1990; Bai 
and Perron 1998, 2003; Wallack 2003) though there are some emerging signs of scholars 
attempting to explain the statistical findings and draw wider conclusions (Rodrik and 
Subramaniam 2004a; Panagariya 2004). There is a huge literature on the reforms of 
1991. Much of this literature simply assumes 1991 to have been significant and amounts 
to a before-and-after study (Dreze and Sen 1995; Chandrasekhar 1996; Ahluwalia 1998; 
Mani 1998; Kumar 1998; Deshpande and Deshpande 1998; Kumar 1999a,b; Khanna 
1999; Tewari 1999; Basant 2000; Jha 2000; Kohli 2001; Ramaswamy 2002; Vaidya 
2002; D’Costa 2003). There is a growing recognition that aggregate GDP growth didn’t 
change after 1991 (Chandrasekhar 1996; Mani 1998; Ahluwalia 1999, 2002; Kumar 
2000a; Chaudhuri 2002; Acharya 2002b; Nagaraj 2002, 2003b; Virmani 2004a,b), and 
productivity growth slowed (Balakrishnan et al 2000; IMF 2002; Das 2003a; Goldar and 
Kumari 2003; Rodrik and Subramanian 2004a; Goldar 2004). There remain few attempts 
to integrate the assumption and the actual outcome. Agriculture has been frequently 
exposed to a spotlight trying to find trends, turning points and structural breaks. Notable 
debates including the green revolution after 1965 (Thamarajakshi 1969, 1977, 1990;
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Vaidyanathan 1977; Srinivasan 1979; Patnaik 1981; Desai 1981; Mody 1982; and Sawant 
1983) and the reasons for rapid agricultural output growth in West Bengal during the 
1980s after several decades of stagnation (Boyce 1987, Harriss 1992, Saha and 
Swaminathan 1994). This thesis attempts to correct the unhelpful dichotomy between 
firstly, analysis of the general economy, confined to the analytical straightjacket of steady 
state growth models, and secondly, agriculture where analysis of growth has long been 
based on the assumption that it is an inherently unstable process. There is a small 
literature looking at episodes of growth and stagnation and its likely sustainability at state 
level, the break from stagnation in Kerala during the 1990s being the most prominent 
example (Subrahmanian and Azeez 2000; Harilal and Joseph 2003; Chakraborty 2005; 
Kannan 2005; Subrahmanian 2006).
2.2. Phases of Growth and Stagnation in India
Virmani (2004a) defines one episode of stagnation as lasting from independence to the 
early/ mid-1970s and an episode of growth from then onwards. The national accounts 
(based on 1993/94 prices) have recently been extended backwards and comparable data 
going back to 1950 is now available. Virmani (2004a) uses this series to construct long­
term growth trends for this fifty-year period. He constructs a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
filtered GDP series and a moving average. Virmani finds there are two clear ‘phases’, 
revealed by the growth rate trends of the HP-filtered series and the ten-year moving 
average. As measured by the HP series the growth trend recorded a downswing after 
independence and reached a low point of 3.3% p.a. between 1971112arid 1973/74.
Growth then recovered during a second (upswing) phase to a highpoint of 6.1% between 
1994/95 and 1995/96. The ten-year moving average fluctuated typically locked between 
3-4% during the first thirty years. Starting from 1978/79 there is a clear trend upwards, 
after which the average never fell below 4% and on occasion exceeded 5%. This 
rigorous statistical definition misses the change in the qualitative nature of growth after 
1965 and also the important questions concerning the sustainability of growth before and 
after 1991.
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2.3. Comparative Episodes of Growth and Stagnation
Some scholars have unearthed episodes of growth and stagnation through international 
comparisons. Here an episode of growth is defined as one in which India is growing 
relatively rapidly compared to either other developing countries or is converging 
(however slowly) on the technological leader. Clark and Wolcott (2001) have shown that 
there is a very long episode of (relative) stagnation lasting from the mid-nineteenth 
century to the mid-1980s when India’s growth stagnated relative to the UK and US. The 
second was an episode of growth after 1980 when India showed signs of some 
convergence to the US. Per capita income rose 10% relative to the US in 1987-91, and 
by another 14% between 1991 and 1998 (Clark and Wolcott 2001:4). The pattern 
changes when we compare India to other LDC’s. Virmani (2004a:56) shows that 
between 1950 and 1964 India’s growth performance was similar to the mean of all 
developing countries. Between 1965 and 1979 however India’s growth performance 
declined dramatically, to 69th from a set of 79 countries for which comparable data is 
available. Ahluwalia (1995) confirms that India’s growth performance was close to the 
bottom between 1965 and 1980. After 1980 India’s growth accelerated whilst growth 
elsewhere declined, hence India experienced an episode of (relative) growth. Between 
1981 and 1986 India grew by almost 5%, growth in the average LDC declined to 2.5%, 
and the group of non-oil LDC's to 3.5%. This led to an improvement in India’s relative 
performance, between 1980 and 2000 India’s growth ranking improved to 9th from 86 
countries. Between 1980 and 2003 only China, Singapore, Thailand, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand had higher average growth. Rodrik (1999a) notes that 
developing countries fall into two groups, those that (at least) sustained growth after the 
1979/80 global crisis and those that collapsed into stagnation. India fell into the former 
category. An international comparison reveals in starker clarity the success of countries 
like South Korea and Taiwan who managed to sustain growth, this fact would be missed 
by focusing only on the domestic economy.
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2.4. Comparative Episodes of Sectoral Growth and Stagnation
In recent years India has been characterised as having service-led economic growth. A 
comparative analysis reveals a more nuanced picture. Virmani (2004a) compares India’s 
experience with other countries to gauge whether the service sector share was an outlier. 
He constructed an average share during 1992 to 2000 along with average per capita GDP 
(constant PPP) regressing one against the other to derive a predicted share for the service 
sector at each income level. India’s share was then compared with the norm for the 160 
countries for which data is available. Based on this equation India’s average service 
sector share is 45%, almost identical to the predicted value of 44%. India had a normal 
share of the service sector in the 1990s. Repeating the calculation for 1980 to 1991 
(using a 148-country sample) India had an average of 40%, lower than the norm of 43%. 
Faster service sector growth in the 1990s can be seen as correcting an earlier imbalance. 
The notion of ‘service-led’ growth in India being a distinct developmental pattern is also 
something of a mirage created by growth of manufacturing which has consistently been 
slower than the LDC norm. Service sector growth in India increased from less than 7% 
in the 1980s to 7.5% p.a. in the 1990s. Manufacturing growth remained below 7%. By 
comparison, manufacturing growth in China between 1979 and 1990 exceeded 10% 
(Nolan 1995).
2.5. Episodes of Growth and Stagnation at State Level
As a large federal country episodes of growth and stagnation can also be analysed at the 
state level (cross-section) as opposed to time-series at the all-India level.
Growth in some states (Orissa, Rajasthan and Gujarat) shows large year-to-year 
fluctuations, and in others (Kerala, Punjab, West Bengal) growth is relatively stable. The 
average also varies considerably between states. Between 1970/71 and 1995/96 growth 
averaged 3.13% in Gujarat, 3.48% in Maharashtra, 2.88% in Punjab, 1.41% in Jammu 
and Kashmir, and 1.61% in Bihar (Dasgupta et al 2000:2416). There are some interesting
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cases of episodes of growth at state level. Real NSDP in Rajasthan grew at 1.32% 1971- 
1980 and by 8.34% 1981-90, Tamil Nadu from 1.79% to 5.7% over the same period. 
Growth in Kerala between 1971-80 was only 2.19% and between 1992-5 8% p.a., in 
Gujarat over the same period the increase was from 3.88% to 10.39% p.a. Industrial 
growth in Haryana was rapid, 7.5% and 9% in the 1970s and 1980s. Industrial growth in 
Kerala declined from 4.97% in the 1970s to 3.36% in the 1980s but reached 9.91% 
between 1992-5. Industrial growth in Gujarat showed an accelerating trend, from 5.27% 
in the 1970s, 7.99% in the 1980s and 15.51% between 1992-5.
Such disaggregated analysis allows us to shine a spotlight on the regional contributions to 
shifts in all-India growth averages. The national shift in growth rates in the early 1980s 
was a regionally concentrated phenomenon (Dholakia 1994). There are only a small 
number of states where 1981/82 is clearly significant. These include Karnataka where 
growth increased by 1.14%, Madhya Pradesh 3.68%, Maharashtra 1.74%, Tripura 1.7%, 
Uttar Pradesh 2.61%, and West Bengal 2.17%. All these states except Karnataka 
experienced an acceleration of growth greater than the all-India average. The 
characteristics of these states form an interesting comparison. They are located in all five 
zones of India. Most of them are large in terms of population, geographical area, 
employment and income and in aggregate account for around 60-70% of the Indian 
economy. All except Maharashtra are low income relative to the national average.
The focus on state level growth forces us to be more nuanced about generalising 
explanations for all-India episodes of growth and stagnation. The national acceleration 
after 1979/80 hides very substantial differences through which growth increased in 
individual states. Maharashtra was the first to turn into a high growth state in 1972/73 
from a moderately growing state without experiencing any increase in the growth of the 
primary or secondary sectors. Gujarat turned into a high growth state in 1973/74 when 
the tertiary sector experienced a sharp increase of 3.11%. In the following year the 
secondary sector experienced a substantial rise in growth of 3.05%. Gujarat however 
experienced only moderate economic growth after 1981/82 because of a sharp 
deceleration in agricultural growth. Uttar Pradesh turned into a high growth state in
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1974/75 when it experienced, firstly, a more than doubling of growth in the primary 
sector then later, a significant acceleration of growth in the secondary sector, and finally 
in the service sector. Growth in Uttar Pradesh slid back relative to the national average 
after 1981/82. Assam and Madhya Pradesh both turned into high growth states in 
1979/80 and were responsible on the margin for shifting the national average to a higher 
level in 1981/82. Both experienced a growth spurt firstly in the industrial and then the 
tertiary sectors. Assam turned into a high growth state in 1979/80 with a sharp increase, 
of 10.62% in secondary sector growth. Subsequently West Bengal in 1982/83 and 
Himachal Pradesh and Karnataka in 1985/86 all experienced a jump in growth of 2.5%. 
Punjab and Haryana had both historically been high growth states and declined relative to 
the national average after 1981/82.
All-India economic growth slowed after the mid-1990s. Krishna (2004) shows that 
rapidly growing Gujarat and Maharashtra slowed from 6.5% to 3.2% and 5.7% to 3.8% 
between 1991/92 to 1995/96 and 1995/96 to 1999/00. Kerala and Orissa likewise from 
5.3% to 4.2% and 3.9% to 1.6% respectively. By contrast Karnataka from 5.1% to 6.7% 
and West Bengal 4.7% to 5.7% improved their growth rates after the mid-1990s. Other 
states to buck the national trend and grow faster after 1995/96 were Bihar, Haryana, 
Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.
The growth experience of Kerala remains something of a puzzle. It experienced a 
deceleration in growth of total SDP in 1972/73, with marked slowdowns in the tertiary 
and secondary sectors. Growth of SDP jumped from 2.5% between 1980 and 1990 to 
5.2% between 1992 and 1998. Given high levels of social development growth was still 
surprisingly low. Rajasthan experienced the highest growth of any state in the pre-reform 
(1980s) period. The state economy grew fastest in tourism, agriculture, construction, 
other services and manufacturing. There are various state specific explanations behind 
this acceleration in growth. The benefits of a delayed green revolution and construction 
of the Command Canal for wheat production, the growth of tourism in the 1980s and 90s 
and rapid electrification of the state in the 1980s. Orissa experienced growth of only 1% 
p.a. in the 1980s, of particular note was the very low (0.72%) growth in agriculture.
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Though the soils and suitability for irrigation are similar to more successful states Orissa 
suffers from a vulnerability to floods and tropical cyclones. In the post reform (1990s) 
period, despite continuing to suffer from these poor geographical endowments, growth 
jumped to 2.5% p.a. Orissa has ranked 6th among all states in terms of hosting foreign 
investment, pursuing a successful industrial policy that has attracted FDI to its abundant 
natural resources. Orissa has 90% of the chrome ore and nickel reserves, 70% of bauxite, 
and 24% of the coal reserves for all-India. Agriculture remains disappointing and 
recorded an average growth of 0.5% in the 1990s.
3. An Episode of Growth, 1951 to 1964
This section outlines the broad characteristics of the episode of growth between 1951 and 
1965. In quantitative terms there was a sharp upward break in growth of GDP and 
industry compared to the pre-independence period. In qualitative terms diversification 
increased rapidly.
It was a common argument among Indian nationalists that British imperialism had led to 
complete/ partial deindustrialisation. This is an enormous paradox for those advocating 
domestic and trade liberalization today. India’s economy between 1873 and 1947 
conformed to a neo-liberal ideal, with secure property rights, free trade, fixed exchange 
rates, monetary stability and open capital markets. During this entire period India 
suffered a decline in its relative income. Income in India declined from around 20% of 
the US level in the early 1870s to less than 7% at Independence (Clark and Wolcott 
2001). Bagchi (1976) argues that India saw a decline in the proportion of national 
income generated by the industrial sector and in the proportion of the population engaged 
in secondary industry. Bagchi also presents evidence to show that there was stagnation/ 
decline in the number of handloom weavers and cotton workers.
Chandra (1982) argues that such long-term stagnation persisted after independence, until 
the 1970s. Stagnation he argues was an absolute not just comparative event. Chandra
5 4
notes that per capita output of crop production fell by more than 20% between 1919 and 
1975/6. Peaks in per capita crop production were little different in 1909/10, 1910/11, 
1916/17, 1964/65, 1970/71, 1975/76. Foodgrain consumption per capita declined from 
173.5kg in 1900-20 to 169kg in 1960/61 and between 1900 and 1970 the proportion of 
the population engaged in agriculture remained unchanged at 70%. The problem with 
Chandra is his use of partial evidence. The focus on agriculture though the largest sector 
in the Indian economy ignores the more general economic growth and structural changes 
that occurred after 1951.
3.1. Economic Growth 1951 to 1964
Table 3.1 shows that the Indian economy grew by over 4% between 1951 and 1964, 
whether GDP is measured by market or factor cost. There was positive growth in GDP, 
consumption and investment in both public and private sectors. Growth was state-led. 
Between 1951 and 1964 growth of government consumption (6.6% p.a.) exceeded 
growth of private consumption (3.7%). The growth of private investment (3.5%) was 
considerably less than the growth of public investment (7.9%). Growth was no miracle 
but a clear break with historical stagnation.
o
Table 3.1: Growth in the Indian Economy, 1951-1964
1951-64
Growth Rate (%)
GDP (Market Prices) 4.4
GDP (Factor Cost) 4.1
GDP at Factor Cost (HP Filtered) 3.9
Pc GDP at Market Prices 2.3
Pc GDP at Factor Cost 2.0
Private Consumption 3.7
Govt Consumption 6.6
Investment 7.9
- Machinery and Equipment 9.7
Private GFCF 3.5
Goods and Services Export 0.0
Coefficient o f  Variation (std/Mean)
GDP at Market Prices 0.5
GDP at Factor Cost 0.6
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Source: (Virmani 2004a: 15).
3.2. Structural Change, 1951-1964
The mistake of Chandra (1982) was to generalise the experience of the agricultural sector 
to that of the whole economy. Table 3.2 shows that the agricultural and allied sector 
grew by only 2.9% p.a. between 1951 and 1964. This was not because the entire 
economy was stagnant but because of the low priority accorded to agriculture in the 
Mahalanobis model. Manufacturing grew by 6.6% p.a. and electricity, gas and water by 
11.2% p.a. (the latter from a low base). Public administration and defence grew by 6.6% 
p.a., communications by 7.4% and trade by 5.6%. The tradable goods sector grew by 
only 3.6% p.a. considerably less than the 5.2% p.a. in the non-tradable sector. Compared 
to historical stagnation and the stagnation that ensued after 1965 these were the “glorious 
Mahalanobis years” (Chandrasekhar 1988:318).
Table 3.2: Sector Growth Rates In India, 1951 to 1964
Sector 1951-64
I Agriculture and Allied 2.9
1.1 Agriculture 3.1
2. Mining 5.6
3. Manufacturing 6.6
3.1 Registered (Modem) 7.9
3.2 Unregistered 5.4
4. Electricity, Gas and Water 11.2
5. Construction 6.8
6. Trade, Hotels and restaurants 5.6
6.1 Trade 5.6
6.2 Hotels and Restaurants 5.6
7. Storage, Transport and Communication 5.9
7.1 Railway 4.8
7.2 Other Transport 6.4
7.3 Storage 2.3
7.4 Communication 7.4
8. FIREBHS 3.1
8.1 Banking and Insurance 6.6
8.2 Real Estate, Housing and Banking Services 2.1
9. Community Social and Personal Services 4.4
9.1. Public Administration and Defence 6.6
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9.2 Other Services 3.3
Sub-Aggregates
A. Tradable Goods 3.6
B. Non-Tradable Services 5.2
b.l Services, excluding FIREHBS 5.6
C. GDP, excluding GDP Administration 4.0
D. Services excluding GDP administration 5.0
Source: (Virmani 2004a: 17).
4. An Episode of Stagnation, 1965 to 1980
This section outlines the broad characteristics of the episode of stagnation between 1965 
and 1980. In quantitative terms the rate of GDP growth showed no statistically 
significant change relative to 1951-65. The rate of industrial growth slowed, in particular 
growth of heavy industry. In qualitative terms growth of productivity and diversification 
of industrial output slowed sharply.
Table 3.3 shows that economic growth between 1965 and 1980 declined to 2.9% p.a., this 
difference is not statistically significant. Virmani (2004a) finds a Chow test for a 
structural break in GDP growth shows a possible break in 1963/64 and also (less likely) 
in 1964/65, both are considerably of less likelihood than a similar test for 1980/81. The 
use of dummy variables for the period 1965/66 to 1979/80 to test for a structural break in 
GDP growth are insignificant. Once the break in 1980/81 is accounted for it is difficult 
to locate any other statistically significant breaks in growth. This is what leads Virmani 
to conclude the entire period between 1950 and 1980 was one of only two ‘phases in 
growth’.
Table 3.3: Growth in the Indian Economy, 1951-64 and 1965-79
1951-64 1965-79
Growth Rate (%)
GDP (Market Prices) 4.4 2.9
GDP (Factor Cost) 4.1 2.9
GDP at Factor Cost (HP Filtered) 3.9 3.5
Pc GDP at Market Prices 2.3 0.6
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Pc GDP at Factor Cost 2.0 0.6
Private Consumption 3.7 2.8
Govt Consumption 6.6 5.1
Investment 7.9 4.5
- Machinery and Equipment 9.7 3.7
Private GFCF 3.5 3.8
Goods and Services Export 0.0 10.2
Oil Import 37.1
Coefficient o f  Variation (std/Mean)
GDP at Market Prices 0.5 1.4
GDP at Factor Cost 0.6 1.5
Source, (Virmani 2004a: 15).
When considering this question in a broader context there are important distinctions in 
the period 1965 to 1980 that mark it out as an episode of stagnation in contrast to the 
earlier episode of growth. The first distinction being a change in the qualitative nature 
and the second a change in the qualitative pattern of economic growth.
4.1. The Nature of Growth: Productivity
The qualitative nature of economic growth showed a sharp decline in productivity growth 
after 1964/65. Sivasubramonian (2004:286) shows that output per unit of input dropped 
from 1.78% p.a. between 1950/51 and 1964/64 to 0.41% p.a. between 1964/65 and 
1980/81. Likewise Virmani (2004b:23) shows that TFP growth fell from +1.4/6% p.a. 
between 1950/51 to 1964/65 to-0.1/+0.6% between 1965/66 and 1979/80.
4.2. The Nature of Growth: Patterns of Industrial Stagnation
Another striking change after 1965 was a sharp break in the quantitative pattern of 
economic growth. After 1965 the Indian government conspicuously failed to maintain 
the momentum of industrialisation framed in the Mahalanobis strategy of planned 
economic development.
Ahluwalia (1985:Ch 7) has made the most comprehensive examination of patterns in
58
Indian industrial stagnation. She estimated semi-logarithmic time trends for alternative 
measures: - value added, value of output and industrial production.
Log Y = a + bt
The regression coefficient b is the estimate of the annual growth rate. Ahluwalia also 
used dummy variables to allow the intercept and slope to differ and show any slowdown 
in the rate of growth of value added or value of output.
Log Y = a + a'D + bt + b'Dt
D takes the value 0 until 1965/6, and 1 afterwards. The sum of the two t’s is the 
compound growth rate for the second period. This allows directly for a test of whether the 
slowdown is statistically significant. The choice of an arbitrary break point is potentially 
problematical but in the case of India quite apparent. 1965/66 marks a watershed in the 
post-Independence Indian economy, marking the end of the third five-year plan, 
devaluation of the Rupee, the second year of the drought, beginning of the three annual 
plans, and the end of the second Indo-Pak war.
Ahluwalia’s results are striking and confirm there was an episode of stagnation that 
would be missed by focusing on GDP growth alone. Industry grew by 7% p.a. between 
1956/7 and 1965/6, and thereafter 5.5% until 1979/80. The slowdown is statistically 
significant. The sectoral incidence of the slowdown reveals distinct patterns. Mining (9% 
of value added) slowed from 9% p.a. in the first period to 3% in the second. Within 
manufacturing industries constituting two-thirds of total value added (notably machinery, 
transport equipment, chemicals and rubber) experienced a significant decline in growth 
after 1965/6. Metal products fell from 12.5% p.a. in the first period to 2.5% in the 
second. Similar though less dramatic patterns are evident in basic metals and non- 
metallic mineral products. Textiles and food manufacturing (20% of value added) did not 
share in the deceleration. Food manufacturing showed no significant change because of 
large year-to-year fluctuations. Other consumer industries such as beverages, tobacco,
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footwear, furniture, and leather and fur products showed no significant decline in growth. 
Those sectors experiencing the greatest slowdown (basic metals, metal products, 
machinery (electrical and non-electrical) and transport equipment were precisely those 
targeted for growth by the Mahalanobis strategy. Growth in the textile sector actually 
increased from 2.3 to 4.4% over the two periods, though the change was not statistically 
significant.
In terms of used and input-based groups between 1959/60 and 1979/80 there are equally 
striking results. Capital and basic goods sectors (that had grown rapidly between 1951 
and 1965) experienced the greatest subsequent downturn. Basic goods, mining, iron, 
steel and other non-ferrous basic metals experienced a sharp slowdown in growth.
Cement showed a fluctuating growth path and fertilisers no significant decline in growth. 
For capital goods slowdown was across the board. Transport equipment (40% of the 
sector) slowed from 11% p.a. to only 3.5%, machinery industries (20% of the sector) also 
experienced a significant slowdown. Growth of intermediate goods fell from 5.7% to 
4.4%. Growth of consumer non-durables increased slightly. In neither case was the 
change significant. Table 3.4 gives some statistical details from another source, the 
figures vary slightly owing to a different choice of break-point from Ahluwalia.
Table 3.4 shows that the average rate of growth of agriculture slowed from 2.9% to 1.4% 
between 1951 to 1965 and 1965 to 1979, this is not statistically significant. A Chow test 
reveals a potential break point at 1964/65 though a dummy variable finds both 1962/63 
and 1964/65 to be insignificant. Virmani (2004a) does not find any statistical break in 
the growth of GDP from agriculture during the entire 52-year span of his analysis, once 
variations in rainfall are accounted for. He argues fluctuations in output, not the 
underlying growth trend has created impressions of structural breaks in agricultural 
growth.
Table 3.4: Sector Growth Rates during Different Phases
Sector 1951-64 1965-79
I Agriculture and Allied 2.9 1.4
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I.l Agriculture 3.1 1.5
2. Mining 5.6 3.7
3. Manufacturing 6.6 4.1
3.1 Registered (Modem) 7.9 4.4
3.2 Unregistered 5.4 3.7
4. Electricity, Gas and Water 11.2 8.1
5. Construction 6.8 3.2
6. Trade, Hotels and restaurants 5.6 4.0
6.1 Trade 5.6 4.0
6.2 Hotels and Restaurants 5.6 4.0
7. Storage, Transport and Communication 5.9 5.6
7.1 Railway 4.8 3.6
7.2 Other Transport 6.4 6.3
7.3 Storage 2.3 8.5
7.4 Communication 7.4 6.1
8. FIREBHS 3.1 4.0
8.1 Banking and Insurance 6.6 6.9
8.2 Real Estate, Housing and Banking 
Services
2.1 3.0
9. Community Social and Personal Services 4.4 4.2
9.1. Public Administration and Defence 6.6 5.7
9.2 Other Services 3.3 3.3
Sub-Aggregates
A. Tradable Goods 3.6 2.0
B. Non-Tradable Services 5.2 4.2
b.l Services, excluding FIREHBS 5.6 4.3
C. GDP, excluding GDP Administration 4.0 2.8
D. Services excluding GDP administration 5.0 4.1
Source: (Virmani 2004:17).
4.3. A Slowdown in Growth or a Structural Break in 1965?
Ahluwalia (1985) confirms the existence of a qualitative change in the growth of Indian 
industry post 1965-7, but examines the issue no further. In fact the results given are . 
insufficient to confirm her hypothesis, “it is never easy to establish causal
relationships especially on questions such as the impact of industrial policy
framework on industrial growth. However, the accumulation of evidence certainly points 
in that direction. It suggests an urgent need for a review and overhaul of the industrial 
policy framework.” (Ahluwalia 1985:165). Ahluwalia is arguing it was the choice of 
policy by the government that generated stagnation. Ahluwalia (1991) agrees that the 
degree of domestic regulation is difficult to quantify and uses partial measures:- the scale 
of operations (to measure industrial fragmentation) and growth in the number of factories
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during the period of analysis (to measure competition). These tests give poor results 
often with the wrong signs. Ahluwalia makes no attempt to relate patterns in industrial 
growth to patterns in the industrial policy framework.
Ahluwalia (1985) confirms the stagnation of the Indian economy after 1965-7 by 
demonstrating a fall in the average rate of growth. The two averages (pre and post­
stagnation) are ambiguous. Both stylised patterns of industrial growth in Fig 1 are 
consistent with Ahluwalia’s findings. Average growth pre and post 1965-7 is the same in 
both, yet offer very different interpretations.
Fig 1: Stylised Patterns o f Growth
The first is a pattern of secular stagnation, consistent with cumulative inefficiency caused 
by increasing government intervention and regulation as suggested by Ahluwalia. The 
second shows a structural break in growth occurring in 1965-7. Further analysis needs to 
be conducted to distinguish between secular decline in the growth rate and a structural 
break to a lower level.
62
I first conducted a series of Chow tests for a general index of industrial, electricity, 
transport and allied industries and manufacturing output to examine if regression 
parameters are the same in the two sub-samples. I accepted the period 1965-7 as the 
arbitrary choice of break point for reasons already given. All indices had a base of 100 in 
1970/1, using data from 1951/2 to 1978/9, the beginning of the first five-year plan to the 
end of the fifth. I also used an index of gross domestic capital formation (GDCF) with 
data extending back one further year to 1950/1. Table 3.5 shows all are significant at the 
one-percent level; we can reject the hypothesis that the growth rate was the same in the 
period before and after 1965-7.
Table 3.5: Results of the Chow tests.
YEAR INDEX F STATISTIC
1951-79 Industrial Production F2.23 = 56.125
1951-75 CC 66 F 2,29 = 48.01
1951-79 Electricity F2»23 = 76.885
1951-75 66 F2,19= 38.373
1951-79 Transport F2,23 = 27.606
1951-75 Cl F2.i9 = 21.961
1951-79 Manufacturing F2.23 = 62.465
1951-75 cc F2.i9 = 50.263
Source: Authors own calculations.
Table 3.6 shows the index of GDCF is not significant at the ten percent level for either 
period. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the growth rate of GDCF has changed before 
and after 1965-7.
Table 3.6: Results
YEAR INDEX F STATISTIC
1950-79 GDCF F2.24 = 2.546
1950-75 cc F2,2o = 2.208
Source: Authors own calculations.
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I then examined issues of secular change within each sub-period using two functions. The 
constant growth function:-
Log Yt = a + bt
And a log quadratic function, that permits decreasing (b2 < 0) or increasing (b2 > 0) 
growth rates.
Log Yt = a + bit + b2t2
The growth rates for the five periods, 1951-79, 1951-75, 1951-65, 1968-75 and 1968-79 
were gauged using the constant growth function. I chose two end points, 1975 and 1979, 
to avoid any problems with a faster growth after the mid-1970’s disguising the earlier 
slowdown. A log-quadratic function was fitted to each of these periods to gauge if there 
was a significant acceleration or deceleration of growth within each period.
The results for manufacturing, industry and electricity show a remarkably similar pattern. 
All show significant deceleration during the periods 1951-75 and 1951-79. Deceleration 
over this period is not steady but characterised by a distinct pattern. All three sectors 
show significant acceleration of production up to 1965, then dramatic deceleration during 
the period 1968-75. Growth falls from 7.5% to 3.97%, 12.71% to 7.12% and 7.59% to 
3.63% in industry, electricity and manufacturing respectively between 1951-65 and 1968- 
75. GDCF shows a fall from 7.49% in 1950-65 to 6.11% in 1968-75, though it is not 
statistically significant (peculiar figures for transport are caused by dramatic fluctuations 
in output).
The acceleration in industrial growth is demonstrated using a table of five year moving 
averages from 1950/1 to 1964/5 (table 3.7). Industrial growth shows a distinct 
acceleration from 1955/6-1959/60 to 1959/60-1963/4, increasing in each five-year period.
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Table 3.7: Five-year Moving Averages of GDP and Inc ustrial Growth
Period GDP Growth Industrial Growth
1950/51 -  1954/55 2.92
1951/52- 1955/56 3.58 7.52
1952/53- 1956/57 4.26 7.76
1953/54- 1957/58 3.10 7.86
1954/55- 1958/59 3.50 7.41
1956/57- 1959/60 3.32 6.61
1956/57- 1960/61 4.06 6.97
1957/58- 1961/62 3.62 7.58
1958/59- 1962/63 4.36 9.03
1959/60- 1963/64 3.70 9.33
1960/61 -  1964/65 4.92 9.03
Source: Authors own Calculations.
The generalised pattern of industrial growth and its sub-sectors was rapid and 
accelerating until 1965, during 1965-75 the average rate growth decelerated sharply.
Fig 2: stylised pattern o f Indian industrial growth
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General acceleration until 1965, a structural break in growth between 1965-7, 
deceleration until 1975, a modest revival to 1979, with growth rates finishing in 1979 
below the level attained in 1951-65.
5. An Episode of Growth, 1980/81 to 1991
This section outlines the broad characteristics of the episode of stagnation between 
1980/81 and 1991. In quantitative terms growth of both GDP and industry increased 
sharply. In qualitative terms productivity growth increased sharply. The economy as a 
whole grew by about three and a half/ four percent from Independence to 1980 and by 
over five percent until 1991.
5.1. GDP Growth 1980/81 to 1991
Nagaraj (1990a) finds growth shows increased by 3.4% p.a. between 1950/51 and 
1979/80 and by 4.6% between 1979/80 and 1987/88. The break in growth remains 
significant for 1979/80 even if the recession that year (-5.2% GDP) is left out. Growth of 
GDP in the 1980s was shared by all three sectors of the economy. The primary sector 
showed a slight increase over the 1960s and 70s, the tertiary sector a steady increase in 
growth over the three decades. Contrary to a widespread view the secondary sector 
(6.9%) in the 1980s actually grew slightly faster than tertiary sector (6.3%). The relative 
growth of the service sector did not happen until the 1990s (table 3.11). Bhargava and 
Joshi (1990) find a sizeable increase in GDP growth with a break at 1980/81, from 3.4 to 
5%. Separating the public and private sectors they find there are even sharper increases 
in private sector manufacturing which more than doubles its growth rate. Nagaraj (1991) 
argues this finding is misleading, showing that moving the turning point from 1980/1 to 
1981/2 makes the relative contribution of the public and private sector appear more equal.
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Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) computed optimal one, two and three break points for the 
growth rate of various series, including per capita GDP (constant dollars and at PPP 
prices), and GDP per worker, in all cases they found a single break occurs in 1979. 
Wallack (2003) analysed GDP and its disaggregated components for structural breaks, 
finding the highest F-value occurring in 1980. Rodrik and Subramanian (2004a) find that 
growth of real GDP per capita and real GDP per worker to be on a marked upward trend 
after 1980. The growth of per capita income increased from 1.7% between 1950 and 
1980 to 3.8% between 1980 and 2000. Virmami (2004) confirms these general patterns 
(table 3.8). Average GDP growth rose from 2.9% between 1965 and 1979 to 5.5% 
between 1980 and 1991, whether measured by market prices or factor cost. When 
measured by HP-filtered data GDP per capita shows an increase, from 0.6% to 3.2/ 3.3%.
Table 3.8: Growth in the Indian Economy
1965-79 1980-91
Growth Rate (%)
GDP (Market Prices) 2.9 5.5
GDP (Factor Cost) 2.9 5.5
GDP at Factor Cost (HP Filtered) 3.5 5.2
Pc GDP at Market Prices 0.6 3.3
Pc GDP at Factor Cost 0.6 3.2
Private Consumption 2.8 4.5
Govt Consumption 5.1 6.0
Investment 4.5 5.0
- Machinery and Equipment 3.7 9.9
Private GFCF 3.8 8.4
Goods and Services Export 10.2 8.4
Oil Import 37.1 6.9
Coefficient o f  Variation (std/Mean)
GDP at Market Prices 1.4 0.4
GDP at Factor Cost 1.5 0.5
Source: (Virmani 2004:15).
5.2. Sectoral Growth, 1980/81 to 1991
Nagaraj (1990a) finds that private sector manufacturing growth (18% of total GDP in 
1987/8) increased from 4.6 to 6.5% after 1979/80, and found the difference to be
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statistically significant. He finds that banking and insurance grew rapidly in the 1980s 
(10.3%), as did mining and quarrying (10.2%) and electricity, gas and water (9.9%). 
Testing for structural breaks in the growth of non-tradable services (excluding GDP 
originating from government administration) the use of a Chow test by Virmani (2004a) 
reveals potential breakpoints in every year from 1980/81 to 1985/86. The highest 
probability of a break occurs in 1985/86. These results suggest that the acceleration in 
the growth of GDP from services was a gradual process between 1980/81 and 1985/86. 
Kelkar and Kumar (1990) find that value added in manufacturing grew 7.6% p.a. between 
1959/60 and 1965/66, 5% between 1966/67 and 1979/80 and 10.13% between 1981/81 
and 1988/89. In contrast to the below average performance of the metal and machine 
building industries, the chemicals and petrochemicals industry experienced above 
industry average growth in the 1980s. Chemicals and chemical product industries 
expanded by 11.19% p.a. The main areas of growth included synthetic fibres, 
downstream petrochemical products, plastics, and inorganic chemicals. These figures are 
broadly echoed by data from Virmani (2004a) (table 3.9). Agriculture enjoyed a sharp 
increase in (average) growth rates from 1.5% between 1965 and 1979, to 4.2% between 
1980 and 1991, manufacturing from 4.1% to 6.1%, banking and insurance from 6.9% to 
11.6%, and real estate, housing and banking services from 3.0% to 8.0%. Service sector 
growth increased from 4.1% to 6.4% even when excluding GDP originating from 
government administration. Very few sectors actually showed slower growth between 
these two periods. Among the exceptions were storage (8.5% to 2.5%) and other 
transport (6.3% to 6.0%). In general these figures demonstrate that the growth pattern of 
the Indian economy in the 1980s marked a significant departure from the Mahalanobis 
period where growth was driven by metal-based products and machine building. The 
investment-led growth of 1951-65 was in stark contrast to the consumption-led growth of 
the 1980s. The consumer goods sector was traditionally the slowest growing amongst the 
various sectors until the end of the 1970s, during the 1980s it became the fastest growing 
segment of industry.
Table 3.9: Sector Growth Rates, 1965-79 and 1980-91
Sector 1965-79 1980-91
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I Agric and Allied 1.4 3.9
1.1 Agric 1.5 4.2
2. Mining 3.7 8.4
3. Manufacturing 4.1 6.1
3.1 Registered (Modem) 4.4 6.8
3.2 Unregistered 3.7 5.0
4. Electricity, Gas and Water 8.1 9.0
5. Constmction 3.2 5.2
6. Trade, Hotels and restaurants 4.0 5.4
6.1 Trade 4.0 5.4
6.2 Hotels and Restaurants 4.0 6.1
7. Storage, Transport and Communication 5.6 5.7
7.1 Railway 3.6 4.9
7.2 Other Transport 6.3 6.0
7.3 Storage 8.5 2.5
7.4 Communication 6.1 6.3
8. FIREBHS 4.0 9.4
8.1 Banking and Insurance 6.9 11.6
8.2 Real Estate, Housing and Banking Services 3.0 8.0
9. Community Social and Personal Services 4.2 5.6
9.1. Public Administration and Defence 5.7 6.2
9.2 Other Services 3.3 5.2
Sub-Aggregates
A. Tradable Goods 2.0 4.7
B. Non-Tradable Services 4.2 6.3
b.l Services, excluding FIREHBS 4.3 5.7
C. GDP, excluding GDP Administration 2.8 5.4
D. Services excluding GDP administration 4.1 6.4
Source: (Virmani 2004a: 17).
5.3. The Qualitative Pattern of Growth
There is a voluminous debate on whether productivity growth increased in the 1980s 
relative to the earlier episode of stagnation (see chapter VII). The balance of the 
evidence suggests there was a turnaround in productivity growth after 1979. There was 
also a sharp fall in the volatility of growth as measured by the coefficient of variation, 
which fell from 1.4/1.5% between 1965 and 1979 to 0.4/0.5% between 1980 and 1991 
(table 3.8). Panagariya (2004) is right in saying that growth in the 1990s was more 
variable (table 3.10) than in the 1980s. This hardly, as he suggests has dire implications 
for the sustainability of growth in the 1980s. Relative to the entire post-independence 
period growth was very stable in the 1980s, the coefficient of variation of GDP being 
much lower between 1980-91 than either 1965-79 (table 3.3) or 1951-64 (table 3.1).
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6. An Episode of Growth, 1991 to 2004
This section outlines the broad characteristics of the episode of growth between 1991 and 
2004. In quantitative terms there was no change in the rate of GDP growth and a 
slowdown of industrial/ manufacturing growth, especially after 1996. In qualitative 
terms the rate of productivity growth slowed.
6.1. GDP Growth, 1991 to 2004
Ahluwalia (1999) argues it is useful to distinguish between two periods in the reform era. 
The years between 1991/92 and 1993/94 were the years of crisis management, where the 
primary objective was stabilisation. Between 1994/95 and 1997/98 was the post­
stabilisation period that had a longer-term objective of raising the trend rate of growth. 
The first period was according to Ahluwalia a great success, the current account deficit 
and inflation fell, while growth gradually accelerated from 0.8% in 1991/92 to 5.3% in 
1992/93 and 6.2% in 1993/94. During the post-stabilisation period GDP growth 
continued impressively in 1994/95 and 1996/97 averaging 7.5%. Growth slowed to 5.1% 
in 1997/98 suggesting to Ahluwalia that as of 1999 that reform had not raised the long- 
run growth rate. The acceleration of GDP despite only a marginal increase in total 
investment suggests that productivity growth had increased, which is “precisely the 
outcome one would expect from efficiency-orientated structural reforms.” (Ahluwalia, 
1999:33). Ahluwalia (2002) confirms the earlier finding showing that between 1992/3 
and 2001/2 growth averaged 6%, though this masks a slowdown, from 6.7% growth in 
the first five years and 5.4% in the next five. For this thesis we look at the entire period 
after 1991 as one episode of growth.
There is no clear evidence of an acceleration or even change in the growth rate of GDP 
after 1991, growth continued at 5.7% from c l980 to c2000. Nagaraj (2002) uses a
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dummy variable to show that there was no statistically significant break in GDP growth 
in 1991. This result holds even when 1991/2 is excluded. Kumar (2000a) excluding the 
crisis year 1991/92 shows there was acceleration between the second half of the 1980s 
(5.8%) and 1992/98 (6.5%). Virmani (2004a:31) found no statistically significant break 
in GDP growth in either 1991/92 or 1992/93 using a dummy variable. GDP he argues 
whether measured by market prices or factor cost increased from 5.5% to 6/6.1% 
between 1980 to 1991 and 1992 to 2001 (Table 3.10).
Table 3.10: Economic Growth in India, 19f 0-91 and 1992-1
1980-91 1992-2001
Growth Rate (%)
GDP (Market Prices) 5.5 6.0
GDP (Factor Cost) 5.5 6.1
GDP at Factor Cost (HP Filtered) 5.2 5.8
Pc GDP at Market Prices 3.3 3.9
Pc GDP at Factor Cost 3.2 4.1
Private Consumption 4.5 4.9
Govt Consumption 6.0 6.6
Investment 5.0 7.8
- Machinery and Equipment 9.9 7.9
Private GFCF 8.4 8.6
Goods and Services Export 8.4 10.8
Oil Import 6.9 13.2
Coefficient o f  Variation (std/Mean)
GDP at Market Prices 0.4 0.2
GDP at Factor Cost 0.5 0.2
Source: (Virmani 2004a: 15).
6.2. Sectoral Growth, 1991 to 2004
India’s manufacturing sector according to Mani (1998) registered a growth rate of 8% 
p.a. between 1985/86 and 1990/91, falling by 2.5% p.a. in the period 1992/93 to 1997/98. 
Between 1991/92 and 1995/96 Chandrasekhar (1996) notes that manufacturing growth 
averaged 7.4%, which though lower than the growth (8.3%) between 1986/87 and 
1990/91 was on an accelerating trend 0.6% 1991/2, 2.3% 1992/3, 6% 1993/4, 9.4% 
1994/5, 12% 1995/6. Kumar (2000a) confirms that the industrial growth rate was on an
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accelerating trend between 1992/3 and 1995/6. Chaudhuri (2002) shows that the 
compound annual growth rate of gross value added in the registered manufacturing sector 
was 7.03% between 1950/51 and 1965/66, 7.66% between 1980/81 and 1990/91 and 
5.91% between 1990/91 and 1998/99. Nagaraj (2002) uses a dummy variable to test for a 
structural break in growth in 1991/2 for both total manufacturing and registered 
manufacturing. By 1994/95 five from the seventeen manufacturing sub-sectors 
(chemicals, metal products, non-electrical machinery and machine tools, electrical 
machinery and appliances and transport equipment) totalling a third of manufacturing 
weight accounted for two-thirds of growth of manufacturing sector. This laments 
Chandrasekhar demonstrates the lack of a ‘synchronised recovery’, quite what the dire 
implications of this are he doesn’t explain. Nagaraj (2003b) finds industrial growth 
slowed sharply in 1991/92 then grew rapidly, peaking in 1995/96 when annual growth 
reached 14%. Growth decelerated over the next seven years with a temporary 
improvement in 1999/00. This slowdown as yet is not yet statistically significant.
Within capital goods the production in (numbers) of passenger cars increased from 
31,000 in 1980/81 to 5.8 lakh in 2000. This was equivalent to annual growth of 15% for 
the two decades. Gross value added in the machine building industry grew by 1.7% p.a. 
between 1981 and 1997, turning negative thereafter. In 2001 output of the domestic 
metal working machine tool manufactures declined by 14%, the fourth consecutive years 
of decline since 1997. This Desai (2001) called a ‘massacre of machine building’. This 
during a period when industrial investment was booming. Much of the incremental 
demand was met by imports, the import-to-consumption ratio nearly doubled from 29% 
in the 1990s to 56% in 1995.
Continued high growth rates between the 1980s and 1990s is almost entirely due to the 
services sector, where annual growth increased from 6.7 to 7.8% (Acharya 2002b). The 
service sector contributed to 60% of growth in the 1990s and 70% in the last four years of 
the decade, growth had become service-sector led. Some of this (about 0.5% p.a.) is 
spurious resulting from higher salaries awarded by the Fifth Pay Commission. Business 
Services was the fastest growing sector in the 1990s, averaging nearly 20% p.a. There is 
a lack of disaggregated data though export and software industry data indicate that this
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growth was mainly on account of the IT sector. Growth began from a low base so its 
contribution to service sector and GDP growth was quite modest. Communication 
services (80% of which was accounted for by the telecommunications sector) grew by 
14% growth p.a. over the 1990s, making a significant contribution to services growth. 
Growth in the banking sector accelerated from 7% from 1950 to 1980, to 12% in the 
1980s and 13% in the 1990s. Overall the contribution was larger, even than that of the 
communications sector. Dummy variables for all of these sectors are positive and 
statistically significant for 1991/92 showing that there was a structural break in growth in 
the 1990s. Education (70% of value added in this sector) and health services (23% of 
value added) both grew at an average of 8% in the 1980s. Public administration and 
defence in the 1990s grew by 6%, similar to growth in previous decades. Transport, 
dwellings, and storage grew at the same trend rate in the 1980s and 90s (Gordon and 
Gupta 2004).
Comprehensive data from Virmani (2004a) confirms these trends, in particular that there 
is a very mixed pattern of growth when comparing 1980-91 and 1992-01 (table 3.11). 
Agriculture slowed down between the two periods from 4.2% to 3.3%. Other notable 
sectors in which growth decelerated include mining 8.4% to 3.8%, electricity, gas and 
water 9.0% to 5.7%, railways 4.9% to 3.3%, and banking and insurance 11.6% to 9.4%. 
Sectors in which growth accelerated include manufacturing 6.1% to 6.8%, hotels and 
restaurants 6.1% to 10.3%, communication 6.3% to 18.0%. The growth rate of tradable 
goods remained nearly the same, 4.7% to 4.5% while that of non-tradable goods 
accelerated from 6.3% to 7.5%.
Table 3.11: Sector Growth Rates, 1980-91 and 1992-2001
Sector 1980-91 1992-2001
I Agric and Allied 3.9 3.3
1.1 Agric 4.2 3.3
2. Mining 8.4 3.8
3. Manufacturing 6.1 6.8
3.1 Registered (Modem) 6.8 7.1
3.2 Unregistered 5.0 6.3
4. Electricity, Gas and Water 9.0 5.7
5. Construction 5.2 5.3
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6. Trade, Hotels and restaurants 5.4 8.1
6.1 Trade 5.4 8.0
6.2 Hotels and Restaurants 6.1 10.3
7. Storage, Transport and Communication 5.7 8.9
7.1 Railway 4.9 3.3
7.2 Other Transport 6.0 7.0
7.3 Storage 2.5 2.0
7.4 Communication 6.3 18.0
8. FIREBHS 9.4 7.7
8.1 Banking and Insurance 11.6 9.4
8.2 Real Estate, Housing and Banking Services 8.0 6.3
9. Community Social and Personal Services 5.6 7.1
9.1. Public Administration and Defence 6.2 6.3
9.2 Other Services 5.2 7.7
Sub-Aggregates
A. Tradable Goods 4.7 4.5
B. Non-Tradable Services 6.3 7.5
b.l Services, excluding FIREHBS 5.7 7.4
C. GDP, excluding GDP Administration 5.4 6.1
D. Services excluding GDP administration 6.4 7.6
Source: (Virmani 2004a: 17).
6.3. The Qualitative Pattern of Growth
There is broad agreement that the rate of productivity growth slowed in the 1990s relative 
to the 1980s (Chapter VIII). In addition growth in the 1990s was more stable. The 
coefficient of variation fell from 0.4/0.5 between 1980 and 1991 to 0.2 between 1992 and 
2001 (table 3.10).
6.4. Why is 1991-2004 a Separate Episode of Growth?
Despite the similarity in the average rate of GDP growth there are three good reasons 
why 1991-2004 is here separated from 1979/80 to 1991. The first is that reforms in 1991 
have been proclaimed by many as marking a distinct turning point in Indian economic 
development. The second is that a vast number of existing studies take 1991 as a turning 
point in their (before-and-after) analysis, so it makes some sense to utilise this literature. 
The third is that a large number of commentators compare unfavourably the sustainability
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of growth prevailing in the 1980s relative to the 1990s. These three factors are 
introduced in turn, though analysed in more detail in chapter VIII.
Optimism knew few bounds, India needed, “merely an appropriate policy framework to 
produce the economic magic that Jawaharlal Nehru wished for his compatriots.” 
(Bhagwati 1993:98). The reforms in 1991 were then and even now accorded acclaim, 
“our second independence had arrived: we were going to be free from a rapacious and 
domineering state...” (Das 2000). They were dramatic, few had imagined that the 
economy “would be transformed in its basic orientation in a matter of a few years.” 
(Sachs et al 1999:13). It marked, “a fundamental transformation of India’s economic 
strategy.” (Varshney, 1999:230).
An enormous body of literature takes 1991 to be significant and analyses a wide range of 
economic processes before and after this date. For example, the consumer durable goods 
sector (Ramaswamy 2002), cement and steel (Vaidya 2002), IT (D’Costa 2003), financial 
sector (Khanna 1999), manufacturing (Mani 1998), corporate sector (Basant 2000), and 
industry (Chandrasekhar 1996). Also capital flows (Kohli 2001), FDI (Kumar 1998), 
employment (Deshpande and Deshpande 1998), poverty (Jha 2000), the black economy 
(Kumar 1999a,b), industrial clusters (Tewari 1999), infrastructure (Ahluwalia 1998), and 
social provision (Dreze and Sen 1995). Too often these studies simply assume 1991 was 
significant and do not actually analyse the causal mechanism by which ‘liberalising 
reforms’ impacted on their area of analysis. The impact of reform thus remains 
something of a black box and the studies are often better considered time-series 
narratives rather than ‘impact of liberalisation’ studies. The fact that the rate of GDP 
growth accelerated at the end of the 1970s/ early-1980s, not with the liberalising reforms 
in 1991 is typically ignored by these studies.
There is much asserting in the literature that growth in the 1980s was not sustainable and 
an implicit assumption that growth in the 1990s was sustainable. Acharya (2002a) argues 
that growth in the 1980s was not sustainable due to the build up of debt. Panagariya 
(2004) argues that growth in the 1980s was fragile and had a higher variance than in the
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1990s. He argues that once reforms in 1991 took root growth became less variable and 
more sustainable with even a slight upward shift in the mean growth rate. Central to the 
high average of the 1980s was the last burst of growth in the decade, the spurt of 7.6% 
during 1988-91. Growth between 1978/79 and 1987/88 averaged 4.1%, little different 
from the long-run Hindu growth path. Without the growth spurt between 1988 and 1991 
Panagariya argues there would be no reason to doubt whether reforms in 1991 had a 
significant impact. Reforms in the 1990s argues Panagariya were more systematic and 
systemic and generated more sustainable growth from 1992 onward.
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Chapter IV: Theoretical Framework
1. Introduction
This chapter critically reviews the literature on the role of state in economic development. 
This falls into two schools, the economic and political. The limitations of the economic 
school include the limited scope of analysis, the lack of a political economy, and the 
importance of complementarity. Weaknesses of the political school include the limited 
analysis of the state’s role, the relation between different theories, and lack of dynamics. 
A number of efforts have emerged to integrate these two schools which are reviewed 
here. The following theoretical section attempts an integration relevant for the empirical 
context outlined in chapter III, focusing specifically on the role of the state. The 
financial role of the state is in allocating the economic surplus to those able to invest 
productively. The production role of the state is to ensure financial resources so 
allocated are used productively, to either raise productivity in an existing market niche 
(learning) or upgrade to a higher technology market niche. The final section looks at how 
institutions can mediate the relationship between conflict and economic growth. The 
existing literature looking at this relationship is very limited. In this thesis a broader 
institutional perspective is considered. A repressive state, an inclusive state or an 
ideological state can help reduce the negative implications of conflict on development.
2. The Economic and Political Schools of the Developmental State
The literature on the role of the state in economic development falls into two schools.
The first begins with identifying market failure and catalogues a range of economic 
policies that can be theoretically justified. Examples are disproportionately drawn from 
the experience of the Asian NIC’s. The second focuses on the capacity of the state to 
identify and implement such policies. These are the ‘economic’ and the ‘political’
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schools. They are complementary, one elucidating the case for state intervention without 
addressing relevant questions of capacity, the other focusing on capability without 
considering what the state should do (Fine and Stoneman 1996). This section makes a 
critical review of these two schools. A number of efforts have emerged since the mid- 
1990s to integrate these two schools, the next section makes a critical review of some of 
these. An important drawback of such efforts is often their very stylised and 
mathematical approach. A close look at work by Khan subsequent to 1996 shows that his 
analysis seeks to answer questions different from those posed in this thesis.
2.1. The Economic School
There is an enormous literature on the economic rationale for state intervention. This 
section critically reviews some of the limitations of this literature; these are the limited 
scope of analysis, lack of a political economy, and importance of complementarity.
2.1.1. Limited Scope o f Analysis
Much of the analysis from the economic school is limited in its wider relevance. An 
example is the high-debt model. Unlike companies in developed countries in Japan and 
Korea debt-equity ratios have typically exceeded one (Wade and Veneroso 1998). 
Together high ratios of bank deposits to GDP, loan intermediation to GDP, and debt-to- 
equity mean the overall financial structure in these two countries is vulnerable to shocks 
that depress cash flow or the supply of bank capital (such as higher interest rates or lower 
aggregate demand). Such a financial structure requires close co-operation between banks 
and firms to protect cash flows. This generates a potential but necessary economic role 
for the state, for example in limiting exposure to foreign borrowing to protect the 
financial sector from external shocks. Such collaboration is not simply ‘crony 
capitalism’ but an important and necessary response to market failure by the state. A by­
product of such intervention is in allowing the state to influence the pattern of bank
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lending. “High household savings, plus high corporate debt/equity ratios, plus bank-firm- 
state collaboration, plus national industrial strategy, plus investment incentives 
conditional on international competitiveness, equals the ‘developmental state’.” (Wade 
and Veneroso 1998:7). In practise this model has limited general relevance. Chapter III 
showed that rapid periods of economic growth have been characteristic of countries other 
than the high-debt Asian NICs. Developmental states include Mauritius and Botswana, 
neither of whom accord to the East Asian high-debt model (Leftwich 2000). The 
developmental role of the state is potentially wider than mediating bank-based borrowing. 
The mobilisation of resources through the state’s own budget was crucial in achieving 
developmental outcomes in Brazil between 1968 and 1980 where there was a positive 
association between growth and public savings (Kriekhaus 2002). The Indian state 
achieved developmental type outcomes between 1951 and 1965 through high levels of 
public investment directed through its own budget (Chapter V). Amsden (1989) places 
the subsidy as the defining role of the developmental state. A subsidy conditional on firm 
performance she argues will both allow and compel manufacturers to become viable in 
LDC’s where there is an existing comparative advantage in agriculture or simple 
processing. Her focus is on only one means of allocating resources. She does not 
consider for example own production in state enterprises, nor how the resources 
necessary for subsidies are mobilised.
2.1.2. Lack o f a Political Economy
The economic school can sound like a wish list of desirable policies, little attention being 
paid to the practicalities of implementation. Late industrialisation is a case of pure 
leaming-by-doing, utilising technological innovations already commercialised in 
developed countries. A subsidy represents a deliberate attempt to get prices wrong, to 
make manufacturing activity profitable and allow firms to engage in leaming-by-doing 
(Amsden 1989). Proponents of this learning model have no political economy of learning 
(Amsden 1989, 2001; Lall 1992, 1995, 1999). Producing is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition to leam. Firms may simply produce inefficiently at high cost. There are
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important political economy pre-conditions for rents to be used to promote learning.
Rents must be allocated in a contingent manner, withdrawn from those firms failing to 
learn, export or reduce costs. The bureaucracy must be competent enough to allocate rent 
ex-ante to potentially dynamic capitalists or ex-post strong enough to withdraw them 
from failing capitalists. The political economy relation of the state with the capitalist 
class is crucial (Khan 2001b).
Another example is New Growth Theory. It seeks to model the sources of productivity 
growth, focusing on technological spill-overs or the leaming-by-doing that arises 
spontaneously or through accumulation. These models variously endogenise technical 
progress (Romer 1986, 1990), human capital formation (Lucas 1988), and government 
expenditure (Barro 1990). An important implication of the theory is that government 
policies can have a permanent impact on the growth rate and it has generated a long list 
of desirable policies. In the model of Lucas (1988) (government) investment in human 
capital enters the production function, has spillover effects that increases the level of 
technology and raises long-mn growth rates. Barro (1990) models how government 
expenditure can generate positive externalities through the provision of goods and 
services complementary to private sector investment (infrastructure, court systems, 
contract enforcement). Romer (1990) models firms in monopolistic competition 
producing knowledge in distinct R+D sectors. Government policy that impacts on 
interest rates or taxes (that influence the incentive to accumulate) or increases incentives 
to undertake R+D can raise long-run growth. It is difficult when desirable policy is 
theoretically so obvious to explain why governments continue for example to fail to 
attain 100% literacy. Only by going beyond the narrow confines of the economic school 
to a broader political economy perspective can we answer such questions. Easterly 
(2001b) examines the ‘political economy of growth without development’ that he argues 
has characterised Pakistan since independence. Pakistan has a well-educated professional 
elite class and has been the third largest recipient of official development assistance in the 
world between 1960 and 1998, yet has failed to invest in its social sector. Social 
indicators like infant mortality, female primary and secondary enrolments are much lower 
than countries with equivalent levels of per capita income (female literacy is around
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30%). This is inexplicable from the perspective of the economic school where 
endogenous growth theory links such outcomes to poor economic growth. Easterly 
(2001b) argues the oligarchy that rules Pakistan may accept lower growth. The higher 
education necessary to raise growth rates would risk a more educated population 
demanding political power at their expense. Similarly such a patriarchal society has little 
incentive, even were it to raise aggregate incomes, to educate women and undermine the 
male monopoly of learning.
Another burgeoning literature focuses on the role of public investment in creating 
profitable investment opportunities for the private sector. Crowding in occurs when 
private sector investment is conditional or contingent on public investment. This may be 
for many reasons, the long-gestation of investments such as power-supply, the limited 
size of domestic capital markets, the risk of large investments without precedent in a 
country undergoing the initial uncertainties of industrialisation, and the fact that much of 
the benefit from such projects is external to the original investment. E.g. investment in 
energy supply may not in itself be profitable, but the social benefits of creating 
investment opportunities in private sector industry may be enormous (Hirschman 1958). 
A private sector firm without recourse to general taxation is unlikely to be able to draw 
back sufficient of these benefits to make the project worthwhile. There has been a lot of 
work on crowding in of private investment in the Indian context. Bardhan (1984/1998) 
and Athukorala and Sen (2002) find the stimulation effects of public investment on 
private (especially corporate) investment dominates any negative effects operating 
through competition for investible funds. The effect is particularly important in 
agriculture (Shetty 1990; Mishra and Chand 1995; Gulati and Bathla 2001). Again the 
economic school would be at a loss to explain why public investment is ever too low.
We need to venture into the realms of political economy for an explanation. An 
influential effort in the Indian context is that of Bardhan (1984/1998). He argued that 
India has a fragmented structure of dominant proprietary classes. In order to appease 
them all the state was forced to expand unproductive subsidies at the expense of
20 Large industrialists, landowners, professional elite, military and civil bureaucracy.
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productive public investment. He argues political economy considerations of political 
management and stability undermined long-term growth.
2.1.3. Complementarity is Important (but not enough)
There has been some limited discussion of complementarity in the economic school. An 
important lesson from early development economists such as Scitovsky and Rosenstein- 
Rodan is that system-wide change such as industrialisation requires co-ordination. With 
interdependence between agents change will not be automatic without the guarantee of 
complementary changes (Chang 1999). A stylised example of complementary 
investment is that of a steel mill and a shipbuilding industry, the former supplying inputs 
to the latter, neither being profitable without the other. Contracts between individual 
private agents to guarantee and if necessary enforce complementary investment may be 
too costly to draw up and monitor. The state has potentially a number of roles to co­
ordinate investment, own production in the state sector, subsidising private production, 
and indicative planning to provide a focal point for co-ordination (Chang 1999). This 
debate is useful but limited, it focuses entirely on production and neglects the related and 
necessary complementary roles offinance (mobilising and allocating the economic 
surplus to those wishing to invest) and institutions (necessary to overcome the inherent 
conflicts associated with development).
2.2. The Political School
The political school focuses on the capacity of the state to identify and implement 
policies that can correct for the various market failures outlined by the economic school. 
Criticisms reviewed here are the limited analysis of what the state should do, the relation 
between different theories, and lack of dynamics.
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2.2.1. What Should the State Do?
Quite frequently the political school gives a very clear story about the constraints facing 
the state, but no clear idea of what exactly the state is constrained from doing. Harriss- 
White (2003) for instance describes how the local state in India is constrained by various 
social structures of accumulation including class, caste, religion, space, and gender. With 
a social structure of patriarchy for example, gender influences access to the state, males 
are better able to secure loans, subsidies, and production licenses. Social structures help 
explain why state intervention is distorted, and the most efficient potential producers are 
unable to secure access to resources. It throws no light though on what the state should 
better be doing. Similarly Bardhan’s (1984) political economy featured three dominant 
proprietary classes, the industrial bourgeoisie, rich farmers and professionals. Bardhan 
argues that this class structure generates severe constraints on the state. “When diverse 
elements of the loose and uneasy coalition of the dominant proprietary classes pull in 
different direction and when none of them is individually strong enough to dominant the 
process of resource allocation, one predictable outcome is the proliferation of grants and 
subsidies to placate all of them.” (1984:61). The growth of unproductive government 
expenditure argues Bardhan choked off productive capital accumulation and led by the 
1970s to industrial stagnation. The very detailed discussion of the constraints facing the 
state is juxtaposed with a very simple discussion of what the state should be doing. The 
only potential state policy analysed by Bardhan is public investment. How exactly his 
political economy influences all those other factors relevant for growth - mobilisation of 
tax revenues, learning, technology policies, provision of education and health, 
complementarity between investment projects and so on is never discussed.
2.2.2. The Relation between Different Theories
Chapter II showed that numerous variables have been proposed and tested as potential 
determinants of growth but there is no way to reconcile these findings. There is the same 
problem with the political economy school. Each political economy seeks to answer its
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own question within a sheltered terms of reference, it is not clear how any of these relate 
to each other. Harriss-White (2003) finds social structures of accumulation (see above) 
constrain the local state in India. Chibber (2003) argues the urban bourgeoisie were 
crucial in undermining the developmental aspirations of the state in the 1950s. Byres 
(1981) argues the rich peasantry has exercised increasingly successful ‘class-for-itself 
action since the mid-1960s and generated a political economy of agricultural subsidy, 
draining the state of resources to feed politically necessary but economically 
unproductive transfers. Bardhan (1984/1998) argues an uneasy coalition of the big 
bourgeoisie, large farmers and civil service has been bought off by the state through 
unproductive subsidies at the expense of productive public investment. Kohli (1990) 
argues efforts at liberalisation in the mid-1980s in India failed because the balance of 
organisational strength and material interests in the Indian polity would lose out and so 
opposed reform. Varma (1998) argues the defining feature in Indian political economy 
has been the changing nature of the middle class and its growing baleful influence on the 
state. Herring (1999) argues that it is rather the incoherence of the class structure that 
presents the strongest constraint on the state. The central bureaucracy is permeable to 
individual capitalists who can selectively manipulate the state through particularistic ties, 
family, school, marriage, and caste. This ‘embedded particularism’ has worked against 
the sort of state-capital relationship, which empowers the state to act against some in the 
interests of all, to pursue corporatism or enforce social compacts. There is very little 
effort to explore the ways in which these different political economy explanations relate 
to each other, whether they are all true, contradictory or complementary.
2.2.3. The Lack o f Dynamics
The political school has catalogued the various ways in which the state is constrained 
from implementing ‘ideal’ growth promoting policies. Rarely is it explored how these 
constraints change over time. Without dynamics such analysis is wooden, deterministic 
and a-historical as events overtake theorising. Bardhan (1984/1998) argued there was a 
political economy of unproductive subsidies undermining productive public investment.
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This argument is difficult to reconcile with the sharp increases in public investment that 
took place in India during between 1951 and 1964 (Chapter V) or early 1980s (Chapter 
VII). The liberal-pluralist tradition sees the principal constraints on the state as political 
in origin. A notable example in the case of India is that of the stalled efforts at 
liberalisation under Rajiv Gandhi (1985-89). Kohli (1990) concluded business groups 
and the middle classes were broadly in favour, while the Congress rank and file, the 
moderate left opposition, and rural groups were against. The latter groups he argues 
being more numerous compelled the state to backtrack on liberalisation under the 
compulsions of democracy. Such an explanation is difficult to reconcile with the more 
successfully sustained efforts at liberalisation after 1991. This problem echoes a key idea 
of this thesis. When analysing economic growth, all too often long-run averages are taken 
and a long-run explanation sought. This fails to acknowledge that growth in India and 
other LDC’s is a process characterised by periods of stagnation, growth spurts, structural 
breaks, volatility and instability. Just as we need to begin theorising about economic 
growth recognising this empirical fact we need to root our political economy analysis in 
efforts to explain such patterns. We need to begin with a political economy that lends 
itself to dynamic analysis and can model sharp changes in economic growth. To take 
Bardhan (1984/1998) as an example, how the three dominant proprietary classes emerged 
and changed over time. How in this political economy context public investment and 
growth increased after 1951, how both declined after 1965, how both increased in the 
early 1980s, and why growth was sustained despite cuts in public investment in the 
1990s.
3. An Integration of the Economic and Political Schools
Fine and Stoneman (1996) argued that as of 1996 attempts to integrate these two schools 
were limited. After 1996 a number of new efforts have emerged, this section makes a 
critical review of some of these. Such criticisms include their stylised and mathematical 
approaches. A look at work by Khan (1996-2001) shows that he is seeking answers to 
questions different from those posed in this thesis.
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3.1. Stylised and Mathematical
Attempts to integrate the political and economic schools have limited relevance. A desire 
to make the maths comprehensible has narrowed the analytical perspective. One such 
example is Grabowski (1994) who analysed the process by which the developmental state 
emerges and the constraints that exist on its capacity to successfully intervene to promote 
learning. Export-led development argues Grabowski requires prior learning in the use of 
new technology through production for the domestic market (import-substitution). The 
success of government policy in promoting learning depends on the states ability to make 
rents (subsidies and protection) conditional on learning. The credibility of the threat to 
withdraw protection is directly linked to the size of the domestic market. With a large 
domestic market the state can withdraw protection and promote another sector or firm 
making the threat to withdraw rents more credible. In a small market it is more likely 
only one firm in an industry can be established so the threat to withdraw protection is less 
credible. There are problems with this argument. South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore 
have had successful developmental states. To argue they are characterised by large 
domestic markets when compared to those developing countries without sustained 
successful developmental state outcomes such as Brazil, India, Mexico, and Pakistan is 
very problematical. Additionally trying to link credibility to one single variable -  the 
size of the domestic market is troublesome -  this cannot explain how the developmental 
outcomes of state intervention vary so strikingly over time. A change in the size of the 
domestic market cannot for example explain the successful developmental-state type 
outcomes in India between 1951 and 1965 and much less successful period between 1965 
and 1980.
Huff et al (2001) extend Grabowski’s model in some respects, their analysis is 
mathematically more elegant but ultimately the model is empty of explanatory power. 
They develop a multi-period model to capture the interaction of the state with the private 
sector. The model examines more closely the features of the developmental state
86
highlighted by Leftwich (2000). The first three (a developmental elite, relative autonomy 
of the developmental state and a powerful competent and insulated economic 
bureaucracy) they argue are important initial conditions. The next three (the capacity for 
effective management of private economic interests; and a mix of repression, poor human 
rights, legitimacy and performance) they argue are likely only to emerge over time. In 
their model the state undertakes investment complementary to private sector investment 
(infrastructure, training, social overhead capital etc), at the cost of forgone consumption. 
The private sector responds with more directly productive investment that generates 
economic growth. A soft state is unlikely to overcome the opportunity cost of forgoing 
current consumption. If the private sector believes the state to be soft it is unlikely to 
invest. The state requires credibility, followed by reputation building and reinforced by 
success to mature into a developmental state. Huff et al (2001) model the process as a 
repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, with simultaneous investment by each player. The 
developmental state is one that manages to convince the private sector by building up a
71reputation it won’t renege and reduce investment for higher current consumption. 
Echoing a comment from chapter II, “the content is stripped of its broader historical and 
social framework in deference to the requirements of the axiomatic and model-building 
associated with methodological individualism.” (Fine 1998:3). History in the model is 
simply a sequence of prisoner’s dilemma type games. There is no explanation of where 
initial credibility comes from or why some states are able to establish reputations for 
being hard. A developmental state is defined ex ante as one that has not reneged and 
built up a reputation for investing rather than consuming.
3.2. Answering Different Questions
Khan in various works between 1996 and 2001 takes three criteria and uses them to 
model the emergence, constraints on and outcomes of state intervention in general and 
developmental states in particular. These three are the nature of patron-client regimes,
21 Or ‘confess’ in the language of a typical prisoner’s dilemma game.
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primitive accumulation22 and learning. For example the emergence of both economic 
dynamism and corruption in East Asia (South Korea under President Park and the 
Kuomintang in Taiwan) he attributes to a distribution of social power which sustained 
patrimonial networks. The state was able to enforce rights and re-allocate/ change them 
at low cost. The state was able to channel primitive accumulation towards creating a 
dynamic capitalist class. In a clientelist regime such as India state officials can be 
challenged by other officials and private agents in competing clientelist coalitions.
Rights are likely to be allocated, not to those able to use them most efficiently but to 
those with superior organisational power. Competition resulted in the creation of 
excessive new rights, excessive entry into industries and white-collar employment, and 
transfers to retain political allegiance rather than promote learning. Such a difference 
Khan also argues helps explain why primitive accumulation in Pakistan and Korea in the 
1960s led to political conflict in the former and created a dynamic class of capitalists 
(chaebols) in the latter. In both rapid accumulation was made possible by the central 
allocation of resources to selected industries intended to accelerate re-investment and 
technology acquisition. In Pakistan mobilisation by excluded groups forced the state to 
re-allocate rents from promoting learning towards non-capitalist groups in an attempt to 
maintain political stability (Khan 2000d).
3.2.1. Primitive Accumulation
Khan’s framework has proved useful in explaining why Pakistan has failed to grow as 
rapidly as South Korea over several generations but it is less suited to analyse episodes of 
growth and stagnation. Khan’s model is based on the transition to capitalism, how 
primitive accumulation may or may not assist in the creation of a class of dynamic 
capitalists. This thesis shines a closer spotlight not on primitive accumulation but 
variously at how the state can influence the allocation of the surplus. This can occur 
through domestic finance, the state budget, retained earnings, and international capital.
22 “We may define primitive accumulation as the transfer of assets, most notably land, by non-market 
means, from non-capitalist to potentially capitalist classes, and usually with state compliance or mediation:
3.2.2. Episodes o f  Growth and Stagnation
This thesis explains the role of the state in promoting episodes of growth and the 
constraints faced by the state in case of episodes of stagnation. Khan by contrast is 
looking at comparative growth over the longer-term. Among his examples are how a 
long history of political mobilisation of non-capitalist classes in pre-Independence 
Pakistan and India has left a very different social structure than in South Korea where 
Japanese colonialism smashed the organisation of pre-capitalist classes. Between 1960 
and the mid-1980s South Korea was able to channel resources to a small group of 
capitalist and ensure a high rate of productive re-investment. In Pakistan by contrast the 
same model was undermined by the mobilisation of non-capitalist classes which forced 
the re-allocation of resources in attempts to maintain political stability, at the cost of 
productive investment (Khan 200Id). Another example from Khan is the historical 
integration of Chinese capitalists into local political elites in Thailand. By the 1970s Thai 
capitalists were able to run their own political factions to a much greater extent than other 
LDC’s. The state was correspondingly unable to allocate rents to enforce learning and 
productivity growth. The allocation of subsidies depended more on political bargaining 
than economic performance (Khan 2000b). In such examples the emphasis is on long­
term historical processes, class formation and colonialism in particular. In order to 
explain sharp changes in economic growth Khan resorts to ad hoc explanations from 
outside his model. The stabilising of rent-allocation in Malaysia, political stability after 
1969 and high growth he explains as an unintended consequence of the 1969 riots and 
subsequent adoption of the New Economic Policy (NEP). This corporatist type 
arrangement of the NEP consolidated the potentially competing Malay clientelist groups 
into a unified structure and established their political dominance over Chinese capitalists. 
Chinese capitalists were taxed effectively in a centralised and stable manner to benefit 
emerging Malay intermediate classes (Khan 2000b). Rapid growth in Pakistan after 1958 
and Korea after 1961 is explained by the military coups which permitted a temporary
by force majeure, whether via theft, eviction, or purchase at a nominal price.” (Byres 2005:83).
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cessation of distributive conflicts and permitted the allocation of resources to a small 
group of industrialists, rapid accumulation and growth (Khan 200 Id). This thesis moves 
away from the grand historical view and builds a framework that begins with the attempt 
to model sharp changes in economic growth over the medium-term.
3.2.3. Use and Origin o f Rents
Khan defines rents by their purpose or what they accomplish. These include monopoly 
rents, natural resource rents, transfers to maintain political stability, Schumpeterian rents/ 
learning rents, and monitoring and management rents (Khan 2000c). This thesis also 
explores how the state is able to mobilise those resources.
4. The (Economic) Role of the State: Finance
This section explores the financial role of the state in allocating the economic surplus to 
those able to invest productively. This section also explores the four complementary 
means of doing so, mobilising resources through the domestic financial system, through 
the state budget, influencing the profitability of the private sector (accumulation through 
retained earnings), and international capital.
4.1. The Allocation of the Surplus
Neo-classical economics holds there is no problem in transferring the surplus.
Individuals are rational and exchange is voluntary, under perfect competition, individuals 
will distribute consumption intertemporally efficiently. Theories such as the Life-Cycle 
and Permanent Income Hypotheses emphasise different reasons why individuals may 
save. Profit maximising firms compete for these resources and so ensure they are 
allocated towards an optimal portfolio of investment projects. Formally, the interest rate
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will be equated to the marginal efficiency of capital.
The neo-classical theory is of limited relevance in a developing economy. Those to 
whom the surplus is allocated will continue to accumulate and become future capitalists, 
those saving from income will be left behind. The current allocation of the surplus will 
have long-term path dependency in class formation. A relevant example is the decision 
of the Pakistani State in the 1950s. This involved a political decision to favour one group 
(migrant Gujarati merchants) over any other. By the late 1960s this group were the rich 
industrialists that have dominated the Pakistani economy subsequently. A further critique 
of the neo-classical model is the black box at the centre of its analysis. The model 
assumes financial intermediaries automatically emerge to facilitate the transfer of the 
surplus. In developing countries the state is likely to play the most important role, 
through promoting the banking system, taxation/ subsidies, influencing the rate of profit 
(hence retained earnings) and influencing patterns and levels of the flow of international 
capital. Together these criticisms imply that the role of the state in allocating the surplus 
must be analysed as a question of political economy. An ‘efficient’ allocation is unlikely 
once we consider political economy factors. Groups may block the allocation of the 
surplus to an emerging capitalist class even if as in neo-classical theory they are 
maximising their interest income and capitalists maximising growth/ profits. Groups may 
resist taxation, the revenues from which are intended for productive subsidies even if they 
may receive higher incomes in the future from growth of GDP or increased employment. 
Groups may block such potentially Pareto optimal allocations for two reasons, one 
connected with commitment and the other to political power. In the case of commitment 
we have what Acemoglu (2002) called a ‘Political Coase Theorem’. When property 
rights are well defined and there are no transaction costs economic agents will contract to 
achieve efficient (output or surplus maximising) outcomes irrespective of who has the 
property right. Extending this to the political sphere would imply that economic and 
political transactions would create a strong tendency towards policies and institutions that 
achieve the best economic outcome regardless of which social group has political power. 
The surplus in other words would be allocated by the state to those best able to invest it 
productively and those from whom the surplus was mobilised would receive a credible
91
promise of dividends or higher employment or some other tangible future reward. In 
reality groups may block such transfers because there can be no credible or enforceable 
commitments that they will be compensated once economic change has occurred. The 
state may tax individuals and use the money to subsidise capitalists but there can be no 
credible commitment that the state will then be able to tax those capitalists to the benefit 
of the original taxpayers. The second related reason is that existing powerful interest 
groups may block the introduction of ‘efficient’ transfers because it may simultaneously 
affect the distribution of political power. The prospect of the state being able to tax a 
newly created capitalist class may be reduced once they have accumulated and gained 
added political leverage over the state and other classes in society. There is also a socio­
political question whether groups would prefer the status quo to an alternative of higher 
income/ rapid industrialisation where another group had even higher incomes. A case in 
point is the massive political mobilisation that occurred in Pakistan in the mid-1960s. 
Groups (intermediate classes) who conceivably could have eventually benefited from 
rapid industrialisation mobilised and forced the re-allocation of rents from productive 
investment to unproductive transfers (Khan 2000d). The image of a small group of 
capitalists luxuriating in enormous profits was too much to bear, regardless of the very 
rapid economic growth then being experienced.
4.2. Domestic Capital: The Financial System and Economic Development
4.2.1. The Economic Role o f a Financial System
Financial markets have five basic functions, to mobilise savings, to allocate resources, to 
facilitate risk management, to monitor managers and exert corporate control, and to 
facilitate the exchange of goods and services (Levine 1997). Mobilisation is assisted by 
the creation of small denomination financial instruments that provide opportunities for 
households to hold diversified portfolios and invest in efficient scale firms - in practise 
buying and selling fractions of entire firms. By enhancing risk diversification, liquidity 
and the size of feasible firms this can improve resource allocation. Financial markets and
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institutions may arise to ease the trading, hedging and pooling of risk. It is difficult and 
costly to evaluate firms, managers and market conditions. Individual savers may not 
have the time or capacity to collect and process relevant information. Pooled groups of 
individuals under the auspices of a financial intermediary can share the fixed costs of 
acquiring and processing information about investments. The financial sector also 
provides liquidity and debt instruments that can facilitate the exchange of goods and 
services.
4.2.2. The Role o f the State in a Financial System
The state has six potential roles in a financial system in an LDC, i) to protect deposits in a 
fractional reserve system, ii) to mobilise domestic savings, iii) to allocate resources to 
projects essential for development, iv) to create institutions to mobilise private sector 
savings, v) to correct market failures that may exist in the allocation of credit to the small 
firms, and vi) protect high-debt financial systems23.
4.2.2.1 To protect deposits
In any fractional reserve banking system there is a possibility of a run on deposits leading 
to a collapse of the financial system. This creates the need for prudential regulation and 
deposit insurance. The banking system differentiates between good and bad borrowers, 
builds up expertise in evaluating borrowers, and establishes long-term relationships with 
customers. Bemanke (1983) blames the severity of the 1930s economic depression on 
the interruption of these relationships. The (temporary) shocks between 1930 and 1933 
and resulting disruption to long-term relationships undermined the effectiveness of the 
financial system in performing these roles. Small businessmen, farmers and households
23 The last is not discussed here due to the limited relevance of this outside a small number of SE/E-Asian 
countries.
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found increased difficulty in acquiring credit. Temporary shocks generated long-term 
constraints in the supply of credit.
4.2.2.2 To mobilise domestic savings through the state budget
Wade (1990) focuses on the states role in allocating resources for investment, Amsden
(1989) in accelerating learning, Evans (1995) in promoting certain industrial sectors, and 
Khan (various) the creation of rents. The role of subsidies and state expenditure 
presupposes the mobilisation of resources but little attention is paid to how this is 
achieved by the state. Krieckhaus (2002) is one exception and notes that the state played 
an important role in resource mobilisation in East Asia. In Korea state savings (5.6% of 
GDP) accounted for one-third of total savings and in Taiwan (10% of GDP) between one- 
third and one-half. In general the literature goes no further than an implicit discussion of 
the state’s role, hinting that individuals have a ‘psychology of impatience’, are 
collectively irrational and place an excessive premium on current consumption. Or again 
implicitly that the state should disregard personal preferences and impose a more rational 
public interest, by forcing down current consumption and boosting the savings rate 
through the state budget. More detailed discussion has been taken up by the extreme left, 
and the discussion of collectivisation as a means to mobilise a surplus from an ‘irrational’ 
peasantry class. “In a socialist planned economy, both the structure of the social product 
and the disposal of it are subject to conscious, rational determination on the part of the 
socialist society.. ..the vital need for the mobilization of the economic surplus generated 
in agriculture” (Eiaran 1957:424).
4.2.23. Allocating resources to projects essential for development
The state has an important role in allocating resources from the financial system towards 
projects essential for economic development, otherwise not likely to be undertaken by the 
private sector. This may be for many reasons, the long-gestation of certain investments
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such as power-supply, the limited size of domestic capital markets, the risk of large 
investments without precedent in a country undergoing the initial uncertainties of 
industrialisation, and the fact that much of the benefit from such projects is external to the 
original investment. E.g. investment in energy supply may not in itself be profitable, but 
the social benefits of creating profitable investment opportunities in private sector 
industry may be enormous (Hirschman 1958). A private sector firm without recourse to 
general taxation is unlikely to be able to draw back sufficient of these benefits to make 
the project worthwhile.
Public enterprises in Taiwan were concentrated in upstream sectors, in “petroleum 
refining, petrochemicals, steel and other basic metals, shipbuilding, heavy machinery, 
transport equipment, fertiliser -  in addition to the standard electricity, gas, water, railway, 
and telephone utilities.” (Wade 1990:179). Sectors where the efficient scale of 
production was very capital-intensive and large relative to both factor and product 
markets, and where linkages to downstream enterprises were high. The output share of 
public enterprises consistently exceeded 12% of GDP between 1951 and 1980, over 30% 
of total national investment24, and by the 1990s over 50% of total investment (Amsden 
2001). In Korea the figures were much less, 5-7% and 20-22% respectively. In Korea by 
comparison the state facilitated and co-ordinated foreign borrowing by privately owned 
firms, “they borrowed from abroad with credit guarantees and subsidies from the 
government. This helped them grow very large, with high debt ratios, yet maintain their 
family ownership structure.” (Amsden 1989:128-9).
Government influence over the price and allocation of bank lending to the private sector 
was central to economic development in Japan, Continental Europe, East and South-East 
Asia and Brazil. Priority lending targets were established by sector and tax incentives 
given to encourage lending to particular sectors. The state also assisted in the provision 
of stable long-term finance by creating specialised development banks . The need to 
socialise risk applies in the case of those sectors exposed to correlated risk such as
24Taiwan had one of the largest state sectors outside the communist bloc (Wade 1990:176-7)
25 Such long-term financing institutions in India have included the IDBI, IFCI, and ICICI.
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interest rate changes or recession. This applies particularly in sectors with high minimum 
efficient scale and large volumes of sunk capital. This necessitates a further role for the 
state, to reduce the risk of financial instability, through deposit insurance, lender-of-the- 
last-resort facilities, subsidies to firms in financial difficulties, banks shareholding in 
companies, and government ownership of banks (Wade 1990:366). A second option is 
for a closer relation between the credit suppliers (banks) in company management. This 
can strengthen the importance of voice (efforts to restructure the company in case of 
difficulties) relative to exit (selling shares in the secondary market). Financial systems 
have proved most successful in promoting development when the state has effectively 
subordinated them to the goal of economic development (Chang and Grabel 2004:Chl0). 
The principal criteria for evaluating the performance of the financial system in this thesis 
will be consideration of its functional efficiency, whether it promotes rapid economic 
growth, rather than criteria such as liquidity and international integration.
4.2.2.4. Creating Institutions to Mobilise Private Sector Savings
The state can also play an important role in mobilising resources indirectly, by creating 
institutions to mobilise private sector savings. Risk-averse households are more likely to 
be responsive to deposit security and intermediation efficiency than to interest rates. 
Household savings depend crucially on the availability of an infrastructure for deposit 
collection, in particular on the extent of the bank branching network. The state has a 
crucial role in deepening the banking system. The state can intervene by regulating the 
spread between loan (higher) and deposit rates (lower). This creates an economic rent for 
banks relative to the situation prevailing in a fully liberalised financial sector. With 
higher returns to intermediation banks will have a stronger incentive to increase their own 
deposit base, by for example opening new branches in un-served rural areas. To preserve 
rents in the long-run the state needs to restrict competition in the banking sector which 
could eliminate the rents (Koy-Fay and Jomo 2000). Under this model of financial 
restraint the dominant mode of competition will be non-price competition, such as 
locality and quality of service. In India, rather than rents providing an incentive for
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expansion of the private sector it was the nationalised banking sector that led the 
expansion of branches. The population per bank branch declined from 90,000 in the mid- 
1950s to around 14,000 in the early 1990s or from 65,000 in 1969 to 11,500 in 1991 
(Bhatt 1991).
4.2.2.5. Correct Market Failures in the Allocation o f Credit to Small Firms
The state has an important role in ensuring finance is available on reasonable terms for 
small firms. Much economic theory and empirical work assumes that capital markets are 
perfect with a representative firm facing an infinitely elastic supply of capital.
Investment then depends on the demand for and cost of capital, state-directed credit will 
be ineffective. In the presence of transaction costs or information asymmetries the supply 
of credit will be imperfectly inelastic. External equity is subject to agency costs 
associated with the verification of firm performance. Legal and accounting systems in 
LDC’s may make verification more difficult. There are likely to be scale economies in 
verification leading to a situation in which only large firms can access private sector 
capital markets. With asymmetric information firms may find credit is rationed at a fixed 
rate of interest on the basis of criteria that differ between large and small firms. Small 
firms may be constrained in investment by internal financing. Directed credit can then be 
effective in overcoming credit rationing faced by small firms. Eastwood and Kohli 
(1999) find that internal finance, debt finance and equity finance are imperfect substitutes 
for one another in India and in less than perfectly elastic supply at the firm level. Large 
firms with new investment opportunities were able to obtain external finance at the 
margin but small firms were not. The financial constraint that directed credit to small 
firms in India was designed to relax does appear to have existed.
4.3. Tax, Transfers and Subsidy
4.3.1. The Economic Role o f Transfers and Subsidies
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In the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model the assumption of perfect knowledge 
(technology) is the key assumption that renders all countries in the same industry equally 
productive. The only policy choice for an uncompetitive country is to adjust prices 
(reduce wages) not to develop know-how (subsidise learning). Amsden (2001) questions 
these assumptions arguing that there are three generic knowledge capabilities that nurture 
knowledge-based assets. These she notes are production capabilities (the ability to 
transform inputs into outputs), project execution skills (the skills necessary to expand 
capacity) and innovation capabilities (the skills necessary to design entirely new products 
and processes). Given differences in production capabilities productivity will tend to 
vary sharply among firms in the same industry26. Endowments and hence the price of 
land, labour and capital no longer uniquely determine competitiveness. Low wages 
(labour-abundance) may be no compensation for high productivity (knowledge- 
abundance) in a rich country.
“In late industrialising countries, the state intervenes with subsidies deliberately to distort 
relative prices to stimulate (manufacturing) economic activity.” (Amsden 1989:8). Such 
a shift in production is necessary to allow firms to learn. “The subsidy serves as a 
symbol of late industrialisation, not just in Korea and Taiwan but also in Japan, the Latin 
American countries, and so on. The First Industrial Revolution was built on laissez-faire, 
the Second on infant industry protection. In late industrialisation, the foundation is the 
subsidy -  which includes both protection and financial incentives. The allocation of 
subsidies has rendered the government not merely as a banker, as Gerschenkron (1962) 
conceived it, but an entrepreneur, using the subsidy to decide what, when, and how much 
to produce. The subsidy has also changed the process whereby relative prices are 
determined.” (Amsden 1989:143-4). Late industrialisation is a case of pure leaming-by- 
doing, utilising technological innovations that have been already commercialised in 
developed countries27.
26 Amsden makes distinguishes this ‘information failure’ and the ‘imperfect information’ discussed by 
(Akerlof 1970; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).
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4.3.2. Role o f the State in Transfers and Subsidies
The most obvious pre-requisite for subsidies is that the state raises mobilise sufficient 
resources. Rapidly growing Asian NICs did not have small states as was suggested by 
Kuznets (1988) and others. They have been successful in mobilising the resources 
necessary to subsidise the industrial sector extensively. Wade (1990:173) notes that 
adding government and public enterprise gross investment to government consumption in 
Taiwan reached 25% between 1963 and 1973, then increased to 33% by 1980. ‘Socialist’ 
India and Tanzania had totals of only 20 and 25% in the later period.
4.4. Retained Earnings and Profitability
4.4.1. The Economic Role o f Retained Earnings and Profitability
The state can influence private sector profitability and hence their capacity to finance 
investment from internal resources.
4.4.2. The Role o f the State in Boosting Retained Earnings and Profitability
The state may influence the distribution of income by shifting income from wages to 
profits. This contrasts with neo-classical economic theory where there is no political role 
in the determination of income distribution. All factors of production will be paid their 
marginal products and income distribution is fully determined by the market. This view 
is mistaken, all prices are potentially political, wages and interest rates in particular 
(Chang 1999). Regulations affecting product markets such as safety, pollution, and 
import controls mean that virtually no price is free from politics. This role of the state
27 This work has its genesis in the tradition of the infant-industry phenomenon.
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draws attention to the idea that development is an inherently conflictual process28.
Potential mechanisms to ensure high profit rates are many and varied. Kuznets (1988) 
emphasises the role of ‘flexible’ labour markets and union repression that allow rapid 
growth in labour demand, and ensure productivity growth consistently exceeds wage 
growth. Many late industrialising countries retained strict controls on entry into 
industries to prevent over-expansion and declining profitability. Such controls were used 
frequently (in Taiwan) in sectors where the minimum efficient scale of production was 
large (Wade 1990:185). In many sectors controls on commodity markets prevented firms 
competing with one another on the basis of price and undermining profitability (Amsden 
1989:152). Table 4.1 shows that throughout the period of rapid industrialisation in 
Korea the government maintained stable rates of profit among the (privately owned) 
chaebols and in light industries. Koy-Fay and Jomo (2000) discuss the same process in 
the context of the financial sector in Malaysia.
Table 4.1 Profitability of Light and Heavy Industry: Average Rate of Return on 
Investment, 1972-1984
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Heavy
Industry
7.92 10.06 12.45 9.34 9.41 8.96 9.69 9.32 7.36 9.11 8.56 9.20 9.75
Light
Industry
11.00 15.30 9.45 9.65 11.50 11.57 13.80 12.50 11.40 11.28 9.13 10.15 9.52
Source: (Amsc en 1989:89).
4.5. International Capital
4.5.1. The Economic Role o f International Capital
International capital in its various forms can supplement domestic capital (portfolio and 
lending) and also add directly to production (foreign direct investment). These are 
examined in turn.
28 This idea is taken up further in section 6.
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4.5.2. The Role o f the State vis-a-vis International Capital
The state has five principal roles with respect to international capital, i) co-ordinating 
foreign borrowing, ii) influencing the end use of foreign debt, iii) controlling the 
disruptive potential of short-term capital flows, iv) influencing the composition of capital 
inflows, and v) segmenting domestic and international capital markets.
4.5.2.1. Co-ordination o f Private Foreign Borrowing
The state needs to coordinate private foreign borrowing. International capital now 
comprises 70 times the volume of world trade and 80% of net global foreign exchange 
transactions have a maturity of seven days or less. It is important for the government to 
maintain information on government holdings of currency reserves to private and public 
foreign currency debt. Un-coordinated financial liberalisation in Korea in the early 1990s 
was a disaster. The domestic banking sector drove explosive growth in Korea’s foreign 
debt, from $44bn in 1993 to $120bn in 1997; much of this was private, and 65% of it 
short-term (Wade 1999). Almost one-third of total foreign debt moved outside the scope 
of financial regulation and supervision, though it constituted foreign exchange liabilities 
for the government.
4.5.2.2 Influencing the End Use o f Foreign Debt.
The state needs to influence the end use of foreign debt to ensure it is used for productive 
developmental purposes. Prior to financial liberalisation in the 1990s East and South 
East Asia had tightly coordinated allocation and access to foreign loans. After
90liberalisation in the 1990s capital inflow into five Asian NICs increased from $47bn in
29 South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines.
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1993 to $93bn in 1996. Much of the inflow took the form of borrowing in dollars and 
Yen by banks, investment houses and insurers and was invested in short-term debt (Wade 
1998b).
4.5.2.3. Controlling the Disruptive Potential o f Short-term Capital Flows.
The state has an important role in controlling the disruptive potential of short-term capital 
flows. Foreign loans are often associated with the problems of maturity mismatch, where 
long-term investment is financed by short-term loans. Capital outflow can then lead to a 
debt deflation where asset sales to realise debt repayments lead to a downward spiral in 
asset prices. Accompanying devaluation of currencies will increase the cost of imported 
intermediate goods. High debt/ equity ratios worsen the problem by generating a bigger 
multiplier effect to a given reduction in demand and cash-flow. Such a situation can 
become a crisis without poor underlying economic fundamentals. Or of self-fulfilling 
crises, “the expectations, even the prejudices of investors become economic 
fundamentals.” (Krugman 1999:110). A self-fulfilling withdrawal of short-term loans 
can be fuelled by the recognition of each investor that others are withdrawing; since the 
debt is short-term it is rational for each investor to join in the panic. There is a large 
literature exploring the inherent instability of a private financial system (Keen 
2001:Chl0). There have been very sharp reversals in capital flows during the 1990s. In 
Mexico between 1993 and 1996, a net shift of $55bn (or 12% of GDP), in South Korea 
1996/97 $40bn (9% of GDP), and Thailand 1996/97 $23bn (15%). Likewise capital 
inflows can occur in a pro-cyclical manner. There is a high correlation between domestic 
financial booms and capital inflows. Kohli (2001) verifies this for the case of India in the 
1990s. Rapid inflows of foreign capital raised domestic expenditure and the demand for 
non-traded goods the rupee appreciated coincident with capital (in)surges in both 1992- 
95 and 1996-97.
4.5.2.4. Influencing the Composition o f Capital Inflows.
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The state has an important role in influencing the composition of capital inflows. In 
general FDI has greater potential benefits than short-term portfolio investment. FDI was 
far more stable during the Mexican crisis in 1994/95 and Asian crisis in 1997/98. Policy 
can distinguish between short-term capital and FDI that is accompanied by technology 
transfer, capital equipment and management expertise.
4.5.2.5. Segmenting Domestic and International Capital Markets.
To implement a sectoral industrial policy the state needs to segment domestic and 
international capital markets. With firms free to borrow on international markets and 
foreign banks free to lend the governments control over sectoral lending will be 
weakened, or “more generally, foreign exchange controls are needed to intensify the 
cycle of investment and reinvestment within the national territory.” (Wade 1990:367). 
There is evidence that capital controls in Malaysia in 1998 were effective in segmenting 
Malaysia’s financial markets from offshore and international capital markets. Such 
controls were implemented transparently, efficiently and with no increase in petty 
corruption. As a result economic recovery was faster, employment and wages did not 
suffer as much,* the stock market did better, interest rates fell more and inflation was 
lower (Kaplan and Rodrik 2001).
4.5.3. The Role o f the State and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
The literature highlights both positive and negative effects of FDI, empirical evidence is 
mixed. The role of the state is to maximise the net benefits of FDI.
4.5.3.1. Theoretical Costs o f FDI
There is a long tradition analysing the potential problems of FDI. The traditional critique
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of FDI centres on ideas that MNC’s tend to transfer inappropriate technology, could 
exercise power over political and economic conditions iri the host , and were able to 
evade taxes through transfer pricing. There is a long history of thinking among followers 
of the dependency school that foreign investment will perpetuate under-development and 
increase internal polarisation within the periphery (Hunt 1989:Ch7). In the long-run 
“foreign investment must be looked upon as a method of pumping surplus out of under­
developed areas, not as a channel through which surplus is directed into them.” (Baran 
and Sweezy 1966:110). There is a long history of such thinking being influential in the 
Indian nationalist movement, Nehru, (1946:544), and beyond (Bagchi 1976).
4.5.3.2 Theoretical Benefits o f FDI
MNC’s that develop forward and backward linkages in the host economy are more likely 
to be beneficial than those that operate as highly integrated units31. Competition in one 
sector may be beneficial to firms in others through price reductions and forward linkages 
to customer firms. FDI may also create demand for local output, these ‘backward 
linkages’ may strengthen supply industries, in turn via forward linkages benefiting other 
local firms. The most important linkage effects are through technological externalities. 
Local firms may adopt MNC technology through imitation or reverse engineering (the • - 
demonstration effect). Without FDI it may be costly for local firms to acquire the 
necessary information relevant for new technologies. The effect represents a potential 
positive externality. Workers trained by an MNC may transfer knowledge to a local firm 
(knowledge spillover effect) of start their own firms (the labour-tumover effect). Rhee
(1990) studied the importance of this effect for the textile sector in Bangladesh. Initial 
investment and training by the Korean firm Daewoo led to massive transfer of skills and 
learning to other textile firms by the movement of workers from the pioneer firm. Rhee
30 The role of copper MNC’s in the 1973 coup in Chile being an obvious example.
31 In a good equilibrium the economy specialises in the production of complex final goods, a large variety 
of specialised inputs and wages are high. In a bad equilibrium the economy specialises in the production of 
simple labour-intensive goods and a low variety of specialised inputs and wages are low. Rodriquez-Clare 
(1996) shows that when both backward and forward linkages materialise the economy ends up with a deep 
division of labour and high wages. MNC’s in East Asia were successful in creating backward linkage
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calls this ‘the catalyst model of economic development’. The ability of local firms to 
absorb technologies introduced by MNC’s may be a key determinant of whether or not 
labour turnover occurs as a means of technology diffusion in equilibrium32. MNC’s may 
transfer technology to firms that are potential suppliers of intermediate goods or buyers 
of their own products (a vertical linkages effect).
Aitken and Harrison (1999) found a positive relationship between foreign equity 
participation and plant performance for 4,000 firms in Venezuela. They also noted a 
possible negative spillover effect from FDI, competition forced domestic firms to lower 
output. Saggi (2002) notes that in 1995 over 80% of global royalty payments for 
international transfers of technology were made from subsidiaries to their parent firms 
indicating the possibility of learning effects. Markusen (1995) notes the potential for 
technology transfer is at least high, the inter-industry distribution of FDI shows that 
MNCs are concentrated in industries that exhibit a high ratio of R+D relative to sales and 
employ a large share of technical and professional workers. Other work confirms the 
presence of positive spillovers (Grossman and Helpman 1991a; Chuang and Lin 1999; 
Kokko 1994).
4.5.3.3. The Role o f the State in Promoting Benefits from FDI
The state has an important indirect role, to maximise the net benefit from FDI. The 
magnitude of positive spillovers has been found to depend on local endowments of skills 
and technology, the capability of local educational and research institutions, local market 
size, technological capability of local firms and various policy factors (Pantibala and 
Pedersen 2002). Local firms and workers in developing countries need to have minimum 
capabilities to absorb new technologies and ideas in order to benefit from foreign
effects to local suppliers (Hobday 1995).
32 The superior technology employed by MNCs may give them a key advantage in competition and an 
incentive to limit knowledge diffusion to rivals. The key method may be to reduce labour turnover by 
offering higher (efficiency) wages. The resulting wage premium then has no necessary relation to the 
social value of the knowledge embodied in workers and technology diffusion is unlikely to be optimal for 
the local economy.
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investment (Lall 1992). There are important public goods aspects of investment in R+D, 
meaning it would be likely under-supplied by private agents33.
The state also has a potentially more strategic role. An industrial policy that targets 
particular types of technology can be important. Higher end technologies such as R+D 
investment generate more spillovers than low-end operations of MNC’s such as data- 
feeding and coding operations (Pantibala and Pedersen 2002). Enforcing an export 
obligation on FDI is also important. FDI attracted by high domestic tariffs to produce for 
the domestic market in an LDC can lead to negative spillovers (Brecher and Diaz- 
Alejandro 1977). Within a protective regime MNC’s may not be motivated to transfer 
new technologies to their affiliates due to the absence of competition. Initial technology 
advantages continue to provide them with an edge over local firms in protected local 
markets. Balasubramanyam et al (1996) find that FDI in export-promoting countries has 
a positive effect on economic growth and FDI has no significant effect on growth in 
import-substitution countries. Delderbos et al (2001) note that if the main motivation of 
FDI is to avoid trade barriers rather than being based on manufacturing cost and 
efficiency, limiting production to simple assembly operations may be the most cost- 
effective response so protection may reduce vertical linkages in manufacturing. Granting 
foreign firms unnecessarily large subsidies, reducing restrictions on profit repatriation, 
liberalisation of regulations on technology transfer, and exemptions on national labour 
and environmental regulations can lead to a race to the bottom. Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan mandated local content requirements (the proportion of local inputs used in the 
production process) with requirements set at low but increasing levels and limited 
royalties on technology licenses paid by partners of MNC’s.
5. Production
The crucial role of the state with regards production is to ensure financial resources 
allocated to private sector firms are used productively, to either raise productivity in an
33 Knowledge is a non-rival good (Romer 1990).
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existing market niche (learning) or upgrade to a higher technology market niche.
5.1. Neo-classical Economics and Production
In the neo-classical paradigm there is no role for the state to promote growth, save for 
removing state created restrictions on the operation of the free market. An important and 
explicit theoretical rationale of liberalisation according to neo-classical economics is to 
achieve an efficient (static) allocation of resources (the theory of comparative advantage). 
The link to economic growth is implicit, rational individuals will save according to 
criteria such as the life-cycle hypothesis, profit maximising firms will utilise these 
available resources to invest efficiently. In a free market there is no such thing as growth 
that is too slow, growth will reflect the time preferences of individual agents.
5.1.1. Need for Learning
The theory of comparative advantage assumes that technology is freely available to all 
countries and firms which then operate on the same production function. Countries will 
settle on the appropriate capital/ labour ratio in accordance with their factor price ratios 
(determined by relative endowments of labour and capital) and shift effortlessly along the 
production function as these ratio’s change (Lall 1992). There is assumed to be no 
problem in assimilating technology from developed countries, no adaptations are required 
and alternatives are available for all factor price combinations. All firms remain equally 
efficient and firm specific learning is unnecessary. Such traditional approaches to 
technology assume that innovation (movements of the production frontier rather than 
along it) is a completely distinct activity from mastering technology or adapting it to 
different conditions (the only admissible country differences are capital/ labour ratios).
In practise with imperfect knowledge productivity may differ among firms in the same 
industry. Technological knowledge is not easily transferred between firms and much
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technology is tacit so requires learning. Firms will not be operating on the same 
production function. Simply ‘getting prices right’ may be insufficient for countries to 
compete internationally34. Neo-classical economics assumes innovation takes place in 
advanced countries and learning in LDC’s is no more difficult than selecting the most 
appropriate among them (Lall 1992; Amsden 1997). There is actually less difference 
between innovation in developed countries and industrialisation based on learning 
already commercialised technology. “The First Industrial Revolution in Britain, toward 
the end of the eighteenth century, and the Second Industrial Revolution in Germany and 
the United States, approximately 100 years later, shared the distinction of generating new 
products and processes...... .economies that did not begin industrialisation until about the
twentieth century tended to generate neither, their products and processes being based on 
older technology. Economies commencing industrialisation in the twentieth century 
transformed their productive structures and raised their incomes per capita on the basis of 
borrowed technology.” (Amsden 1989:3).
5.1.2. State Policy
A typical LDC is most competitive in price sensitive, low-value, low-priced items. An 
LDC could compete over time by trying to enhance it price competitiveness within its 
existing niche by extending hours, reducing overheads (subcontracting) and intensifying 
work conditions (a low road of competition). A high road of competition could consist of 
remaining in an existing production niche and raising productivity (learning), or 
upgrading to a less (price) competitive market niche to capture rents. State intervention 
is needed to push an economy up the high road of competition.
Neo-classical theory argues export structures are simply a product of comparative 
advantage, and factor prices and that the composition of exports does not matter. In 
practise, while many allocations may be (neo-classically) efficient some are more
34 It could be that the price of labour needs to be negative in order for a country to have a comparative 
advantage in labour-using industries.
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(dynamically) efficient than others. Growth in world trade, spill-over benefits for the 
whole economy are positively, and ease of market entry of competitors negatively, 
related to the technological complexity of a product (Lall 1999:1775). Specialising in the 
production and export of labour-intensive, simple manufactured goods or primary 
products will leave a country vulnerable. Where barriers to entry are low global 
competition will drive prices and profits down. These market conditions can apply both 
to product markets (primary products) or factor markets (unskilled labour). Rents arise 
from and define the act of innovation and the ability to appropriate rents is crucial for 
sustained income growth (Kaplinsky 1999). Countries have to raise productivity and 
product innovation faster than the decline in margins due to competitive pressures. These 
considerations rather than market or information failures35 is what creates the potential 
for successful industrial policy by the government.
5.1.3. Market Failures in Learning
Much technology is tacit and to effectively master it extensive experience in use is 
necessary. Leaming-by-doing may imply a lengthy and unpredictable period of losses as 
firms learn and adapt technology to make it more appropriate to developing country 
conditions. In theory private capital markets could fund firms through the period of 
learning. In practise uncertainty, risk and illiquidity mean private capital will be 
reluctant. This is especially relevant when economies are industrialising and the 
economy is undergoing profound structural changes where past history is a poor guide to 
evaluating future investment and lending decisions. Investment in learning by one 
entrepreneur in discovering a commercial niche that can be profitably exploited is likely 
to lead to rapid imitation36. Learning is an investment, the returns to which cannot be
35 This being in the tradition of Stiglitz who takes Pareto Efficiency as the benchmark and government 
policy as a means to make the world look more like neo-classical theory. If there exists a wedge between 
social and private costs (an externality) taxation, subsidy or regulation can push the economy towards the 
overall social optimum. An optimal Pigouvian tax can replicate an ‘efficient’ allocation (Mas-Colell et al 
1995:355).
36 Rhee (1990) notes that the number of export-orientated RMG factories in Bangladesh exploded after the 
single firm Desh proved it was a profitable proposition at the end of the 1970s, by 1985 there were 700 
such firms.
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fully appropriated. Entrepreneurs in LDC’s face similar problems to innovators in 
developed countries. While neo-classical economics subscribes to the need for patent 
protection to generate an incentive for innovation it advocates complete freedom of 
market entry in all other scenarios. Learning is likely then to be under-supplied so 
profits/ rents that reward and motivate learning may lead to a more dynamically efficient 
economy even if they are a sign of resource mis-allocation according to considerations of 
static/ allocative efficiency.
These various market failures may generate a need for intervention in both factor and 
product markets to direct resources to particular activities. By so allocating resources the 
state creates rents that both induce and facilitate learning by private actors. Policy needs 
to increase the expected payoff to learning, hence it is important to distinguish firms that 
are engaged in costly learning and those who simply imitate the results of others learning. 
Temporary trade protection may increase profits from learning but only for firms 
producing for the domestic market (Hausman and Rodrik 2003). Trade protection or 
export subsidies do not discriminate between innovators and imitators. Export subsidies 
could be good at discriminating between successful and unsuccessful performers ex-post. 
Providing subsidies or government credit contingent on exporting can allow policy 
makers to discriminate between firms.
There is a good chance learning rents will fail to generate growth. The failure of infant 
industries protected from international competition to become dynamic and stagnating on 
guaranteed profits is an often cited example. There are important pre-conditions for rents 
to promote learning. Rents must be allocated in a contingent manner, withdrawn from 
those firms failing to learn, export or reduce costs. The bureaucracy must be competent 
enough to allocate rent ex-ante to potentially dynamic capitalists or strong enough ex­
post to withdraw them from failing capitalists. The relation of the state to various classes 
is important. To the capitalist class in order to enforce discipline, and ensure rents are 
contingent on the states desired performance criteria. The relation of the state to other 
non-capitalist classes must be such that they don’t mobilise and dissipate efficient rents 
towards non-productive areas (Khan 2000b).
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6. Institutions
There is a large literature looking at the effect of institutions in promoting economic 
growth (North 1990; Sokoloff and Engerman 2000; Rodrik et al 2002). This section 
looks at the related but under-researched topic of how institutions can mediate the 
(negative) relationship between conflict and economic growth. The first part defines 
development as a conflictual process, the second shows that conflict is bad for economic 
growth, the third demonstrates how conflict and state capacities to manage it will be 
measured here, and the fourth shows that institutions can reduce conflict. Existing 
analysis of institutions and conflict mainly considers those institutions compatible with 
neo-liberal economic theory. There are severe theoretical and empirical problems with 
this literature. This thesis has a broader institutional perspective. A repressive state, an 
inclusive state or an ideological state may help reduce the negative implications of 
conflict on development.
6.1. Development and conflict
Economic development is concerned with shifting resources from low to high 
productivity areas, and as such is an inherently conflictual process. The mobility of some 
assets will be limited; owners will then face problems of obsolescence and 
unemployment. Those having sunk investments in physical capital, skills, contractual 
relationships, and political patronage are likely to resist change (Chang 1999). Section 
5.1 showed how the process of surplus allocation is inevitably a conflictual process. The 
dangers to development of ignoring conflict are profound. The failure to incorporate 
Bengali’s during the decade of development in Pakistan under General Ayub Khan 
(1958-68) led to civil war in 1970/71 and the secession of Bangladesh.
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6.2. Conflict is bad for economic growth
Easterly and Levine (1997) quantify the adverse impact of ethno-liguistic fragmentation 
on income, growth and economic policies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Alesina et al (1999) 
find that ethnically diverse cities in the US spend less on public goods. Goldin and Katz 
(1999) find lower public support for higher education and Goldin and Katz (1997) lower 
school graduation rates in US states with more religious and ethnic heterogeneity.
Miguel (2000) finds lower primary school funding in more ethnically diverse districts in 
Kenya. Mauro (1995) and LaPorta et al (1998) find ethnic diversity predicts poor quality 
of government services in developing countries. Mauro (1995) and Annett (1999) find 
that linguistic or religious diversity leads to greater political instability. Rodrik (1999a, 
2000b) finds ethnically polarised nations react more adversely to external terms of trade 
shocks.
6.3. Measures/ Descriptions of State Capacities
There are several works that seek to measure conflict and the conflict resolution 
capacities of the state. Rowthom (1977) agreed that conflict was endemic in capitalism 
over the distribution of income. Conflict he argued occurred between prices relevant to 
capitalists (profits) and labour (wages) and generate inflation if the combined demands of 
both classes exceed total national income. The problem with using inflation as a proxy 
for conflict is that numerous other factors such as drought, not initially related to conflict 
cause inflation. Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) measure conflict that spills outside the 
normal political system. They record the activities of ‘demand groups’ such as labour, 
students, and agricultural interest groups. Their measures of conflict are indices such as 
strike activity, demonstrations and student indiscipline. The problem with such a 
measure is that it doesn’t consider latent conflict. A powerful adversarial union need 
never strike, management or the government will concede quickly for fear of the 
consequences. The Rudolph’s are actually considering a special case of conflict where 
contending parties are more equally matched and conflict results in a protracted struggle.
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Kohli (1990) measures conflict occurring through the political system. He argues 
electoral competition and the struggle by political entrepreneurs for office has mobilised 
poorer and lower caste groups and politicised pre-existing social cleavages. Conflict he 
measures as the absence of enduring coalitions, policy ineffectiveness, and an inability to 
accommodate political disagreement without violence. Again this is too narrow, conflict 
need not necessarily only occur through the formal political system.
This thesis draws on this range of sources. From Rowthom the idea that conflict between 
labour and capital and the role of profits/ income distribution is important (see 5.4).
From the Rudoplph’s that conflict can be society-centred and be manifest through 
demand groups, from Kohli that the capacity of the state to govern is an important 
determinant and result of the effects of conflict. We need however a more objective and 
encompassing measure of the conflict resolution capacity of the state. This measure is 
provided by state budgets. Budgetary allocations in which investment, tax revenue, 
national savings are rising are an indication that conflict is being successfully managed. 
Section 6.13 has argued discipline is necessary to induce learning, hence diversification 
and productivity growth are also signs that conflict is being successfully managed. It is a 
key idea of this thesis that conflict is endemic in development but the state can overcome 
conflict through a variety of institutions, inclusive, repressive or ideological.
Potentially the most important form of conflict is latent. This may not erupt into street 
protest or political turmoil but may induce the government to manage it through the 
budget. High levels of current expenditure, subsidies, over-manning in state enterprises, 
stagnant savings and tax revenue, declining levels of investment and few signs of 
learning are signs the state is paying more attention to conflict management than to 
development. Chapter VI shows that conflict in India erupted in the mid-1960s and can 
be measured by conventional indices -  strikes, demonstrations, political violence etc. By 
contrast a massive increase in state fiscal deficits, subsidies and unproductive transfers 
partly funded by the growth of external debt was managing latent conflict during the 
1980s (Chapter VII). The state was unable to control conflict through inclusive, 
repressive or ideological means so bought it off through the state budget. The budget for
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this period captures an upsurge of latent conflict that would be missed by more 
conventional measures such as strike activity or demonstrations.
6.4. Institutions can reduce conflict
Easterly (2001c) finds that the ethnic conflict effect on growth in the original Easterly 
and Levine (1997) growth regressions disappears if institutions are of sufficiently high 
quality. Good institutions he finds also reduce the risk of wars and genocide. Rodrik 
(1999a, 2000b) explores how institutions may reduce the negative implications of 
external shocks. He finds when social divisions are deep and (his measures of) 
institutions of conflict management are weak the economic cost of exogenous shocks 
such as a decline in the terms of trade are magnified by the distributional conflicts that 
are triggered. He assumes latent social conflict is measured by the depth of pre-existing 
social cleavages in a society37, these can exist along lines of wealth, ethnic identity, 
geographic division etc. Once latent social conflict and the quality of conflict- 
management institutions are controlled for Rodrik finds that various measures of 
government policy (trade policies, debt-export ratios, govt consumption etc) contribute 
almost nothing to explaining growth differentials before and after economic shocks.
6.5. Which Institutions?
Those institutions tested in the existing literature are mainly those theorised as being 
important in neo-classical economic theory, in particular, property rights and democratic 
political institutions. Easterly tests proxies for property rights. “Institutions that give 
protection to legal minorities, guarantee freedom from expropriation, grant freedom from 
repudiation of contracts, and facilitate cooperation for public services would constrain the 
amount of damage that one ethnic group could do to another. Such pro-business rules of
37 This is not generally true as for example peaceful Zambia (73 different languages) and violent Zimbabwe 
(two main tribes, the Matabele and Shona) testify.
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the game may prevent ethnic groups from expropriating business owners of a different 
ethnic group.” (2001c:6-7). Rodrik (1999a, 2000b) examines institutions which 
‘adjudicate distributional contests within a framework of rules and accepted procedures 
without open conflict and hostilities’. These he argues include democracy, an 
independent and effective judiciary, an honest and un-corrupt bureaucracy, and 
institutionalised modes of social insurance. As proxies Rodrik uses measures of civil 
liberties and political rights, quality of governmental institutions, rule of law, 
competitiveness of political participation, and public expenditure on social insurance.
6.5.1. Property Rights: A Critique o f Easterly (2001c)
New Institutional Economics (NIE) takes a straightforward view of economic growth 
arguing that stable property rights are the most important factor, in both physical property 
(land and capital assets) and also intellectual and copyright property (North and Thomas 
1973). The experience of enough successful sustained episodes of growth, e.g. South 
Korea after 1961 and China after 1978 suggests stable property rights are not necessary 
and sufficient to ensure sustained economic growth. In Korea property rights were not 
stable but were regularly re-allocated to those able to use them most productively. The 
violation of collective property rights during the enclosure movement in Britain during 
the eighteenth century contributed to the development of the woollen industry by 
promoting sheep fanning on the confiscated land. Land reform in Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan after WWII contributed to development. Property rights are a more complex 
question’ It is important which property rights are protected and under what conditions.
If there exist groups who can make better use of property, an efficient mechanism of 
transfer rather than protection will promote development. Development is inherently 
conflictual and involves a rapid re-allocation of rights to resources and income streams. 
Unstable property rights are a feature of rapid economic development. Stable property 
rights are only likely to emerge at high levels of development. Chang (2002) notes that 
protection of intellectual property rights emerged only towards the end of the nineteenth 
century in today’s developed countries, long after industrial revolutions. Patent laws
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until then lacked disclosure requirements, incurred high fixed costs in filing and afforded 
inadequate protection. Switzerland, among the most innovative European economies 
took until 1954 to acquire a patent law comparable to other developed economies, 
chemical substances remained unpatentable until 1978. This general pattern is also true 
for the range of neo-liberal institutions, an independent judiciary, clean and efficient 
bureaucracies, and good corporate governance institutions and financial institutions. 
Easterly (2001c) in his analysis of conflict and institutions is actually unearthing the 
result that countries at high levels of development have lower levels of conflict.
6.5.2. Democracy: A Critique o f Rodrik (1999a, 2000b)
Democracies are now more commonly argued to be conducive to market orientated 
economic reforms. The mechanism is not often made clear but seems to revolve around 
the argument that open flows of information, guided by public opinion can coalesce 
around optimal (market) solutions. Sen (1999) makes one of the clearest expositions of 
this general argument arguing that economic and political freedoms will reinforce each 
other. The conceptualisation of economic needs depends on public debate and 
discussion, the guarantee of which requires basic political liberty and civil rights.
Political freedom (democracy) generates an incentive for politicians to meet those needs. 
Famously Sen (1982) pointed out that no substantial famine has ever occurred in an 
independent country with a democratic form of government and a free-press. Rodrik 
(1999a) argues democracy also generates more predictable long-run growth rates, greater 
economic stability, handles adverse shocks better and has superior distributional 
outcomes.
A case study of India shows there is no reason to suppose that democracy will reduce 
conflict. Democracy can serve to sharpen existing social cleavages through continual 
pressures for competitive political mobilisation. In conditions of competitive party 
politics distributive issues along class, party, and ethnic lines tend to become rapidly 
polarised (Kohli 1990). A good example is impact of the 1969 split of the Congress
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Party on the politics of the state of Gujarat. Indira Gandhis’ branch of the Congress won 
political power in the state through appealing to backward groups, the Kshatriya, Harijan, 
Adivasis and Moslem. The rump of the old Congress retained the support of the high 
caste Patidars. The Patidar community until the 1960s had retained an uncontested 
dominance of the state, owning land, dairy co-operatives and being disproportionately 
well represented in educational institutions. The numerically dominant Khastriyas came 
to political power in the 1970s. This generated a separation of socio-economic power 
(Patidars) and control over local political institutions (Kshatriyas) which was resented by 
the Patidars who began to resist their political expulsion by force. In 1981 riots and 
violence spread throughout central Gujarat. Urban riots were centred among medical 
students in Ahmedabad where reservation policies for lower caste students were 
impacting on the chances of higher caste students. This pattern has been common across 
India. Bardhan argues, “the political arithmetic of group equity and democratic 
mobilisation, apart from bankrupting the state treasuries and debilitating the governments 
capacity to invest in necessary social economic infrastructure, has been eating away at the 
institutional insulation of administrative and economic decision making at the central, 
and in particular, at the state levels, with adverse consequences both for development and 
for governance.” (2001:239).
There is widespread empirical evidence to show democracy is an outcome of 
development. The typical franchise during industrialisation in today’s developed 
countries was tiny, in France between 1830 and 1848 only 0.6% of the population, and 
the 1832 Reform Act in England extended voting rights from 14 to 18% of men.
Economic development promotes the pre-requisites for democracy (Lipset 1959; 
Rueschemeyer et al 1992; Huber et al 1993; Barro 1999). Przworski et al (2000) accept 
these conclusions and examine whether democracies are more likely to emerge as 
countries develop under dictatorships or having emerged for reasons other than economic 
development are only more likely to survive in countries that are already developed.
They conclude that democracy is only likely to emerge/ consolidate at high levels of 
development. Rodrik (1999a) in his analysis of conflict and institutions is actually
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unearthing the result that countries at high levels of development have lower levels of 
conflict.
There is no reason to suppose democracy will lead to greater protection of property 
rights. Property rights can be threatened by private actors, landless peasants and 
organised labour in particular. Democracy equalises the right to influence the allocation 
of resources so may exacerbate the threat to property from the poor. The contrary 
assumption is so widespread that economists regularly use dictatorship as a proxy for 
weak property rights. Przworski et al (2000:211) find to the contrary that average tax 
rates are no higher in dictatorships, and dictatorships are in fact less likely to nationalise 
private firms.
6.6 Other institutions
There are other institutions that may reduce the impact of conflict on economic growth, 
those analysed here are i) a repressive state, ii) inclusive institutions, and, iii) ideological 
institutions.
6.6.1. A Repressive State
In his characterisation of the developmental state Leftwich (1995, 2000) argued 
institutions may allow the state to implement growth promoting and distributionally non­
neutral policies. Among his seven components of a developmental state Leftwich listed 
‘relative state autonomy’, ‘bureaucratic power’ and ‘a weak or flattened civil society’. 
These three components focus on the ability of the state to exclude or crush groups that 
do not benefit from or would oppose growth and industrialisation. Authors have 
discussed this idea in a variety of contexts, of India Bardhan said “In the context of 
economic growth it is rather the capacity of the system to insulate economic management 
from political processes of distributive demands, rent-seeking and patronage
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disbursement that makes the crucial difference.” (1984:72). Khan (2000d) notes that the 
models of development followed by South Korea and Pakistan in the 1960s were similar. 
Both relied on allocating the economic surplus to a small group of large-scale capitalists. 
South Korea succeeded in ensuring a high rate of re-investment and excluding other 
groups. In Pakistan a relatively more numerous and politicised intermediate class 
succeeded in forcing the government to divert an increasing share of the economic 
surplus to unproductive politically motivated rents. Kohli (1994) argued the impact of 
Japanese colonialism in South Korea was to transform the Korean state from a relatively 
corrupt and ineffective social institution into a highly authoritarian, penetrating 
organisation capable of both transforming and controlling Korean society. The colonial 
state established new production alliances with dominant classes and brutally suppressed 
and systematically controlled the lower classes. The colonial state broke the hold of the 
landowning classes, pensioned off the old rural elite and replaced them with Japanese 
career civil servants.
6.6.2. Inclusive institutions
A more inclusive institution building strategy is possible. An important part of securing 
legitimacy for a given (re)allocation of rights may be in compensating the (potential) 
losers rather than repressing them. Acemoglu and Robinson (1999) argue the House of 
Lords in Britain gave the landed classes a guaranteed stake in political power during the 
19th Century which served to compensate them as their relative economic power declined 
with the onset of industrialisation. Without such compensation in Austria-Hungary and 
Russia landed groups opposed industrialisation for longer. Jomo and Gomez (2000) 
argue the New Economic Policy instituted in Malaysia after the 1969 ethnic riots 
managed to ensure a stable redistribution of rents from the ethnic Chinese to the 
indigenous Bumiputra. As well as raising the share of the latter in total corporate capital 
it has reduced contestation costs and allowed the more successful ethnic Chinese to 
accumulate.
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Identifying those requiring compensation, minimising the transaction costs associated 
with such transfers, and minimising rent-seeking by other entities requires a state that is 
not ‘autonomous’ but “embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to 
society and provides institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and re­
negotiation of goals and policies.” (Evans 1995:12). A state that is only autonomous 
lacks the intelligence and ability to rely on private decentralised implementation and is 
incapable of resolving collective action problems. Where this thesis departs from Evans 
(1995) is that he argued the concept of embedded autonomy implies dense links with 
industrial capital and an exclusionary arrangement with other groups. This is insufficient, 
there are many other potentially powerful groups in society whose opposition may at 
least have to be neutralised to permit a policy of sustained industrialisation. A dominant 
political party may provide just such an inclusive and embedded institution.
It is a characteristic of many developmental states that they have a single dominant 
political party. This may occur in the context of democracy such as the Botswana 
Democratic Party or Liberal Democratic Party in Japan or authoritarianism such as the 
Kuomintang in Taiwan. The Congress party in India between independence and the mid- 
1960s provided an embedded institution that was able to dominate civil society, provide 
compensation and ideological incorporation.
The system of one-party dominance is different from a one party system38. The model 
consists of a party of consensus and parties of pressure, the latter function on the margin. 
Those groups outside, various pressure groups and dissidents from the ruling party do not 
constitute alternatives to the ruling party, their functional role is to pressurise, criticise, 
and influence. This structure provides an in-built corrective, through factionalism within 
the ruling party and a latent threat from outside. These are necessary parts of the one- 
party dominant system and prevent the ruling elites from ossifying. The chief mechanism 
of the Indian system was the elaborate system of factions at every level of political and 
governmental activity through which Congress functioned (Menon 2003:24, 48). The 
party provided a system of co-ordination between the various levels through vertical
38 The argument here is based on Kothari (1964).
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faction chains. Congress “provided a subtle and resilient mechanism for conflict 
management and transactional negotiations among the proprietary classes” (Bardhan 
1984/1998:77). It provided a well-defined network for the distribution of the spoils of 
office, institutionalised procedures of transaction and absorbed dissent by co-opting 
leaders of subordinate classes. In power Congress monopolised patronage resources right 
down to the village Panchayats, sugar co-operatives, banking corporations, and state 
allocated resources such as licenses, fertilisers, seeds and road construction. This made 
opposition profoundly difficult. Successful leaders were those skilful in rewarding 
diverse factions and communities (Weiner 1971). The central leadership provided a 
system of mediation, arbitration and inter-level co-ordination in the party. The plurality 
within the dominant party made it more flexible and representative and the party was 
prepared to absorb groups from without. The consensus of Congress stemmed both from 
its historical legacy as the party of independence and through the continuing 
accommodation of interests. Congress acted to neutralise some the more important 
cleavages within society, incorporating the labour movement and the linguistic re­
organisation of states. Indian society is fragmented into many different religious, 
language, caste, class and ethnic groups. Until the mid-1960s these did not provide the 
cleavages around which political organisations developed. Congress was an inclusive 
party with a social base of support in some parts of India completely different with its 
social foundations in other parts (Chhibber and Petrocik 2002). The Congress acted to 
incorporate such differences within the party, functioning as a collection of state level 
political parties incorporating local influences (Chapter V).
6.6.3. Ideological
Woo-Cumings (1999) argues the authoritarian states of East Asia did not obtain their 
legitimacy through a mandate from civil society, or by following rules to gain office, 
rather by the project they were carrying out. Legitimacy was obtained by successfully 
achieving rapid economic development in an uncertain and dangerous Cold-war world.
A political party that can subordinate its members individual aspirations to a collective
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ideology, and exclude opponents can be an important institution to reduce conflict and 
facilitate economic reform. Kohli (1987) argues that tightly organised ideological parties 
were better able to penetrate rural society in India without being co-opted by propertied 
groups and implement modest reforms. Again for the case of India Harriss (2000) argues 
that a regime with a coherent leadership, an ideological and organisational commitment 
to exclude propertied interests, and an organisation that is both centralised and 
decentralised (embedded-autonomy) will allow institutional penetration while facilitating 
a degree of regime autonomy from the propertied classes.
The BJP is clearly a different political construct from the 1950s vintage Congress39. 
Whereas the earlier Congress built its support through vertical mobilisation, obtaining the 
support of local notables heading vote banks, the BJP mobilised on the basis of a strong 
organisation. The BJP is a cadre based, ideological political party relying on a network 
of activists owing allegiance to the BJP and the wider Hindu nationalist organisation (the 
Sangh Parivar). Activists are used to majoritarian discipline and factionalisation has been 
relatively less of an issue for the BJP. The BJP has functioned (since its formation in 
1980) as a highly successful, disciplined political party, characterised by mass 
membership, high levels of ideological commitment, and a tightly knit party structure that 
has endured without splits since its formation (Basu 2001). The BJP provided a clear 
ideological message to which people could owe allegiance and subordinate their 
particularist interests. The BJP has an organic view of society, that all castes are 
harmonious components of society. They emphasised integrating the low castes through 
fear of the ‘Muslim other’, efforts to provide welfare and an intense effort to propagate 
particular ideological moral and cultural ideals (Sanskritisation)40.
West Bengal provides a good case study of a political-economic environment before and 
after the impact of an ideological party. West Bengal between 1967 and 1977 was 
characterised by political chaos. The Left United Front (UF) government in 1967
39 There are signs the difference was narrowing by the late 1990s. The BJP gradually shifted its electoral 
strategy from mobilisation to alliances and electoral adjustments, increasing the influence of 
accommodation at the expense of ideology (Hansen and Jaffrelot 1998).
40 Through for example screenings of the Mahabaratha and Ramayana.
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sponsored a land grab movement; this was taken to further extremes by the revolutionary 
violence of the Naxalbari movement. The central government responded by dismissing 
the state government and between 1971 and 1977 and a more compliant Congress party 
in (local) power cracked down. There were large numbers of politically motivated 
‘encounter killings’ by the police and widespread arrests of UF members. The 
Communist Party (the largest constituent of the UF government) reformed itself, stressing 
a commitment to democracy, making itself more social democratic and less communist, 
whilst retaining the democratic centralism of internal party organisation. It was an 
ideological party, with that ideology imposed on disciplined cadres. This removed the 
worst elements of factional conflict and made the party subservient to larger 
organisational goals, enabling the party once returned to power (1977) to implement 
modest but genuine redistributive goals. Government was decentralised and competitive 
elections held for the village Panchayats. Many central government programmes (Food 
for Work, Employment Guarantee) were better implemented in West Bengal 
(Swaminathan 1990). Operation Bagra in the early 1980s provided tenurial rights and 
improved incomes for 25% of rural households (Kohli 1990:Chl0). This ideological 
party provided for a cohesive and effective government that has remained in power from 
1977 to 2004.
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Chapter V: The Role of the State and the Episode of Growth in 
India, 1951/52 to 1964/65.
1. Summary of Chapter Findings
The chapter is divided into three parts, each focusing on one particular role that the state 
has in promoting economic development. These relate to finance, production and 
institutions. The underlying hypothesis is that the state needs to be successful in all three 
to initiate and sustain an episode of growth. The first two examine the potential 
economic roles of the state, and the third the potential political role of the state.
The first economic role of the state is the mobilisation and allocation of the surplus. The 
Indian state had two principal roles related to finance that initiated the episode of growth 
after 1951/52. This chapter will demonstrate that the state was very successful in 
mobilising resources, both on its own account through tax revenue, and indirectly through 
private sector savings. Revenue from the tax system, public sector and household 
savings and savings inflow from abroad all increased sharply between 1951/52 and 
1964/65. Patterns of resource mobilisation changed over time but there was a 
consistently important role for the state. The second important financial role of the state 
was in allocating resources to projects essential for development. The state was largely 
successful in achieving this between 1951/51 and 1964/65. The state managed to control 
current expenditure while sharply increasing public investment.
The second economic role of the state is in achieving a productive use of the surplus in 
both the public and private sectors. This section outlines the principal sources of 
economic growth between 1951/52 and 1964/65. These are higher aggregate investment, 
creating a guaranteed market via import controls, a self-sustaining momentum of growth 
in the public sector and a structure of regulation and high levels of public investment that 
generated profitable investment opportunities for the private sector. The attention of the
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state to international relations enabled the momentum of growth to avoid two potential 
constraints emanating from agriculture and imports.
This section continues by evaluating growth over this period. The orthodox view of the 
planning period is negative. By analysing separately the periods 1951/52 to 1964/65 and 
1964/65 to 1979/80 this thesis reveals a very different picture. There are signs of 
productivity growth in the Indian industrial sector before the mid-1960s hidden by the 
use of long-run (1950-1980) averages. There was a sharp decline in productivity (TFP) 
growth only after the mid-1960s. There are three crucial proximate reasons why 
productivity growth was relatively rapid between 1950/51 and 1964/65. These were, 
diversification into high(er) productivity industries, a pattern of balanced growth and an 
efficient process of extensive growth.
This final section will show how institutions enabled the state to overcome the conflict 
inherent in mobilising resources and then using them to promote productive investment. 
This section will show that the principle reason the Indian state was able to overcome the 
inevitable conflicts associated with (rapid) industrialisation was an inclusive institution -  
the Congress party. The Congress was able to identify those losers requiring 
compensation and minimise the transaction costs associated with such transfers through 
an elaborate structure of patronage. By monopolising patronage resources the Congress 
was able to accommodate new leaders and groups and make it rational for groups and 
patrons to remain within the party even if they were not gaining benefits in the short­
term. The exit option deprived them of any future prospect of benefits. With Congress 
as the ‘only-game-in-town’ patrons acquiesced in the Congress programme (higher 
resource mobilisation and productive public investment) in the hope of future rewards. 
Industrial policy could focus on economic planning rather than containing conflict. The 
Congress system allowed groups losing out from the pattern of economic development to 
be incorporated and compensated at minimal cost. A good example is the demobilisation 
of a militant labour movement in the late 1940s. Into the 1950s and early 1960s labour 
was not benefiting from the development strategy. Labour was incorporated into the 
Congress system and strike activity quickly dropped down to pre-war levels and radical
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labour ceased to be a threat. The Congress system allowed groups isolated from the 
development process to be incorporated (the language movement is discussed here) and 
their opposition to be quickly diffused. Groups fundamentally opposed to the 
geographical integrity of India or its basic political settlement were more easily identified 
and repressed. Finally there is some argument to show that even some elite groups 
excluded from the immediate benefits of development acquiesced in their own exclusion 
from an ideological motivation.
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2. The (Economic) Role of the State, 1951/52 to 1964/65: Finance
This section examines the role of the state in mobilising and allocating the surplus. The 
state had three principal roles related to finance that initiated the episode of growth after 
1951/52. These were to mobilise domestic and foreign savings, to create institutions to 
mobilise private sector savings and to allocate resources to projects essential for 
development.
This section will show that the state was very successful in mobilising resources. The 
mechanism by which the state mobilised the surplus showed distinct changes over time. 
In particular tax revenue nearly doubled between 1951/52 and 1964/65. In the early 
1950s there was a sharp rise in savings by households, after 1956/57 there a rise in net 
inflow of savings from abroad, finally in the early 1960s public sector savings grew 
rapidly. Private corporate sector savings increased steadily throughout the whole period.
2.1. The Role of the State and the Mobilisation of Domestic and Foreign Savings
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show that estimates of the marginal rate of gross savings consistently 
exceeded the rate of gross savings after 1951. This led to sharp increases in the average 
rate of gross savings, from 9.5% in 1951/51 to 14.6% in 1964/65.
Table 5.1: Estimates of the Marginal Rate of Saving in the Indian Economy, 1950-85
Period Marginal Rate of Gross Saving (%)
1950/51 to 1960/61 20.0
1961/62 to 1969/70 18.2
Source: (Chakravarty 1987:103)
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Table 5.2: Rate of Gross Saving in the Indian Economy, 1951-1965 (% of GDP at 
market prices, three year moving averages)
Year Rate of Gross Domestic Saving
1951/52 9.5
1952/53 9.0
1953/54 9.3
1954/55 11.2
1955/56 12.8
1956/57 12.9
1957/58 11.8
1958/59 11.5
1959/60 12.3
1960/61 13.1
1961/62 13.8
1962/63 14.0
1963/64 14.2
1964/65 14.6
Source: (Bardhan 1984/1998:97).
The state boosted total savings, firstly by raising resources through the tax system and 
generating higher public sector savings, secondly by mobilising private sector savings 
(section 3). The state more than doubled the share of national income raised in taxation 
from 7% at the beginning of the 1950s to nearly 15% by the mid-1960s (table 5.3).
Table 5.3: Government Tax Revenue, 1950/51-1968/69
Year Tax Revenue as a % of NNP
1950/51 6.92
1951/52 ................................................... 7 . 7 6 ........................................................
1952/53 7.22
1953/54 7.00
1954/55 7.91
1955/56 8.15
1956/57 8.30
1957/58 9.76
1958/59 9.15
1959/60 9.63
1960/61 10.98
1961/62 11.79
1962/63 13.33
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1963/64 14.16
1964/65 13.42
1965/66 14.78
1966/67 14.33
1967/68 12.82
1968/69 13.51
Source: (Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1975:8).
The state was successful in achieving its aspirations outlined in the First Five-Year Plan
in 1951. “the State must itself raise through taxation, through loans and through
surpluses earned on state enterprises a considerable proportion of the savings
needed public savings, as distinguished from private savings, personal or corporate,
must be developed steadily.” (Planning Commission 2003, First FYP, 1951, Ch2:8).
Greater tax revenue is not sufficient to increase domestic savings, it could be dissipated 
through higher levels of current expenditure. Table 5.4 shows that the rate of savings in 
the Indian public sector increased after 1951/52, especially so after 1958/59.
Table 5.4: Gross Savings in the Public Sector (three-year moving average) as % of 
GDP at current market prices._____________
Year Gross Savings in the Public Sector
1951/52 1.9
1952/53 1.7
1953/54 1.4
1954/55 1.5
1955/56 1.8
1956/57 1.9
1957/58 1.9
1958/59 1.8
1959/60 2.1
1960/61 2.5
1961/62 3.1
1962/63 3.3
1963/64 3.5
1964/65 3.5
Source: (Bardhan 1984/1998:99).
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Subsidies to agriculture through government irrigation systems declined between 1950/51 
and 1960/61 (table 5.5). Keeping such expenditures in check was a necessary7 but not 
sufficient condition to increase investible resources.
Table 5.5: Budgetary Losses on Account of Operation of Government Irrigation 
Systems ___________ ______________________________________________
Year Operating 
Loss Rs m 
at 1970/71 
prices
Area
Irrigated by 
Canals (m 
ha.)
Net Sown 
Area (m 
ha.)
Implicit 
Subsidy per 
ha. of canal 
irrigated 
area
Implicit 
Subsidy per 
ha. of net 
sown area
1950/51 365.6 8.30 118.75 44.0 3.08
1960/61 355.9 10.37 133.20 34.3 2.67
1970/71 1,370.2 12.84 140.78 106.7 9.73
Source: (Cha cravarty 1987:]127).
An important source of savings in the mid-1950s was the net inflow of resources from 
abroad. The net inflow of savings from abroad increased sharply from 0.2% of GDP in 
1954/55 to 3.2% of GDP in 1957/58 (table 5.6).
Table 5.6: The Net Inflow of Savings from Abroad (% GDP).
Year %
1951/52 0.4
1952/53 0.5
1953/54 -0.1
1954/55 0.2
1955/56 1.2
1956/57 2.4
1957/58 3.2
1958/59 2.8
1959/60 2.6
1960/61 2.4
1961/62 2.7
1962/63 2.3
1963/64 2.5
1964/65 2.4
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Source: (Bardhan 1984/1998:99).
The state had an important role in facilitating this inflow. The formation of the Non- 
aligned Movement at the Bandung Conference in 1954 placed India in a very fortuitous 
geo-political situation and India was thereafter able to procure aid from a wide range of 
countries (table 5.7).
Table 5.7: Sources of External Assistance (RsM)
Loans (repayable in 
foreign currencies)
Aid Authorised up 
to end of 1st Plan
Aid Authorised up 
to end of 2nd Plan
Aid Authorised up 
to end of 3rd Plan
International
Institutions
572 2,612 4,231
US 903 1,085 7,917
UK - 1,226 2,420
W. Germany - 1,342 3,081
France - - 571
Italy - - 813
Japan - 268 1,381
USSR 648 3,190 1,005
Czechoslovakia - 231 400
Poland - 143 270
Switzerland - 65 180
Source: (Streeten anc1 Hill 1968:328).
The Russians, British, and Germans all constructed steel mills in the 1950s. Among the 
western democracies India was perceived as the democratic alternative to totalitarian 
China. Institutions such as the Centre for International Studies and the Ford Foundation 
supported India with funding and relevant research. At times of crisis the Indian 
government did draw on this goodwill. Poor harvests after 1955 culminated in a 
monsoon failure in north India in 1957, and a sharp fall in foodgrain production between 
1956/57 and 1957/58. In August 1956 the Indian government signed a PL-480 agreement 
with the US government. Foodgrain imports in 1957 were released through non-profit 
fair-price shops. By the mid-1950s the large sterling reserves accumulated in the 1940s 
had been largely drawn down and the need for capital goods imports was higher than
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expected leading to a foreign exchange crunch. A sharp increase in concessional capital 
inflows allowed the government to preserve the investment plans of the Second Five- 
Year Plan (1956-61) intact.
2.2. The Role of the State in Creating Institutions to Mobilise Private Sector Savings
As well as mobilising its own resources through the tax system and facilitating the inflow 
of resources from foreign sources the state played an important role in mobilising 
resources indirectly, by creating institutions to mobilise private sector savings.
80% of total savings in India since Independence have originated from the household 
sector. Kok-Fay and Jomo (2000) argue that risk-averse households are more likely to 
increase financial savings in response to deposit security and intermediation efficiency 
than to interest rates. Household savings depend crucially on the availability of an 
efficient infrastructure for deposit collection, in particular on the extent of the bank 
branching network. After Independence the state increased its control over the private 
banking sector. The Banking Companies Act of 1949 empowered the RBI to control the 
opening of new banks and bank branches, inspect the accounts of a banking company and 
prevent the winding up of a licensed bank. The act was amended on several occasions in 
the 1950s in each case to provide greater control over bank liquidation. There was a 
sharp decline in banking failures after 1951. After 1960 new sections were added to 
enable the RBI to compulsorily merge weak banks with strong ones. The number of 
banks fell from 566 in 1951 to 85 in 1969 (Sen and Vaidyai 1997). In 1962 a national 
deposit insurance scheme was launched. After its formation in 1955 the State Bank of 
India made a conscious effort to spread branches into rural areas. The Life Insurance 
Corporation of India was established in 1956 by nationalising all life insurance firms then 
operating.
Gross savings originating in the private household sector showed a sharp increase from 
6.6% of GDP in 1951/52 to 9.9% of GDP in 1956/57. Gross savings from the private
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corporate sector increased from 0.9% of GDP in 1951/52 to around 2% of GDP in the 
early 1960s (table 5.8).
Table 5.8: Gross Savings of the Private Corporate Sector and Household Sectors 
(three year moving average) as % of GDP at current market prices____________
Year Gross Saving in the Private 
Corporate Sector
Gross Savings in the Household 
Sector
1951/52 0.9 6.6
1952/53 0.9 6.4
1953/54 0.9 7.0
1954/55 1.1 8.6
1955/56 1.2 9.8
1956/57 1.2 9.9
1957/58 1.1 8.8
1958/59 1.1 8.6
1959/60 1.4 8.8
1960/61 1.7 8.9
1961/62 2.0 8.7
1962/63 2.0 8.7
1963/64 1.9 8.8
1964/65 1.8 9.3
Source: (Bardhan 1984/1998:99).
The finance ratio is the ratio of total financial claims issued during the course of a year to 
national income, and can be used as an indicator of the rate of financial development. 
Such institution building efforts by the state led to an increase in the finance ratio from 
0.75 in 1951/52 to 9.45 in 1960/61 (Sen and Vaidya 1997:26).
2.3. Allocating resources to projects essential for development
The second important financial role of the state was in allocating resources to projects 
essential for development. This section will demonstrate that the state was largely 
successful in achieving this. By mobilising revenue and controlling current expenditure 
the state created fiscal space to sharply increase public investment between 1951/52 and
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1964/65 .
There was a perception among policymakers in India in the late-1940s that 
industrialisation was essential, for political as much as economic reasons.
Nehru considered there was a need for industrialisation and to that end, “three
fundamental requirements heavy engineering and machine making industry, scientific
research institutes and electric power” (Nehru 1946:410). Indian planning reflected 
deeper concerns, political independence was considered impossible, “within the 
framework of international interdependency” (Nehru 1946:407), unless India were highly 
industrialised. Reflecting early thinking on dependency, “the attainment of national 
freedom and the elimination of foreign control became an essential pre-requisite for 
planning” (Nehru 1946:395), and “....during the late 1950’s, we thought of anyone 
advocating a higher share of agriculture as more or less right wing, an agent of the US...” 
(Desai 1998:46). These aspirations were closely reflected in planning documents of the 
period.
“The public sector has to expand rapidly. It has not only to initiate developments which 
the private sector is either unwilling or unable to undertake; it has to play the dominant 
role in shaping the entire pattern of investments in the economy, whether it makes the 
investments directly or whether these are made by the private sector. The private sector 
has to play its part within the framework of the comprehensive plan.” (Planning 
Commission 2003, Second FYP, 1956, Ch2:l).
These aspirations were largely achieved in practise. The Indian state between 1951/52 
and 1964/65 sharply increased allocations from its own budget towards those projects 
essential for economic development.
2.3.1. Own Investment by the State
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Between 1951/52 and 1964/65 the rise in total investment was entirely driven by the 
public sector. Total level of investment increased (with fluctuations) from a range of 10- 
12% of GDP between 1951/52 and 1953/54 to 16.8% in 1964/65. This rise is matched 
almost exactly by the increase in public sector investment, from 3.3% in 1951/52 to 8.3% 
in 1964/65, a rise of 5% of GDP (table 5.9).
Table 5.9: Investment Ratios (Three Year Moving Averages) % of GDP (1970/81 
market prices)_________________________________________________________
Year Gross Fixed Capital Formation Gross Fixed Capital Formation in 
the public sector
1951/52 12.2 3.3
1952/53 11.1 3.5
1953/54 10.5 3.7
1954/55 11.2 4.4
1955/56 12.8 5.0
1956/57 14.7 5.8
1957/58 14.7 5.7
1958/59 14.2 6.0
1959/60 13.5 6.2
1960/61 14.0 6.6
1961/62 14.5 7.0
1962/63 15.1 7.3
1963/94 15.8 7.8
1964/65 16.8 8.3
Source: (Bardhan 1984/1998:97)
The share of the state in total investment rose from around 25% in 1951/52 to 50% in 
1964/65 (table 5.9). The central importance assigned to the public sector was first 
articulated in the Industrial Policy Resolution (1956) and incorporated into the 2nd FYP 
(1956-61). The public sector for both ideological and practical reasons was given the 
task of strategically controlling the commanding heights of the economy. This formed 
the basis of ‘reservation’ in sectors such as iron and steel, heavy plant and machinery
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manufacture, mining, coal, transport and power41. Infrastructure became a near 
monopoly for the public sector.
“In the generation and distribution of electric power, the public sector has now the 
principal share and is being rapidly enlarged. Its share in transport has also steadily 
increased. In large industries and minerals the total investment in the public sector 
during the Third Plan will be distinctly higher than in the private sector. As compared to 
1950/51, by the end of the Third Plan, the contribution of the public sector will increase 
from less than 2 per cent to nearly a fourth in organised manufacturing industries and 
from less than a tenth to over a third in mineral production... ..As the relative share of the 
public sector increases, its role in economic growth will become even more strategic and 
the State will be in a still stronger position to determine the character and the functioning 
of the economy.” (Planning Commission 2003, Third FYP, 1961, Ch:6).
The state was successfully able to control its own pattern of expenditure. A rising share 
of total state expenditure was accounted for by investment. The percentage more than 
doubled from 25.56% in 1950/51 to a peak of 54.64% in 1958/59, then stabilised at a 
level around 47/48% until 1964/65 (table 5.10).
Table 5.10: Central Government Capital Expenditure as a Percentage of Total 
Expenditure (in Current Prices)_______ _________________________________
Year %
1950-51 25.56
1951-52 3339
1952-53 31.45
1953-54 37.23
1954-55 52.98
1955-56 46.62
1956-57 48.77
1957-58 51.77
1958-59 54.64
1959-60 46.75
1960-61 47.73
41 Existing private sector companies in these areas were permitted to operate and their expansion permitted.
136
1961-62 47.18
1962-63 46.46
1963-64 47.54
1964-65 48.23
Source: (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987:231)
3. The (Economic) Role of the State, 1951/52 to 1964/65: Production
This section examines the role of the state in achieving a productive use of the surplus in 
both the public and private sectors. This section outlines the principal sources of 
economic growth over the 1951/52 to 1964/65 period. These were increased aggregate 
investment, a guaranteed market via import controls, a self-sustaining momentum of 
growth in the public sector and a structure of regulation and high levels of public 
investment that generated profitable investment opportunities for the private sector. The 
attention of the state to international relations enabled the momentum of growth to avoid 
two potential constraints emanating from agriculture and imports.
This section continues by evaluating growth over this period, the orthodox view is 
negative. By analysing separately the periods 1951/52 to 1964/65 and 1964/65 to 
1979/80 this thesis reveals a different picture. There are signs of productivity growth in 
the Indian industrial sector before the mid-1960s. This positive outcome is hidden by the 
use long-run (1950-1980) averages. There was a sharp decline in productivity (TFP) 
growth after the mid-1960s. There are three crucial proximate reasons why productivity 
growth was relatively rapid between 1950/51 and 1964/65. These are firstly, 
diversification into high(er) productivity industries, secondly, a pattern of balanced 
growth and thirdly, an efficient process of extensive growth.
3.1. Sources of Growth: Investment
The most important source of growth from both supply and demand sides was increased 
investment. Aggregate investment increased from 10.5% of GDP in 1953/54 to 16.8% of
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GDP in 1964/65. This was led by increased public investment, which increased from 
3.7% of GDP to 8.3% of GDP over the same period (table 5.9). This expansion of 
investment laid capacity in sectors crucial for industrial growth - the generation and 
distribution of electric power, iron and steel, mining, coal, transport and machinery. The 
expansionary momentum generated by rapid growth of investment was important from 
the demand side. A careful reading of the evidence suggests that changes in demand had 
a crucial impact on TFP (Ahluwalia 1985; Goldar 1986)42. Growth rates of TFP show 
two distinct structural breaks, in 1965-7 and 1980/1. Only the latter has been properly 
identified and analysed. Ahluwalia (1991) finds the upturn in TFP during the 1980’s to 
be coincident with rapid demand expansion. Mohan-Rao (1996b:3188) finds a positive 
correlation between output growth and TFP in Indian manufacturing. Ahluwalia and 
Williamson (2003:67) find a systematic relation between higher growth rates of GDP and 
those of TFP.
3.2. Sources of Growth: Replacing Imports
Increased trade protection after 1950/51 guaranteed the domestic market for the output of 
private industry and thereby created a derived demand for inputs and infrastructure 
generated by public sector investment. Nearly a quarter of industrial growth between 
1950/51 and 1965/66 came through import substitution (Chandrasekhar 1988). Import 
substitution was highest in consumer goods (such as cotton, textiles, and sugar) until 
1957, then with the launch of the 2nd FYP (1956-61) shifted to intermediate and 
investment goods (such as steel, cement and capital goods) (Bhagwati and Desai 1970; 
Bagchi 1977). Despite the unexpectedly large requirements for imports (capital goods, 
raw materials) that occurred during the industrialisation programme India did manage to 
reduce its dependence on imports. There was a declining trend in trade ratios during this 
period (table 5.11).
42 Verdoom’s law suggests there is a positive relationship between TFP and output growth.
138
Table 5.11: Ratio of Merchandise to INon-residential GDP at Current Prices
Period Imports as % of 
GDP
Exports as % of 
GDP
Average trade to GDP 
Ratio
1950/51 to 
1960/61
7.82 5.84 6.83
1960/61 to 
1970/71
6.27 4.03 5.15
Source: (Sivasubramonian 2004:261)
3.3. Sources of Growth: Heavy Industry Creates its Own Demand
The mid-1950s witnessed an abrupt shift in the allocation of state (and hence aggregate) 
investment towards heavy industry. Plan sector expenditure on industry and metals 
jumped from Rs 97 crore (4.9% of total expenditure) during the 1st FYP to Rs 900 crore 
(24.1% of total plan expenditure) during the 2nd FYP (table 5.12). This expenditure was 
targeted to iron and steel, coal, fertilisers, heavy engineering and heavy electrical 
equipment.
Table 5.12: Pattern of Planned Public Sector Outlay in the First Three Five-Year 
Plans (Rs. crores, Actual Expenditure) _________ _________ _________ ______
Agricult 
ure and 
Allied 
Activitie 
s
Irrigatio 
n and 
Flood 
Control
Power Industry
and
Metals
Transpor 
t and 
Commun 
ications
Social
and
Commun
ity
Services
Total
First 290 432 151 97 518 472 960
FYP,
1951-56
(14.8) (22) (7.7) (4.9) (26.4) (24.1) (100)
Second 549 436 446 1,125 1,261 855 4,672
FYP,
1956-61
(11.8) (9.3) (9.5) (24.1) (27.0) (18.3) (100)
Third 1,089 665 1,252 1,967 2,112 1,492 8,577
FYP,
1961-6
(12.7) (7.8) (14.6) (22.9) (24.6) (17.4) (100)
Source: (Chakravarty 1987:108).
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Higher public investment generated a self-sustaining momentum of growth in the public 
sector. Once production facilities were established the wage costs in state industrial 
enterprises were a fixed not a variable cost of production. This implied that an increase 
in the demand for fixed capital goods (investment) met from domestic resources 
(government or private investment) raised public savings by an almost equal amount.
The value of the investment multiplier was close to one. The growth of heavy industry 
was certainly rapid but was largely disassociated from the rest of the economy. In 
accordance with the thesis of primacy to heavy industry machines were certainly being 
used to make machines in India, but then those machines, simply made still more 
machines. There was a rapid increase in the growth of iron and steel, all types of 
machinery and chemicals, and minimal increase in the output of textiles (table 5.15). In 
this it bore some striking similarities to the heavy industrialisation drives in the socialist 
economies.
“A concentric, self-repeating, self-inducing process occurs: the production of investment 
goods is raised so as to have more fixed capital, which largely produce investment goods
that contribute in turn to the growth of fixed capital There is an internal spiral
(or propeller), because the spiral motion advances, resulting in ever more investment, 
ever more fixed capital, and ultimately, ever more aggregate output.” (Komai 1992:171).
3.4. The Industrial Licensing Framework and the Private Sector
After 1951 and particularly with the launch of the Second FYP in 1956 the state sought to 
develop a pre-planned industrial structure. Plan priorities included targets for private 
investment, these were translated into a structure of regulation that did have a profound 
influence on investment decisions by the private sector. The policy framework included 
the Industrial Development and Regulation (IDR) Act (1951). The Act stipulated that a 
license would be required for establishing a new industrial unit, increasing production 
capacity, and changing the location of an existing unit43. The policy framework also
43 Small-scale industries (defined in terms of assets) and cottage industries were exempt.
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included a protective foreign trade regime (import licensing and tariffs) and the 
regulation of imports of foreign technology and capital. To this were added price and 
distribution controls in specific industries. The IDR aimed to channel industrial 
investment into socially desired directions. Despite problems with administration and a 
lack of flexibility in implementation it was a success in encouraging a change in India’s 
industrial structure in accordance with the desired pattern enunciated in the Mahalanobis 
model.
It was not simply a question of corralling an unwilling private sector through regulation 
into making a particular pattern of investment. Public investment was focused in basic, 
long gestation, high-risk sectors and in infrastructure. In the language of Hirschman 
(1958) such investment created forward linkages that generated profitable investment 
opportunities for the private sector. The five-year plans demonstrated the government 
were committed to higher growth and assured potential investors that demand would 
grow at this higher rate. Bhagwati characterises the problem as a case of multiple 
equilibria, “for countries stuck in a Nash equilibrium with low levels of investment, there 
existed a superior co-operative equilibrium with higher levels of investment and growth.” 
(1998:27). Infrastructure investment, “made the government’s commitment to kicking 
the system up into some bastardised version of the Rosenstein-Rodan-Vishny-Shleifer 
equilibrium quite credible to the private sector, triggering the self-fulfilling private sector 
investment response that lifted the economy into higher investment and growth rates.” 
(Bhagwati 1998:28).
There is good evidence that the private sector responded to the creation of forward 
linkages by increasing directly productive investment. De Long and Summers (1991) 
find that the accumulation of machinery is a prime determinant of national rates of 
productivity growth. They find a ‘clear, strong and robust’ relationship between national 
rates of machinery and equipment investment and productivity growth, and countries that 
invested heavily in equipment between 1960 and 1985. The results from De Long and 
Summers suggest that the private return to equipment investment is below the social 
return, and that the social return is very high (over thirty percent they estimate). There
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was a very high level of investment in equipment in India between 1950/51 and 1964/65 
(table 5.13).
Table 5.13: Growth Rates of Non-residential Net Fixed Capital Stock (1993/94 
prices).___________ ______________________ ___________________________
Period Structures Equipment Total Average Ratio GFCF/ 
GDP
1950/51 to 1964/65 6.55 5.54 6.26 16.38
1964/65 to 1980/81 6.04 -0.04 4.82 19.74
Source: (Sivasubramonian 2004:149).
The high level of equipment investment up until the mid-1960s was led by the private 
sector. The share of machinery investment by the private sector increased from 3.1% to 
5.0% of GDP between 1960/61 and 1964/65. Over the same period investment in 
machinery by the public sector fluctuated in the range 2.5-3.0% of GDP. By contrast 
investment in inventories and construction (less directly productive) by the private sector 
declined sharply and rose in the public sector (Desai 1981:279).
3.5. The State and Potential Constraints on Growth
The most important potential constraints on state-led industrialisation between 1951/52 
and 1964/65 were agriculture and imports. Both of these were successfully managed by 
the state.
The agricultural sector in these early years was the major economic sector accounting for 
over 70% of total employment. The traditional industries that dominated the Indian 
economy, such as cotton and jute textiles, sugar, vegetable oils and tobacco were agro­
based. The poor performance of agriculture can set constraints on industrial growth, 
through for example, a wage-good constraint squeezing profit margins. In practise 
agriculture had a neutral impact on growth between 1950/51 and 1964/65. There was a
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decline in the agricultural terms of trade in the 1950s indicating there was no pressure of 
excess demand pressures leading to a secular relative price increase (Desai 1981). End­
point comparisons of three-year averages centred around a peak agricultural year show 
relatively rapid growth of agricultural production (3% p.a.) between 1952-5 and 1959-62 
(Patnaik 1981). The marketed surplus in agriculture increased by 2.90% pa between 
1951/52 and 1965/66, faster than agricultural production, which grew by 2.74% pa. This 
difference increased the proportion of marketed surplus, from 39% of output in 1951-2 to 
44% in 1965-6 (Thamarajakshi 1969). The output of agriculture constituted the principal 
wage-good in 1950s India. If wage goods were becoming a binding constraint on 
industrial growth all industries should be affected, with the largest effect being on the 
most labour-intensive. Labour-intensive consumer non-durables however showed steady 
growth across 1951/52 to 1964/65 and 1965/66 to 1979/80. The scarcity of the wage 
good in a partial equilibrium context could raise the wage rate relative to the price of the 
manufactured product, reducing industrial profitability. Section 4 shows that what 
limited evidence does exist does not support this thesis.
Public investment was heavily biased against agro-based industry especially after 1956. 
This was compounded by a monsoon failure in north India in 1957 that led to a sharp fall 
in foodgrain production between 1956/57 and 1957/58. Donor sentiment at this time was 
still very favourable, in August 1956 the Indian government had signed a PL-480 
agreement with the US government. Large food imports from the US augmented 
domestic supplies and held the price level. Food imports supplied an average 5-8% of 
domestic availability and even underpinned a terms-of-trade shift in favour of industry 
(Frankel 1978:Ch4).
The other potentially constraining side effect of state engineered industrialisation was the 
growing reliance on imports that undermined the balance of payments. Despite 
intentions to achieve self-sufficiency, dependence on imports of basic and intermediate 
goods increased over the 2nd FYP. The financial crisis of 1957/57 due to higher than 
expected imports of industrial goods and foodgrains led to more intensified rationing of 
foreign exchange. Massive donor support allowed the main features of the 2nd FYP to be
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retained. Western democracies were very keen to see her succeed in the ‘democracy vs. 
dictatorship’ race with Maoist China.
3.6. An Evaluation of Growth and Efficiency 1950-1965
Bhagwati (1993) called the Mahalanobis strategy ‘The Model That Couldn’t’, castigating 
it not for a failure to mobilise resources but for poor productivity. Between 1950 and 
1984 he notes the savings rate approximately doubled from 10 to 22% of GDP with 
economic growth showing no equivalent increase. Desai (1981) argued that high rates of 
industrial investment in the 1960s and 70s and a low rate of industrial growth necessarily 
implied a low rate of productivity growth. Ahluwalia (1985) found a generalised decline 
in capital efficiency across all industry groups between 1959/60 and 1979/80. Ahluwalia 
(1991) went beyond capital-output ratios and estimated TFP growth. Growth between 
1959/60 and 1985/86 she argues was associated with 8% p.a. growth of capital, moderate 
growth (3%p.a.) in employment and negligible growth of TFP (-0.4% p.a.). Contrary 
views have generally accepted the low-productivity thesis and made other arguments. 
Chakravarty argued efficiency was not a basis to dismiss planning “where major 
structural changes are involved and where the ‘invisible hand’ can only be grasped 
through very dark glasses” (1987:5). Raj (1984) suggested that rising ICOR?s might be 
not due to inefficiency but to technological factors such as a more capital-intensive post 
green-revolution agriculture. This orthodox view is that there was a failure of efficiency/ 
productivity. This view is based on long-run data for the entire period from the early 
1950s to the 1980s.
By looking at episodes of growth and stagnation, in particular separating the period’s 
1951/52 to 1964/65 and 1964/65 to 1979/80 a very different picture emerges. There are 
signs of productivity growth in Indian industry before the mid-1960s. This positive 
outcome is hidden by the use of Ahluwlia and others of long-run (1950-1980) averages. 
There was a sharp decline in productivity growth after the mid-1960s. The slowdown in 
GDP growth was caused by a drop in the growth of output per unit of input (TFP
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growth), from 1.78% p.a. to 0.41% p.a (table 5.14). The contribution of factor 
accumulation actually increased. Virmani (2004b:23) agrees with these figures and 
shows with various estimates that TFP growth collapsed from +1.4/6% between 1950/51 
and 1964/65 to -0.1/+0.6% between 1965/66 and 1979/80.
Table 5.14: Factor Inputs and Productivity Growth in India, 1950/51 to 1980/81
Period Total Factor Input Output per unit of 
input
GDP
1950/51 to 1964/65 2.32 1.78 4.10
1964/65 to 1980/81 2.71 0.41 3.12
Source: (Sivasubramonian 2004:286).
Sustained economic growth in a nation’s per capita income can only occur if there is a 
rise in output per unit of input. Increased inputs without an increase in the efficiency 
with which they are used must run into diminishing returns, input driven growth is 
inevitably limited (Krugman 1994). There are three crucial proximate reasons why 
productivity growth was relatively rapid between 1950/51 and 1964/65. These are firstly, 
diversification into high(er) productivity industries, secondly, a pattern of balanced 
growth and thirdly, an efficient pattern of extensive growth.
3.6.1 The Nature o f Growth: Diversification
There was a substantial diversification in the structure of production towards potentially 
high(er) productivity technology and capital-intensive sectors during the 2nd FYP (1956- 
61). Table 5.15 shows the minimal increase in the output of a key consumption/ wage 
good cotton textiles and rapid growth of chemicals, iron and steel and especially of 
machinery.
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Table 5.15; Index Number of Industrial Production (1950/51 = 100).
Group 1955/56 1960/61
General Index 139 194
Cotton Textiles 128 133
Iron and Steel 122 238
Machinery (All types) 192 503
Chemicals 179 288
Source: (Planning Commission 2003, Third FYP 1961 Ch3:p5).
Industrial production grew by an annual average of 9% between 1961 and 1965, the 
sharpest increase was in the capital goods sector which showed growth of nearly 20% 
p.a., in basic goods 10.5% p.a. and consumer goods a paltry 5% p.a. (Rangarajan 
1982:292). Between 1960/61 and 1965/6, 29.93% of the growth of net value added in the 
registered manufacturing sector was contributed by intermediate goods and 25.63% by 
capital goods (Chaudhuri 2002). Consumer durables contributed only 4.77% of growth 
in net value added. There was an impressive growth in the range and sophistication of 
industrial output. Between 1956 and 1960 the weight of consumer goods in an index of 
industrial production dropped from 48.4% to 37.2%, basic goods increased from 22.3% 
to 25.1 % and capital goods from 4.7% to 11.8% (Ahluwalia 1991:13). In terms of 
patterns of output growth the aims of the planning strategy were starkly effective.
3.6.2 The Nature o f Growth: Balanced
Between the early-1950s and the mid-1960s the allocation of the surplus (income 
distribution) was consistent with the Mahalanobis strategy. Planned capacities and 
supplies of capital and consumer goods were approximately equal. The intentions of the 
government and (heavily regulated) private sectors balanced so the macroeconomy 
avoided either excess capacity or inflationary conditions, or a combination of both 
simultaneously in different sectors. The evolution of the production structure responded 
in accordance with planned rather than private intentions because the government 
successfully implemented licensing, fiscal policy and its own allocation of investment to 
regulate the flow of resources and demand in different sectors. In particular the
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government managed to control the emerging pattern of income distribution. Increments 
in national income were largely diverted to the state or to savings and used to expand 
public investment rather than remaining in the private sector generating an ‘unplanned’ 
demand for consumption. Capacity utilisation rates remained high until after the mid- 
1960s (table 5.16). This illustrates that the pattern of resource allocation was efficient in 
terms of avoiding major bottlenecks or generating excess unused capacity. 
Complementary investment projects were successful in generating a pattern of balanced 
growth that avoided wasted capacity and inefficiencies in production.
Table 5.16: Capacity Utilisation Rates, 1960-65 to 1971-75 (%)
Industry
Group
1960-5 1966-70 1971-5
Basic
Goods
86.0 82.0 77.4
Capital
Goods
85.9 66.4 60.2
Intermedia 
te Goods
89.3 81.9 79.7
Consumer
Goods
86.6 82.2 80.1
Source: (Ah uwalia 1985:109).
3.6.3. Extensive Growth in India, 1951/52 to 1964/65
Growth in India between the early-1950s and mid-1960s was extensive in nature, based 
on the horizontal replication of industry and production. In particular the gradual 
indigenisation of capital goods and components previously imported. There is evidence 
to show that the process of replication (hence extensive growth) was efficient.
Steel production was rapidly expanded by foreign aid projects in the 1950s. The Soviets 
set up a plant at Bhilai, the British at Durgapur and West Germans at Rourkela all with 
contemporary 1950s vintage technology. These plants were expanded at various intervals 
in the coming decades using the same technology. Expansion was extensive in nature
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(D’Mello 1988). Hindustan Machine Tools (HMT) was initially developed through 
foreign collaboration; this initial agreement was terminated in 1956. A second factory 
was soon after opened in Bangalore without foreign assistance. Engineers, supervisors 
and operators moved from the ‘mother factory’ to set up new offshoots. There are some 
indications of learning, this second factory was operational in fourteen months, the first 
took over a decade. More factories were opened in the early 1960s, in Pinjore, 
Kalamassery and Hyderabad. Technology was initially purchased under license, the 
production of machine tools were then gradually indigenised by dismantling and 
elementising the entire machine and phasing out the import content. The indigenous 
content of milling machines increased from 35% in 1957/58 to 94% 1963/64, radial drills 
from 30% 1958/59 to 91% 1963/64, low priced lathes from 57% 1959/60 to 95% in 
1963/64 and grinders from 43% in 1960/61 to 90% in 1963/64 (Mazcaranhas 1982). In 
1966 HMT made a significant breakthrough and successfully competed for an order of 
250 milling machines to the defence ministry. Growth was extensive in nature, acquiring 
a technology and expanding its use to increase output and indigenise the production 
process. A similar example is the motor vehicle industry, which expanded production 
significantly after being given tariff protection in 1953. The number of vehicles 
produced by the five main firms increased from 2700 in 1953 to 37,408 in 1965. All 
vehicle designs were borrowed from foreign collaborators. Indigenous design 
capabilities were limited mainly to a few two-wheeler vehicles. Over this entire period 
there were no technological innovations (Narayana et al 1992). Learning was limited to 
the indigenisation of component supply. Output growth was extensive in nature, through 
increasing production of vehicles of a given specification and design.
Extensive growth was efficient in the sense production was being efficiently replicated. 
There was little sign of any increase in the sectoral incremental capital-output ratios 
(ICOR’s) in relevant economic sectors. The ICOR in the secondary sector remained 
unchanged from 2.1 between 1950/51 to 1955/56 and 1955/56 to 1960/61. The ICOR in 
the unregistered manufacturing sector changed only marginally from 6.1 between 
1950/51 and 1955/56, to 7.5% between 1955/56 and 1960/61 and 5.6 between 1960/61
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and 1965/6644. In the unregistered manufacturing sector these figures were 1.1, 1.9, and 
2.7 respectively. Capital output ratios in the (government) engineering sector fell from 
3.55 in 1960/61 to 3.29 in 1965/66, in the (government) chemicals sector from 7.66 to 
3.00 over the same period (Desai 1981). Alongside rapid efforts to indigenise production 
of capital goods there are signs that imports were replaced by domestic production of a 
comparable nature. The relative price of capital goods remained stable between 1955 and 
1965 despite a reduction from 20% to 10% in the share of capital goods in total imports. 
Continued import substitution after the mid-1960s was associated with a gradual rise in 
the relative price (Athukorala and Sen 2002:26-7)45. As they were constructed these 
early industrial units rapidly reached capacity levels of production, indicating that the 
technical engineering skills necessary to produce were quickly diffused. Production of 
steel ingots at Bhilai rose from 40.2% of (estimated) capacity in 1960/61 to 111.8% in 
1964/65. In Durgapur these figures were 16.8% and 100.6% respectively. In the 
Hindustan Aluminuium Company (HALCOM) production of primary aluminium 
increased from 41.7% of capacity in 1962 to 126.2% in 1965.
4. The (Political) Role of the State, 1951/52 to 1964/65: Institutions
This section focuses on institutions that allow the state to overcome the inherent conflicts 
associated with (rapid) economic development. In particular this section can explain why 
a number of other works have trouble explaining the pattern of state intervention over this 
period. Bardhan (1984/1998) argued that the heterogeneous social structure of India 
meant that revenues would be diverted from productive investment to unproductive 
subsidies. In fact productive investment rose strongly between 1951 and 1965. Desai 
(1981) argued that the strongest political force in India was a ‘vast army of the petty 
proletariat’. This he argues constrained the state to dissipate its surplus to promote and 
maintain employment in small and public enterprises and left the state unable to impose 
industrial discipline in a culture of low labour productivity. In fact this chapter has
44 Chapter VI shows these dramatically increase after 1965.
45 A key cost of import substitution argued Krueger (1998) is that domestically produced capital goods will
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shown that the extensive growth that occurred between 1951 and 1965 was relatively 
efficient and that there were definite indications of productivity growth. Patnaik (1998) 
and Byres (1981) discuss the difficulty of mobilising resources. Patnaik of the general 
difficulty of taxing property owners, and Byres specifically of raising resources from the 
agricultural sector. By contrast this chapter has shown that the state was very successful 
in mobilising resources through savings and tax revenue. This section will show how 
institutions enabled the state to mobilise resources and use them to promote productive 
investment.
This section will show that the principle reason the Indian state was able to overcome the 
inevitable conflicts associated with (rapid) industrialisation was an inclusive institution -  
the Congress party. By monopolising patronage resources through electoral dominance 
the Congress was able to accommodate new leaders and groups. The monopoly of 
patronage resources made it rational for groups and patrons to remain within the party 
even if they were not gaining short-term benefits. The exit option deprived them of any 
future prospect of benefits. With Congress as the ‘only-game-in-town’ patrons 
acquiesced in the Congress programme in particular higher resource mobilisation and 
productive public investment in the hope of future rewards. Industrial policy could focus 
on economic planning rather than containing conflict. The possibility of monitoring and 
imposing discipline on the public sector and on capitalists by a strong state and planning 
commission was a real one. The state was also able to ensure high rates of productive 
private sector investment that were complementary to its overall industrial policy. The 
Congress system allowed groups losing out from the pattern of economic development to 
be incorporated and compensated at minimal cost. A good example is the demobilisation 
of a militant labour movement in the late 1940s. Into the 1950s and early 1960s labour 
was not benefiting from the development strategy. Labour was incorporated into the 
Congress system and strike activity quickly dropped down to pre-war levels. Radical 
labour ceased to be a threat even as the development strategy nibbled away at real 
incomes. The Congress system allowed groups isolated from the development process to 
be incorporated (the language movement is discussed here) and their opposition to be
be more expensive than imported options.
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quickly diffused. Groups fundamentally opposed to the geographical integrity of India or 
its basic political settlement were more easily identified and repressed. Finally there is 
some argument to show that even some elite groups excluded from the immediate 
benefits of development or suffering from rising levels of inequality acquiesced in their 
own exclusion from an ideological motivation.
4.1. Congress: An Inclusive Institution
The Congress system functioned as a mechanism to absorb those losing out (the labour 
movement) or to integrate those at risk of missing out (the linguistic movements of the 
1950s and 1960s) from the process of development. This section concludes by noting 
that on occasion repression and also more generally a certain ideological unity (certainly 
among elites) in post independence India and a profound legitimacy of the newly 
installed Congress government allowed the state to rapidly mobilise tax revenue and 
savings.
Bardhan said “In the context of economic growth it is rather the capacity of the system to 
insulate economic management from political processes of distributive demands, rent- 
seeking and patronage disbursement that makes the crucial difference.” (1984:72). His 
argument is too narrow, it is precisely the lack of insulation and detachment from society 
that permitted the state to initiate an episode of growth between 1951/52 and 1964/65.
The rapid economic growth and structural changes that occurred after 1951 was made 
possible because the state could utilise patronage resources to incorporate interest groups. 
An important part of securing legitimacy for the (re)allocation of rights and income 
streams that resulted from rapid industrialisation was in compensating the losers. 
Identifying and incorporating those losers requiring compensation, minimising the 
transaction costs associated with such transfers, and minimising rent-seeking by other 
entities required a state that was more ‘embedded’ than ‘autonomous’. The state has to 
be “embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides 
institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and re-negotiation of goals and
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policies.” (Evans 1995:12). The experience of India between 1951/52 and 1964/65 
illustrates that the position of Bardhan is wrong and Evans too narrow. Evans argues that 
the concept of embedded autonomy implies dense links not with society in general but 
specifically with industrial capital and an exclusionary arrangement with other groups. In 
India after 1951 there were many other powerful groups in society whose opposition at 
least had to be neutralised to permit a policy of sustained industrialisation. It was the 
Congress party between independence and the mid-1960s that constituted the required 
embedded institution that was variously able to incorporate civil society (not insulate the 
state) and provide compensation for those groups losing out.
Brown captures the role of the Congress in this period succinctly. “Congress also 
functioned as an integrating mechanism by virtue of its ideological openness, welcoming 
many shades of opinions within its ranks to the extent that it was not only the dominant 
party within the polity but almost within itself an ideological party system. The only 
groups excluded from Congress were those Nehru believed guilty of attitudes and actions 
which threatened to divide and destabilise the country, particularly communists and those 
who overtly defined India in Hindu terms, or those who excluded themselves, such as a
small band of socialists Congress, by its social openness and flexibility at state level,
put down roots in every part of India, welcoming into its ranks virtually all those with a 
stake in public life who saw it as a vehicle for influence and power. Its chameleon-like 
adaptability to local social configurations of power was reflected and confirmed by its 
choice of candidates to fight elections for particular seats, (Brown 2003:221). This 
summary based undoubtedly on earlier work by Weiner and Kothari needs unpacking.
Weiner (1967) in field work of local Congress organisations showed how the party had 
an adaptive quality and was able to build alliances using patronage networks anchored by 
local notables, panchayat leaders, and caste elites. Kothari (1964) analysed how the 
Congress as an institution was able to incorporate, co-opt and diffuse dissent. Kothari 
labelled the Congress-system a structure of one-party-dominance, distinguishing this 
from a one-party system. The model consists of a party of consensus and smaller 
external parties of pressure, the latter existing on the margins of the political system.
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There were also various factions within the Congress party. Voice from outside and 
factionalism within provided an in-built corrective that prevented the ruling elite from 
stagnating. The elaborate network of factions through which Congress operated allowed 
for the efficient functioning of patronage and incorporation. By the time of Independence 
Congress had been a mass organisation for more than twenty years. Congress 
membership in Uttar Pradesh for example increased from 62,000 in 1936 to 1.45m in 
December 1938 (Menon 2003:244). Gandhian notions of the organic unity of Indian 
society and of class conciliation provided the ideology for inclusivity. The provincial 
party was organised into 21 units in conformity with major linguistic boundaries. There 
was a concerted effort to decentralise the party with branches in every district and tulaka 
(Menon 2003:63-76). This hierarchical structure allowed the party to develop a system 
of factions at every level of political and governmental activity. The party provided a 
system of co-ordination between these various levels through vertical faction chains. 
Bardhan agrees with this much at least, Congress he argues “provided a subtle a resilient 
mechanism for conflict management and transactional negotiations among the proprietary 
classes” (1984:77). The central leadership provided a system of mediation and 
arbitration and inter-level co-ordination in the party. The person of Nehru provided the 
ultimate arbiter46.
4.2. Patronage, Discipline and Productive Investment
The Congress system was extremely flexible in incorporating a diverse array of elites into 
its ranks. These were then subject to the hierarchy, conflict management procedures and 
transactional negotiations of the system. The monopoly of patronage resources within 
the system generated an incentive to remain inside in the hope of future rewards. 
Combined these factors allowed the state to more rigorously implement its industrial 
policy.
46 “Throughout the 1950s Nehru enjoyed unlimited, indeed, virtually unchallenged power over the Indian 
republic. He was the darling of India’s people, the hero of his party, the unrivalled leader of his
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The Congress party in government instituted an ‘open elite system’ that permitted 
aspiring social groups to gain a share of power within the party (Jafffelot 2003). New 
leaders were accommodated as both cause and effect of the party’s endemic factionalism. 
New groups were incorporated to reinforce the positions of existing leaders. Successful 
leaders were those skilful in rewarding diverse factions and communities (Weiner 1971). 
Votes were in turn delivered by local level bosses acting as political intermediaries 
between the party and electorate. This pattern varied across different areas of India, in 
Madhya Pradesh the Congress simply aggregated the vote banks controlled by former 
princes or jagidars. In Uttar Pradesh the leadership of Congress was upper caste but 
successfully promoted and co-opted untouchable leaders. Congress was the inclusive 
party with social bases of support that varied absolutely in different parts of India. In the 
1971 general elections Congress drew majority support from every class, religion and 
caste, 65% of Sikhs, 62% of Hindus, 68% of Harijans, 65% of high and middle castes 
(Chhibber and Petrocik 2002). The Congress functioned as a collection of state level 
political parties incorporating local influences. In 1971 for example the support of 
Muslims in Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat for Congress far exceeded Congress’s average vote 
in those states, while in Tamil Nadu the support of Muslims was below the average 
Congress vote share. In Rajasthan Congress derived support from the Jats, and the 
Rajputs represented the opposition. In Haryana the Congress was supported by Punjabi 
Hindus and upper castes while the Jats voted for the opposition Lok Dal. Although 
Indian society is fragmented into many different groups, according to religion, language, 
caste, class and ethnic differences. The all-inclusive nature of the Congress meant that 
until the mid-1960s these did not provide cleavages around which alternative political 
organisations developed.
Congress monopolised government from the centre and states down to village 
Panchayats. In the 1952 elections Congress received 45% of the national and 42% of 
votes in the assembly elections, in 1957 this rose to 48% and 45% respectively. This 
translated into over seventy-percent of seats in the Lok Sabha and control of almost every 
state government. In 1952 seventy-seven parties competed and divided the opposition,
government.” (Wolpert 1996:457).
154
the Socialist Party came second with 10% of the vote. In power Congress monopolised 
the spoils of patronage from sugar co-operatives, banking corporations, and the 
government allocation of resources - licenses, fertilisers, seeds and road construction. 
This in turn was used to cement its position in power and facilitate the party’s economic 
programme. The monopoly of patronage resources made it rational for groups and 
patrons to remain within the party even if they were not gaining short-term benefits. The 
exit option would deprive them of any future prospect of benefits. With Congress as the 
‘only-game-in-town’ patrons acquiesced in the Congress programme in particular higher 
resource mobilisation and productive public investment in the hope of future rewards.
The inclusive nature of Congress reduced extra-political conflict. Groups were brought 
into the Congress-system by a variety of patrons but once inside were subject to its 
hierarchy, conflict management procedures and transactional negotiations. This enabled 
the state operating alongside the dominant party system to allocate a large share of 
resources to those best able to make productive use of them. Groups not benefiting 
immediately remained inside the party. They did not have the option of cultivating 
alternative political patrons outside the Congress system. Industrial policy could focus 
on economic planning rather than containing conflict. The possibility of monitoring and 
imposing discipline on the public sector and on capitalists by a strong state and planning 
commission was a real one. Section 3.6 showed that extensive growth engineered by the 
state sector was efficient. Growth was based on increasing productivity, rapid 
diversification of the industrial sector, a balanced pattern to expansion and efficient 
replication of the industrial enterprise structure. Section 3.4 argued that an important 
source of growth came from the private sector. The state was able to ensure high rates of 
productive private sector investment that were complementary to its overall industrial 
policy.
After 1951 the state sought to develop a pre-planned industrial structure. Plan priorities 
for the industrial sector included targets for state investment and were translated into a 
structure of regulation that had a profound influence on the allocation of investment in 
the private sector. Section 3.4 showed that there is good evidence that the private sector
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responded to the emergence of forward linkages by increasing directly productive 
investment. Table 5.13 showed that there was a very high level of investment in 
equipment between 1950/51 and 1964/65. The state created opportunities for private 
sector investment it was the private sector that utilised these opportunities and made more 
directly productive investment in equipment.
4.3. Patronage and Conflict
The Congress system allowed groups losing out from the pattern of economic 
development to be incorporated and compensated at minimal cost. A good example is 
the demobilisation of a militant labour movement in the late 1940s (Chibber 2003 :Ch4). 
After 1945 India faced an explosion of strikes and union activity as real wages were 
being eroded by post-war inflation. Into the 1950s and early-1960s labour was not 
benefiting from the development strategy. Investment not consumption was growing 
strongly, public investment grew by 8.8% p.a. and private investment by 8.5% p.a. 
between 1961/2 and 1965/6. Government tax revenue rose from under 7% of GDP in 
1950/51 to nearly 15% in 1965/66. This revenue was being raised primarily from 
regressive sources, notably excise duties, which increased their share of central tax 
collections from 16.7% to 52.6% of the total. The share of direct taxes (income and 
corporation taxes) declined from 42.8 to 27.0% of central tax collections over the same 
period (table 5.17)47.
Table 5.17: Structure of Central Tax Co lections (% Distribultion)
Year Income
Tax
Corpora 
te Tax
Direct Customs Excise Indirect Total
1950/51 32.8 10.0 42.8 38.8 16.7 51.2 100.0
1955/56 27.1 7.6 34.7 34.4 29.9 65.3 100.0
1960/61 18.4 12.2 30.6 18.7 45.8 69.4 100.0
1965/66 13.2 11.9 27.0 17.8 52.6 73.0 100.0
47 A declining share of income taxation would likely be of little benefit to the bulk of labour. India 
typically has an extremely high exemption rate that removes the vast majority of labour from income tax 
liability.
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Source: (Sundrum 1987:304).
The growth of tax revenue outpaced growth of current expenditure, public sector savings 
increased from 1.8% of GDP in 1958/59 to 3.5% in 1964/65. The structure of output 
growth was not one favouring the consumer. Between 1960 and 1965 investment in 
capital and intermediate goods grew by 17% p.a., the manufacturing sector grew by 9% 
p.a. There was negligible growth in the output of textiles whilst iron and steel, machinery 
and chemicals expanded strongly (table 5.15). Mean consumption fell in both rural and 
urban areas between 1950 and 1965, from Rs65 (per month in 1973/74 prices) to Rs49 
and Rs85 to Rs60 respectively (Ravallion and Datt 1996:12). Real wages per worker in 
factories rose a little between 1951 and 1955 then declined back to a similar starting point 
in 1964 (Bhagwati and Desai 1970). An index of real wages rose from 100 in 1960 to 
104 in 1967 (Tulpule and Datta 1988). Real wages in India were the same in 1964 as in 
1948, there were declines between 1955 and 1964 (Mirlees 1968). Wages as a proportion 
of value added in manufacture fell rapidly from 53.5% in 1949 to 39.8% in 1958 then 
more slowly to 36.5% in 1964 (Mitra 1977). The capital-intensive pattern of economic 
growth led to slow growth of labour absorption. Between 1951 and 1983 factory 
employment increased by only 3.5% p.a. (Ahluwalia 1996). Total employment increased 
by only 1.63% p.a. between 1950/51 and 1964/65 (Sivasubramonian 2004:68). There 
was no trend decline in poverty from the early 1950s to the mid-1960s (Ahluwalia 1978; 
Sundrum 1987:159).
In September 1946 the incoming Congress government were confronted by two left-led . 
labour organisations mobilised around an ideology of opposition to industrial capital. In 
December 1947 a Tripartite Conference was held to end hostilities. The two most 
important measures were firstly, the enactment of labour laws that drastically undermined 
the potency of collective bargaining and made unions dependent on state patronage, and 
secondly, the engineering of a split in the union movement. Steps were taken to curtail 
union independence and legislation passed to make the state and not unions the arbiter of 
industrial conflict. The labour legislation recognised trade unions as a legitimate vehicle
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to be used by labour in pursuit of their interests, the legitimacy of strikes and collective 
bargaining. The Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 provided for the formation of works 
committees to negotiate over localised disputes. Though recognised in theory the 
prospect of genuine collective bargaining was severely curtailed. Unions were given 
little in the way of actual protection against employer coercion. The act provided that 14 
days notification was needed for a strike, for public utilities the state was given the option 
to compel arbitration. The state was also able to declare any industry a public utility for a 
period of six months. The largest and most union militant federation the All-India Trade 
Union Congress provided the biggest component of the militant upsurge. A new 
federation, the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC) was formed and 
affiliated to Congress. Every affiliated organisation was compelled to submit to 
arbitration when industrial disputes were not resolved by negotiation. Under patronage 
of the government the INTUC grew rapidly to become the largest labour organisation in 
the country. In return for accepting these institutional arrangements, leave, holidays, 
promotion, wage scales, and employment were regulated by government legislation. The 
most important of these was the Industrial Employment Act and Factories Act in which 
the state legislated for employment conditions rather than leaving them to collective 
bargaining. These efforts worked, strike activity quickly dropped down to pre-war levels 
and radical labour ceased to be a threat even as the development strategy nibbled away at 
real disposable income. Employment protection provided some compensation for 
declining real incomes.
4.4. Patronage, Incorporation and Repression
The Congress system allowed groups isolated from the development process to be 
incorporated and their opposition diffused. Groups fundamentally opposed to the 
geographical integrity of India or its basic political settlement were more easily identified 
and repressed.
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At independence the inherited state boundaries were based on the vagaries of British 
colonisation, leaving large minority languages stranded in numerous states. Language in 
India has a crucial material aspect. Proficiency in an officially recognised language was 
needed for those aspiring to public employment or for entry to higher education. Some 
two-thirds of formal sector workers were employed by the state, Bardhan (1984/1998) 
listed such professionals as one of the three dominant proprietary classes. By the early- 
1960s language had become a means by which large numbers were (indirectly) being 
excluded from the benefits of development. In 1960 Assamese was adopted as the 
official language of Assam. This was intended to limit access to state educational and 
employment opportunities for the non-Assamese. The sole official language of Bihar 
was Hindi. According to the 1961 census only 44.3% of the population declared it as 
their mother tongue. The all-India Constituent Assembly had resolved to retain English 
for a transition period and postponed for 15 years the official implementation of Hindi. 
English was to remain for this time the official language of the union and inter-province 
communication whilst provincial languages were retained in their own states. In 1963 the 
Official Languages Act promised Hindi as the official language by 1965, but for English 
to continue as an ‘associate additional official language’. This ambiguity led to large- 
scale riots in Tamil Nadu in 1965. There was a fear that the language riots would 
escalate into full-blown secessionist demands. The central state sought to avoid direct 
conflict and approached the problem with clear guidelines, based on arbitration and 
mediation with local leaders. The informal mechanisms of the Congress party 
organisation and its decentralised reach proved crucial in this process. The party centre 
promoted and supported strong state leaders to ensure mutual compromise on language 
issues. In 1955 the States Re-organisation Committee published its report aiid the 
southern states were re-organised in a manner that brought their boundaries into closer 
conformity with traditional linguistic regions. Somewhat later in 1960 Bombay province 
was split into Maharashtra and Gujarat, in 1966 Punjab was re-organsied and Haryana 
created. The political heat was removed from the language movement and its nascent 
leadership incorporated into the Congress party at senior levels, which then retained 
political power in all these new states in the 1962 elections .
48 The contrast with Pakistan is striking. In 1961 the Constituent Assembly rejected that Bengali be used
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In the case of groups fundamentally opposed to the geographical integrity of India and its 
basic political settlement the state neither incorporated nor excluded but repressed. The 
Maharajah of Kashmir acceded in October 1947 and his decision was backed up by 
military force. Hyderabad was invaded in September 1948. The communist uprising in 
Telengana was brutally suppressed between 1948 and 1950. Another concern was the 
appearance of Hindu nationalism with the assassination of Gandhi in January 1948. The 
nationalist RSS was swiftly banned. The fear of disorder was reflected in the 
constitutional creation of a strong centralised state (Brass 2000). Article 356 of the 
Constitution allowed for takeover of state governments by the centre. Freedom of speech 
was restricted by a state expanding its leeway to prosecute for ‘agitational’ offences - 
public order, decency/ morality, contempt of court, defamation, and incitement to 
violence. All these restrictions were imposed with the passage of the Preventative 
Detention Act under the authority of the constitution. The Defence of India Act was 
strengthened and other security measured passed such as the Terrorist and Disruptive 
Activities Act and Maintenance of Internal Security Act. All these enhanced the power 
of the state against the citizenry. These powers of preventative detention and internal 
security have been used extensively in Punjab, Kashmir and the North-east. Various 
forces under the control of the centre to maintain internal security mushroomed - the 
Central Reserve Police Force, the Border Security Force, and Central Industrial Security 
Force.
with Urdu as a national language, though over half of the population spoke Bengali and only 7% Urdu. The 
middle classes and vernacular elites felt humiliated by the use of only Urdu and English on banknotes. A 
general strike and three deaths from police action generated Bengal’s first martyrs and a direct line to the 
massive political mobilisation in the 1960s and independence in 1971. The language issue became a 
convenient hook on which to mobilise opposition, in large part owing to the inept handling of the issue by 
the state (Rahman 1997; Talbot 1998; Jaffrelot 2002).
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4.5. A Propitious Ideology in 1951
The development (Mahalanobis) model was based on extremely rapid rates of resource 
mobilisation, tax revenue and rising savings. These resources were ploughed back into 
the capital-intensive and heavy industrial sectors. This pattern of development had 
minimal positive impact in the short-run on living standards. The specific case of labour 
was discussed in section 4.3. There is some argument to show that even some elite 
groups excluded from the immediate benefits of development or suffering acquiesced in 
their own exclusion from an ideological motivation. This idea echoes the work by Woo- 
Cumings (1999) and others who argue that the authoritarian states of East Asia did not 
obtain their legitimacy through a mandate from civil society, or by following rules to gain 
office, rather by the project they were carrying out. Legitimacy was obtained through 
rapid economic development in an uncertain and dangerous cold-war world.
Varma argues that the middles classes in the 1950s had a “a certain commonality of 
approach and thinking, an attitude towards the nation and the society, a sense of idealism 
and high minded purpose transcending purely individual concerns.” (1998:27). This was 
derived he argues from Gandhian ideological concerns of morality being an end in itself, 
of probity in public life and of the need for both state and society to have a sensitivity 
towards the poorest. The natural corollary of such concerns argues Varma were the 
secular state, self-reliance and a distrust of displays of wealth. In India the legitimacy of 
the leadership was derived from their sacrifice and struggle against the British Empire. 
Nehru’s mantle of nearly a decade in British prisons gave him enormous popular and 
initially unchallenged legitimacy. The moral cause of independence enunciated by 
Gandhi meant “there was an ideology, a vision, a calling which the middle class could 
owe loyalty to.” (Varma 1998:36). This vision between 1951 and 1965 was based on 
mobilising resources, taxation and savings, rapid rates of investment and a promise of 
future benefits. There was also in 1950/51 a broad ideological acceptance of the 
development model pursued. The Mahalanobis plan was an abrupt break with the 
laissez-faire of the Raj but was in keeping with the broad thrust of elite thinking in post-
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Independence India. While Desai (1998) argues ‘there was an alternative to 
Mahalanobis’ he doesn’t make any case that it would have better suited the political 
economy of post-independence India. Others while not necessarily believing in the 
desirability of the post-Independence development model argue convincingly it was an 
acceptable compromise and neatly fitted with the prevailing political economy constraints 
of the time (Kaviraj 1988; Chatteijee 1996). Chateijee says “A development ideology 
was a constituent part of the self definition of the post-colonial state.” (1996:86). 
Chakravarty argued the five-year plans were “especially important as attempts at giving 
concrete shape to the vision of transformation, social and economic, to which the 
modernising elite subscribe.” (1987:9). Others argue that the acceptance of planning and 
developmental role of the state was persuasive across the ideological spectrum, from the 
business-orientated ‘Bombay Plan’, M.N.Roy’s Left ‘Peoples Plan’, Narain’s ‘Gandhian 
Plan’ for a self sufficient village economy (Patnaik 1998; Corbridge and Harriss 
2000:Ch3). Khilnani (1998) makes a more positive case, that the Mahalanobis model 
was both desirable and politically convenient. Swadeshi he argues was important 
historically in the nationalist movement and associated with both the boycotting and 
destruction of foreign made goods49. The ideological and the practical coincided; self- 
reliance could be easily and politically profitably equated with import substitution. In the 
context of 1950/51 India there seemed to be no other alternative to planned economic 
development, there was little questioning of the new policy directions, and a general 
acceptance of the integrity and judgement of those who had led the independence 
struggle (Ahluwalia and Williamson 2003:6). Much of the populace was ideologically 
prepared to sacrifice immediate benefits in order to gain a future return. The ideology of 
independent India was a propitious one in which to rapidly raise the rates of savings and 
tax revenue.
49 First articulated at the beginning of the C 20th in Bengal by Rabindranath Tagore and others and later 
converted into an all-India mass movement by Gandhi.
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Chapter VI: The Role of the State and the Episode of
Stagnation Growth in India, 1965/66 to 1979/80.
1. Summary of Chapter Findings
This chapter is divided into four main parts, the first briefly summarises the key data 
surrounding the episode of stagnation between 1965/66 and 1979/80, then reviews and 
critiques the existing set of causal explanations. The remainder of the chapter is divided 
into three parts, each focusing on one particular role that the state has in promoting 
economic development. The Indian state between 1965 and 1980 had three principal 
roles with regards to the domestic financial system. These were mobilising domestic 
savings, creating institutions to mobilise private sector savings, and allocating resources 
to projects essential for development. Contrary to suggestions by many authors the 
Indian state was very successful in mobilising resources. The pattern was very different 
to that prevailing between 1951/52 to 1964/65. Between 1965/66 and 1979/80 tax 
revenue and household savings increased while private corporate sector savings and the 
net inflow of savings from abroad declined. The second important financial role of the 
state was in allocating resources to projects essential for development. After the mid- 
1960s the share of total investment was dragged down by a decline in public investment. 
Private investment by contrast remained stable or even increased slightly after the mid- 
1960s. The second economic role of the state is in achieving a productive use of the 
suiplus, in both public and private sectors. In terms of industrial growth and 
diversification, resource mobilisation and its productive allocation, the period 1950-65 
was successful. It is only after 1965 that the economy suffered a dramatic decline in 
performance. A close look at more disaggregated figures shows there was quite rapid 
aggregate productivity growth between 1950 and 1965, then stagnation until 1980. The 
final section focuses on institutions that allowed the state to overcome the inherent 
conflicts associated with (rapid) economic development. Exogenous shocks that hit the 
Indian economy in the mid-1960s caused a dramatic decline in the Congress party in the
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1967 elections. There was a sharp structural break in indicators of conflict after the mid- 
1960s and a rise of a new political economy of agriculturalism. This undermined the 
state’s ability to allocate resources towards projects essential for development and ensure 
resources allocated were used productively. As a result of growing political conflict from 
the mid-1960s onwards allocations of public resources were not going to those capitalists 
or state enterprises able to make productive use of them but instead to those that needed 
to be accommodated for the sake of political stability. Industrial policy became 
increasing a means of containing conflict rather than of economic planning. There is also 
evidence that extensive growth by replication became less efficient after the mid-1960s. 
Finally, this section shows that there was an increase in pressure from demand groups 
including trade unions after the mid-1960s. There was a structural break in the 
distribution of factor incomes in the organised sector after 1965/66. This was caused 
both by increasing wages and also by a slowdown in productivity growth. This had a 
material impact on the ability of firms to finance private corporate sector investment or 
more specifically investment in machinery.
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2. Recap from Chapter III: An Episode of Stagnation, 1965/66 to 
1979/80
India suffered a slowdown in industrial growth between 1965 and 1980 relative to 1950 
to 1965. Industrial growth declined from over 7% p.a. to little over 5%. This was in 
direct contrast to the governments aim to achieve rapid industrialisation. The slowdown 
is statistically significant and shows a distinct pattern by sector (Ahluwalia 1985:Ch7). 
Within manufacturing, industries constituting two-thirds of total value added (including 
machinery, transport equipment, chemicals and rubber) experienced a significant decline 
in growth after 1965/6. The slowdown in heavy industry was general; output growth of 
metal products fell from 12.5% p.a. in the first period to 2.5% in the second. Similar 
though less dramatic slowdowns in growth are evident in basic metals and non-metallic 
mineral products. The growth of textiles increased from 2.3% in the earlier period to 
4.4% in the later period. Food manufacturing showed no significant change because of 
large year-to-year fluctuations. Other consumer industries such as beverages, tobacco, 
footwear, furniture, and leather and fur products showed no significant decline in growth. 
In terms of use and input-based groups between 1959/60 and 1979/80 there are equally 
striking results. Rapidly growing capital and basic goods sectors experienced the greatest 
downturn. More slowly growing intermediate and consumer non-durable industries 
experienced no deceleration. Consumer durables show rapid growth in both sub-periods. 
Productivity growth as measured by TFP turned negative after 1965/66.
3. Limitations of Existing Explanations
There was a wide-ranging debate examining the causes of stagnation in India50. This 
section briefly reviews the main themes from this debate, concluding they do not 
satisfactorily explain stagnation.
50 See Varshney (1984) and Ahluawlia (1985) for good surveys.
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3.1. Agriculture Industry Linkages
The agricultural sector has important links to the industrial sector from both demand and 
supply sides. In a closed economy the marketed surplus of wage goods generates a 
ceiling to employment growth. The marketed surplus has both a real and financial 
component. Food and raw materials provide direct working capital for industry. A 
financial surplus represents a command over resources that can be transferred to industry 
(Mitra 1977; Lipton 1978; Byres 1979). Agriculture may become a drag on industry by 
limiting the supply of industrial raw material inputs to agro-based industries. In India 
such industries are predominantly consumer non-durable and intermediate goods (30% of 
industrial sector value added). The most important agro-based industries in the 1950s 
were textiles, dependent on the supply of raw cotton and jute (50% of value added) and 
food manufacturing, dependent on the supply of sugarcane and tea (25% of value added). 
Agricultural incomes also account for a large proportion of final output demand in the 
industrial sector in terms of both income and numbers of potential consumers, 70% of the 
Indian population during the 1950s and 60s resided in rural areas and agriculture 
accounted for around 50% of GDP. In this period rural consumption was three times 
higher than urban consumption for clothing and, footwear. The growth of labour 
productivity in agriculture was an important influence on releasing labour for non- 
agricultural employment.
Variously (Thamarajakshi 1969, 1977, 1990; Vaidyanathan 1977; Srinivasan 1979; 
Patnaik 1981; Desai 1981; Mody 1982; arid Sawarit 1983) firidno evidence of a 
slowdown in the agricultural sector after 1965, in terms of output, marketed surplus or net 
domestic availability. Mitra (1977) argues there was a distinct shift in the weighted terms 
of trade towards agriculture after 1965. His evidential base is poor. Desai (1981) finds 
the trend does not extend outside Mitra’s limited time period, he finds instead no sign of 
a continuous improvement in the terms of trade; there was a decline in the 1950s, a rise in 
the 1960s and a fall in the 1970s. If wage goods were the binding constraint on industrial 
growth all industries should be affected, with the largest effect being on the most labour­
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intensive. Industrial deceleration however was concentrated in capital and basic goods 
industries -  the least labour-intensive. Labour-intensive consumer non-durables showed 
steady growth across 1951/52 to 1964/65 and 1965/66 to 1979/80. Finally food, drink, 
tobacco and textiles accounted for only 6% of GDP in the early-1960s; such a small 
sector could not have had much aggregate impact on the Indian economy. Low growth of 
agricultural output per capita (0.5% p.a. 1950-1980) was a continued constraint on the 
rest of the Indian economy and can help account for the slow growth of consumer goods 
output between 1951/52 and 1979/80, but not for the sudden onset of stagnation after 
1965.
3.2. Import Substitution
The structural break and stagnation in industrial growth could be explained by a 
slowdown in import substitution after the mid-1960s and consequent erosion of the 
demand stimulus for industrial growth. To test this hypothesis it is necessary to relate 
patterns in opportunities for (potential) import substitution to patterns in industrial 
stagnation. Chandrasekhar (1988) argues there was indeed an exhaustion of import- 
substitution opportunities by the mid-1960s. In 1965/6 the share of imports in domestic 
availability he shows exceeded 20% in only 4 from 20 industrial groups (petroleum 
products, basic metals, non-electrical machinery and electrical machinery). Ahluwalia 
(1985) notes that the contribution of import substitution to industrial growth declined 
after the mid-60s for most industry groups. The general thrust of the evidence though 
indicates there is no clear pattern between a loss of potential opportunities for import 
substitution and industrial stagnation. Table 6.5 (later) shows that imports as a share of 
GDP declined from 7.26% of GDP in 1959/60 to 6.08% of GDP in 1965/66 and 
continued falling into the early 1970s, reaching a low of 4.11% of GDP only in 1972/73. 
For capital goods continuing opportunities for import substitution were associated with a 
deceleration in the growth rate of domestic output, and for consumer durables continuing 
import substitution accompanied continuing rapid growth of domestic output. The share 
of imported machinery in investment declined from 38.6% in 1961/2 to 27.8% in 1965/6
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and continued to fall over next five years to 16.8%. An index of machinery imports 
(1960/61 = 100) rose to 103 in 1961/62, 143 in 1965/67 and only by 1970/71 declined to 
74 (Rangarajan 1982:297). India had achieved minimal progress towards self- 
sufficiency, by commodity there was no negative correlation between import growth and 
growth of domestic production. Industrialisation created ongoing opportunities for 
import substitution (Desai 1971). More generally import substitution is only one element 
of demand growth. Growth depends on the whole structure of demand and supply.
Trade ratios remained below 10% of GDP between 1951 and 1980, aggregate effects 
were not large. It is difficult to sustain the proposition that a sudden exhaustion of import 
substitution brought about the collapse in the growth of the capital goods industries after 
1965.
3.3. Public Investment and the Structural Break
Public investment is critical in India, by the 1960s it comprised 40-50% of total organised 
sector investment, up from 25% in 1950/1. The slowdown in public investment after 
1965-7 had a direct demand effect in certain heavy industries (Srinivasan and Naryana 
1977; Patnaik 1981; Rangarajan 1982; Bardhan 1984; Chandrasekhar 1988). The 
structural break in infrastructure investment was dramatic and does coincide with the 
structural break in industrial growth after 1965-7 (table 6.9). In 1966/67 public 
investment was reduced by 13%. Public investment in infrastructure, which had been 
growing by 17% p.a. between 1960-65, grew by only 2% p.a. for the next decade.
Ahluwalia (1985) makes the strongest case against the public investment thesis, arguing 
that the demand for the output of heavy industries depends on overall investment, public 
or private. Total investment rose from 15.5% of GDP in 1960/61 to 19.6% of GDP in 
1965/66, subsequent cuts in public investment in public investment were offset by rising 
private investment, hence total investment remained stable at 16-18% of GDP until 
1979/80 (table 6.8). There are important problems with this argument, relating to both 
the differing role of public and private investment and the changing composition of both
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after 1965/66. These are examined in detail later in this chapter.
3.4. Income Distribution and Economic Growth
Income distribution is usually seen as a determined variable (Ricardo and Kuznets), or as 
potentially a separate question from growth and efficiency51. In India much debate has 
focused on the possible negative implications of rising inequality for growth. This debate 
falls into two areas, the first is related to the pattern of demand. Sau (1974), Mitra (1977) 
and Nayyar (1978) argue that increasing inequality narrowed the population base of 
demand for industrial output. Bagchi (1970, 1975, 1977, 1981, 1988) and Chandra 
(1982) argue that demand from (high-income) elites will not ultimately solve the 
problem. The consumption basket of the rich they argue has a higher import content and 
fewer domestic linkages.
Evidence for this proposition in Sau (1974) is limited and convincingly critiqued 
(Rangarajan 1982). Shetty (1978) is typical of the poor use of partial and indirect 
evidence of rising inequality, he is convincingly critiqued (Desai 1981). M.S. Ahluwalia 
(1978) and Ahluwalia (1985) find no trends in inequality, certainly not a sharp shift in 
income distribution that could explain the sudden onset of stagnation after 1965.
The other strand of the debate has to the contrary focused on rising inequality reducing 
demand by raising the level of savings (Chakravarty 1979). To explain stagnation after 
1965 purely in terms of aggregate demand-based explanations is theoretically incomplete 
(Nayar 1978, 1981; Patnaik 1984). This argument lacks a hypothesis of why the state 
was unable to offset stagnation originating from shifts in income distribution. Declining 
aggregate demand due to shifts in patterns of income or rising aggregate savings can be 
offset by expansionary policy by the state.
51 The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics (Varian 1992).
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3.5. The Policy Framework Constraint on Economic Growth
The efficiency of factors hypothesis examines sources of industrial growth from the 
supply-side. Declining TFP generated a supply-side constraint, “cumulative inefficiency 
through the years may have had a stifling effect on the growth of manufacturing.” 
(Ahluwalia 1985:140). Ahluwalia (1985), Bhagwati (1993) and many others have 
catalogued the negative impact of the policy framework on economic growth. These 
policy constraints they argue consisted of, industrial licensing, import licensing and the 
trade policy regime, price controls, and restrictive policies towards foreign investment 
and technology. Large business houses secured investment licenses to prevent entry 
rather than expand capacity. The Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practises Act (MRTP) 
Act, 1969 did not reduce the concentration of economic power but did accentuate the 
slow and cumbersome functioning of the regulatory system. Indian industry was given 
indefinite protection from competition. High protection granted to capital and 
intermediate goods industries raised costs across the industrial sector. Small-sector 
reservation (electrical appliances, electronic equipment, several mechanical engineering 
products, auto parts and components) combined with various incentives provided for the 
small-scale sector resulted in the resistance of the small-scale sector to expansion, and 
fragmentation of the large into small. Uncertainties rooted in industrial policies and 
procedures discouraged long-term planning by industry and gave wide discretion for 
officials at every stage of the clearance procedure. This pushed entrepreneurs towards 
speculation and short-term maximisation rather than creative activity.
This general argument is difficult to reconcile with the structural break in industrial 
growth after 1965. This hypothesis cannot explain why India experienced rapid 
industrial growth until 1965, or why growth suddenly slowed after 1965 despite the 
contemporary steps towards liberalisation.
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4. The (Economic) Role of the State, 1964/65 to 1979/80: Finance
This section examines the role of the state in mobilising and allocating the surplus.
The Indian state between 1965 and 1980 had three principal roles with regards to the 
domestic financial system. These were mobilising domestic savings, creating institutions 
to mobilise private sector savings, and allocating resources to projects essential for 
development.
Authors have argued there was a problem of mobilisation after 1965 (Patnaik 1981,
1998). The Indian state they argue was unable to tax property and profit income so faced 
a crisis of resource mobilisation by the mid-1960s. This section will demonstrate that to 
the contrary the state was very successful in mobilising resources. Compared to 1951/52 
to 1964/65, tax revenue and household savings increased, while private corporate sector 
savings and the net inflow of savings from abroad declined. The rate of gross domestic 
savings increased rapidly, especially after banking sector nationalisation in 1969. The 
main contributors were public and private household savings, private corporate savings 
stagnated. After the mid-1960s the share of total investment was dragged down by lower 
public investment, which declined from a peak of 9.6% of GDP in 1965/66 to a low of 
6.3% in 1970/71. Private investment by contrast remained stable or even increased 
slightly between the mid-1960s and early-1970s.
4.1. The Role of the State and the Mobilisation of Domestic (and foreign) Savings
There was a decline in total savings between 1966/67 to 1968/69, from 15.3% to 14.8%, 
then a steady and sustained rise to 22.9% in 1979/80 (table 6.1).
Table 6.1: Gross Domestic Savings, 1965/66 to 1979/80 (% of GDP at current 
market prices, three year moving averages).
Year Rate of Gross
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Domestic Savings
1965/66 15.2
1966/67 15.3
1967/68 14.8
1968/69 14.8
1969/70 15.8
1970/71 16.8
1971/72 16.8
1972/73 17.6
1973/74 17.9
1974/75 19.2
1975/76 20.2
1976/77 21.4
1977/78 22.8
1978/79 22.9
1979/80 22.9
Source: (Bardhan 1984/1998:97-8).
The state achieved this rise in total savings through two means. The first was raising 
resources through the tax system and generating higher public sector savings (the second, 
related to mobilising private sector savings is examined in the next section). Between 
1966/67 and 1979/80 the state sharply increased the volume of resources raised through 
the tax system, from 13.6 to 18% of GDP (table 6.2).
Table 6.2: Consolidated Government, 1966/67 to 1978/79
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6/67
196
7/68
196
8/69
196
9/70
197
0/71
197
1/72
197
2/73
197
3/74
197
4/75
197
5/76
197
6/77
197
7/78
197
8/79
Revenue 13.6 12.6 13.1 13.2 13.6 14.9 15.3 14.2 15.1 17.4 18.0 17.1 18.0
Fiscal
Deficit
7.3 5.5 4.4 3.8 4.6 5.3 5.2 4.3 4.1 4.6 5.4 4.9 5.7
Primary
Fiscal
Deficit
6.7 5.0 4.2 3.6 4.3 4.8 4.8 3.8 3.5 3.8 4.7 4.5 5.0
Source: (Joshi and Little 1994:100, 132).
Higher revenue is not sufficient to raise the level of public sector savings; it can be 
dissipated in higher current (government) expenditure. During this period there was no 
trend in measures of the government deficit (table 6.2). Both the fiscal and primary fiscal
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deficit were higher in 1966/67 and 1967/68 than subsequently. Over the whole period the 
government increased its contribution to total domestic savings. After a brief decline 
from 3.1% in 1965/66 to 2.3% in 1967/68 public sector savings increased steadily for the 
rest of the period to a peak of 4.8% in 1977/78 (table 6.3).
Table 6.3: Gross Savings in the Public Sector (three-year moving average) as % of 
GDP (current market prices).
Year Gross Saving 
in the Public 
Sector
1965/66 3.1
1966/67 2.6
1967/68 2.3
1968/69 2.5
1969/70 2.8
1970/71 3.0
1971/72 3.0
1972/73 3.0
1973/74 3.2
1974/75 3.8
1975/76 4.5
1976/77 4.7
1977/78 4.8
1978/79 4.6
1979/80 4.2
Source: (Bardhan 1984/1998:99).
Unlike the period 1951/52 to 1965/66 there was no recourse to foreign savings to 
supplement domestic resource mobilisation. The net inflow of savings from abroad 
declined very sharply over this period, from 2.8% in 1965/66 to a low o f-1 .1% in 
1976/77 (table 6.4).
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Table 6.4: Net Inflow of Savings from Abroad (% GDP)
Year Net Inflow of 
Savings from 
Abroad
1965/66 2.8
1966/67 2.8
1967/68 2.4
1968/69 1.5
1969/70 1.0
1970/71 0.9
1971/72 0.9
1972/73 0.8
1973/74 0.7
1974/75 0.5
1975/76 -0.3
1976/77 -1.1
1977/78 -1.0
1978/79 -0.3
1979/80 0.8
Source: (Bardhan 1984/1998:99).
The decline in foreign capital inflow was politically motivated. After 15 years of 
independence and widespread rhetoric on the desirability of self-sufficient economic 
growth India had been humiliated by the events of 1965-6. Successive droughts in 1965 
and 1966 left India dependent on grain imports from the US. Using its leverage through 
the auspices of the World Bank, the US pressurised India into making a sharp (almost 
40%) devaluation in 1966, and liberalisation of industrial and trade policies. The US 
failed to deliver promised aid in return for these reforms after Indian criticism of the US 
role in Vietnam. The Congress collapse in the 1967 elections can in part be traced to this 
humiliation which was widely condemned within India. The Indian state made a 
conscious effort to reduce dependence on foreign aid after 1966. This is clearly reflected 
in planning documents of the time.
“Dependence on foreign aid will be greatly reduced in the course of the Fourth Plan. It is 
planned to do away with concessional imports under PL 480 by 1971. Foreign aid net of 
debt charges and interest payments will be reduced to about half by the end of the Fourth
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Plan. Planned increases in production of foodgrains, raw materials and manufactured 
goods are calculated to make it possible to limit the growth of other imports to 
manageable proportions.” (Planning Commission 2003, Fourth FYP, 1969-74, Chl:6).
These aspirations were achieved not only in terms of capital flows but also in terms of 
import dependence. Imports as a share of GDP fell from 7.83% of GDP in 1966/67 to a 
low of 4.11% of GDP in 1972/73. The ratio increased as oil prices rose between 1973/74 
and 1974/75 (table 6.5).
Table 6.5; Exports and Imports as a % of GDP, 1965/66 to 1974/75.
Year Imports as a % of 
GDP
1959/60 7.26
1960/61 7.73
1961/62 7.08
1962/63 6.92
1963/64 6.50
1964/65 6.09
1965/66 6.08
1966/67 7.83
1967/68 6.39
1968/69 5.77
1969/70 4.34
1970/71 4.21
1971/72 4.43
1972/73 4.11
1973/74 5.26
1974/75 6.79
Source (Sivasubramonian 2004:276).
4.1.1 The Role o f the State in Creating Institutions to Mobilise Private Sector Savings
As well as mobilising resources through the tax system the state played an important role 
in mobilising resources indirectly, by creating institutions to mobilise private sector 
savings.
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Private corporate savings were stagnant between 1965/66 and 1979/80, fluctuating 
between 1.3% and 1.8% of GDP. Household savings increased steadily from 10.5% of 
GDP in 1965/66 to 17% in 1979/80 (table 6.6).
Table 6.6: Gross Savings in the Private Corporate and Household sectors (three- 
year moving average) as % of GDP (current market prices).
Year Gross Saving 
in the Private 
Corporate 
Sector
Gross Savings 
in the House 
Household 
Sector
1965/66 1.6 10.5
1966/67 1.4 11.2
1967/68 1.3 11.1
1968/69 1.3 11.0
1969/70 1.5 11.5
1970/71 1.6 12.3
1971/72 1.6 12.2
1972/73 1.7 12.9
1973/74 1.8 12.8
1974/75 1.8 13.6
1975/76 1.6 14.0
1976/77 1.4 15.2
1977/78 1.5 16.4
1978/79 1.6 16.6
1979/80 1.7 17.0
Source: (Bardhan 1984/1998:99)
Eighty-percent of total savings in India since Independence have originated from the 
household sector. Kok-Fay and Jomo (2000) argue that risk-averse households are more 
likely to increase (financial) savings in response to deposit security and intermediation 
efficiency than to interest rates. Household savings depend crucially on the availability 
of efficient infrastructure for deposit collection, in particular the extent of the bank 
branching network and efficiency of services provided to local communities. In July 
1969 14 of the largest Indian scheduled commercial banks totalling 86% of deposits were 
nationalised. Nationalisation was accompanied by a sustained effort to spread the
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coverage of banking, particularly to rural areas. A more than seven-fold increase in the 
number of bank branches reduced the population per bank branch from 65,000 in 1969 to
20,000 in 1979/80 (table 6.7). An increase in the geographical coverage of banks 
doubled the share of the rural population in total deposits from 7.2% in 1973 to 14.6% in 
1993. Except for brief spells in 1973/74 and 1979/80 the state ensured a positive real 
return on bank deposits. The finance ratio is the ratio of total financial claims issued 
during the course of a year to national income and is an indicator of the rate of financial 
development. This ratio increased from 17.15 in 1970/71 to 33.03 in 1980/81 (Sen and 
Vaidya 1997). Deposits as a percentage of national income rose from 15.3% in 1969 to 
51.8% in 1994. Most of this increase was in the form of time deposits. The ratio 
M3/GDP had declined between 1959 and 1967 then increased steadily to 60% in 1993.
Table 6.7: The Spread of Banking Facililties in India, 1960/61 to 1979/80
Year Population Per Bank Branch/ 1000
1960/61 88
1961/62 89
1962/63 88
1963/64 85
1964/65 81
1965/66 79
1966/67 75
1967/68 73
1968/69 68
1969/70 59
1970/71 48
1971/72 43
1972/73........................................................ 39
1973/74 35
1974/75 33
1975/76 30
1976/77 26
1977/78 23
1978/79 21
1979/80 20
Source: (Joshi and Little 1994:312)
177
4.2. Allocating resources to projects essential for development
The second important financial role of the state was in allocating resources to projects 
essential for development.
There was a distinct change in the pattern of investment after the mid-1960s. Between 
1960/61 and 1965/66 total investment increased from 15.5% to 19.5% of GDP (table
6.8). This was due to increasing investment rates in both the public and private 
(household and corporate) sectors.
Table 6.8: Investment in India,
Year Total % 
GDP
Total 
Public % 
GDP
Total 
Private % 
GDP
1960/61 15.5 7.6 7.9
1961/62 15.9 7.2 8.6
1962/63 16.7 8.1 8.6
1963/64 17.3 8.5 8.8
1964/65 18.0 8.9 9.1
1965/66 19.5 9.6 10.0
1966/67 18.7 8.4 10.3
1967/68 18.0 7.2 10.9
1968/69 17.8 7.0 10.8
1969/70 17.2 6.4 10.8
1970/71 16.5 6.3 10.2
1971/72 17.2 6.8 10.4
1972/73 18.2 8.1 10.1
1973/74 17.5 7.7 9:8
1974/75 16.7 6.5 10.2
1975/76 16.8 7.0 9.8
1976/77 18.6 8.5 10.0
1977/78 19.0 8.5 10.5
1978/79 18.1 8.1 10.1
1979/80 18.6 8.7 9.8
960/61 to 1979/80
Source: (Joshi and Little 1994:330-1).
After the mid-1960s the share of total investment was dragged down by a decline in
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public investment. Public investment declined from a peak of 9.6% of GDP in 1965/66 
to a low of 6.3% in 1970/71, this generated a fall in total investment from 19.5% of GDP 
in 1965/66 to a low of 16.5% of GDP in 1970/71. Private investment by contrast 
remained stable or even increased slightly between the mid-1960s and early-1970s. After 
the early-1970s the level of total investment begins to recover led by increasing public 
investment and high and stable private investment.
5. The (Economic) Role of the State, 1951/52 to 1964/65: Production
This section examines the role of the state in achieving a productive use of the surplus in 
both the public and private sectors.
This section begins by reviewing the existing literature that argues India suffered from a 
failure of productivity growth between 1950 and 1980. This is the empirical foundation 
for authors like Chibber (2003) who argue the developmental aspirations of the state 
failed from the outset of independence. A closer look at the 1950-1980 period reveals a 
very different picture. In terms of industrial growth and diversification, resource 
mobilisation and its productive allocation, the period 1950-65 was successful. It is only 
after 1965 that the economy suffered a dramatic decline in performance. A close look at 
more disaggregated figures shows there was quite rapid aggregate productivity growth 
between 1950 and 1965 and then stagnation until 1980. 1965 also saw a sudden 
structural break in growth. This section reviews four crucial proximate reasons for the 
slowdown in productivity growth after 1965/66. These are firstly, a slowdown of 
diversification into high(er) productivity industries, secondly, reductions in productive 
public investment, thirdly, a reduction in productive private investment and fourthly, less 
efficient extensive growth.
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5.1. Lack of Productivity, 1950-1980
The crucial role of the state in production is ensuring that the surplus be used 
productively, to either raise productivity in an existing market niche (learning) or upgrade 
to higher technology production. By 1965/66 India had diversified its industrial structure 
and created a broad base of capacity in basic, intermediate and capital goods. There is 
wide agreement that the Indian state failed to promote productivity growth in either the 
public or private sector between 1950 and 1980. Desai (1981) argued that high rates of 
industrial investment in the 1960s and 70s and a low rate of industrial growth necessarily 
implied a low rate of productivity growth. Raj (1984) suggested that rising ICOR’s 
might not be due to inefficiency but to technological factors such as a more capital- 
intensive post green-revolution agriculture. Chakravarty (1987) suggested higher ICORs 
in industry could be due to a general shift to more capital-intensive sectors such as 
fertilisers, power and petroleum not to inefficiency per se. Ahluwalia (1985, 1991) 
disagrees and finds a generalised decline in capital efficiency across all industry groups 
between 1959/60 and 1979/80. Ahluwalia (1991) goes beyond capital-output ratios to 
test for changes in efficiency in the use of factor inputs by estimating TFP growth52. The 
5.3% long-term increase in value added between 1959/60 and 1985/86 was associated 
with 8% p.a. growth of capital, moderate growth (3% p.a.) in employment and negligible 
growth of TFP (-0.4% p.a.). For intermediate goods the decline (-1.5%) was of particular 
significance due to the magnification effect on other industries through inter-industry 
input-output linkages. The largest industry in the manufacturing sector, cotton textiles 
experienced virtually no TFP growth over this 25 years period. Non-ferrous metals 
experienced growth of 11% p.a. in capital stock, 3.4% growth in labour. 0.4% in value 
added and -7.3% in TFP. In total 36 industries, accounting for more than 50% of value 
added in 1970/71 experienced negative growth of TFP. The orthodox story is of a failure 
of productivity.
52 Partly in response to a comment from (Raj 1984) that capital-output ratios could be increasing due to a 
faster relative price increase of capital goods.
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5.2. Productivity between 1950/51 and 1979/80: A Problem from Independence?
State allocation of resources to the private sector without accompanying discipline is 
unlikely to induce positive productivity growth and/or learning. Firms will tend to divert 
subsidies to more directly profitable activities (subsidies are fungible), firms may come to 
prefer the quiet life where profits are derived from protection and subsidies and turn to 
rent-seeking for more favours to boost profits rather than cutting costs and expanding 
markets. A necessary condition for developmental outcomes is the ability of the state to 
discipline business and compel productive investment and/ or learning (Grabowski 1994; 
Evans 1995; Khan 2000c; Huff et al 2001) etc. The rents created by government 
intervention after 1950/51 had an important potential role in facilitating productivity/ 
learning (Amsden 1989). It is important that rents so created were conditional. (Khan 
2000b) lists some of the necessary conditions for ensuring that rents allocated by states in 
the form of different types of subsidies to infant industries remain efficient53. The 
bureaucracy must be competent enough to allocate rent ex-ante to potentially dynamic 
capitalists and ex-post strong enough to withdraw them from failing capitalists54.
Chibber (2003) argues that the ability of the state to impose discipline on the private 
sector was undermined at the outset of independence, in the late-1940s and early-1950s 
by a concerted offensive from the capitalist class. This he argues was reflected in a 
watering down of the scope for discipline by the Planning Commission which lacked 
institutional teeth, and anaemic industrial regulatory legislation55. The crucial difference 
being Chibber argues is that India turned to import substitution and Korea (the exemplar 
of successful state disciplinary capacity) to export promotion56. Import substitution made 
it rational for the capitalist class to oppose discipline. The departure of British capital in 
the 1940s was leaving profitable niches for Indian capital. The domestic market offered
53 Amsden (1997) notes that learning is subject to market failures (social benefit exceeding private benefit) 
among late-industrialising countries as much as innovation is among developed countries.
54 Evans (1995) called this as ‘embedded-autonomy’.
55 There are obvious parallels with then contemporary land reform legislation where bold intentions were 
watered down and emerged in heavily compromised form that had little practical impact (Herring 1983).
56 Khan disagrees arguing neither export promotion nor import substitution have distinct impacts on the 
ability of the state to ensure rents promote learning. The difference he argues was due to the nature of the 
intermediate classes in Korea and India.
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large easy profit opportunities in replacing imports of consumer goods. The diversified 
structure of Indian business houses made it relatively easier to divert (fungible) subsidies 
to other branches of production. By making multiple and excessive applications for 
licenses and not implementing them Indian capital could reduce competition and retain 
oligopolistic profits. Export promotion in Korea by contrast required state support and 
discipline, to acquire new technology, in building distribution networks, in ensuring the 
quality and reputation of exports57. Whereas state discipline was a hindrance to profits in
ro
India it was a precondition in Korea, the economic strategies chosen generated different 
incentives for private capital in relation to the state.
Chibber (2003:207) argues that from these unpromising initial conditions planning and 
state capacity were eroded further after 1950 by a dynamic that deligitimised state 
intervention. The Planning Commission (PC) was associated with failure, domestic 
capital managed to work the system, and other Ministries increasingly ignored the 
requisites of planning. The death of Nehru in 1964 deprived planning of its most 
influential supporter. Nehru’s replacement Lai Bahadur Shastri fatally undermined the 
Planning Commission by forming the alternative Prime Ministers Secretariat. Indira 
Gandhi after 1966 marginalised the institution further treating it as simply an advisory 
body. Chibber’s argument is that there was a failure of productivity and learning from 
the outset of Independence, he supports the orthodox view of the period 1950 to 1980.
It will be argued here that Chibber’s pessimism about the initial conditions of planning is 
unduly pessimistic and that the Indian state did achieve successful developmental 
outcomes after 1950, especially between 1960 and 1965.
57 State discipline provided a mutually beneficial solution to a collective action problem of a prisoners 
dilemma variety.
58 The idea of the Indian state being free to choose a development strategy is obviously a questionable one, 
chapter IV I noted the Mahalanobis model was in many ways a product of the political economy of post- 
Independence India.
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5.3. Productivity and Developmental Outcomes, 1950-65
In the 1950s the Indian state made rapid progress in diversifying the structure of industry. 
By the early-1960s the industrial structure had shifted from one dominated by textiles and 
sugar to one with substantial capacity in iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, machine 
building, coal and heavy chemicals. Between 1960/61 and 1965/6 29.93% of the growth 
of net value added in the registered manufacturing sector was contributed by basic 
intermediate goods, 25.63% by capital goods and only 4.77% from consumer durables 
(Chaudhuri 2002). There was an impressive growth in the range and sophistication of 
industrial output. Between 1956 and 1960 the weight of consumer goods in an index of 
industrial production dropped from 48.4% to 37.2%, basic goods increased from 22.3% 
to 25.1% and capital goods from 4.7% to 11.8% (Ahluwalia 1991:13). Industrial 
production grew by an annual average of 9% between 1961 and 1965, the sharpest 
increase was in the capital goods sector which showed growth of nearly 20% p.a., in 
basic goods only 10.5% p.a. and consumer goods a paltry 5% p.a. (Rangarajan 
1982:292).
This growth was investment led. Public investment grew by 8.8% p.a., private 
investment by 8.5% p.a. between 1961/2 and 1965/6 (table 6.8). Between 1960 and 1965 
investment in capital and intermediate goods grew by 17% p.a. and the manufacturing 
sector by 9% p.a. Government tax revenue rose from less than 7% of GDP in 1950/51 to 
nearly 15% in 1965/66. Rising revenue outpaced growth of current expenditure hence 
public sector savings increased from 1.8% of GDP in 1958/59 to 3.5% in 1964/65. The 
current account deficit fell from 2.7% of GDP (55% of exports) to 1.7% (43% of exports) 
in the same period. In 1965 the economy had rapid investment-led growth, with falling 
deficits in the current accounts and a benign inflationary environment. In terms of 
patterns of output growth the aims of the planning strategy were starkly effective.
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5.4. A Collapse of the Developmental State after 1965-7
It is argued here that instead of planning being gradually eroded from the outset of 
independence only in relation to economic failure in the period after 1965 is it possible to 
argue with Herring (1999:1) that India is ‘the most dramatic case of a failed 
developmental state’ or with Shetty (1978) that India suffered a ‘structural retrogression’.
There was a structural break in growth in 1965-67 (Chapter III). Industrial growth 
declined from over 7% p.a. to little over 5%, in direct contrast to the governments aim to 
achieve rapid industrialisation. The slowdown is statistically significant and shows a 
distinct pattern by sector (Ahluwalia 1985:Ch7). Within manufacturing, machinery, 
transport equipment, chemicals and rubber experienced a significant decline in growth 
after 1965/6. The slowdown in heavy industry was general. In terms of use-based and 
input-based groups rapidly growing capital and basic goods sectors experienced the 
greatest downturn. More slowly growing intermediate and consumer non-durable 
industries experienced no deceleration.
There are signs of productivity growth in the Indian industrial sector before the mid- 
1960s. There was a sharp decline in productivity growth after the mid-1960s. This 
structural break is hidden by long-term averages combining the 1950s, 60s and 70s by 
Ahluwalia and others. The relative contribution of factor accumulation actually increased 
from the period between 1950/51 and 1964/65 (2.32%) and between 1964/65 and 
1980/81 (2.71%). The slowdown in GDP growth was caused by a sharp drop in the 
growth of output per unit of input (TFP growth), from 1.78% p.a. to 0.41 % p.a (table
6.9). Virmani (2004b:23) agrees with these figures and shows with various estimates that 
TFP growth collapsed from +1.4/6% between 1950/51 and 1964/65 to -0.1/+0.6% 
between 1965/66 and 1979/80.
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Table 6.9: Factor Inputs and Productivity  Growth in India, 1950/51 to 1980/81
Period Total Factor Input Output per unit of 
input
GDP
1950/51 to 1964/65 2.32 1.78 4.10
1964/65 to 1980/81 2.71 0.41 3.12
Source: (Sivasubramonian 2004:286).
There are four crucial proximate reasons for the slowdown in productivity growth after 
1965/66. These are firstly, a slowdown of diversification into high(er) productivity 
industries, secondly, reductions in productive public investment, thirdly, a reduction in 
productive private investment and fourthly, less efficient extensive growth.
5.4.1. A Slowdown in Diversification
After rapid structural change until the mid-1960s the rate of diversification into sectors of 
(potentially) higher productivity then slowed dramatically. The share of capital goods in 
industrial production dropped from 15.2% in 1970 to 15.0% in 1980, the share of 
intermediate goods increased only marginally over the same period, from 20.9% to 
21.3% (Ahluwalia 1991:13). This reduced productivity growth from an allocational 
effect.
5.4.2. Reductions in Public Investment
Public investment declined from a peak of 9.6% of GDP in 1965/66 to a low of 6.3% in 
1970/71, this generated a fall in total investment from 19.5% of GDP in 1965/66 to a low 
of 16.5% of GDP in 1970/71. Private investment by contrast remained stable or even 
increased slightly between the mid-1960s and early-1970s. After the early-1970s the 
level of total investment begins to recover led by increasing public investment and high 
and stable private investment (table 6.8). The relative stability of aggregate investment 
between 1965/66 and 1979/80 is the basis of Ahluwalia (1985) that public investment
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cuts cannot explain industrial stagnation after 1965 and specifically the slowdown in the 
growth rate of heavy industry. She argues that the demand for the output of capital and 
basic industries depends on overall investment, public or private. This is wrong the 
growth of capital and basic goods industries was contingent on public investment. The 
share of infrastructure investment in total investment rose sharply from 13.2% to 21-23% 
between 1960/61 and the mid-1960s. After 1965/66 this share fell rapidly to a low of 
10.1% in 1973/74 (table 6.10). It is infrastructure, not total investment that created a 
direct demand for the output of capacity created in the capital and basic goods industries. 
This argument is even more relevant in areas of industry reserved for state production.
For example state reservation of the railway sector implied output of industries producing 
railway equipment was wholly dependent on related public investment. For seven of the 
next ten years after 1965 investment in the railway sector was reduced (Ahluwalia 1988).
Table 6.10: Infrastructure: Share in Total Investment
Year Infrastructure
1960/61 13.2
1961/62 19.0
1962/63 22.9
1963/64 23.4
1964/65 21.3
1965/66 18.1
1966/67 13.6
1967/68 14.3
1968/69 13.8
1969/70 12.7
1970/71 13.3
1971/72 13.5
1972/73 13.7
1973/74 10.1
1974/75 11.7
1975/76 16.2
1976/77 15.8
1977/78 16.2
1978/79 13.2
1979/80 15.5
Source: (Ahluwalia 1985:78-9)
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Reduced infrastructure investment after the mid-1960s led directly to a sharp decline in 
capacity utilisation (Srinivasan andNarayana 1977; Nayyar 1978, 1981; Patnaik 1981; 
Ahluwalia 1985, 1991; Chandrasekhar 1988; Chaudhuri 1998). There were sharp falls 
(nearly 20%) in capacity utilisation rates between 1966 and 1970 (table 6.11). Reduced 
public investment in the mid-1960s led to reduced output in many basic and capital goods 
industries in the private sector e.g. steel pipes and tubes, steel castings and forgings, 
industrial machinery, machine tools, and railway equipment. This was reflected in 
significant underutilisation of capacity, ranging from 50 to 75% in such sectors. Capacity 
utilisation in the production of steel ingots by public sector plants fell sharply in Bhilai 
from 111.8% in 1964/65 to 54.1% in 1965/66, in Durgapur from 100.6% in 1964/65 to
50.1 % in 1969/70. In aluminium production capacity utilisation at HINDALCO fell 
froml26.2% in 1965 to 72.7% in 1967. The revival of infrastructure investment (table 
6.11) after 1973/74 led to some increase in capacity utilisation in capital goods from 1976 
onwards.
Table 6.11: Capacity Utilisation Rates, 1960 to 1980 (%)
Industry
Group
1960-5 1966-70 1971-5 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Basic
Goods
86.0 82.0 77.4 84.8 88.3 83.8 79.3 •77.2
Capital
Goods
85.9 66.4 60.2 59.4 67.3 65.3 64.9 62.4
Intermedia 
te Goods
89.3 81.9 79.7 79.6 83.0 81.4 82.0 82.5
Consumer
Goods
86.6 82.2 80.1 80.9 81.8 83.8 80.2 80.1
Source: (Ah uwalia 1985:109).
Reductions in public investment led to declining capacity utilisation in the capital goods 
sector. This directly reduced measured rates of productivity growth. There is also 
evidence of a general macroeconomic relationship between demand and productivity
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growth in India59. TFP growth shows two distinct structural breaks, in 1965-7 and 
1980/1, only the latter has been properly identified and analysed. Ahluwalia (1991) finds 
the upturn in TFP during the 1980’s to be coincident with rapid demand expansion. 
Mohan-Rao (1996b:3188) finds a positive correlation between output growth and TFP in 
Indian manufacturing. Ahluwalia and Williamson (2003:67) find a systematic relation 
between higher growth rates of GDP and those of TFP.
There is also more specific evidence relating reductions in public investment to slower 
productivity growth through a reduction in leaming-by-doing. “The low level of demand 
for steel equipment made it difficult for HEC to move up the learning curve in a number 
of product areas, and affected its financial performance adversely by not allowing it to 
exploit scale economies. There was hardly any repetition in the production of 
steelmaking equipment and rolling mill equipment, which together accounted for around 
65% of HMBP’s capacity to produce steel plant equipment. A plate mill (40,920 tons) 
and a continuous casting mill (7.868 tons) were supplied for the Bhilai steel plant 
expansion and a sintering machine (4,108 tons) and a rolling mill (5,551 tons) were 
supplied for the Bokaro Stage III expansion, but none of this equipment was 
manufactured a second time.” (Ramamurti 1987:138). Another (strange) example is that 
of Hindustan Machine Tools (HMT). The firm was set up in the public sector in 
collaboration with Oerlikons of Switz as producer of specialist machine tools. Actual 
production was only ever restricted to a few varieties. In the mid-1960s the firm 
diversified into the production of watches. The protected market was a source of easy 
profits and stopped the firm from going sick while rendering the specialised capacity 
irrelevant.
5.4.3. Changing Patterns o f Private Sector Investment
Private sector investment rose from 7.9% of GDP in 1960/61 to over 10% after 1965/66 
(table 6.8). There is good evidence to show that private investment was becoming less
59 Verdoom’s law suggests there is a positive relationship between TFP growth and growth of output.
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productive after the mid-1960s. Despite stable or increasing private sector investment 
there was a sharp fall in private corporate investment from 4.6% of GDP in 1963/64 to 
1.5% of GDP in 1969/70, then continued stagnation until 1979/80 (table 6.12). The 
stability of total private investment as a share of GDP was achieved by an increase in less 
productive household investment which increased from 5.2% of GDP in 1963/64 to 9.5% 
in 1969/70.
Table 6.12; Unadjusted Gross Fixed Capital Formation, 1960/61 to 1989/90
Year Total Private Private
Private % Corporate Household
GDP % GDP % GDP
1960/61 7.9 2.4 5.5
1961/62 8.6 3.5 5.1
1962/63 8.6 2.6 6.0
1963/64 8.8 3.6 5.2
1964/65 9.1 3.0 6.1
1965/66 10.0 1.9 8.0
1966/67 10.3 1.8 8.5
1967/68 10.9 1.8 9.1
1968/69 10.8 1.7 9.1
1969/70 10.8 1.3 9.5
1970/71 10.2 1.6 8.6
1971/72 10.4 1.9 8.5
1972/73 10.1 1.8 8.2
1973/74 9.8 2.1 7.7
1974/75 10.2 1.7 8.5
1975/76 9.8 2.1 7.6
1976/77 10.0 1.3 8.7
1977/78 10.5 1.7 8.8
1978/79 10.1 1.1 9.0
1979/80 9.8 1.6 8.3
Source (Joshi and Little 1994:330-1).
De Long and Summers (1991) find that the accumulation of machinery is a prime 
determinant of national rates of productivity growth. They find a ‘clear, strong and 
robust’ relationship between national rates of machinery and equipment investment and 
productivity growth between 1960 and 1985. Lee (1995) finds that openness to
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international trade promotes growth by improving access to cheaper imported capital 
goods. The results from De Long and Summers suggest that the private return to 
equipment investment is below the social return, and that the social return is very high 
(over thirty percent). The level of private corporate investment in India declined sharply 
after the mid-1960s (table 6.13). Even this remaining lower level of corporate investment 
by the mid-1960s was shifting to lower productivity areas. There was a collapse in the 
growth of investment in equipment, from an average of 5.54% p.a. between 1950/51 to 
1964/65 to -0.04% p.a. between 1964/65 to 1980/81 (table 6.13). By contrast the share of 
private construction investment in GNP 3.7% in 1964/65 to 8.2% in 1978/79 (Desai 
1981:279)
Table 6.13: Growth Rates of Non-residential Net Fixed Capital Stock (1993/94 
prices).___________ ______________________ ___________________________
Period Structures Equipment Total Average Ratio GFCF/ 
GDP
1950/51 to 1964/65 6.55 5.54 6.26 16.38
1964/65 to 1980/81 6.04 -0.04 4.82 19.74
Source: (Sivasubramonian 2004:149)
5.4.4. Extensive Growth Becomes Less Efficient
Chapter V showed how growth in the 1950s was extensive in nature. Capital-intensive 
sectors such as steel, machine tools, motor vehicles and aluminium were set up through 
foreign collaboration with 1950s vintage technology. Growth was based on the 
horizontal diffusion of this technology and through indigenising production. A good 
example was HMT which opened various new factories replicating the initial technology. 
There are few signs that there was learning in this process but chapter V did review 
evidence to suggest this process of replication was efficient.
There was little sign of intensive growth and learning in existing capacity in the state 
owned heavy industrial sector after 1965. A major expansion of the Bhilai steel plant in
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1974 required that the major part of detailed design and engineering was done by the 
Soviets, as was the detailed engineering and technical project work for the construction of 
the Visahkhapatnam plant in 1979. There was little evidence of indigenisation in plant 
planning, design and engineering. At Bokaro the number of Soviet specialists nearly 
trebled in number between 1969 and 1983 (D’Mello 1988). The number of foreign 
experts likewise remained high at HEC in the early 1980s, after fifteen years of 
production. Production judged of poor quality and rejected remained high at HEC. If 
learning was taking place such figures should diminish rapidly. For grey iron rolls, 
shaped castings and ingot-molds rejection rates remained in the range of 10-30% between 
the mid-1960s and early 1970s (Ramamurti 1987). Only in the case of ingot moulds was 
there a sign of a steady decline in this rate. Engineers in the state-owned capital-intensive 
sector had acquired the technological capabilities to ensure physical operation of plants 
but not to improve production processes. A sign of this is the very low levels of R+D, 
which is a very rough proxy of learning efforts. In BALCO R+D accounted for less than 
0.1% of net sales, in HINDALCO less than 0.3% of net sales. Capacity utilisation in 
steel production in Bhilai dropped from 111 .8% in 1964/65 to 54.1% in 1965/66. It never 
returned to those early levels, remaining in the range 80-90% into the 1980s. Capacity 
utilisation in steel production in Durgapur dropped from 100.6% in 1964/65 to a low of 
50.1% in 1969 but then fluctuated in a range between 50 and 60% until the 1980s. The 
same pattern is true of production of steel in Rourkela and Bokaro and of aluminium in 
HALCOM (Nayar 1990). Low levels of capacity utilisation was a sign of a failure of 
learning not only of demand, in the late 1970s India had to import steel despite having 
unused capacity domestically (Nayar 1990:260).
There is likewise evidence that extensive growth by replication became less efficient after 
the mid-1960s. Sectoral ICOR’s showed a sharp increase after the mid-1960s. In the 
primary sector from 2.1 between 1950/51 and 1960/61 to 4.0 between 1970/71 and 
1975/76. In the secondary sector from a stable 4-5 between 1950/51 and 1965/66 to 9.4 
between 1965/66 and 1970/71 to 12.3 between 1970/71 and 1975/76. In the registered 
manufacturing sector from 5.6 between 1960/61 and 1965/66 to 12.9 between 1965/66 
and 1970/71 and 17.8 between 1970/71 and 1975/76. In the unregistered manufacturing
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sector from 2.7 to 8.3 and 6.6 over the same periods. Average capital output ratios in 
government in chemicals increased from 3 in 1965/66 to 12.25 in 1970/71 and 14.18 in 
1975/76. These patterns cannot be explained only by a fall in capacity utilisation in the 
capital goods sector. Capacity utilisation gradually increased (from low levels) in the 
1970s (table 6.10). There is also evidence that plants set up later tended to have 
permanently lower levels of capacity utilisation. While early steel plants at Bhilai and 
Durgapur surpassed 100% capacity utilisation in their early years the Bokaro plant 
(opened in the mid-1970s) never achieved capacity utilisation over about 75%. The first 
aluminium plant Hindustan Aluminium Company (HALCOM) surpassed 100% capacity 
in 1965 not long after opening. The second plant Bharat Aluminium Company (BALCO) 
never achieved capacity utilisation greater than 67%, and for much of the period to the 
early 1980s operated at only a third of capacity. There was a general lack of investment 
in technological upgrading and plant maintenance. In the cotton mill sector in crucial 
technologies like blow room, carding, combing, drawing and weaving a higher fraction of 
machinery in 1976 compared to 1951 was 40 or more years old (Chandrasekhar 1984:28).
6. The (Political) Role of the State, 1965/66 to 1979/80: Institutions
This section focuses on institutions that allow the state to overcome the inherent conflicts 
associated with (rapid) economic development.
The Indian economy lurched into stagnation after the mid-1960s not because of a failure 
of resource mobilisation but because the surplus was being consumed and invested in a 
less-productive manner.
The shocks that hit the Indian economy in the mid-1960s caused a dramatic decline in the 
Congress party in the 1967 elections. It lost a large number of central and state level 
parliamentary seats, there was a sharp fragmentation of the political structure. The 
network of factions from the centre to local politics disintegrated, this made it harder to 
co-opt, mediate, funnel patronage resources, and buy off groups losing out from the
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process of development. There was a sharp structural break in indicators of conflict after 
the mid-1960s and a rise of a new political economy of agriculturalism. This undermined 
the state’s ability to allocate resources towards projects essential for development and 
ensure resources allocated were used productively. Allocations of public resources were 
going not to those capitalists or state enterprises able to make the productive use of them 
but instead to those that needed to be accommodated for the sake of political stability60. 
Industrial policy became increasing a means of containing conflict rather than of 
economic planning. This is the political economy explanation behind the sharp falls in 
public investment. Reduced infrastructure investment after 1965/66 led directly to a 
sharp decline in capacity utilisation with a direct impact on productivity growth through a 
reduced leaming-by-doing. There is also evidence that extensive growth by replication 
became less efficient after the mid-1960s. Trade unions were able to push for large wage 
increases in the organised public and private sectors from the mid-1960s onwards. This 
had a material impact on the ability of firms to finance private corporate sector 
investment or more specifically investment in machinery.
6.1. Shocks Cause the collapse of Congress
The series of shocks that hit the Indian economy in the mid-1960s, the war with Pakistan 
in 1965 and droughts in 1965 and 1966 undermined the Congress party. In 1965/66 
foodgrain output fell by 20%, in the following year another disastrous harvest saw 
foodgrain production rise by only 1.7%. Although real GDP was only 3% lower in 
1966/67 relative to 1964/65, foodgrain availability had fallen by 10% per capita and 
foodgrain price inflation reached 18%. The humiliating appeals to the U.S. for food aid 
exposed the much-repeated aspirations to achieve self-reliance as hollow boasting. The 
devaluation foisted on India by the World Bank in 1966 was bitterly opposed. These 
shocks led directly to the sharp decline in the electoral performance of the Congress in 
the 1967 elections.
60 (Khan 2000d:28) makes the same point about Pakistan in the mid-1960s.
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In the 1967 general and state elections Congress returned to power in the centre with 
40.8% of the vote with a 25 seat majority losing 78 seats in the central and 264 seats in 
the state legislative assembly’s. Congress lost control of eight state governments. The 
decline of Congress after 1967 was not marked by the rise of a coherent opposition party 
in the Lok Sabha but by a sharp fragmentation of the political structure. There were 
striking changes in the distribution of Lok Sabha seats in the 1967 compared to the 1962 
elections (table 6.14). The Hindu nationalist party the Bharatiya Jana Sangh appealing to 
themes of family and caste gained 21 seats in the north of India. The right-wing free 
market Swatantra party a coalition of urban big-business and the rural aristocracy gained 
26 seats. The (newly split) Communists won 13 seats and the two socialist parties 18 
seats. Perhaps the most striking measure of the incoherence of the 1967 elections was 
that Independents gained 15 seats. A diverse array of political groupings came to power 
in the eight states lost by Congress. Among the most important regional forces were the 
DMK cultural and linguistic nationalism in Tamil Nadu and CPI(M) class-based 
mobilisation in West Bengal.
Table 6.14: Elections to the Lok Sabha 1962 and 1967
Party 1962 1967
Indian National Congress 361 (44.7%) 283 (40.8%)
Bharatiya Jana Sangh 14 (6.4%) 35 (9.4%)
Swatantra 18 (7.9%) 44 (8.7%)
Communist Party of India 29 (9.9%) 23 (5.0%)
Communist Party of India 
(Marxist)
- 19 (4.4%)
Praj a Socialist Party 12(6.8%)......................... 13(3.1%)
Samyukta Socialist Party 6 (2.7%) 23 (4.9%)
Others 34 (10.5%) 45 (10.0%)
Independents 20(11.1%) 35 (13.7%)
Source: (Sridharan 2002:478-9).
An important part of the functioning of the one party dominant system argued Kothari 
(1964) was a network of factions. The decline of Congress in terms of Lok Sabha seats 
and control over state governments undermined its structure of factions. Prior to 1967
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Congress had developed an elaborate system of factions at every level of political and 
governmental activity. Factions provided a well-defined network for the distribution of 
the spoils of office, institutionalised procedures of transaction and absorbed dissent by 
co-opting leaders of subordinate classes. Congress “provided a subtle a resilient 
mechanism for conflict management and transactional negotiations among the proprietary 
classes” (Bardhan 1984/1998:77). The enrolment of disparate groups by leaders seeking 
to gain control of committees through force of numbers pushed the Congress towards an 
inclusive strategy.
The control of patronage resources was vital to maintain these networks. Before 1967 
Congress monopolised patronage resources which made opposition difficult. Congress 
controlled government down to the village Panchayats, sugar co-operatives, banking 
corporations, and through the allocation of resources, licenses, fertilisers, and seeds.
After 1967 with opposition parties in power in eight states Congress no longer 
monopolised patronage and the network of Congress factions began to fall apart. 
Capitalists could seek patrons outside the Congress system so were no longer subject to 
its hierarchy, conflict management procedures and transactional negotiations. With 
Congress no longer the only game in town it made less sense for groups losing out in the 
short-term to remain within the Congress system in hope of future rewards. This had two 
effects, the destabilising of politics and the fragmentation of the Congress party itself.
The aftermath of the elections was a period of chronic political instability, the disregard 
of parliamentary norms, abuse of constitutional powers, and increase in class, caste and 
rural violence. Between March 1967 and 1970 there were 1,827 parliamentary defections 
to different parties, 23 state governments were constituted and collapsed. By the end of 
1968 state governments had been dismissed and replaced by direct (Presidents) rule by 
the centre in Haryana, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and the Punjab. The state lost 
its ability to control and channel rent-seeking through the parallel organisation of the 
Congress party. Losing its monopoly of power gave an impetus to the defection of 
groups within the Congress. A major split occurred in the Congress in 1967 with the 
formation of the BKD under Charan Singh in Uttar Pradesh. This party appealed to 
backward or middle status cultivating peasants and became the second largest party after
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mid-term state elections in 1969. Between March and November 1967, the Communist 
Party of India (Marxist) or CPI(M) in West Bengal became the second largest party and 
formed an alliance of smaller parties including Congress dissidents (the Bangla 
Congress) and formed the states first non-Congress. The Haryana Congress in Haryana 
likewise came to power in the state comprised of dissidents from Congress.
6.2. Increase in Conflict
The sudden increase in political conflict after 1965-67 extended far beyond the confines 
of political parties and electoral politics. There was a sharp break in indicators of conflict 
in the Indian polity after the mid-1960s. The incidence of riots, reported incidents of 
student indiscipline and workdays lost through strike action was relatively stable until 
1965 then all three rose dramatically. All three measures reached a permanently higher 
level from 1966 onwards, riots more than doubling, strikes rising five-fold and student 
indiscipline rising ten or twenty-fold (table 6.15).
Table 6.15: Indicators of Demand Politics
Year Riots (Thousands) Student ‘Indiscipline’: 
Reported Incidents
Workdays Lost (Millions)
1960 27 80 6.5
1961 27 172 5.0
1962 29 97 6.1
1963 28 109 3.3
1964 33 395 7.7
1965 . 3 3 ..................... 271...................................... 6.5
1966 35 607 13.8
1967 42 - 17.1
1968 45 2,665 17.2
1969 56 3,064 19.0
1970 68 3,861 20.6
1971 64 4,380 16.5
1972 - 6,365 20.5
1973 - 5,551 20.6
1974 81 11,540 40.3
1975 67 3,847 21.9
1976 63 1,190 12.8
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1977 80 7,520 25.3
1978 - 9,174 29.7
1979 - 9,203 29.8
Source: (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987:227).
Over this same time period there was an upsurge in mobilisation of extremist political 
movements. In West Bengal in 1967 the Naxalbari rebellion began, starting with landless 
Harijans and Tribals in areas dominated by tea plantations against landlords. By May 
1969 it encompassed an estimated 15-20,000 activists with groups operating in Andhra 
Pradesh, Kerala, West Bengal and Orissa. There was also a sharp increase in the level of 
communal violence. Between 1954 and 1966 the average number of communal riots per 
annum was 70.2, rising to 209 in 1967, 346 in 1968, and 521 in 1970. Hindu nationalists 
were widely considered to have been involved in the three big set piece riots between 
1967 and 1970, in Ranchi, Ahmedabad and Bhiwandi, (Jaffrelot 2002:214).
The various features of a dominant party outlined by Kothari (1964) largely disappeared 
after the mid-1960s. Those groups outside the dominant party, various pressure groups 
and dissidents began to constitute alternative parties of government. Without their 
functional role in pressurising, criticising, censuring and influencing, Congress was free 
to become more rigidly centralised. The rise of Indira Gandhi to dominance within the 
Congress from 1968/69 onwards only accelerated this process. Brass writes of a 
leadership strategy after the early-1970s that became “Highly personalised and 
centralised and that involved unprecedented assertions of executive power.” (1996:40). 
The elaborate mechanism of patronage and incorporation through which Congress 
functioned disintegrated. The party was no longer able to provide a system of co­
ordination between vertical faction chains at all levels of government. Out of power 
Congress lost its monopoly of patronage resources and alternative competing patrons 
emerged. Indian society is fragmented into many different groups, according to religion, 
language, caste, class and ethnic differences, after the mid-1960s these began to provide 
cleavages around which alternative political organisations developed. The open elite 
system that had permitted aspiring social groups to gain a share of power within the party
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dried up. Strong local and state level leaders were no longer brought into the party. The 
necessary decentralisation of power disappeared as power was increasingly centralised 
and appointments made from the top downwards (on the basis of loyalty to the central 
leadership) rather than bottom up (on the basis of commanding a local faction).
After 1967 Congress lost its ability to identify those requiring compensation, minimising 
the transaction costs associated with such transfers and rent-seeking by other entities.
The state was no longer “embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to 
society and provides and institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and re­
negotiation of goals and policies.” (Evans 1995:12). The loss of its elaborate structure of 
patronage networks left the Congress leadership more autonomous but without the 
intelligence and ability to rely on private decentralised implementation and it became 
increasingly incapable of resolving collective action problems. Powerful social groups 
began mobilising in direct opposition to the evolving pattern of development, they 
opposed rather than being incorporated and bought off. Political parties ceased 
functioning as arenas of accommodation and conflict moved instead to street violence 
(Kohli 1990). The most dramatic example was that of West Bengal which by 1967 had 
descended into chaos. The police were restricted by the new left government from 
intervening in the growing strife between labour and management. Parties incorporated 
thugs (mastans in Bengali) into their organisation to match the growing threat from other 
parties doing the same. Conflict was prevalent among white and blue-collar 
professionals and between the youth wings of various parties. Extreme violence focused 
against normal political channels erupted from the Naxalite movement.
6.3. A Change New Political Economy of Agriculturalism
Droughts in 1965 and 1966 and subsequent humiliating reliance on the US for grain 
imports gave an added political imperative to the achievement of self-sufficiency. There 
was a fundamental change to a Green Revolution agricultural strategy between 1964 and
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196761. The shift focused on the application of new technology to those best able to 
make use of it and a shift to price incentives through subsidising inputs and high(er)/ 
stable prices for output. The new technology was steered to regions where the middle 
peasantry was already in the ascendancy and was well placed to adopt both biochemical 
and mechanical innovations. Biochemical innovations (HYYs, chemical fertilisers, 
pesticides and the regulated flow of irrigation water) were in theory scale neutral. In 
practise the easier access of larger peasants to secure favourable output prices, subsidised 
credit and input prices implied their easier accessibility to middle peasants. The 
costliness and scale bias of mechanical innovations (tractors, threshers, drills, mechanical 
pumps for irrigation) implied they were most easily used by middle peasants.
The shift in agricultural strategy deliberately enhanced the economic status of a group of 
capitalist orientated middle peasants in the north of India (Byres 1981). Subsequently 
‘class-for-itself action’ was pursued with ‘relentless skill’ as the economic strength of this 
class was translated into promoting class interests. The outcomes of these efforts were 
the continued absence of taxation on income from agriculture, high procurement prices, 
favourable inter-sectoral terms of trade, preventing the nationalisation of the grain trade 
in 1973, and undermining efforts at land reform. This process was reflected in the 
creation of the BKD party that formed the state government of Uttar Pradesh in 1969 
under Charan Singh62. The 1969 UP elections marked a change in the nature of politics 
to a pattern of horizontal political mobilisation. The BKD campaigned, mobilised and 
governed on the basis of reducing taxation of agricultural revenues, subsidising public 
investment inputs and raising prices for state procurement of agricultural commodities. 
Charan Singh became Central Finance Minister in January 1979 and presided over the 
March budget dubbed the ‘kulak budget’. Duty on chemical fertilisers was reduced by 
50%, taxes on mechanical tillers, light diesel oil (electric waterpumps), plastic PVC pipes 
for irrigation reduced. The Agricultural Refinance and Development Corporation was 
exempted from income tax, commercial banks were given concessions for rural lending, 
subsidies on minor irrigation were extended to larger farms, and government expenditure
61 (Vanaik 1990; Varshney 1998:Ch 3).
62 In alliance with the Jan Sangh.
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on dairy farms, rural electrification, and grain storage facilities was increased. These 
benefits accrued more or less exclusively to the rich peasantry (Byres 1981). Mitra 
(1977) argues the growing strength of agricultural influences led to a deliberate shift in 
the agriculture/ industry terms of trade towards the former63. Varshney (1998:49) argues 
food prices became a focus of political debate certainly after 1971, and traces this change 
directly to the Green Revolution strategy64.
After the mid-1960s agricultural prices replaced land reform as the major element in 
agrarian unrest. This had major political implications. By definition land reforms could 
only mobilise subaltern rural classes against the landlords, never the rural sector as a 
whole. By contrast agricultural prices, “began to emerge as a sectoral, as opposed to a 
class, issue which, to the great surprise of urban intellectuals, attracted small farmers 
too.” (Varshney 1998:81). This shifted the nature of contradiction and conflict in Indian 
political economy to one of urban verses rural India, rather than within the agricultural 
sector. Of relevant note was the gradual change in the CPI(M) in West Bengal. The 
party shifted from urban radicalism to an agrarian multi-class alliance. The CPI(M) gave 
up land-grabbing which differentiated rural classes and pursued rural-based pragmatism 
after its electoral victory in 1977. Surplus raising farmers (those with an objective 
interest in higher procurement prices) have since the mid-1960s been joined in alliance 
and protest by both marginal farmers and the landless. Corbridge and Harriss argue 
“These movements are vehicles and expressions of the interests of the richer and most 
commercially dependent cultivators, and that the participation by -  for example -  poor 
peasants and landless labourers in actions taken by the farmers’ movements, has 
frequently depended upon coercion and upon the ways in which they have organised 
around ties of caste and kinship.” (2000:105). This coercive perspective is too bleak, 
objective class interests in the rural sector had also changed. Technological change and 
the spread of irrigation reduced the size of landholdings that could still be considered 
marginal. Varshney (1998) estimates the cut-off point for a surplus farmer has declined
63 Influentially but ultimately not convincingly (Desai 1981).
64 See also (Bharadwaj 1985: Weiner 1986) among many others.
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from 2.5 to 1.5 acres in the Punjab65. High prices may be relevant to even deficit 
marginal farmers, all farmers using Green Revolution technology will have to sell a part 
of their output to purchase Green Revolution inputs. Losses of those making net food 
purchases may be-offset if higher price led incomes of larger farmers generate increased 
agricultural or non-agricultural employment.
6.4. Conflict, the Budget and Allocation
Chapter IV argued that the state budget can be an objective and encompassing measure of 
the conflict resolution capacity of the state. Specifically budgetary allocations in which 
investment, tax revenue, national savings are rising are an indication that conflict is being 
successfully managed. This is likely to be particularly pronounced on the expenditure 
side of the state budget. Taxes are more broad based and less visible whilst expenditure 
can more directly target/ benefit particular groups and is very visible. Section 5.2 has 
argued discipline is necessary to induce learning, hence diversification and productivity 
growths are also signs that conflict is being successfully managed. It is a key idea of this 
thesis that conflict is endemic in development but the state can overcome conflict through 
a variety of institutions, those can be inclusive (such as political parties or political 
leadership), repressive or ideological.1 This section has demonstrated both that the 
principal conflict management institution of the 1950s and early-1960s had by the mid- 
1960s collapsed.
As the ability of the state to manage conflict declined even as measures of conflict 
increased there were sharp shifts in the state budget after the mid-1960s. The share of 
capital expenditure in total central government expenditure rose steadily from the early- 
1950s to the mid-1960s then fell sharply, from 48.23% in 1964/65 to 32.77% in 1973/74 
(table 6.16).
65 Thus technological change is enlarging the class of ‘bullock capitalists’ (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987) use 
2.5 acres as their definitional cut-off point.
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Table 6.16: Central Government’s Capital Expenditure as a Percentage of Total 
Expenditure (in Current Prices).______ __________________________________
Year %
1950-51 25.56
1951-52 33.39
1952-53 31.45
1953-54 37.23
1954-55 52.98
1955-56 46.62
1956-57 48.77
1957-58 51.77
1958-59 54.64
1959-60 46.75
1960-61 47.73
1961-62 47.18
1962-63 46.46
1963-64 47.54
1964-65 48.23
1965-66 45.83
1966-67 40.22
1967-68 37.24
1968-69 36.74
1969-70 32.74
1970-71 32.37
1971-72 32.20
1972-73 33.48
1973-74 32.77
1974-75 37.58
Source: (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987:231).
Section 6.3 noted that one of the key new ‘demand-groups’ growing in mobilisational 
strength after the mid-1960s were the green revolution farmers. This had a very direct 
impact on the state budget. The share of subsidies going to agriculture increased after the 
mid-1960s (Bardhan 1984/1998). These included subsidies to maintain farm support 
prices, and also provide urban consumers with lower issue prices, and to reduce the price 
to farmers of fertiliser, water, and diesel. Food subsidies doubled by 1976/7 then doubled 
again by 1984/5. Fertiliser subsidies increased from Rs 60 crore to Rs 600 crore, 
between 1976/7 to 1979/80. There was a massive surge in subsidies to the agricultural
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sector after the early-1960s after a stable or even declining level of subsidy in the 1950s 
(table 6.17).
Table 6.17: Budgetary Losses on Account of Operation of Government Irrigation 
Systems ___________ ___________________________________ ___________
Year Operating 
Loss Rs m 
at 1970/71 
prices
Area
Irrigated by 
Canals (m 
ha.)
Net Sown 
Area (m 
ha.)
Implicit 
Subsidy per 
ha. of canal 
irrigated 
area
Implicit 
Subsidy per 
ha. of net 
sown area
1950/51 365.6 8.30 118.75 44.0 3.08
1960/61 355.9 10.37 133.20 34.3 2.67
1970/71 1,370.2 12.84 140.78 106.7 9.73
1980/81 4,348.5 15.53 140.30 280.0 31.00
1982/83 5,228.4 15.37 141.77 340.2 36.88
Source: (Cha a-avarty 1987:1[27).
The growth of a political economy of agricultural rent-seeking after the mid-1960s led to 
the systematic diversion of developmental expenditure from infrastructure and industry to 
agricultural subsides and higher procurement prices. This is the political economy 
explanation behind the sharp falls in public investment outlined in section 4.2 and 5.4.2. 
Public investment declined from a peak of 9.6% of GDP in 1965/66 to a low of 6.3% in 
1970/71. Public investment played the leading role in generating demand for capital 
goods and creating capacity in sectors providing infrastructure inputs like power, fuel and 
transport. Table 6.10 showed that there were particularly sharp cuts in infrastructure 
investment after 1965/66 (table 6.10). Reduced infrastructure investment after the mid- 
1960s led directly to a sharp decline in capacity utilisation (table 6.11). Scholars have 
found a systematic relation between higher growth rates of GDP and those of TFP in 
India (Ahkuwalia 1985, 1991; Mohan-Rao 1996b; Ahluwalia and Williamson 2003:67). 
There is also more specific evidence relating reductions in public investment leading to 
falling rates of capacity utilisation had a direct impact on productivity growth through a 
reduction in rates of leaming-by-doing.
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6.5. Conflict and Industrial Policy
By the mid-1970s economic stagnation, rising exports and good weather had generated 
an unplanned increase in foreign exchange and food reserves, removing the risk of supply 
bottlenecks. For some the solution was a simple one, “if the Indian economy is to break 
away from its recent stagnation, a return to a vigorous growth in public sector investment 
as part of a return to planned development is essential.” (Srinivasan and Naryana 
1977:106). Such a solution was simplistic and ignored the political economy constraints 
that existed after the mid-1960s. There was no problem of mobilisation, rather one of 
allocation. As a result of growing political conflict from the mid-1960s onwards 
allocations of public resources were going not to those capitalists or state enterprises able 
to make the productive use of them but instead to those that needed to be accommodated 
for the sake of political stability. Industrial policy became increasing a means of 
containing conflict rather than of economic planning. The possibility of monitoring and 
imposing discipline on capitalists and public sector enterprises declined. Producers were 
able to cultivate alternative political patrons outside the Congress system. After which 
they were then protected from any investigation or censure about the use they made of 
the subsidised resources allocated to them.
Banking nationalisation in 1969 led to a rapid growth in coverage of the banking system 
and emergence of large all India term-financing institutions. There was a resulting sharp 
increase in provision of loan capital to the private manufacturing sector by 25% p.a. from 
the beginning of the 1970s. These resources were absorbed unproductively by the private 
sector. Section 5.4 showed that the structure of private corporate investment was also 
becoming less productive. Investment in machinery collapsed after 1964/55 (table 6.13) 
while the share of private construction investment in GNP increased from 3.7% in 
1964/65 to 8.2% in 1978/79 (Desai 1981:279). There size of the black economy 
increased from 3% of national income in the 1950s, slowly to 7% by the end of the 1960s 
then exploded, reaching 20% in 1981 (Kumar 1999a+b). The evolution of the production 
in the private sector responded to private intentions not the Mahalanobis strategy. The
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regulatory structure and planning commission were becoming irrelevant. Illegal capacity 
was built in defiance of plan norms and regularised ex-post in various amnesties. In such 
an environment the state was unable to force up productivity and learning by ensuring 
investment resources were used productively or in already established industries by 
threatening to withdraw subsidies. Threats of subsidy withdrawal was not are not credible 
or feasible when they and other centrally allocated rights were being allocated according 
to political criteria (Khan 1996a+b).
Chapter V showed how growth in the 1950s was extensive in nature. Capital-intensive 
sectors such as steel, machine tools, motor vehicles and aluminium were set up with 
1950s vintage technology through foreign collaboration. Growth was based on the 
horizontal diffusion of this technology and through indigenising production. There are 
few signs that there was learning in this process but chapter V did review evidence to 
suggest this process of replication was efficient. Section 5.4.4 showed there was little 
sign of intensive growth and learning in existing capacity in the state owned heavy 
industrial sector after 1965. Foreign experts were still required in large number for tasks 
other than day to day production engineering. Capacity utilisation fell across the board in 
response not just to lower levels of public investment but also to a general lack of 
concern with technological upgrading and plant maintenance and poor management.
There is also evidence that extensive growth by replication became less efficient after the 
mid-1960s with sectoral ICOR’s showing a sharp increase. There is also evidence that 
plants set up later tended to have permanently lower levels of capacity utilisation.
6.6. Labour Conflict, Profitability and Private Sector Investment
Private sector investment rose from 7.9% of GDP in 1960/61 to over 10% of GDP after 
1965/66 (table 6.8). There is good evidence to show that private investment was 
becoming less productive after the mid-1960s. Despite stable or increasing private sector 
investment, there was a sharp fall in private corporate investment from 4.6% of GDP in 
1963/64 to 1.5% of GDP in 1969/70, then continued stagnation until 1979/80 (table
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6.12). The stability of total private investment as a share of GDP was achieved by an 
increase in household investment. There is evidence (section 5.4.3) that investment in 
machinery is an important determinant of productivity growth (De Long and Summers 
1991; Lee 1995; Hendricks 2000). Even the reduced level of private corporate 
investment was shifting to a lower productivity areas (table 6.13). There was a collapse 
in the growth of investment in equipment, from an average of 5.54% p.a. between 
1950/51 to 1964/65 to -0.04% p.a. between 1964/65 to 1980/81.
The sharp fall in corporate investment after the mid-1960s can in part be traced to a shift 
in patterns of income distribution. Section 6.2 showed that there was an increase in 
pressure from demand groups after the mid-1960s. Demand groups included trade 
unions, which were able to push for large wage increases in the organised public and 
private sectors from the mid-1960s onwards. Real earnings per (factory) worker declined 
from 100 in 1951 to a low of 91 in 1967 then rose rapidly over the next few years to 101 
in 1970/1 (Subramanian 1977:716; Chakravarty 1974:211; Rudolph and Rudolph 
1987:263). Real wages in Indian industry increased from 100 in 1960 to only 104 in 
1967 then rose steadily in two bursts, to 120 in 1972 and to 143 between 1978 and 1982 
(Tulpule and Datta 1988). Real wage in organised manufacturing increased from 1,197 
rupees per year in 1960/61 to Rs 1,215 p.a. in 1967/68 then further to Rs 1,453 p.a. in 
1971/72 and to Rs 1,682 p.a. in 1979/80. In agriculture from 1.43 rupees per day to Rs 
1.25, Rs 1.59 and Rs 1.52 over the same time period (Joshi and Little 1994:92).
There was a structural break in the distribution of factor incomes in the organised sector 
after 1965/66 (table 6.18). Between 1960/61 and 1964/65 the division of GDP between 
employee compensation and the operating surplus of corporations was quite stable, 
around 67/33 to 68/32. From 1965/66 onwards there was a sharp break, by 1967/68 the 
ratio had shifted to 74.2/25.8, nearly 6% of GDP had shifted from organised sector 
corporations to labour. This was caused both by increasing wages for which evidence 
has been given here and also by a slowdown in productivity growth, evidence for which 
was been presented in section 5. This had a material impact on the ability of firms to 
finance private corporate sector investment or more specifically investment in machinery.
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Table 6.1*!: Factor Incomes of Organised Sector at Current Prices
Year Compensation of Employees, % of NDP Operating Surplus, % of GDP
1960/61 68.87 31.13
1961/62 68.07 31.93
1962/63 68.45 31.55
1963/64 67.63 32.37
1964/65 68.76 31.24
1965/66 69.53 30.47
1966/67 71.06 28.94
1967/68 74.18 25.82
1968/69 74.22 25.78
1969/70 72.55 27.45
1971/72 72.58 27.42
1972/73 72.62 27.38
1973/74 74.08 25.92
1974/75 73.18 26.82
1975/76 71.76 28.24
1976/77 72.67 27.33
1977/78 68.62 31.38
1978/79 69.56 30.44
Source: Sivasubramonian, 2004, p37.
Mitra presents detailed evidence on profitability ratios in Indian industry and finds 
support for this general pattern. Profits as a percentage of total capital employed dropped 
from 10.1% in 1965/66 to 8.5% in 1968/69 among medium and large public limited 
companies (1977:149). Similar patterns exist for public limited companies broken down 
into five different size categories (p 151 -2). For Coal mining and sugar (p i 53), cotton 
textiles, jute textiles (p i54), iron and steel, other non-ferrous metals and engineering 
(pl55), and cement (p i56).
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6.7. The Personality of Indira Gandhi, an Alternative Explanation?
There is another view that explains the shift in Indian politics after the mid-1960s as a 
consequence of the death of Nehru, the subsequent succession crisis and eventual rise to 
power of Indira Gandhi. The death of Nehru in 1964 was important. Nehrus’s presence 
at the centre as ultimate arbiter and toleration of decentralisation allowed effective 
authority to exist at all levels of Congress. Throughout the organisation Nehru and his 
confidants who acted as mediators and arbitrators of factional conflicts remained in 
“complete mastery of policy and politics” (Brass 1996:70). It was a situation of strong 
centre, strong states and strong leaders. All levels had the capability and legitimacy to 
resolve disputes and impose consensus, and if not pass the problem up to the next level. 
The explosion of rent-seeking can be traced to her reliance on pure patronage rather than 
the organisation of Congress to retain power in general elections. The collapse of the 
Congress organisation can be traced to her desire to cement her own position at the 
centre. This argument is persuasive but can be argued in structural terms that support the 
hypothesis here. After the electoral collapse in 1967 it may be argued Indira was driven 
towards radical ideological rhetoric in order to win back power for Congress. This then 
required splitting the Congress party which was in the mid-1960s still a very broad 
alliance representing all shades of the nationalist movement. Relying only on 
explanations that focus on the personal predilections of Indira cannot account for the fact 
that the organisation and institutions of nearly all political parties fragmented after the 
mid-1960s66.
66 See for example the rise of NTR in Andhra Pradesh (Kohli 1988a).
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Chapter VII: The Role of the State and the Episode of
Stagnation Growth in India, 1979/80 to 1991.
1. Summary of Chapter Findings
This chapter is divided into four main parts, the first outlines India’s episode of growth 
between 1979/80 and 1991, then reviews and critiques the existing explanations for this 
growth. Each of the remaining three parts of the chapter focuses on one particular role 
that the state has in promoting economic development. The first two examine the 
potential economic (finance and production) roles of the state and the third the potential 
political role of the state (institutions). The Indian state between 1979/80 and 1991 had 
three principal roles with regards to the domestic financial system. These were 
mobilising domestic savings, creating institutions to mobilise private sector savings, and 
allocating resources to projects essential for development. The state managed to maintain 
a steady if slow rate of growth in aggregate savings, and tax revenue. Rapid growth in 
current expenditure undermined these efforts and public sector savings fell sharply. 
Private corporate sector savings grew marginally during the 1980s but household savings 
increased rapidly, particularly the financial component. The second important financial 
role of the state was in allocating resources to projects essential for development there 
was a sharp increase in public investment in the early-1980s. The crucial role of the state 
in production is ensuring that the surplus is used productively, to either raise productivity 
in an existing market niche (learning) or upgrade to higher technology production. There 
was a sharp increase in productivity growth after 1979/80. There are four reasons why 
productivity growth increased in the 1980s. These are firstly, higher levels of public 
investment, secondly, an increase in productive private investment, thirdly, the existence 
of large slack in capacity and fourthly, a pattern of extensive growth. Productivity 
growth was a somewhat haphazard process of extensive growth with few signs of 
learning. Despite big election victories in 1980 and 1984 this was not a restoration of the 
old Congress system. The party organisation had decayed and the authority and ability of
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Congress to mediate in local affairs had declined sharply and there emerged an 
institutional vacuum in the periphery. Intense and undisciplined factionalism has led to a 
difficulty in retaining power, the resort to populism and conflict shifting to street 
violence. Congress was unable to diffuse political tensions by negotiation and 
incorporation of the local level leadership. In the 1950s higher public investment was 
associated with a sharp rise in tax revenue, increased public sector savings, and a strict 
control over subsidies. In the 1980s higher public investment was associated with a small 
rise in tax revenue, sharper increases in government current expenditure and subsidies, a 
massive increase in the government fiscal deficit and a sharp decline in public sector 
savings. The state in the 1980s did not have the institutions necessary to mobilise the 
necessary resources to pay for expansion and allocate the resulting burden. The 
explosion of rent-seeking that had occurred after the mid-1960s (Chapter VI) continued 
unabated. The state possessed no institution for identifying those requiring 
compensation, minimising the transaction costs associated with such transfers, and 
minimising rent-seeking by other entities. Rent-seeking and the growth of unproductive 
rents continued unabated and indiscriminately. Political mobilisation in agriculture 
generated a massive growth in subsidies (rents). Subsidies increased across the board in 
numerous economic sectors, reaching 15% of GDP in 1987/88. Strike activity reached 
new peaks in the 1980s and was quickly followed by rising wages. In the 1980s 
expanded levels of public investment in infrastructure and power did tackle what had 
hitherto been a major constraint on growth. Some plants in the public sector rapidly 
increased capacity utilisation, others remained mired in inefficiency. There were some 
signs that higher capacity utilisation was behind higher levels of productivity and ICOR’s 
declined during the 1980s. There are few signs the incentives and opportunities 
generated by higher public investment were accompanied by discipline. There are also 
few if any signs of learning at these major industrial enterprises, expanded demand and 
public investment was allowing them to ignore other failings. Finally, this section 
concludes with evidence showing that the pattern of resource mobilisation in the 1980s 
was not sustainable.
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2. Recap from Chapter III: An Episode of Growth, 1979/80 to 1991
Nagaraj (1990a) in 1979/80 and Bhargava and Joshi (1990) in 1980/81 found GDP 
growth increased from a trend average of about 3.5% to one of over 5%. Rodrik and 
Subramanian (2004a) find three measures related to aggregate growth performance, real 
GDP per capita, real GDP per worker, and TFP displayed a sharp upward trend beginning 
1980. Using other statistical techniques Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) computed optimal 
one, two and three break points for the growth rate of per capita GDP (constant dollars 
and at PPP prices), GDP per worker, and TFP, in all cases they found a single break in 
1979. Wallack (2003) analysed GDP and its disaggregated components for structural 
breaks, he found the highest F-value occurred in 1980.
3. Limitations of Existing Explanations
There is little discussion around the episode of growth 1979/80 to 1991 beyond studies 
identifying the statistical break. Recent exceptions are Rodrik and Subramanian (2004a) 
and Panagariya (2004). This section reviews briefly some of the possible explanations of 
factors that could have initiated the episode of growth after 1979/80 and finds they have 
limited explanatory potential.
3.1. Favourable External Environment?
There is a wide debate about the links between the external environment and economic 
growth. Kaplinsky (2001) argues foreign trade exposure may be bad for economic 
development, Sachs and Warner (1999) that a boom in foreign trade has the potential to 
initiate domestic industrialisation. Lall (1999) argues Indian export performance is 
passively linked to growth in the world economy. In the case of India there is very little 
evidence to suggest that a favourable external environment caused the pick up in 
economic growth in the early 1980s. The evolution of India’s terms of trade since 1960
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reached their most unfavourable point during the 1980s, when they declined about 20% 
relative to previous periods (Rodrik and Subramaniam 2004a). The structural break in 
growth in the early-1980s occurred simultaneously with a disastrous harvest, sharp 
increase in oil prices, high inflation and a large current account deficit (Joshi and Little 
1994: Ch6).
3.2. External Liberalisation?
There is an extremely large literature testing the link between openness and trade 
liberalisation and economic growth much of it arguing in favour of a positive relationship 
(Dollar 1992; Sachs and Warner 1995; Krueger 1998). For the case of India there is little 
evidence of external/ trade liberalisation in the early-1980s significant enough to explain 
the structural break in economic growth. During the 1980s protection through tariffs 
(measured in terms of effective protection) increased and protection through quantity 
restrictions (QR’s) (in terms of the coverage of these restrictions) declined only 
marginally (Das 2003b: 18)67. These numbers understate the increase in effective 
protection for final/ consumer goods for much of the 1980s and 90s stemming from 
(limited) liberalisation of the capital goods sector. The simple average tariff increased 
from 94% in 1980/81 to 127% in 1989/90 (Pandey 2004). The same pattern is true by 
import-weighted measure. There was also an increase in the standard deviation. It was 
only after 1989/90 that the average tariff rate and standard deviation declined. Duty 
collection as a share of imports rose from over 30% in the early 1980s to nearly 45% in 
the late-1980s. As a share of GDP duty collections declined steadily only after the mid- 
1990s. Incorporating the level of export subsidies reduces the level of protection but 
confirms the pattern of sharply rising protection during the 1980s. The annual growth of 
non-oil imports and exports barely changed between the 1970s and 1980s, it was only in 
the 1990s that figures for both increased sharply. Crude openness indicators such as the 
openness ratio show how much more openness increased in the 1990s relative to the 
1980s (table 7.1).
67 Trade protection is notoriously hard to measure (Edwards 1998; Rodriquez and Rodrik 2000) etc.
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Table 7.1: Measures of Trade Performance and Openness 1970s to 1990s
1970s 1980s 1990s
Annual Growth of 
Non-oil import 
Volume
1.1% 2.8% 12.9%
Annual Growth of 
export volume
4.6% 4% 10.7%
Openness Ratio 9.8% 12.7% 19.3%
Source: (Rodrik and Subramanian 2004a: 1())•
The average trade ratio actually declined for much of the 1980s, from a local peak of 
7.85% in 1980/81 to 6.22% in 1986/87 (table 7.2). There is a surge in imports in 1980/81 
connected with increased oil prices but otherwise no obvious trend in the ratio of imports 
to GDP. The ratio of exports to GDP shows a downward trend between 1977/78 and 
1985/86.
Table 7.2: The Ratio of Foreign Trade to GDP at Current Prices, 1977/78 to 1990/91 
(% of GDP) _________________ ____________________________________
Year Imports Exports Average
1977/78 6.93 6.23 6.58
1978/79 7.30 6.13 6.72
1979/80 8.97 6.30 7.63
1980/81 10.23 5.47 7.85
1981/82 9.48 5.44 7.46
1982/83................. 8.95......................... 5.51 7.23..........................
1983/84 8.44 5.21 6.83
1984/85 8.16 5.59 6.87
1985/86 8.36 4.64 6.50
1986/87 7.68 4.76 6.22
1987/88 7.49 5.28 6.38
1988/89 7.92 5.67 6.80
1989/90 8.58 6.70 7.64
1990/91 8.95 6.75 7.85
Source: (Sivasubramonian 2004:277)
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Rodrik and Subramanian (2004a) use a gravity model to examine the determinants of 
external trade. A dummy variable for India is negative and significant in all periods until 
2000. The dummy increased in value throughout the 1980s and started to decline only in 
the mid-1990s. This is again evidence that external trade only began to influence the 
aggregate economy significantly in the 1990s not the early-1980s.
The real exchange rate remained broadly unchanged during the first half of the 1980s, the 
rupee then experienced a real depreciation of over 40% in 1985-90. Linking this with the 
boom in industrial growth is difficult. A real depreciation will boost aggregate demand 
and can increased output in the short-term. The consequences for raising long-run
/TO
productivity growth are less clear . A devalued exchange rate could impact overall 
productivity growth through an import substitution induced reallocation effect (if 
tradeables are generally more productive than the rest of the economy). A raising share 
of tradeable goods in overall GDP can result in an economy wide productivity increase.
In India the share of the manufacturing sector was too small to explain overall 
productivity growth in this manner.
3.3. Agriculture-Industry Linkages?
Many have argued that growth in the agricultural sector may stimulate aggregate 
economic growth (Ahluwalia 1985; Patnaik 1987; Nagaraj 2003b). The agricultural 
sector has important links to the industrial sector from both demand and supply sides.
The marketed surplus has both a real and financial component. Agriculture may become 
a drag on industry by limiting the supply of industrial raw material inputs to agro-based 
industries. Agricultural incomes also account for a large proportion of final output 
demand in the industrial sector, in 1980/81 agriculture accounted for 37% of GDP (Joshi 
and Little 1994). The growth of labour productivity in agriculture is important in 
releasing labour for non-agricultural employment.
68 See Rodrik and Subramanian (2004a) for a fuller explanation of this point.
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There is no clear evidence that improved agricultural growth generated the structural 
break in economic growth in the early-1980s. There was a sharp increase in the growth 
rate of labour productivity which increased from 0.1% p.a. in the 1970s to 2.6% p.a. in 
the 1980s (Rodrik and Subramanian 2004a). There are a number of difficulties in linking 
this with the improvement in the aggregate economy. In quantitative terms the 
turnaround was much less than in manufacturing and services. If rising agricultural 
productivity were the underlying cause for improved productivity performance elsewhere 
in the economy a necessary condition according to Rodrik and Subramanian (2004a) to 
be met is deterioration in the agricultural terms of trade. The agricultural terms of trade 
reached a peak in 1973/74 and declined thereafter (Thamarajakshi 1990). The level of 
the terms of trade was similar in the 1980s as in the mid-1960s.
There is mixed evidence on trends in growth rates of agricultural output. Growth of 
foodgrain production increased from 2.37% p.a. between 1970/1 and 1977/8 to 2.94% 
between 1977/8 and 1985/6 (Chandrasekhar 1988). The trend rate of overall growth 
increased from 2.3% between 1967/8 and 1981/2, to 3.4% between 1981/2 and 1991/2 
(Rao and Storm 1998). Nagaraj (1990b:2317) though finds no evidence of a break in the 
growth rate in the 1980s, there is remarkable stability in the growth of crop output 
between 1949/50 and 1987/88. These changes (if any) are too small to explain large 
changes in the macroeconomy. This was also a period in which industrial growth was 
less dependent on agricultural growth, but agriculture was becoming ever more 
dependent on industry. The percentage of purchased inputs to total inputs (proxy for 
demand for industrial inputs in agriculture) doubled from 16.4% in 1970/71 to 35.6% in 
1983/84 (Thamarajakshi 1990). Industry recorded positive growth during the 1987/88 
drought, whereas during previous droughts industry had gone into recession (Kurien 
1989:791).
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3.4. ‘Internal’ Liberalisation?
There is no evidence to support the view that a shift in the economic policy regime led to 
a structural break in economic growth in the early 1980s. The timing and magnitude of 
(piecemeal) internal liberalisation are not compatible with a productivity and growth 
takeoff in the early 1980s. There were some important steps between 1984 and 1988 to 
dismantle the licensing system, however as late as 1991 it remained pervasive, 60% of 
industry was still subject to licensing and controls (Chopra et al 1995). Of Rajiv’s 
reforms after 1985, “In retrospect, they amounted to an acquiescence in the regime but a 
mild attempt at moderating its worst excesses.” (Bhagwati 1993:80).
3.5. An Elite-Import-Led Growth Strategy?
Numerous authors have argued growth in the 1980s was driven by (elite) consumption of 
consumer durables. The output of consumer durables between grew by 16% p.a. between 
1980/81 and 1988/89 compared to 7.4% for the manufacturing sector as a whole. Some 
sectors such as scooters, computer systems, passenger cars, domestic refrigerators, and 
consumer electronics show output by 1984/85 that was up to 80% above targeted figures 
(Nagaraj 1990b). Baru (1985) argues there were wide-ranging direct tax concessions to 
the property owning classes that were funded by an increasing budget deficit and higher 
indirect taxes on consumption of the poorest fostering he argues the growth of luxury 
good consumption. Patnaik (1986) argues that the luxury-consumption led growth was a 
deliberate anti-egalitarian strategy and Heralded a narrowing of the class basis of the state. 
Harriss (1987) argues that growth was based on meeting pent-up demand in luxury 
markets. “There is a desperate effort to create and encourage within the system an upper 
crust of the affluent whose economic activities can support and sustain growth for a 
while.” (Kurien 1989:795).
There are severe problems with this argument such a pattern of growth cannot explain 
acceleration (Kumar 1986). Luxury growth was based on the delicensing of industrial
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capacity in order to enjoy economies of scale by utilising imported machinery. However 
the high import intensity of such investment and luxury consumption would generate few 
growth impulses in the domestic economy. Output would only cater to a small fraction of 
the population and demand would quickly reach saturation point (Bagchi 1981). There 
are problems with characterising the structural break in growth as being synonymous 
with luxury consumption. The high growth rates of consumer durables need not be 
equated with luxury consumption, given the widening of the domestic manufacturing 
base and rising per capita incomes. Radios for example have moved from the status of 
luxury to staple consumption. The growth of consumer non-durables is likely to have 
been under -estimated given that a greater share is to be produced in the unorganised 
sector. Finally, the consumer durables sector is simply too small to explain a turnaround 
in aggregate economic growth. The weight of the consumer durables sector in the indices 
of industrial production in the 1980/81 series was only 2.55%. The luxury-growth thesis 
might help explain the shift in the sectoral pattern of output growth but cannot explain the 
jump in aggregate growth.
4. The (Economic) Role of the State, 1979/80 to 1991: Finance
This section examines the role of the state in mobilising and allocating the surplus. The 
Indian state between 1979/80 and 1991 had three principal roles with regards to the 
domestic financial system. These were mobilising domestic savings, creating institutions 
to mobilise private sector savings, and allocating resources to projects essential for 
development.
This section will show that the state managed to maintain a steady if slow rate of growth 
in aggregate savings, and tax revenue. Rapid growth in current expenditure undermined 
these efforts and public sector savings fell sharply. Private corporate sector savings grew 
marginally during the 1980s. Household savings increased rapidly, particularly the 
financial component.
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4.1. The Role of the State and the Mobilisation of Domestic (and foreign) Savings
Though the marginal rate of savings declined in the early 1980s relative to the 1970s it 
remained high (table 7.3).
Table 7.3: Estimates of the Marginal Rate of Saving in the Indian Economy
Period MR(gross)S %
1970/71 to 1979/80 26.3
1980/81 to 1984/85 21.4
Source: (Chakravarty 1987:103.
The marginal continued to exceed the average rate of domestic savings throughout the 
1980s leading to a steady rise in the (total) level of savings. Gross domestic savings 
increased from an average of 19.7% of GDP between 1980/81 to 1984/85 to 21.7% of 
GDP in 1989/90 (Table 7.4).
Table 7.4: Gross Domestic Savings in India, 1980/81 to :
Year Gross Domestic Savings
Average 1980/81 to 1984/85 19.7
1985/86 19.7
1986/87 18.4
1987/88 20.3
1988/89 21.0
1989/90 21.7
Average 1985/86 to 1989/90 20.2
Source: (Chakravarty 1987:103).
There was a slow, steady rise in tax revenue during the 1980s by about 2% of GDP 
between the first and second half of the 1980s (table 7.5).
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Table 7.5: Consolidated Government Fiscal Transfers, 1980/81 to 1990/91 (% of 
GDP) _______ i_______ i_______  ^______ i_______ _______ _ _____
Average
1980/81
to
1984/85
1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 Average
1985/86
to
1989/90
Revenue 18.1 19.5 20.0 20.1 19.6 20.9 19.5 20.0
Current
Expenditure
18.6 21.4 22.6 23.1 22.7 24.8 23.9 23.0
Defence 2.7 3.3 3.8 4.0 3.8 3.6 - 3.7
Interest 2.6 3.3 3.6 4.0 4.2 4.6 4.8 3.9
Subsidies 2.6 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 4.2 - 3.6
Source: (Joshi and Little 1994:193).
Greater revenue mobilisation is not sufficient to raise the level of public sector savings. 
During the 1980s efforts to mobilise tax revenue (up 2% of GDP) were undermined by 
even faster growth of current expenditure. Current expenditure increased by 
approximately 5% of GDP between the first and second half of the 1980s (table 7.5). 
This increase was driven primarily by increases in defence expenditure, interest and 
subsidies.
Mundle and Rao (1991) examined the level and composition of subsidies for the Central 
and fourteen state governments in India in 1987/88. The budget and national accounts 
define subsidies as explicit payments made to producers to alter price or output decisions. 
Mundle and Rao define government subsidies as the difference between the cost of 
delivering various publicly provided goods and services and resultant cost recoveries. 
Their concept is broader and includes losses from departmental enterprises, subsidies to 
households implicit in the provision of social and economic services below cost, and non­
recovered loans. Even this total will be an underestimate, as it does not include tax 
expenditures, such as the provision of higher education where the market-clearing price is 
higher than the actual cost of supply. They find that only 32% of the cost of social and 
economic services provided by the centre and states was recovered in 1987/88 giving an 
estimate of total subsidies of 15% of GDP.
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The consolidated (centre and state) government fiscal deficit increased from 4.9% of 
GDP between 1975/76 and 1977/78 to 10.4% of GDP in 1990/91. The rise was steady 
and unrelenting (table 7.6).
Table 7.6: Consolidated Government Fiscal Deficit, 1975/76 to 1990/91 (% of GDP)
Year Consolidated Government Fiscal Deficit
1975/76 to 1977/78 4.9
1978/79 5.7
1979/80 6.5
1980/81 8.1
1981/82 6.7
1982/83 7.3
1983/84 8.2
1984/85 9.7
1985/86 9.3
1986/87 10.9
1987/88 10.0
1988/89 9.4
1989/90 10.4
1990/91 10.4
Source: (Joshi and Little 1994:166, 193).
The net effect of slowly rising revenue and rapid growth in current expenditure led to a 
sharp decline in public sector savings in the 1980s. Public sector savings dropped 
sharply from an average of 3.7% of GDP between 1980/81 and 1984/85 to only 1.7% of 
GDP in 1989/90 (Joshi and Little 1994:196)
Unlike the period of stagnation (1965-80) there was a growing recourse to foreign 
savings during the 1980s. Foreign savings had fallen to a low o f-1.1% of GDP in 
1976/77. There was a steady rise during the 1980s. The net inflow of foreign savings 
increased from an average of 1.5% of GDP between 1980/81 and 1984/85 to an average 
of 2.4% of GDP between 1985/86 and 1989/90 (table 7.7).
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Table 7.7; The Net Inflow of Foreign Savings in the 1980s.
Average
1980/81
to
1984/85
1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 Average
1985/86
to
1989/90
Foreign
Saving
1.5 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.8 2.4 2.4
Source: (Joshi and Little 1994:196).
4.1.1 The Role o f the State in Creating Institutions to Mobilise Private Sector Savings
As well as mobilising its own resources through the tax system and facilitating the inflow 
of resources from foreign sources the state played an important role in mobilising 
resources indirectly, by creating institutions to mobilise private sector savings.
The finance ratio is the ratio of total financial claims issued during the course of a year to 
national income and is an indicator of the rate of financial development. The measure 
continued rising with the expansion of the state owned banking sector, from 33.03 in 
1980/81 to 41.3 in 1985/86. The new issues ratio is the ratio of primary issues to net 
physical capital formation and is indicator of the extent to which the non-financial sector 
financed its investment through external funds. This ratio increased sharply in the 1980s, 
from 0.85 in 1980/81 to 1.28 in 1991/92 (Sen and Vaidya 1997). Of particular 
importance was the nationalised Unit Trust of India (UTI), which though formed in 1964 
(as a subsidiary of the IDBI) increased its role in the mobilisation of savings in the 1980s. 
Its share in total financial assistance to industrial sector increased from 3.2% in 1980/81 
to 22.2% in 1993/94. Bank lending increased its share as a source of finance, from 
22.6% of total physical investment in 1980/81 to 1986/87 to 34% between 1987/88 to 
1992/93. Equity issues plus bonds likewise increased their share from 10.4% to 22.5% 
(Cobham and Subramaniam 1998:1037).
The level of private corporate savings increased slightly during the 1980s, from an 
average of 1.6% of GDP between 1980/81 to 1984/85 to an average of 1.9% of GDP
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between 1985/86 and 1989/90 (table 7.8). The principal driving influence on sustaining 
aggregate savings rates in India during the 1980s was private sector household saving. 
Household saving increased from an average of 14.3% of GDP between 1980/81 and 
1984/85 to 17.8% of GDP in 1989/90. Of the two components of household saving, it 
was financial savings that grew most rapidly, by over 2% of GDP between the first half 
and end of the 1980s. The re-allocation of savings from a physical to a financial form 
illustrates that the government was being successful in creating institutions to mobilise 
private sector savings.
Table 7.8: Private Secf:or Savings, 1980/81 to 1989/9C
Average
1980/81
to
1984/85
1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 Average,
1985/86
to
1989/90
Corporate 1.6 2.0 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.1 1.9
Household 14.3 14.5 13.9 16.5 17.1 17.8 16.0
Financial 6.7 7.1 7.9 7.8 7.3 8.9 7.8
Physical 7.6 7.4 6.1 8.6 9.8 8.9 8.2
Source: (Joshi and Little 1994:196).
4.2. Allocating resources to projects essential for development
The second important financial role of the state was in allocating resources to projects 
essential for development.
4.2.1. The Structural Break in Growth and Public Investment
The key to the acceleration of growth and productivity in the early 1980s was the 
structural break in public investment. Public investment increased sharply from the mid- 
1970s to the early-1980s, from 6.5% of GDP in 1974/75, to 10.1% of GDP in 1982/83. 
The share of public infrastructure investment increased from 4% of GDP in 1974/75 to 
5.3% of GDP in 1980/81 (table 7.9).
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Table 7.9: Unadjust ed Gross Fixed Capif
Year Total
GFCF
Total
Public
GFCF
Public
Infrastru
cture
1974/75 16.7 6.5 4.0
1975/76 16.8 7.0 4.3
1976/77 18.6 8.5 4.7
1977/78 19.0 8.5 4.7
1978/79 18.1 8.1 4.8
1979/80 18.6 8.7 5.2
1980/81 19.3 8.6 5.3
1981/82 19.4 9.1 5.2
1982/83 19.5 10.1 5.3
1983/84 18.3 9.6 4.7
1984/85 18.4 9.8 5.0
1985/86 18.7 9.7 4.9
1986/87 18.6 10.4 5.6
1987/88 19.4 9.6 5.2
1988/89 19.0 9.1 4.8
1989/90 18.9 9.1 4.7
Formation (1980/81 prices, % of GDP)
Source: (Joshi and Little 1994:330-1).
5. The (Economic) Role of the State, 1979/80 to 1991: Production
This section examines the role of the state in achieving productive use of the surplus in 
both public and private sectors. The crucial role of the state in production is ensuring that 
the surplus is used productively, to either raise productivity in an existing market niche 
(learning) or upgrade to higher technology production. The first section shows that there 
was a sharp increase in productivity growth after 1979/80. There are four reasons why 
productivity growth increased in the 1980s. These are firstly, higher levels of public 
investment, secondly, an increase in productive private investment, thirdly, the existence 
of large slack in capacity and fourthly, a pattern of extensive growth. Productivity 
growth was a somewhat haphazard process of extensive growth with few signs of 
learning.
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5.1. An Evaluation of Growth, 1979/80 to 1991
The crucial role of the state in production is ensuring that the surplus is used 
productively, to either raise productivity in an existing market niche or upgrade to higher 
technology production.
The most influential work suggesting there was a turnaround in productivity growth in 
the early-1980s was that by Ahluwalia (1991). Between 1965/66 and 1979/80 she found 
TFP growth of negative 0.3% p.a. the turnaround in the first half of the 1980s was 
dramatic with TFP growth of positive 3.4%. She found the best performing sectors 
(judged by TFP) after 1980 were chemicals, machinery, and transport. There are a 
number of scholars who disagree with these early findings. Balakrishnan and 
Pushpangadan (1994, 1996, 1998, 2000) argue that the single deflation method used by 
Ahluwalia is flawed, the price of materials (inputs) they argue had been rising relative to 
the price of output. With a single deflation method, both components of value added, the 
value of output and of inputs are deflated by a single price index. Balakrishnan and 
Pushpangadan do not find a statistically significant increase in TFP growth after the 
early-1980s, this result they argue is an artefact of mistakenly using a single deflation 
technique. Mohan-Rao (1996a+b) improves the methodology used in the early work 
(such as making adjustments for monopoly power in the product market and 
disaggregating by enterprise size and public/ private ownership) and argues both capital 
and labour productivity declined between 1974 and 1983/84. He argues that estimates 
are not robust to changes in the length of the data series! There is no difference between 
pre and post-1983/84 if the prior data series is extended back to 1965 or 1970, or if 
1980/81 is used as the base year for the output price series. Pradhan and Basu (1999) 
repeat this question using micro-level studies (of various key industries such as 
chemicals, cement, iron and steel, and non-ferrous metals) using a longer time-series, 
1963/64 to 1992/93. They suggest there may be some downward trend in TFP during 
1982-1993 but the dominant pattern is of large fluctuations in the growth rate of TFP.
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There are methodological problems with the pessimistic work and the balance of later 
argument suggests that there was an increase in TFP growth after c l979/80. The 
pessimistic conclusions are difficult to square with the widely accepted finding that 
economic growth increased while aggregate investment remained stable. Verdoom’s law 
for examples suggests a positive relationship between TFP growth and output growth, for 
which there is supporting evidence (Rao 1996b:3188). Dholakia and Dholakia (1994) 
find problems with the methodology in Balakrishnan and Pushpangadan, they argue these 
results are very sensitive to the weights used to derive the input price index. Correcting 
for this ‘error’ they find an acceleration of TFP in the 1980s relative to the 1970s. Goldar 
(2002, 2004) using double deflation method finds an acceleration of TFP in 1980s. The 
difference he argues hinges on the choice of base year for price indices (Balakrishnan and 
Pushpangadan use 1970/71 as a base), they use instead the 1980/81 series.
Gangopadhyay and Wadhwa (1998) offer specific evidence and find rising labour 
productivity, capital deepening and falling labour costs in textiles, leather, metal 
products, and other manufacturing in the early-1980s69. These are the industries 
dominated India’s export drive. Ahluwalia (1995) shows TFP growth during 1981-89 
increased over the previous decade by 3.2% points. Goldar (1995) found TFP growth for 
the organised manufacturing sector of 1.55% between 1970/71 and 1980/81, this rose to 
3.85% between 1980/81 and 1985/86, and still further to 5.05% between 1985/86 and 
1990/91. Mitra (1999) found TFP increased from negative 0.76% p.a. between 1976/77 
and 1984/85 to positive 5.57% p.a. between 1984/85 and 1993/94. Mitra finds the 
improvement in the second period to across a large number of industries and states .
Unel (2003) uses various means of measuring TFP. In general he finds that between 
1979/80 and 1997/98 the capital-output ratio has been virtually constant while labour 
productivity and capital intensity have grown rapidly (table 7.10). The finding of a sharp 
structural break in TFP growth has been confirmed most recently by Virmani (2004a:23).
69 The productivity turnaround in textiles dates from after 1985.
70 There is still a productivity problem. In a large majority of states TFP growth in beverages, basic metals 
and metal products continues to be negative.
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Table 7.10; Growth rate in variables (percentage).
Period Total Value 
Added per 
Worker 
(labour 
productivity)
Capital per 
Worker 
(capital 
intensity)
Capital per 
unit of Output 
(Capital- 
Output Ratio)
TFP1 TFP2
1979-90 6.3 7.3 1.0 1.8 3.2
1990-91 -4.9 5.8 11 -8.8 -7.2
1991-97 7.8 7 -0.8 2.5 4.7
Source: (Une 2003:12)
Another striking feature that emerges from cross-national evidence is the respective 
contributions of capital accumulation and TFP growth to overall productivity growth. 
Prior to 1980 the contribution of TFP growth to overall productivity growth (10%) was 
lower in India than any other region except the Middle East, even Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Since 1980 nearly 60% of overall growth has been accounted for by TFP, matched only 
by China, and not even East Asia.
There are four reasons why productivity growth increased in the 1980s. These are firstly, 
higher levels of public investment, secondly, an increase in productive private 
investment, thirdly, the existence of large slack in capacity, and fourthly, a pattern of 
extensive growth.
5.1.1. Sources o f Productivity: Public Investment
Chapter V showed how public investment increased rapidly in the 1950s increasing 
industrial capacity and along with trade protection a demand for the output of industry. 
Growth in the 1950s was based on rapid diversification of the industrial structure. The 
pattern of growth was also balanced, with relatively high rates of capacity utilisation in 
all major economic sectors. New plants established in sectors such as steel and 
aluminium rapidly reached full capacity. Growth during the 1980s was likewise based on 
rapid increases in public investment. Public investment was focused on a few key
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constraints that enabled alleviated bottlenecks in growth for both the public and private 
sectors. The Sixth Five-Year Plan (1980/81 to 1984/85) identified some of these key 
constraints as they had emerged during the late-1970s.
“The experience of the recent past shows that a lack of co-ordination among critical 
sectors acts as a general drag on economic growth. Production capabilities created after a 
massive investment effort remain underutilised due to shortfalls in performance of a few 
sectors.” (Planning Commission 2003, Sixth FYP:Ch3:7)
“Trends in capacity utilisation up to 1979/80 in major industries have been a source of 
considerable concern because in most cases there has been a decline after
1976/77............. while the poor use of capacity represents a waste of resources and thus
adds to the resource constraint, it also provides an opportunity for a quick increase in
output and productivity in the short run The poor utilisation of capacity in
agriculture as well as in industry stems from many factors but the major problem areas 
can be located in the basic infrastructure of power and transport.” (Planning Commission 
2003, Sixth FYP:Ch3:l).
Not only did the level of public investment increase (Table 7.1) its composition also 
shifted towards a more growth-enhancing pattern (as identified by the Sixth FYP). Public 
investment increased by 4.9% 1980/81, 12.5% in 1981/92 and 15.9% in 1982/83 (there 
were more moderate increases in the next two years), in the same years infrastructure 
investment increased by 8%, 6.1%, 5%. The most pronounced increases were in 
infrastructure sectors such as coal, electricity, nitrogenous fertiliser, phosphatic fertiliser 
and cement (Nagaraj 1990:2321). The share of power in public plan expenditure rose 
from 18.8% during the Fifth FYP (1974/75 to 1978/79) to 28.3% in the 6th FYP (1980/81 
to 1984/85). All-India power supply increased by 25% between 1979/80 and 1982/83 
and steadily reduced the percentage shortfall from requirement from 16.1% in 1979/80 to 
9.2% in 1982/8 Ahluwalia (1985:97). Energy consumption increased sharply, from 
5.12% p.a. between 1970/71 and 1980/81 to 6.93% p.a. between 1980/81 and 1990/91 
(Sivasubramonian 2004:265). New sources of fuel were expanded especially rapidly.
2 2 7
The availability of natural gas increased by 23.69% p.a. between 1980/81 and 1990/91, 
from 0.47% in the earlier period, and lignite 10.69% (from 4.18%).
5.1.2. Sources o f Growth, Private Investment
The level of total private investment stagnated between the mid-1970s and 1989/90, 
falling to a low of 8.6% of GDP in 1984/85 (table 7.11). This figure hides a very 
dramatic change in the composition of private investment. The rise in, and changing 
patterns of public investment generated a dramatic response by the private sector. Private 
corporate investment dropped sharply after the mid-1960s in response to cuts in public 
investment, remained low before surging ahead in the early-1980s, from 1.1% of GDP in 
1978/79 to 4.4% of GDP in 1982/83.
Table 7.11: Unadjusted Gross Fixed Capital Formation (1980/81 prices, % of GDP)
Year Total
Private
Private
Corpora
te
Private
Househ
old
1974/75 10.2 1.7 8.5
1975/76 9.8 2.1 7.6
1976/77 10.0 1.3 8.7
1977/78 10.5 1.7 8.8
1978/79 10.1 1.1 9.0
1979/80 9.8 1.6 8.3
1980/81 10.7 2.6 8.1
1981/82 10.3 .3.7 . . 6.6
1982/83 9.3 4.4 5.0
1983/84 8.7 3.3 5.4
1984/85 8.6 3.7 4.9
1985/86 9.0 3.9 5.1
1986/87 8.1 4.2 3.9
1987/88 9.7 3.2 6.5
1988/89 9.9 3.2 6.7
1989/90 9.9 3.1 6.8
Source: (Joshi and Little 1994:330-1).
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De Long and Summers (1991) find that the that the accumulation of machinery is a prime 
determinant of national rates of productivity growth. They find a ‘clear, strong and 
robust’ relationship between national rates of machinery and equipment investment and 
productivity growth, and that countries investing heavily in equipment enjoyed rapid 
growth between 1960 and 1985. The results from De and Summers suggest that the 
private return to equipment investment is below the social return, and that the social 
return is very high (they estimate over thirty percent). There was a boom in investment 
in equipment, from an average growth rate of 0.52% between 1970/71 and 1980/81 to 
12.52% between 1980/81 and 1990/91 (table 7.12).
Table 7.12: Growth Rates of Non-residential Fixed Capital Stock, Net at 1993/94 
Prices
Net Fixed Capital Stock
Year Structures Equipment Total Average Ratio 
GFCF/ GDP
1960/1 to 1970/1 7.66 0.62 5.86 19.16
1970/1 to 1980/81 5.27 0.52 4.50 19.49
1980/81 to 
1990/91
3.41 12.52 5.06 21.01
Source: (Sivasubramonian 2004:149).
The government was able to make a credible commitment to sustained higher public 
investment in the early-1980s. The fact of credibility generated a disproportionate 
response by the private sector. It is the perceived permanence or credibility of changed 
incentives that is crucial in motivating a response by the private sector (Rodrik 1989). 
Between 1970/71 and 1972/73 there was an equally sharp rise in public investment, 
without sparking increased rates of private investment. The series of economic shocks 
that hit the Indian economy at the end of the 1970s were severe. The 1979 drought was 
the worst since Independence, agricultural production went down by 15.2% and 
foodgrain production by 17.6%. Inflation accelerated and industry went into recession. 
In addition the OPEC oil price increase reduced the terms of trade by 33% between 1979
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and 198071. The oil import bill increased from $2bn in 1978/79 to $6.6bn in 1980/81. 
Policy changes in response to a shock provide an ideal opportunity to establish 
credibility. The debate over the 1981 IMF Loan provided a forum for the Indian 
government to signal its policy intentions (Ghosh 1998). The government did not 
respond with fiscal contraction and import controls as it had in previous crises after 1965 
and 1973. Instead the government sought borrowing for expansionary adjustment, to 
increase investment especially in oil and infrastructure, the IMF applied only minimal 
conditionalities. The large stocks of foodgrains, low foreign debt, foreign exchange 
reserves and low-conditionality IMF agreement made expansion credible. Public 
investment increased despite recession, declining manufacturing output between 1979/81 
and 1981/82, and high inflation (which reached 14% between 1981/82 and 1982/83). 
There was minimal adjustment on the current account which was still registering a deficit 
of 1.8% of GDP (26% of exports) in 1984/85. The rate of public investment was 
sustained and increased after the 1979/80 economic crisis; in stark contrast to the 
recession of 1965/6 when public investment was cut sharply.
5.1.3. Fiscal Expansion and Slack
Table 7.13, column one shows the actual fiscal deficit from 1974/75 to 1989/90. This is 
an insufficient measure of the state’s fiscal stance. The economic cycle will impact on 
tax revenues and expenditures. The second column measures the cyclically neutral fiscal 
deficit. This is what the deficit would be were the economy at a normal point in the 
economic recession (the deficit without the impact of boom or recession). The fiscal 
impulse measures the difference between these two columns. A positive fiscal impulse 
means the state is adding to aggregate demand. The rise in the actual deficit in the late- 
1970s/ early-1980s, from 4.9% of GDP in 1977/78, 5.7% in 1978/79, and 6.5% in 
1979/80 is only partly due to expansionary fiscal policy. The economic recession 
connected with the rise in global oil prices increased the cyclically neutral fiscal deficit.
71 Higher world interest rates did not have much impact in India, unlike many other LDC’s had not engaged 
in variable-interest commercial borrowing in the 1970s.
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The fiscal impulse over these years was quite minor. Section 5.1.3 argued it was the 
changing composition not level of state expenditure that initiated the episode of growth 
after 1979. It was only by the late-1980s that the stance of fiscal policy became strongly 
expansionary and sustained the episode of growth. From 1984/85 the fiscal impulse 
ranged between 4 and 6%.
Table 7.13: Consolidated Government: Fiscal Stance and Fiscal Impulse, 1974/75 to 
1989/90
Year Fiscal
Deficit
Cyclically
Neutral
Fiscal
Deficit
Fiscal
Impulse
1974/75 4.1 5.1 -1.0
1975/76 4.6 4.2 0.4
1976/77 5.4 5.2 0.3
1977/78 4.9 4.6 0.3
1978/79 5.7 4.4 1.3
1979/80 6.5 6.8 -0.3
1980/81 8.1 6.3 1.8
1981/82 6.7 5.9 0.8
1982/83 7.3 6.1 1.2
1983/84 8.1 5.5 2.6
1984/85 9.7 5.7 3.9
1985/86 9.3 5.6 3.8
1986/87 10.9 5.6 5.3
1987/88 10.0 5.6 4.5
1988/89 9.4 4.5 4.9
1989/90 10.4 4.4 5.9
Source: (Joshi and Little 1994:233.
In 1979/80 there was sufficient slack in the economy to enable expanded public sector 
investment to generate sharp increases in growth and productivity. The Sixth FYP 
(Planning Comission 2003 :Ch3:1) noted that capacity utilisation in a range of important 
sectors had declined over the second half of the 1970s. In Saleable Steel (integrated 
plants) from 91.9% in 1976/77 to 69.1% in 1979/80, aluminium from 83.5% to 58.2%, in 
Fertilisers (stabilised plants) from 66.0% to 61.5%, in cement from 86.6% to 72.6%, in
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newsprint from 76.9% to 63.2%, in paper and paper board from 79% to 68.2%, and in 
thermal power generation from 56% to 45%. Despite higher manufacturing growth in the 
1980s there was no expansion of employment growth in the registered manufacturing 
sector in the 1980s. Between 1982/83 and 1986/87 there was growth in real net value 
added, in the capital intensity of production and earnings per worker, but the absolute 
number of workers declined. Nagaraj argues the increase in earnings per worker, “was 
mainly on account of an above average increase in the number of days worked per 
worker.” (Nagaraj 1994:178). Between 1980 and 1989 annual earnings per worker went 
up by 3.5%. Nearly half of this growth in earnings represented an increase in man-days, 
the wage rate for the standard working day rose only by 1.5% p.a. (Nagaraj 1994, 2000b; 
Bhalotra 1998). There was an overhang of employment after a prolonged period of 
stagnation since the 1960s. After the pickup in economic growth firms first used existing 
stock of labour (and capital) more intensively, linking wage agreements to productivity, 
reorganising production, subcontracting the manufacture of components, and increasing 
use of part-time workers72. This caused the increase in man-days without higher person- 
employment. Higher investment and more capital-intensive options were explored only 
after these other options were used up.
5.1.4. Extensive Growth
Growth in the 1950s was extensive in nature, based on the horizontal replication of 
industry and production. Chapter V shows there is evidence this process of growth by 
replication was efficient. By contrast the period of the Sixth Five-Year Plan was about 
utilising the then existing industrial capacity in the public sector more efficiently and 
hence raising productivity. A major part of this was expanded investment in what had 
hitherto been a major constraint on growth, power supply and infrastructure.
72 The share of casual workers in total employment increased from 4.6 to 10% between 1980/81 and 
1986/7. This is significant but not enough to account for the sharp increase in man-days worked which was 
also dependent on intensified working conditions among existing employees.
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Between 1951 and 1965 new capacity in most of the major industrial enterprises quickly 
reached maximum capacity utilisation. In 1964/65 capacity utilisation (production of 
steel ingots by public sector plants) was 111.8% in Bhilai, 100.6% in Durgapur, 97.9% in 
Rourkela. In 1965 capacity utilisation (production of primary aluminium) was 126.2% in 
HINDALCO. The pattern of changes in capacity utilisation after cl 980 is much more 
haphazard, some plants prospered and others continued to stagnate. Public sector steel 
producers for example showed very mixed fortunes (table 7.14). Bokaro increased 
capacity utilisation rapidly after the late 1970s. Capacity utilisation at TISCO (not given 
in the table) increased from an average of 88.3% in the 1970s to 105.3% in 1987/88. 
Capacity at Bhilai remained well utilised while at Durgapur, Rourkela and IISCO 
capacity utilisation remained stagnant or even declined. Capacity utilisation at 
HINDALCO (production of primary aluminium) quickly rose from 77.8% in 1979 to 
102.1% in 1987, and at BALCO from 30.1% in 1979/80 to 91.1% in 1987/88. The 
achievement of self-sufficiency in power by HINDALCO occurred with the addition of 
large extra capacity in captive power plants in 1981 and 1983, this was a crucial factor in 
allowing the firm to rapidly expand output.
Table 7.14: Production of Ingot Steel by Pu die Sector Plants
Year Bhilai Bokaro Durgapur Rourkela IISCO
1979/80 84.3 57.0 55.1 70.4 56.5
1980/81 81.6 36.9 46.3 64.7 60.9
1981/82 84.6 71.7 58.1 66.8 60.0
1982/83 85.2 73.2 59.5 63.6 62.4
1983/84 73.6 67.2 50.0 60.4 54.3
1984/85 79.9 77.0 47:5 62.2 44.4
1985/86 93.8 80.1 54.7 65.4 55.3
1986/87 89.2 82.2 57.6 61.1 52.8
Source: QSfayar 1990:158-9).
The Sixth FYP (quoted earlier) was correct in arguing investment targeted at removing 
bottlenecks and allowing existing capacity to be utilised could have rapid effects on 
productivity. The all-India capital-output ratio declined from 5.40 to 4.45 between
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1970/71 and 1979/80 to 1980/81 and 1983/84 (table 7.15). Alternatively the ICOR 
declined from 5.773 to 4.009 between 1973 and 1980 (Tendulkar and Sen 2003:187).
Table 7.15: Estimates of Incremental Capital-Output Ratios in the Indian Economy
Period Gross Ratio Net Ratio
1970/71 to 1979/80 5.40 4.11
1980/81 to 1983/84 4.45 3.38
Source: (Chakravarty 1987:1105.
There are few signs the incentives and opportunities generated by higher public 
investment were accompanied by discipline. Some public sector firms responded to 
higher public investment by expanding output, others remained mired in inefficiency and 
failed to utilise capacity. There are few if any signs of learning at these major industrial 
enterprises, expanded demand and public investment were allowing them to ignore other 
failings. The energy consumption per unit of output in steel plants was increasing over 
the 1980s, indicating a lack of learning and growing inefficiency at plant level (table 
7.16).
Table 7.16: Specific Energy Consumption (mega calories) in Integrated Plants
Per ton of Saleable Stee 73 Per ton of Ingot Steel
Plant 1976/77 1981/82 1983/84 1976/77 1981/82 1983/84
Rourkela 12.63 12.51 15.52 7.60 7.21 12.30
Bhilai 9.01 10.19 14.77 6.20 7.08 12.36
Durgapur 10.44 12.14 19.55 7.62 8.76 14.60
Bokaro 10.04 11.97 21.76 6.61 7.06 16.67
IISCO 14.94 16.39 31.06 11.82 12.58 23.20
Source: (Das 1992:290).
Labour productivity at public sector steel plants was either stagnant or declining over the 
course of the 1980s (table 7.17).
73 The energy consumption per ton of crude steel in Japan, Austria, West Germany, US and UK was 5,
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Table 7.17: Labour Productivity (Ingot tonnes per man year)
Year Bhilai Bokaro Rourkela IISCO TISCO
1971/72 70 - 35 36 46
1972/73 72 - 50 24 45
1973/74 63 - 42 24 40
1980/81 69 48 43 33 63
1981/82 71 77 47 34 62
1982/83 71 72 44 34 64
1983/84 63 63 42 28 64
1984/85 69 69 43 22 68
1985/86 65 68 46 30 68
1986/87 61 68 44 29 74
Source: (Nayar 1990:202)
6. The (Political) Role of the State, 1979/80 to 1991: Institutions
This section focuses on institutions that allow the state to overcome the inherent conflicts 
associated with rapid economic development.
The first section shows how despite big election victories in 1980 and 1984 there was no 
restoration of the old Congress system. The party organisation had decayed and the 
authority and ability of Congress to mediate in local affairs had declined sharply, an 
institutional vacuum had emerged. Intense and undisciplined factionalism led to a 
difficulty in retaining power, the resort to populism and conflict shifted to street violence. 
Congress was unable to diffuse political tensions by negotiation and incorporation of the 
local level leadership. The second section compares the increase in public investment 
over the 1980s to the increase between 1953/54 to 1964/65. In the 1950s this was 
associated with a sharp rise in tax revenue, increased public sector savings, and a strict 
control over subsidies. Between 1979/80 and 1989/90 higher public investment was 
associated with a small rise in tax revenue, sharper increases in government current
5.25, 5.5, 6.25 and 6.5 mega-calories respectively.
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expenditure and subsidies, a massive increase in the government fiscal deficit and a sharp 
decline in public sector savings. The state in the 1980s did not have the institutions 
necessary to mobilise the necessary resources to pay for expansion and allocate the 
resulting burden. There was more than simply a problem in allocating the burden of 
higher public investment. The state possessed no institution for identifying those 
requiring compensation, minimising the transaction costs associated with such transfers, 
and minimising rent-seeking by other entities. Rent-seeking and the growth of 
unproductive rents continued unabated and indiscriminately. Political mobilisation in 
agriculture generated a massive growth in subsidies (rents). Subsidies increased across 
the board in numerous economic sectors, reaching 15% of GDP in 1987/88. Chapter V 
showed that labour did not derive much benefit from growth between 1951 and 1965, 
indirect taxation was growing rapidly, real wages if anything declined, employment 
growth was slow and poverty remained little changed. Congress was successfully able to 
diffuse opposition from organised labour by incorporating the union movement within 
the party via an affiliated trade union congress (the INTUC) and pro-labour legislation. 
The number of strikes remained low until the mid-1960s, when they took off rapidly, this 
generated increased rents in the form of rapid rises in real wages. The labour movement 
progressively fragmented from the mid-1960s onwards, organisation at the apex splitting 
along ideological and party lines. Strike activity reached a new peak in the 1980s and was 
quickly followed by rising wages.
The final section recaps that growth in the 1950s was extensive in nature (Chapter V) 
based on the horizontal diffusion of this technology and through indigenising production. 
There are few signs that there was learning in this process but Chapter V did review 
evidence to suggest that growth by replication was efficient. In the 1980s expanded 
levels of public investment in infrastructure and power did tackle what had hitherto been 
a major constraint on growth. Some plants in the public sector rapidly increased capacity 
utilisation, others remained mired in inefficiency. There were some signs that higher 
capacity utilisation was behind higher levels of productivity and that ICOR’s declined 
during the 1980s. But there are few signs the incentives and opportunities generated by 
higher public investment were accompanied by discipline. There are also few if any
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signs of learning at these major industrial enterprises, expanded demand and public 
investment was allowing them to ignore other failings. Finally, this section concludes 
with evidence showing that the pattern of resource mobilisation in the 1980s was not 
sustainable.
6.1. The Decayed Congress System
After the defeat in 1977 Congress came back to power in 1980 winning 351 
parliamentary seats with 43% of the vote. There are superficial signs the Congress 
victories of 1980 and 1984 restored the party to a situation of national and state level pre­
eminence (table 7.18).
Table 7.18; Parliamentary Election Results, 1952-84
Electio 
n of 
Party
1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984
Congre 
ss (%)
45.0 47.8 44.7 40.8 43.7 34.5 42.7 49.6
Second
Largest
Party
(%)
10.6 10.4 9.9 9.4 10.4 41.3 19.0 7.7
No of 
Seats
364 371 361 283 352 154 353 415
Source: (Chibber and Petrocik 2002:62; Sridharan 2002:478)
In 1980 Congress attracted a broad base of support, both the very rich and the very poor, 
and remained the choice of India’s minorities, the, Muslims and Christians, won 57 of the 
79 constituencies reserved for scheduled castes, and 29 of the 37 reserved for tribals. The 
party won a majority of the vote in the Sikh dominated Punjab and won convincingly in 
both rural and urban areas. Congress was the only national party, winning a majority of 
parliamentary seats in all major states except Kerela and West Bengal. The Janata party
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came closest to being a national opposition party, though came second to Congress in 
only nine seats. Congress won a majority in eight from the ten states contesting assembly 
elections74. The situation in 1984 was more of the same, except an even more striking 
victory for Congress, who won 415 of the 535 seats, with 49.6% of the vote, the largest 
ever majority in India.
This was not a restoration of the old Congress system. The features of the dominant 
party outlined by Kothari (1964) were conspicuous by their absence in the 1980s.
Congress in government had been restored by the 1980 and 1984 election victories but 
the party organisation was moribund. Corbridge and Harriss (2000) called the Congress 
in the 1980s ‘dominance without authority’. The party had become increasingly 
centralised under Indira Gandhi between 1969 and 1975 with a corresponding decline in 
the party organisation. Weiner (1967) in field work of local Congress organisations 
showed how the party in the 1950s had an adaptive quality and was able to build alliances 
with the locally powerful and used patronage networks anchored by local notables, 
panchayat leaders, and caste elites. These areas were revisited by Kohli (1990), he found 
the Congress organisation at local level was defunct, its local offices closed, positions for 
leadership vacant and party meetings conspicuous by their absence. The taluka (district) 
Congress committees disappeared, there were no organisational elections at taluka or 
pradesh (state levels), or to the All-India-Congress-Committee (AICC). Elections had 
been an important motivation for leaders to bring in supportive factions, broadening their 
own support and in the process making Congress more inclusive. Office bearers even up 
to State Chief Ministers were appointees by the central leadership (Indira Gandhi) not 
chosen by the party or grass-roots. Efforts to reinvigorate inter-party democracy 
floundered under Rajiv Gandhi in the mid-1980s, as his national popularity waned and it 
became apparent that elections would risk giving his internal opponents a legitimacy and 
platform to oppose him. The authority and ability of Congress to mediate in local affairs 
had declined sharply. In Kheda (Gujarat) the decay of the party system in the 1970s into 
the 1980s left local parties unable to resolve the social conflict between the Patidars and
74 The exceptions were Tamil Nadu and Kerala.
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Kshatriyas, in Guntur (Andhra Pradesh) between Kammas and Reddis, in Belgaun 
(Karnataka) between the Lingayats and Kokkaligas, in Gujarat between the Patidars and 
Kshatriyas. Congress in the 1950s and early-1960s had incorporated all of these warring 
groups within ‘the system’. Inside they were subject to its hierarchy, conflict 
management procedures and transactional negotiations. In Gujarat in 1985 riots erupted 
and despite having a huge majority in the state assembly the local Congress party and 
state government were unable to cope with minority agitation. The Patidars long most 
the important economically resented the loss of political power to the numerically 
dominant Kshatriyas and took to the streets to protest. Congress had ceased to be an 
institution of integration and groups mobilised outside its weakening formal political 
structures. This argues (Kohli 1990) helps to explain a number of political trends - 
coalitional instability, ineffective local government, and the emergence of personal rule. 
Intense and undisciplined factionalism has led to a difficulty in retaining power, the resort 
to populism and conflict shifting to street violence.
The 1950s Congress had been able to diffuse regional (language) tensions by negotiation 
and incorporation of the local level leadership, the state/ party was conspicuously 
unsuccessful at this in the 1980s. Rajiv on assuming office in 1984 re-opened 
negotiations with Sikh militants in the Punjab, and various factions involved in the 
disturbances in Assam. In both cases agreements were signed and conflict initially 
declined. In both cases the accords were not implemented, Congress did not possess the 
organisational machinery to implement at the local level agreements reached at the 
centre. Without a clear and hierarchical network of patronage the Congress leadership in 
New Delhi was isolated, instead of incorporation protest dissolved into popular agitation 
and extremist demands. In the Punjab efforts to work with the moderate leadership of the 
Akali Dal failed, the peace accord was not implemented, and ultimately dissolved when 
Congress proved unable to take action against its members who had been involved in the 
1984 anti-Sikh riots in Delhi. Before long the Khalistan movement was again claiming 
several thousand lives a year. In Assam the government proved unable to remove the 
illegal immigrants that had motivated an anti-foreigner movement. Conflict continued 
unabated, Congress was unable to mediate or incorporate. Hindu-Muslim communal
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clashes in Gujarat and the Gorkanaland agitation in West Bengal are other examples.
Congress won the national and state elections in 1980 and 1984 but proved unable to 
retain power, it lacked the organisation and networks of patronage to retain support.
After 1980 Congress did badly in subsequent state elections, losing in Haryana, Kerela, 
West Bengal and Himachal Pradesh. After the 1984 victory, Congress began losing state 
elections, in the Punjab, Assam, Sikkim, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh (the Telugu Desam led 
by NTR), and by 1987 in Haryana the Hindi heartland of the Congress party. Dissenters 
regularly left the party to contest parliament either for opposition parties or for Congress 
breakaway factions. Ramakrishna Hegde a ex-Congress leader won Karnataka for the 
Janata pary in January 1983. Congress dissident Sharad Pawar became president of the 
Congress(S) in October 1981. Former Finance Minister V.P. Singh left the Congress and 
became Prime Minister in the National Front Government that took power nationally 
after elections in 1989.
6.2. Financing Public Investment
There was a very sharp increase in public investment, from 6.5% of GDP in 1974 to 
10.1% of GDP in 1982/83 (table 7.11). The sharp increase despite recession in the early- 
1980s and the focus on key infrastructural sectors like power and transport was the key to 
the contemporaneous structural break in economic growth. This was similar to the 
increase in public investment between 1953/54 to 1964/65 (table 5.9). In the 1950s this 
was associated with a sharp rise in tax revenue (table 5.3), increased public sector savings 
(table 5.4), and a strict control over subsidies (table 5.5). Between 1979/80 and 1989/90 
higher public investment was associated with a small rise in tax revenue (table 7.5), 
sharper increases in government current expenditure, and subsidies (table 7.5), a massive 
increase in the government fiscal deficit (table 7.6) and a sharp decline in public sector 
savings (table 7.7).
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The Indian state was capable of boosting investment rates in the early-1980s, and 
initiating an episode of growth. The state did not have the institutions necessary to 
mobilise the necessary resources to pay for expansion and allocate the resulting burden.
Even groups excluded from development or suffering from rising levels of inequality 
may acquiesce in their own exclusion for ideological reasons. Woo-Cumings (1999) 
argues the authoritarian states of East Asia did not obtain their legitimacy through a 
mandate from civil society, or by following rules to gain office, rather by the project they 
were carrying out. Legitimacy was obtained by successfully achieving rapid economic 
development in an uncertain and dangerous cold-war world. A political party that can 
subordinate its members individual aspirations to a collective ideology, and exclude 
opponents can be an important institution to reduce conflict and facilitate economic 
reform. The rise of Rajiv to power was largely circumstantial and had nothing to do with 
a vision of economic reform or particular ideology. The ‘Rajiv-Wave’ was based on 
sympathy and dynastic sentiments, there was no ideological commitment to Rajiv’s 
preferred economic policies. The massive parliamentary majority, 415 from 535 seats 
was an illusion.
6.3. Rent-seeking and the Growth of Rents
It was not simply a problem in allocating the burden of higher public investment that was 
faced by the Indian state in the 1980s. The explosion of rent-seeking that had occurred 
after the mid-1960s (Chapter VI) continued unabated. The state possessed no institution 
for identifying those requiring compensation, minimising the transaction costs associated 
with such transfers, and minimising rent-seeking by other entities.
Chapter VII argued that the droughts in 1965 and 1966 and humiliating reliance on the 
US for grain imports gave impetus to the Green Revolution. The shift focused on the 
application of new technology to those best able to make use of it and a shift to price 
incentives, both subsidised inputs and high(er)/ stable prices for output. This shift in
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agricultural strategy enhanced the economic status of a group of capitalist orientated 
middle peasants in the north of India. Subsequently ‘class-for-itself action’ was pursued 
with ‘relentless skill’ as the economic strength of this class was translated into promoting 
class interests. This process continued into the 1980s. The Lok Dal, a northern agrarian 
based political party formed in 1969 formed a central role in the Janata coalition in 1977, 
its leader Charan Singh briefly becoming Finance Minister. The Lok Dal formed the 
second biggest party in the Lok Sabha with 41 seats after the 1980 general election. 
Agricultural interests continued to mobilise throughout the 1980s. Devi Lai became 
Chief Minister of Haryana, defeating the Congress in 1987 with a promise to right-off 
cooperative loans. In 1990 the World Bank estimated this policy cost $1.5bn. He 
became both Deputy Prime Minister and Agricultural Minister in the non-Congress 
governments between 1989 and 1991. In the autumn of 1989 a massive rally of farmers 
bore down on New Delhi to agitate for higher agricultural prices and subsidies.
The results of this rent-seeking were massive increases in rents to the agricultural sector. 
Subsidies that had begun to rise in the 1970s exploded in the 1980s. “If agitations broke 
out -  as they did in Tamil Nadu (1970, 1972, and 1977), Punjab (1975 and 1985) and 
Uttar Pradesh (1986-7, 1988-9) -  then more often than not, electricity and water tariffs 
which lie within the purview of state governments would be reduced.” (Varshney 
1998:140). Fertiliser subsidies increased from 0.39% of GDP in 1980/81 to 1.11% in 
1989/90, and the share going to farmers rose from 24.54% in 1983/84 to 53.08% in 
1989/90. Power subsidies to agriculture increased from Rs 4.10bn in 1980/81 to Rs 
25.30bn in 1990/91. The cost recovery of power costs from agriculture fell from 43.99% 
in 1980/81 to 13.91 % in 1990/91. In total input subsidies (power, fertiliser and 
irrigation) together accounted for 0.64% of GDP in 1980/81 and 2.46% in 1990/91. As a 
share of GDP in agriculture they increased from 1.8% in 1980/81 to 8.7% 1990/91. The 
increase in subsidies was directly related to the choking off of investment in agriculture, 
especially in irrigation (Gulati and Narayanan 2003:202). Government losses on 
operation of irrigation and subsidies increased after 1970 and dramatically so after 1980 
(table 7.19).
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Table 7.19: Budgetary Losses on Account of Operation of Government Irrigation 
Systems ___________ _______________________________________________
Year Operating 
Loss Rs m 
at 1970/71 
prices
Area
Irrigated by 
Canals (m 
ha.)
Net Sown 
Area (m 
ha.)
Implicit 
Subsidy per 
ha. of canal 
irrigated 
area
Implicit 
Subsidy per 
ha. of net 
sown area
1960/61 355.9 10.37 133.20 34.3 2.67
1970/71 1,370.2 12.84 140.78 106.7 9.73
1980/81 4,348.5 15.53 140.30 280.0 31.00
1982/83 5,228.4 15.37 141.77 340.2 36.88
Source: (Cha a*avarty 1987:1[27.
Public investments in agriculture fell from Rs75bn (1993/94 prices) in 1980/81 to Rs 
50bn in 1990/91. By contrast subsidies to agriculture increased from Rs 37bn in 1980/81 
to Rs 58bn in 1990/91. This shift of expenditure patterns was inefficient, subsidies did 
little to promote growth that was being directly undermined by reduced public investment 
(Shetty 1990; Kumar 1992; Dhawan 1996). In 1980 the remit of the Agricultural Price 
Commission was extended to include the agricultural-industrial terms of trade when 
recommending support prices for agricultural procurement. Hitherto support prices had 
been based only on input costs. Procurement prices increased by around 40% between 
1976/77 to 1982/83 and became more akin to minimum prices rather than support prices.
Mundle and Govinda Rao (1991) find this growth of subsidies to be generalised. They 
attempt to measure the level and composition of subsidies for the central and fourteen 
state governments in 1987/88. They define government subsidies as the difference 
between the cost of delivering various publicly provided goods and services and 
recoveries arising from such deliveries. This is a broader definition from those frequently 
used and includes subsidies to households implicit in the provision of social and 
economic services below cost, non-recovered loans, and investments in non-departmental 
enterprises and co-ops. They found that only 32% of the cost of social and economic 
services provided by the state were recovered, giving a measure of subsidies of 15% of 
GDP. Visible subsidies accounted for only a little over a quarter of total subsidies.
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Education alone accounted for 23% of all subsidies75. For agriculture, irrigation, and 
flood control only 20% of costs were recovered.
Chapter V showed that labour did not derive much benefit from growth between 1951 
and 1965, indirect taxation was growing rapidly, real wages if anything declined, 
employment growth was slow and poverty remained little changed. Congress was 
successfully able to diffuse opposition from organised labour by incorporating the union 
movement within the party via an affiliated trade union congress (the INTUC) and pro­
labour legislation. The number of strikes remained low until the mid-1960s, when they 
took off rapidly (table 6.15), this generated increased rents in the form of rapid rises in 
real wages (chapter VI). The labour movement progressively fragmented from the mid- 
1960s onwards, organisation at the apex fragmented splitting along ideological and party 
lines. The average membership of a union was only 710 in 1976 showing a clear long­
term decline (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987:ChlO). Strike activity reached new peaks. The 
number of workdays lost rose from a localised peak of 30million in 1979, to a post-war 
record of 50million in 1984. Real wages in organised manufacturing and in the public 
sector increased by about 30% from the late-1970s to the early-1980s (Joshi and Little 
1994:155).
6.4. Conflict and Industrial Policy
As a result of continuing political conflict from the mid-1960s onwards allocations of 
public resources increasingly went hot to those capitalists or state enterprises able to 
make productive use of them, but instead to those that needed to be accommodated for 
the sake of political stability. Industrial policy remained a means of containing conflict 
rather than of economic planning. The possibility of monitoring and imposing discipline 
on capitalists and public sector enterprises was negligible. Producers were able to
75 Student indiscipline continued at very high levels in the early-1980s. Reported incidents increased from 
a few hundred p.a in the 1950s and 1960s, to the thousands in the 1960s and 70s., to between 7-11,000 in 
the early-1980s.
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cultivate alternative political patrons outside the Congress system. After which they were 
then protected from any investigation or censure about the use they made of the 
subsidised resources allocated to them.
Chapter V showed how growth in the 1950s was extensive in nature. Capital-intensive 
sectors such as steel, machine tools, motor vehicles and aluminium were set up with 
1950s vintage technology through foreign collaboration. Growth was based on the 
horizontal diffusion of this technology and through indigenising production. There are 
few signs of learning in this process. Chapter V reviewed evidence to suggest this 
process of replication was efficient. In the 1980s expanded levels of public investment in 
infrastructure and power tackled what had hitherto been a major constraint on growth. 
Section 5.14 shows that some plants in the public sector rapidly increased capacity 
utilisation, others remained mired in inefficiency. There were some signs that higher 
capacity utilisation was behind higher levels of productivity and ICOR’s declined during 
the 1980s. But there are few signs the incentives and opportunities generated by higher 
public investment were accompanied by discipline. There are also few if any signs of 
learning at these major industrial enterprises, expanded demand and public investment 
was allowing them to ignore other failings. Energy consumption per unit of output in 
steel plants was increasing over the 1980s, indicating growing inefficiency at plant level 
(table 7.16). Labour productivity at public sector steel plants was either stagnant or 
declining over the course of the 1980s (table 7.18).
6.5. The Sustainability of Growth, 1979/80 to 1991
Numerous authors have argued that growth in the 1980s was based on an unsustainable 
fiscal expansion (Joshi and Little 1994; Sachs et al 1999; Bajpai 2002; and Acharya 
2002b). This generated growing levels of external debt and also squeezed the domestic 
banking system to the point of insolvency. In 1990/91 the gross fiscal deficit of the 
centre and states reached 10% of GDP. This was spilling over into a current account 
deficit, which increased from an annual average of $2.3bn during 1980-5 to $5.5bn
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during 1985-90. Foreign savings reached only 2.4% of GDP on average during the 
1980s (table 7.8). Capital inflows were not in the main responsible for financing the 
budget deficit that reached over 10% of GDP by the end of the 1980s. Even so the 
method of financing this capital inflow left the economy vulnerable. The real economy 
was doing well on the eve of crisis. In 1990 agricultural production was at a peak (good 
monsoon), industrial production was growing by over 8% and exports were doing well 
(Jalan 1992). India had been affected by shocks before but the short-term position in 
1991 had never been so bad before. The debt service ratio (as a proportion of exports of 
goods and services) increased from 9.1% in 1980, 18.1% in 1984, and 26.3% in 1989.
By the late-1980s almost the entire incremental deficit was financed from commercial 
borrowing. The ratio of short-term debt to foreign exchange reserves increased to 382% 
in 1991/92.
It was rather from domestic sources that higher public investment and current expenditure 
were both financed from. There was little change in the recourse to foreign financing, 
which remained at about 1% of GDP. Domestic borrowing by contrast increased from 
2.7% of GDP in 1977/78 to 7.9% of GDP in 1989/90 (table 7.20).
Table 7.20: Financing of Public Investment, 1977/78 to 1989/90
Public Sector Borrowing
Year Public
GDCF
Gross
Public
Sector
Savings
Total Foreign Domestic
1977/78 8.2 4.3 3.9 1.2 2.7
1978/79 9.5 4.6 4.9 0.8 4.1
1979/80 10.3 4.3 6.0 0.8 5.2
1980/81 8.7 3.4 5.3 1.2 4.1
1981/82 10.5 4.5 6.0 0.7 5.3
1982/83 11.3 4.4 6.9 1.0 5.9
1983/84 9.8 3.3 6.5 0.9 5.6
1984/85 10.8 3.8 8.0 1.4 6.6
1985/86 11.1 3.2 7.9 1.1 6.8
1986/87 11.7 2.7 9.0 1.6 7.4
1987/88 10.4 2.2 8.2 1.3 6.9
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1988/89 9.9 2.0 7.9 1.3 6.6
1989/90 10.7 1.7 9.0 1.1 7.9
Source: (Joshi and Little 1994:306-7).
One of the key means by which this borrowing was squeezed out of the domestic 
economy was through pre-empting deposits from the (nationalised) domestic banking 
system. The Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) specifies the proportion of their deposit 
liabilities that banks must invest in government securities, this ratio was raised from 34% 
in 1978/79 to 38.4% in 1990/91. The Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) specifies the proportion 
of their deposit liabilities banks must hold in the form of cash, this was raised from 5% in 
the 1970s to 15% in 1991. The SLR had been raised to give government cheap access to 
credit, the CRR to control the secondary expansion of credit brought about by 
monetisation of the governments fiscal deficit. By 1991 more than half of banking sector 
deposits were being pre-empted by the government. The financial viability of the 
banking system was reaching limits by the late-1980s.
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Chapter VIII: The Role of the State and the Episode of Growth
in India, 1991 to 2004
1. Summary of Chapter Findings
This chapter is divided into four main parts, the first briefly summarises the episode of 
growth between 1991 and 2004, then reviews and critiques existing explanations for this 
episode of growth. The remainder of the chapter is divided into three parts, each focuses 
on one particular role that the state has in promoting economic development. The first 
two examine the potential economic (finance and production) roles of the state and the 
third the potential political role of the state (institutions).
The Indian state between 1991 and 2004 influenced five areas that were important in 
terms of mobilising and allocating the economic surplus. These were mobilising 
domestic savings, creating institutions to mobilise private sector savings, influencing 
retained earnings and profitability, allocating resources to projects essential for 
development and correcting market failures in the allocation of credit to small firms.
High levels of revenue expenditure and declining tax revenue led to a sharp fall in public 
sector savings over the 1990s. The state made substantial efforts to mobilise private 
sector savings through promoting the stock market. Savings rose while the market was 
booming in the early-1990s but the market has proved of little long-term benefit in 
mobilising or channelling resources to the corporate sector. A change in the nature of the 
state in the 1990s set the conditions that generated a dramatic rise in profitability of the 
corporate sector bringing with it increased private corporate sector savings and 
investment. The government sharply reduced public investment and liberalised the 
financial sector in the hope that the private sector would be enabled to take up the slack 
in investment. Private investment did increase rapidly in early-1990s. Though there is 
good evidence reviewed in this chapter to suggest that over the longer term the private
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sector has not replaced the downgraded developmental role of the state. However, the 
fears that the reduction of directed credit programmes in the 1990s would starve the 
small-scale sector of lending have proved to be unfounded.
The state had an important role with regards to international capital. Despite an orthodox 
view which sees the build of up deficits over the 1980s as the cause of the 1991 crisis 
there was growth without sustained domestic macroeconomic adjustment during the 
1990s. There was careful management by the state of the level and composition of 
capital inflows that made such inflows more sustainable and allowed the state to 
undertake liberalisation without stabilisation.
Neo-liberal theorists justify the need for liberalising economic reform by the promotion 
of economic efficiency. A strong prediction of neo-classical economics is that 
liberalisation will lead to a higher level of income through the more efficient allocation of 
resources. Trade liberalisation after 1991 raised the share of trade in GDP. As predicted 
by the theory of comparative advantage the evolution of the structure of trade over the 
1990s has been in accordance with the broad predictions of comparative advantage -  
production and exports towards labour-intensive manufactured goods and imports 
towards everything else. Also techniques of production in Indian industry have generally 
become more labour-intensive. However the theory of comparative advantage is 
concerned with the level of income not long-term growth rates. The theory argues that 
liberalisation should increase the level of income, and generate a (transitional) period of 
faster economic growth. There is a good deal of evidence to suggest this is exactly what 
happened in India oVer the 1990s. There was a (temporary) boom in economic growth 
and investment until the mid-1990s, after which the growth rate dropped to its longer- 
term norm.
To analyse the implications for long-run growth we need to go beyond the theory of 
comparative advantage. In the long-run India could react to intensified competition by 
trying to enhance it price competitiveness within its existing labour-intensive niche by 
extending hours, reducing overheads (subcontracting) and intensifying work conditions (a
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low road of competition). Secondly, a high road of competition could consist of 
remaining in an existing labour-intensive production niche and raising the productivity of 
labour (learning), or upgrading to a less (price) competitive market niche to capture rents. 
India’s comparative advantage remains in low-tech, labour-intensive production and 
exports. There is broad supporting agreement that productivity (TFP) growth has 
declined over the reform relative to the pre-reform period. The software and textiles 
sectors illustrate more specifically the general point discussed in the empirical critique of 
comparative advantage. Both sectors have expanded rapidly in the reform period, in both 
production and exports, but remain stuck at the low end of the market.
The final section looks at the political-institutional role of policy change during the 
1990s, in particular it will attempt to answer contradictions in the existing literature.
There are three hypotheses discussed here to explain how the state was able to sustain the 
neo-liberal agenda. Firstly, that the state was able to repress those that opposed 
liberalisation. Secondly, the state was inclusive and able to identify and buy off those 
who opposed reforms. And thirdly, the state was able to incorporate people into its 
project through an ideological motive, even were they not gaining from reform. There 
are signs the dominant proprietary classes in India became more fragmented over the 
1990s and that this made repression less necessary. There are various ways which Indian 
politics became more inclusive in the 1990s hence more amenable to support 
liberalisation. There was a revival of the national party system. Instead of the Congress 
as a dominant party a relatively stable two party system emerged between the Congress 
and BJP. Between 1991 and 1996 the fear of the BJP united numerous opposition 
movements behind the Congress; they voted for liberalisation for fear of the alternative. 
Finally between 1998 and 2004 the structure and organisation of the BJP was conducive 
to maintaining a cohesive and united party in government. The section dealing with 
ideology first shows that the rise of caste based politics weakened the kisan (farmers) 
movement by undermining its multi-caste/ multi-caste character. The growth of material 
rents to agriculture was replaced by ideological rents to the kisan lobby. Finally, this 
section will also show that the BJP is an ideological party and has retained the allegiance 
of supporters to a large extent because of their belief in the ideology of the party. This
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kept a cap on rent-seeking for a time and allowed the party to pursue economic 
liberalisation without getting totally distracted by the task of buying off and co-opting 
opponents or the party fragmenting in opposition. The growth of political mobilisation 
according to caste led to striking political success for various parties in the north of India.
2. Recap from Chapter HI: An Episode of Growth, 1991 to 2004
The Indian economy continued growing at a relatively rapid rate. After growth of only 
3.13% during the period of stagnation (1951-65) the Indian economy expanded by 5.5% 
p.a. between 1980/81 and 1990/91, and by 5.87% between 1990/91 and 1999/00 (table 
8.1).
Table 8.1: Source of GDP Growth in the Non-residential Sector, 1950/51 to 1999/00
(Contributions to GDP Growth in % Points)
1950/51 to 
1964/65
1964/65 to 
1980/81
1980/81 to 
1990/91
1990/91 to 
1999/00
Non-
Residential
GDP
4.15 3.13 5.50 5.87
Labour
Input
1.11 1.35 1.38 0.98
Capital
Input
1.06 1.29 2.06 2.88
Total Factor 
Input
2.35 2.72 2.48 3.86
Output Per 
Unit of . 
Input
1.80 0.41 2.02 2.01
Source: (Sivasubramonian 2004:291).
Chapter VII examined the debate about the upsurge in economic growth and productivity 
and argued it occurred in the late-1970s or early-1980s. Growth was sustained in the 
1990s. It may be argued that the episode of growth ran from cl 980 to 2004 and it is 
invalid to consider two periods separated in 1991. This is the approach followed by
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(Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004:1) “Since 1980 its economic growth rate has more than 
doubled, rising from 1.7% (in per-capita terms) in 1950-80 to 3.8 percent in 1980-2000.” 
There are certainly very striking similarities in the broad patterns of growth in 1980/81 to 
1990/91 and 1990/91 to 1999/00 relative to earlier periods. In the latter two decades the 
rate of economic growth increased from just over three to over five percent. This was 
marked by a jump in both capital input and output per unit of input (table 8.1). The 
approach followed in this thesis is to separate these two episodes for a number of reasons. 
There is firstly a vast literature which assumes the 1991 reforms to be significant, 1991 
marked “a fundamental transformation of India’s economic strategy.” (Varshney 
1999:230). A large literature argues that growth in the 1980s, though rapid was 
unsustainable and the 1991 crisis was an inevitable outcome of growth in the 1980s 
(Panagariya 2004). The two periods though similar in many ways should be treated as 
separate episodes.
3. The (Economic) Role of the State, 1991 to 2004: Finance
This section examines the role of the state in mobilising and allocating the surplus.
The Indian state between 1991 and 2004 influenced five areas that were important in 
terms of the mobilisation and allocation of the economic surplus. These were mobilising 
domestic savings, creating institutions to mobilise private sector savings, influencing 
retained earnings and profitability allocating resources to projects essential for 
development and correcting market failures in the allocation of credit to small firms.
This section will show that the state was unsuccessful in mobilising resources directly 
through its own budget. High levels of revenue expenditure and declining tax revenue 
led to a very sharp fall in public sector savings over the 1990s. In terms of creating 
institutions to mobilise private sector savings the focus was on the stock market. The 
efforts of the state to promote the stock market proved successful in mobilising resources 
when it was booming in the early-1990s but have proved of little long-term benefit in
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mobilising resources or channelling them to the corporate sector. A change in the nature 
of the state in the 1990s set the conditions that generated a dramatic rise in profitability of 
the corporate sector. This shift has a clear link with the growth of private corporate 
sector savings and investment.
The government sharply reduced public investment and liberalised the financial sector in 
the hope that the private sector would be enabled to allocate resources to those projects 
essential for long-run development. The rate of private investment did increase rapidly in 
the first half of the 1990s; this boom has obvious links to reforms of the financial sector. 
There is evidence to suggest the private sector over a longer-time period has not filled the 
downgraded developmental role of the state. There are four separate arguments here.
The first, relates to the lack of diversification in the structure of investment in the 1990s, 
the second, to the temporary nature of the investment boom, the third, to the speculative 
nature of the investment boom in the early 1990s, and the fourth, to the emerging 
constraints on the ability of firms to access long-term developmental finance. The fears 
that the reduction of directed credit programmes in the 1990s would starve the small- 
scale sector of lending have proved to be unfounded.
The section looking at international capital shows that the state had a very important role. 
During the 1990s the state co-ordinated foreign borrowing, influenced the end use of 
foreign debt, controlled the disruptive potential of short-term capital flows, influenced the 
composition of capital inflows and segmented domestic and international capital markets. 
Over the 1990s there was no sustained domestic macroeconomic adjustment. The fiscal 
deficit remained high and by the end of the decade even exceeded the 1989/90-crisis 
level. There was very careful management by the state of the level and composition of 
capital inflows, they were restructured to make them more sustainable and allow the state 
leeway to continue running large budget deficits.
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3.1. The Role of the State and the Mobilisation of Domestic (and foreign) Savings
The rate of gross domestic savings increased in the first few years of the reform period, 
from 22% in 1991/92 to a peak of 25.1% in 1995/96, thereafter stagnating between 
21.5% and 24% of GDP (table 8.2).
Table 8.2: Gross Domestic Savings in India, 1991/92 to 2001/02
1991/
92
1992/
93
1993/
94
1994/
95
1995/
96
1996/
97
1997/
98
1998/
99
1999/
00
2000/
01
2001/
02
Gross
Domestic
Savings
22.0 21.8 22.5 24.8 25.1 23.2 23.1 21.5 24.1 23.4 24.0
Source: ( MF 2003:17).
The primary reason for stagnation of overall savings was the state’s failure to mobilise 
public savings. Gross tax revenue of the central government steadily declined throughout 
the 1990s, from 10.1% of GDP in 1990/91 to a low of 8.3% in 1998/99, before 
recovering somewhat to 9.0% in 2000/01 (table 8.3).
Table 8.3: India: Central Government Tax Revenue, 1990/91 to 1997/98
1990
/91
1991
192
1992
/93
1993
/94
1994
/95
1995
/96
1996
191
1997
/98
1998
199
1999
/OO
2000
/01
Gross Tax 
Revenue
10.1 10.3 10.0 8.8 9.1 9.4 9.4 9.1 8.3 8.9 9.0
- Corporate 
Tax
0.9 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.7
- Income 
Tax
0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.5
- Excise 
Taxes
4.3 4.3 4.1 3.7 3.7 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.3
- Customs 
Duties
3.6 3.4 3.2 2.6 2.6 3.0 3.1 2.6 2.3 2.5 2.3
- Other 
Taxes
0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2
VDIS - - - - - - - 0.7 - - -
Less: States 
Share
2.6 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.2 2.3 2.5
Net Tax 
Revenue
7.6 7.7 7.2 6.2 6.7 6.9 6.8 6.3 6.0 6.6 6.6
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Source: (IM F 200 2 :2 8 ).
Attempts to shift the burden of taxation from indirect to direct taxes and away from trade 
taxes was generally borne out in terms of revenue collection but proceeded at different 
rates, so undermined resource mobilisation. There were sharp and steady declines in the 
revenue from excise taxation (table 8.3), from 4.3% of GDP in 1990/91 to 3.3% of GDP 
in 2000/01 and customs duties, from 3.6% of GDP in 1990/91 to 2.3% in 2000/01. There 
was some rise in revenue from income tax, from 0.9% of GDP in 1990/91 to 1.5% in 
2000/01, and corporation tax, from 0.9% of GDP in 1990/91 to 1.7% in 2000/01. The 
fall in customs and excise was steeper than the rise in direct tax leading to the decline in 
overall gross tax revenue by the central government. Financial liberalisation is estimated 
to have cost the state budget around 1% of GDP as a result of higher market interest rates 
on government securities (Pinto and Zahir 2004). The broad emphasis on tax reform 
during the 1990s was to provide incentives rather than raise revenue through cutting back 
on exemptions and widening the tax base.
Contrary to much discussion that suggests the central government shifted the burden of 
fiscal adjustment to the states there was little change in the states’ share of central 
government revenue (table 8.3). The amount remitted to state governments by the centre 
remained around 2.5% of GDP throughout the 1990s.
At state level total revenue and grants declined from 12.2% of GDP in 1994/95 to 10.7% 
in 1999/00. Revenue from state taxes declined from 5.5% of GDP in 1994/95 to 5.3% in 
1999/00, and non-tax revenue from 2.1% of GDP in 1994/95 to 1.5% in 1999/00 (table 
8.4).
Table 8.4; India: Consolidated State Government Operations, 1994/95 to 1999/00
1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00
Total Revenue and 
Grants
12.2 11.7 11.3 11.4 10.4 10.7
- Share of Central 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.9 2.2 2.3
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Government Revenue
- States Taxes 5.5 5.4 5.2 5.4 5.3 5.3
- States Non-Tax 
Revenue
2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.5
- Central Government 
Grants
2.0 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.6
Source: (IMF 2000:42; IM 2002:141).
The second failure of the state relates to the utilisation of resources. There was a 
reduction in expenditure by the central government, from 19.66% of GDP in 1990/91 to 
16.63% in 1997/98 (table 8.5). Thereafter expenditure rose between 1997/98 and 
2000/01 by about 1.5% of GDP (IMF 2002:141). The rise in total expenditure cannot be 
accounted for by defence, interest and subsidies which had important impacts on 
government finances in other periods. Expenditure rose sharply during the mid-1960s, 
after the 1962 war with China and 1965 war with Pakistan. Subsidies rose sharply in the 
mid-1980s under the Congress-Rajiv government. In the 1990s however there was little 
change in aggregate expenditure on interest, defence and subsidies, from 8.78% of GDP 
in 1990/91 to 8.50% of GDP in 1997/98.
Table 8.5: Structure of Central Government Revenue and Expenditures
1990/
91
1991/
92
1992/
93
1993/
9
1994/
95
1995/
96
1996/
97
1997/
98
Total
Expenditure
19.66 18.06 17.38 17.71 17.00 16.23 16.15 16.63
Interest 4.01 4.31 4.41 4.59 4.66 4.55 4.67 4.65
Defence 2.88 2.65 2.49 2.73 2.46 2.44 2.36 2.55
Subsidies 1.79 1.59 1.33 1.34 1.22 1.10 1.14 1.30
Source: (Ahluwalia 1999:38).
The combined share of state and central expenditure declined steadily from 36.6% of 
GDP in 1990/91 to 32.3% in 1997/98 (table 8.6). Central Government expenditure fell 
from 19.6% of GDP in 1990/91 to 16.6% in 1997/98 then rose by about 1.5% of GDP 
between 1997/98 and 2000/01 (IMF 2002:140).
2 5 6
Total revenue expenditure was little changed over the 1990s, 27.3% of GDP in 1990/91 
and 26.4% in 1997/98. Section 2.4 shows that the reduction in total expenditure was 
achieved through cuts in capital expenditure.
Table 8.6: Sitate and Central Government Expenditure, 1990/911 o 1997/9 8
1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98
Total
Expenditure
36.6 34.4 33.3 33.5 33.2 32.6 32.3 32.3
Central
Government
19.6 18.1 17.4 17.7 17.0 16.7 15.7 16.6
State
Government
17.0 16.3 15.9 15.8 16.2 15.9 16.6 15.7
Revenue
Expenditure
27.3 27.3 26.7 27.2 26.9 26.6 26.9 26.4
Source: (Bajpai and Sachs 1999:85).
The most important implication of these trends is the general failure of fiscal adjustment 
in the 1990s. Expenditure adjustment was insufficient to offset declines in revenue and 
reduce the government budget deficit. The consolidated government fiscal deficit 
reached 10.5% of GDP in 1989/90, was reduced to 7.4% of GDP in 1992/93 then rose 
after 1993/94 to exceed 10% of GDP by the end of the decade (Bajpai and Sachs 
1999:84; IMF 2001:74). This is quaintly known in the literature as ‘fiscal slippage’. 
Public sector savings declined sharply from 2.0% of GDP in 1991/92 to -2.5% in 
2001/02 (table 8.7).
Table 81.7: Pultfiic Sector Savings
1991
/92
1992
/93
1993
/94
1994
/95
1995
/96
1996
/97
1997
/98
1998
199
1999
/OO
2000
/01
2001
/02
Public
Sector
2.0 1.6 0.6 1.7 2.0 1.7 1.3 -1.0 -1.0 -2.3 -2.5
Source: (IMF 2003:17).
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Between 1992/93 and 1996/97 the real interest rate averaged less than the growth rate of 
GDP. This allowed the ratio of central govt debt to GDP to fall despite primary deficits 
averaging over 2% of GDP. Total public debt as a share of GDP declined from 61.68% 
in 1990/91 to 56.29% in 1996/97 (Jha et al 2003:156). Between 1997/98 and 2001/02 the 
interest rate began to exceed the growth rate of GDP, and the primary deficit rose to an 
average of 3.5% of GDP. The combination by definition is unsustainable. Total public 
debt as a share of GDP then rose to 62.59% in 2000/01 (Jha et al 2003:156).
3.2. The Role of the State in Creating Institutions to Mobilise Private Sector Savings
3.2.1. Reforms and Outcomes in the 1990s: The Stock Market
The reform of the regulatory framework governing the stock market began in the late- 
1980s and was accelerated by a share-trading scam in 1992. Institutional reforms have 
included the abolition of capital issues control, bringing all primary and secondary 
market intermediates under the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), and new 
regulations relating to insider-dealing, electronic trading and takeover bids. Those 
related to the competitive conditions of trading have included, the free pricing of new
76issues, allowing foreign institutional investors to have access to the stock market , 
allowing Indian companies to list GDR’s on foreign stock markets, and permitting NRI’s 
to buy shares without RBI permission.
The most innovative example of government intervention was the establishment of a new 
Securities Exchange -  the National Stock Exchange (NSE) (Shah and Thomas 2004).
Until 1994 equity trading in India was dominated by floor-based trading on the Bombay 
Stock Exchange (BSE). Such trading was non-transparent, illiquid and access to stocks 
was limited for those outside of Bombay. The NSE was a pioneer among securities 
exchanges in the world in using a demutualised structure where a consortium of 
government owned financial institutions rather than brokerage owned it. The ownership
76 Foreign institutional investors invested a cumulative $21bn between 1993 and 2000.
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pattern removed incentives to restrict membership, new corporate and foreign brokerage 
firms were freely admitted. Trading commenced at the NSE in November 1994, from 
October 1995 it has been the largest exchange in India. The NSE pioneered many 
important innovations in market design in India. The most important was electronic 
trading (1994), a Clearing Corporation as a central counterparty (1996) and paperless 
settlement at the depository (1996). Competition between the NSE and BSE is unique, 
the exchanges operate in the same city during the same trading hours, all major stocks 
trade on both exchanges so the exchanges compete for order flow and not just for listings. 
The rise of the NSE has been a spur to reform at the BSE. The BSE subsequently started 
electronic trading and improved its rules governing the admission of corporate and 
foreign brokerage firms. The BSE has spread its reach and now uses satellite 
communications to reach locations outside Bombay.
In contrast to public sector savings (table 8.7) private sector savings increased from 
20.1% of GDP to a peak of 23.2% in 1994/95, then stagnated until 1998/99 reaching 
22.5% (table 8.8). The most important institutional innovation by the state relating to the 
mobilisation of private sector savings was promoting of the stock market. The expansion 
of the stock market in India during the 1990s was remarkable in terms of the number of 
companies listed, market capitalisation and value added. Some argue that the huge 
expansion of the stock market was not associated with either a rise in aggregate domestic 
savings or an increase in the proportion of financial savings and stock market growth in 
the 1980s only involved portfolio substitution by households and institutions from bank 
deposits to stock market instruments (Nagaraj 1996; Singh 1998; and Nagaishi 1999). In 
this spirit Muhleisen (1997) forecast that private sector savings would reach only 23.5% 
of GDP between 2000/01 and 2005/06 (from 23.2% in 1996/97).
Even as these pessimistic conclusions were being drawn the rate of private sector savings 
in India was set for a sharp jump, to 26.5% of GDP by 2001/02 (table 8.8). A surge in 
private sector savings from 17% of GDP in 1991/92 to 19.7% in 1994/95 was led by 
increases in both household and private corporate sector savings. Private corporate sector 
savings increased from 3.1% of GDP in 1991/92 to 4.9% of GDP in 1995/96 then
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fluctuated at around 4% of GDP until 2001/02. The decline in household saving from 
19.7% of GDP in 1994/95 to 17.0% in 1996/97 was the key to the overall stagnation 
analysed by Mehleisen (1997) and others. The rate then recovered rapidly, rising to 
22.5% of GDP in 2001/02. This rise was strong enough to offset stagnation in private 
corporate sector savings, and falling public sector savings to raise aggregate savings to 
new heights.
Table 8.8: Savings by Source, 1993/4 to 1998/99 (% of GDP at marke prices)
1991/
92
1992/
93
1993/
94
1994/
95
1995/
96
1996/
97
1997/
98
1998/
99
1999/
00
2000/
01
2001/
02
Private
Sector
20.1 20.2 21.9 23.2 23.1 21.5 21.8 22.5 25.1 25.7 26.5
Household
Saving
17.0 17.5 18.4 19.7 18.2 17.0 17.6 18.8 20.8 21.6 22.5
- Physical 
Saving
7.5 8.8 7.4 7.8 9.3 6.6 8.0 8.3 10.1 10.7 11.3
- Financial 
Saving
9.5 8.7 11.0 11.9 8.9 10.4 9.6 10.5 10.7 10.9 11.2
Corporate
Saving
3.1 2.7 3.5 3.5 4.9 4.5 4.2 3.7 4.4 4.1 4.0
Source: (IMF 2003:17).
Examining the patterns of savings at a more disaggregated level reveal that for at least 
part of the decade the stock market was successful in mobilising financial savings from 
households. The rise in household sector savings during the first half of the 1990s was 
driven primarily by growth in financial savings, which increased from 9.5% of GDP in 
1991/92 to 11.9% of GDP in 1994/95 (table 8.8). This occurred during the stock market 
boom. Stock market capitalisation increased from 19.4% of GDP in 1991/92 to 54.2% in 
1992/93 and after a fall in 1993/94 to over 45% between 1994/95 and 1996/97, then 
declined to below 40% in 1997/98 and below 30% in 2001/02 (table 8.9). The finance 
ratio77 improved to an average of nearly 40% between 1992/93 and 1995/96, from 31.7% 
between 1985/86 and 1991/92.
77 The finance ratio is total financial issues by all sectors of the economy divided by Net National Product 
as current market prices (Saggar 2003).
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Table 8.9; Financial Intermediation (% of GDP)
1991
192
1992
/93
1993
/94
1994
/95
1995
/96
1996
191
1997
/98
1998
199
1999
/OO
2000
/01
2001
/02
Bank
Deposits
39.1 40.2 40.3 41.8 40.2 41.0 44.2 46.4 48.1 52.3 54.7
Stock Market 
Capitalisation
19.4 54.2 30.6 46.6 46.7 48.2 35.7 38.7 33.0 47.1 29.7
Source: (IMF 2003:14).
There are signs towards the end of the 1990s that there was substitution by households 
and institutions from stock market instruments back into bank deposits as argued by 
(Mehleisen 1997; Singh 1998). Between 1996/97 and 2001/02 stock market 
capitalisation dropped from 48.2% to 29.7% of GDP and the share of bank deposits in 
GDP increased from 41% to 54.7% (table 8.9). The share of household financial saving 
going to shares and debentures increased from 10% in 1989/90 to a peak of 22.2% in 
1991/92 then collapsed to 5% in 1995/96. Much of this movement is accounted for by 
savings through the Unit Trust of India (UTI) (table 8.10).
Table 8,10: Household Saving in Financial Assets (% of Gross Financial Saving)
1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96
Currency 15.6 11.0 11.5 8.7 14.2 11.6 13.1
Bank
Deposits
32.3 30.8 31.9 40.1 35.7 45.8 43.6
Insurance/
Pension
Funds
28.3 29.5 27.5 29.0 29.6 23.3 29.9
Claims on 
Govemme 
nt
13.8 14.0 6.9 5.2 7.2 9.6 8.5
Shares
and
Debenture
s
10.0 14.8 22.2 17.1 13.3 9.8 5.0
Of Which: 
UTI
4.4 6.0 12.8 7.4 4.8 1.8 -
Source: (Muhleisen 1997:10).
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What is worrying is that increased private sector savings after the mid-1990s were led by 
growth in physical savings by households. The share of household financial savings 
remained stagnant at around 11% of GDP between 1996/97 and 2001/02. Physical 
savings by contrast boomed, from 6.6% of GDP in 1996/97 to 11.3% in 2001/02. This 
general picture is echoed by Khanna (2002) who found that investment in the stock 
market comprised approximately 10-18% of marginal savings of the household sector in 
1990-94, and by the end of the decade only 3.5%. The state proved successful in 
mobilising resources through the stock market when it was booming in the early-1990s 
but has proved of little long-term benefit.
3.2.2. Retained Earnings and Profitability
This section will show that there was a sharp rise in profitability of the corporate sector. 
This has a clear link with the growth of private corporate sector savings and investment.
There has been little discussion exploring the link between profits, investment and 
economic growth. Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) briefly explore the link between 
economic reform in the 1980s and likely profitability of the corporate sector. They ' 
argued that reforms in the 1980s were pro-business rather than pro-market. There was 
less attention to external liberalisation and more to reducing taxes, easing access to 
imported capital inputs, and liberalising capacity restrictions. The pattern of reform they 
argue was about gaining favour from incumbent business interests rather than liberalising 
the economy as a whole. Athey and Laumas (1994) found profit to be a crucial influence 
on investment among large firms between 1978 and 1986. This they argue was due to the 
government policy of directed credit to small-firms which forced larger ones to increase 
reliance on internal funds.
The empirical evidence for India in the 1990s is fairly clear, a variety of studies have 
revealed a sharp increase in corporate profitability. The share of labour in net domestic
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product was stable in the late-1980s at around 60%, after peaking at 60.16% in 1991/92 
there was a sharp and continual fall to stable low of 50.11% in 1996/97 (table 8.11).
Table 8.11: Distribution of NDP by Factor Incomes (Current Prices)
Year Labour, % Share in NDP 
Excluding Dwellings
Non-Labour, % Share in 
NDP Excluding Dwellings
1989/90 59.00 41.00
1990/91 59.59 40.41
1991/92 60.16 39.84
1992/93 61.60 38.40
1993/94 54.74 45.26
1994/95 52.16 47.84
1995/96 54.74 45.26
1996/97 50.11 49.89
1997/98 52.96 47.04
1998/99 51.67 48.33
1999/00 51.78 48.22
Source: (Sivasubramonian 2004:28).
Other evidence confirms this pattern. Uchikawa (2002:37) calculates the share of profits 
in gross income as the excess of net income over wages, deducting the rent and interest 
paid from net value added. The average share of profit and depreciation in gross income 
comparing two periods (1981/82 to 1990/91) and (1991/92 to 1997/98) increased from 
37.3% to 40.3% in capital goods, 52.9% to 62.5% in intermediate goods, 40.9% to 52.5% 
in consumer durables and 38.3% to 51.5% in consumer non-durables. Balakrishnan and 
Babu (2003) find increased profit shares for the majority of industry groups. Basant 
(2000) notes that all indices of profitability declined in the first two years of economic 
reform but picked up thereafter, most significantly for the iron and steel, drugs and 
pharmaceuticals, and automobile sectors.
Profitability of the corporate sector has a clear link with the growth of private corporate 
sector savings (table 8.8) and as we shall see later in the chapter the growth of private 
corporate sector investment (table 8.15).
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3.3. Allocating Resources to Projects Essential for Development
The second important financial role for the state was in allocating resources to projects 
essential for development. This section will show that the government sharply reduced 
public investment and liberalised the financial sector in the hope that the private sector 
would be enabled to allocate resources to those projects essential for long-run 
development. The rate of private investment did increase rapidly in the early-1990s.
This boom has obvious links to financial sector reforms. There is evidence to suggest the 
private sector over a longer-time period has not replaced the downgraded developmental 
role of the state. There are four separate arguments here. The first relates to the lack of 
diversification in investment patterns in the 1990s, the second to the temporary nature of 
the investment boom, the third to the speculative nature of the investment boom, and the 
fourth to emerging constraints on the ability of firms to access long-term developmental 
finance. The fears that the reduction of directed credit programmes in the 1990s would 
starve the small-scale sector of lending though have proved to be unfounded.
Critics following work by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) characterised the Indian 
financial sector as repressed in 1991. Financial liberalisation they argued would lead to 
higher levels of investment and output growth via increased savings and the supply of 
domestic credit. Repression it was argued by Joshi and Little (1994) was harmful to 
resource mobilisation and efficient resource allocation. Liberalisation of the financial 
sector they argued would also enable the financial system to perform its role of allocating 
scarce resources more efficiently. During the 1990s the state retreated from regulating the 
financial sector and directly allocating resources (Khanna 1999; Ahluwalia 1999, 2002; 
Acharya 2002; Bajpai 2002; Williamson and Zagha 2002). This was observed first in the 
sharp cuts in public investment and also the substantial and ongoing liberalisation of the 
financial sector throughout the 1990s (table 9.14).
In 1991 public sector banks accounted for 90% of commercial bank deposits.
Competition in the banking sector hitherto lacking increased. Nine new private banks
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were opened between 1994 and 1995. The total number of foreign banks increased from 
24 to 42 between 1991/92 and 2000/01 (IMF 2002:78). In 1991 all basic interest rates on 
loans and deposits were regulated (except for the inter-bank rate) with wide differentials 
depending on the size and sector. This administered structure was highly complex, rigid 
and not related to market conditions. By July 1991 63.5% of every increase in demand 
and time deposits had to be set-aside for investment in government securities. The Cash 
Reserve Ratio (CRR) then totalled 25% and the Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) 38.5%. 
Of the remainder 40% was reserved for priority sectors such as the small-scale, 
agriculture and housing. Even this free proportion was subject to credit norms by sector, 
purpose, and security. Insurance companies had to hold half their portfolio in 
government funds. Reforms initiated in 1991 were justified as attempts to remove these 
microeconomic inefficiencies and allow a greater role for markets in the determination of 
interest rates and by extension the allocation of financial resources. In the banking sector 
the SLR has been reduced from high of 38% in 1991 to 25% by 1996. New income 
recognition norms based on international accounting standards have been gradually 
enforced resulting in several public sector banks showing large balance sheet losses. 
Public sector banks have been re-capitalised to ensure a capital-adequacy ratio of at least 
8%, in practise the figure has rose towards 10%.
There is considerable evidence to show that the financial system did become more 
efficient over the 1990s. Abiad et al (2004) attempted to measure the impact of financial 
liberalisation on the efficiency of capital allocation. The removal of controls on lending 
they argue would permit credit to be re-allocated to firms offering higher returns. They 
show in a simple model that the variation in Tobin’s q78 should be lower in countries with 
more liberalised financial sectors. In a fully liberalised financial sector each firm faces 
the same market interest rate and can invest as much as it wants implying that marginal 
returns to capital are equalised across firms. In a non-liberalised financial system the 
government may impose price controls (interest rate ceilings etc) or quantity controls. 
Firms will still equate marginal returns to capital to the interest rate but firms facing
78 Abiad et al (2004) note that we cannot use ex-post marginal returns, they may increase after liberalisation 
if a better functioning financial system leads firms to select higher-risk and higher-retum projects.
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higher interest rates will need to set a lower steady state level of capital. Greater 
variation in interest rates across firms will generate a variation in returns across firms. 
Abiad et al (2004) find that financial liberalisation in India has been more important than 
financial deepening79 for improving allocative efficiency. Liberalisation in India has 
improved allocative efficiency through an effect on the quality not quantity of 
investment. Koeva (2003) finds that the banking sector in India has become more 
efficient over the 1990s when judged by conventional measures. The cost of financial 
intermediation and bank profitability has decreased in recent years. This Koeva argues is 
associated with greater competition following decreased industry concentration following 
the entry of new foreign and domestic banks. The market share of nationalised banks has 
declined by 6%.
Net non-performing loans of public sector banks had reached 16.3% at the end of 1992-3 
(Ahluwalia 1999). There was a steady rise in capital-adequacy ratios and a decline in 
non-performing loans for both public and private sector banks during the latter half of the 
1990s (table 8.12).
Table 8.12: Indicators of Financial System Soundness, 1995/96 to 200/0180
1995/9
6
1996/9
7
1997/9
8
1998/9
9
1999/0
0
2000/0
2
CAR -  Public Sector 
Banks
8.7 10 11.6 11.2 10.7 11.2
CAR -  Private Domestic 
Sector Banks
- 12.8 12.7 11.9 12.9 11.8
NPL -  Public Sector 
Banks
8.9 9.2 8.2 8.1 7.4 6.7
NPL -  Private Domestic 
Sector Banks
4.3 5.4 5.3 7.4 5.4 5.4
Source: (IMF 2002:138).
79 They measure financial liberalisation in terms of bank credit to the private sector relative to GDP, stock 
market capitalisation relative to GDP and stock market turnover relative to market capitalisation.
80 Risk Weighted Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR), Net Non-Performing Loans, % of outstanding net loans 
(NPL).
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Gross investment increased quite sharply in the first few years of reform, from 22.6% of 
GDP in 1991/92 to 26.9% of GDP in 1995/96, then steadily declined to 23.7% of GDP in 
2001/02. Public sector investment declined from 9.1% of GDP in 1991/92 to 6.7% of 
GDP in 2001/02 (table 8.13). The very high figure for public investment of 9.7% of GDP 
in 1994/95 proved to be only temporary exception.
Table 8.13: Savin g and Investment, 1993/4 to 19981/99 (% of GDP at market prices
1991
/92
1992
/93
1993
/94
1994
/95
1995
/96
1996
/97
1997
/98
1998
199
1999
/OO
2000
/01
2001
/02
Gross
Investment
22.6 23.6 23.1 26.0 26.9 24.5 24.6 22.6 25.2 24.0 23.7
Public
Sector
9.1 8.5 9.0 9.7 7.8 7.9 7.2 6.9 7.4 6.8 6.7
Foreign
Savings
0.3 1.7 0.4 1.0 1.7 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.0 0.5 -0.3
Source: (Ilv F 2003:17).
Despite declining public investment total private investment rose sharply from 13.5% in 
1991/92 to 19.1% in 1995/96 (table 8.14). This more than compensated for the declining 
trend in public investment, leading to a steady rise in total investment, from 22.6% in 
1991/92 to 26.9% in 1995/96. Disaggregating private sector investment reveals why this 
investment boom was so conducive to economic growth. Investment growth was led by 
the private corporate sector, where investment increased from 5.8% of GDP in 1991/91 to 
9.7% of GDP in 1995/96.
Table 8.14: Invesltment, 1993/4 to 1998/99 (% of GDP at market prices)
1991
/92
1992
/93
1993
/94
1994
/95
1995
/96
1996
191
1997
/98
1998
199
1999
/OO
2000
/01
2001
/02
Gross
Investment
22.6 23.6 23.1 26.0 26.9 24.5 24.6 22.6 25.2 24.0 23.7
- Private 
Sector
13.5 15.1 14.1 16.3 19.1 16.6 17.4 15.6 17.8 17.2 17.1
— Corporate 
Sector
5.8 6.4 6.1 7.7 9.7 9.0 8.7 6.7 6.9 5.3 5.1
Household
Sector
7.7 8.7 8.0 8.6 9.4 7.5 8.7 8.9 10.9 11.9 11.9
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Source: (IM F 2003:17 .
De Long and Summers (1991) find that the accumulation of machinery is a prime 
determinant of productivity growth. They find a ‘clear, strong and robust’ relationship 
between national rates of machinery and equipment investment and productivity growth. 
Lee (1995) finds that international trade has a positive relationship with growth because it 
provides access to cheaper foreign capital goods. De Long and Summers argue that the 
private return to equipment investment is below the social return, and that the social 
return is very high (over thirty percent they estimate). The boom in equipment 
investment that began in the 1980s continued during the 1990s (table 8.15). From an 
average growth rate of 0.52% between 1970/71 and 1980/81 to 12.52% between 1980/81 
and 1990/91, and 9.59% p.a. between 1990/91 and 1999/00.
Table 8.15: Growth Rates of Non-Residential Fixed Capital Stock (1993/94 Prices)
Net Fixed Capital Stock
Period Structures Equipment Total
1970/1 to 
1980/1
5.27 0.52 4.50
1980/1 to 
1990/91
3.41 12.52 5.06
1990/1 to 
1999/00
4.48 9.59 6.00
Source: (Sivasubramonian 2004:149).
Financial sector reforms facilitated the growth of private corporate sector investment.
The SLR declined from 38.5% in 1991 to 25% in 1998, and enabled financial institutions 
to expand disbursements (at 1981/82 prices) by 15.7% p.a. between 1991/91 and 1997/98 
despite a rise in interest rates. The stock market boom contributed to this investment 
boom. The total amount of new capital issued by non-government public limited 
companies (including preference shares and debentures) at 1981/82 prices increased from 
Rs 2,927 crore in 1991/92 to Rs 8,525 in 1992/93 and Rs 16,417 in 1994/95.
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This investment generated rapid growth for two reasons, firstly, it was concentrated in the 
private corporate sector and secondly it was focused on the most productive type of 
investment -  equipment. However there is a good deal of evidence to suggest the state 
had undermined the long-run ability of the financial sector to allocate resources to 
projects essential for development. The private sector had not replaced the development 
role of the state. There are four separate arguments examined here.
The first argument relates to the lack of diversification in the structure of investment in 
the 1990s. There was no shift of investment to labour-intensive export-orientated 
industries. The boom in investment between 1991/92 and 1995/96 remained 
concentrated in the same small cluster of industrial sectors as it had done before 
liberalisation. Between 1991/92 and 1997/98 gross fixed capital formation of NIC 30 
chemical, 31 rubber and plastic, 33 basic metal, 35-36 machinery, 37 transport equipment 
rose rapidly. These five main investing industries accounted for 63.6% of total 
investment, barely changed from 64.4% in the 1980s. A shift in the concentration of 
investment did not happen.
The second argument relates to the temporary nature of the investment boom between 
1991/92 to 1995/96. Total gross investment fell after 1995/96 and stagnated for the rest 
of the decade, beginning at a level in 2001/02 (23.7%) little different from its level in 
1991/92 (22.6%). Most strikingly there was a dramatic shift in the pattern of private 
sector investment. After 1995/96 private corporate sector investment dropped sharply 
downwards, falling from 9.7% of GDP in 1995/96 to only 5.1% of GDP in 2001/02, 
below the level attained in 1991/92 (5.8%). Private household sector investment 
continued a steady rise throughout the 1990s finishing in 2001/02 at 11.9% of GDP.
The third argument relates to the speculative nature of the investment boom. A relevant 
hypothesis is that liberalisation of international trade can reduce the relative price of 
capital goods and this can stimulate an investment boom. There is however no clear link 
between changes in the prices of capital goods and sectors that subsequently invested 
rapidly (NIC 30, 31, 33, 35-6 and 37). Uchikawa (2001) finds a decline in the relative
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price of capital goods in NIC 33, and 35-36 and an increase in NIC 30, 31 and 37. Rather 
than being related to fundamental changes in incentives and prices generated by 
liberalisation or to changing patterns of demand the boom in investment was essentially 
speculative in nature. The splurge in private corporate sector investment generated sharp 
declines in capacity utilisation after 1995/96. Underutilisation made appearance in 
chemical, rubber and plastic, machinery and transport equipment after output growth 
slowed in the mid-1990s. These trends are confirmed by figures on growth rates of 
capital and labour productivity which both declined in NIC 30, 31, 35-6, 37.
The fourth relates to the argument that reforms of the financial sector did not enhance the 
long-run capacity of the financial sector to allocate resources to projects essential for 
development. By March 1995 the incremental SLR was down to 25% and the average to 
29%. This reduction was achieved in tandem with the government paying market- 
determined rates on its borrowing. Market borrowing as a share of total financing of the 
government deficit increased from 21.3% in 1990/91 to 51.1% in 1993/94. Market 
borrowing by government in the form of 182-364 day T-Bills increased from 0.8% of 
total capital receipts in 1990/91 to 30.1% in 1994/95 (Sen and Vaidya 1997). The access 
of state owned developmental financial institutions to cheap SLR funds was cut off. The 
DFI’s had traditionally been the most important source of long-term borrowing for firms. 
The two largest are the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) and the Industrial 
Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI). Prior to reforms the government 
provided subsidised credit to the DFI’s which was then lent out at a fixed rate of interest 
to those firms who had acquired a license to create/ expand capacity. DFIs have always 
lacked a retail network to collect deposits from households (which provide 80% of 
domestic savings in India) and in a liberalised financial system were now forced to raise 
capital through the sale of bonds and debt instruments at very high rates of interest (16- 
18%)81. The disruption of financing to the DFI’s has had a serious impact on the 
corporate sector. DFI’s remain the only institutions with capabilities to assess long-term 
projects. There has been a marked decline in credit from DFI’s to the corporate sector.
81 Khanna (2002) finds no evidence the cost of capital to Indian firms has declined due to the entry of 
foreign investors to the stock market.
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DFI’s used to provide about 22-24% of finance to large Indian firms at the beginning of 
the 1990s. In the first few years of reforms DFI lending declined to about 6% of new 
investment. Despite financial liberalisation the overall proportion of funds raised 
internally increased from 30 to 37% during the 1990s (Khanna 2002).
Total government debt held by banks actually absorbed a higher percentage of deposits in 
the 1990s (40%) than in the latter half of the 1980s (36%). Private sector banks are 
holding more government debt that is required by the SLR. The government pays a 
higher interest rate than the average interest cost of funds and public sector debt carries a 
low risk weight for the purposes of capital adequacy (2%). There is other evidence the 
banking sector is becoming more short-termist. The share of aggregate long-term debt 
fell from 90% of the total in 1989 to 70% in 2002 (Topalova 2004).
3.4. Correcting Market Failures in the Allocation of Credit to Small Firms
In the presence of transaction costs or information asymmetries there are reasons to 
believe that the supply of credit to small firms will be inelastic. If targeted firms are 
facing an inelastic or rationed source of funds directed credit can be effective. External 
equity is subject to agency costs associated with the verification of firm performance. 
Legal systems in LDC’s may make verification more difficult and there are likely to be 
scale economies in verification. This may lead to a situation in which only large firms 
are able to access funds from private sector capital markets. Directed credit in India after 
banking sector nationalisation in 1969 did see a rapid shift of credit to the small-scale 
sector. The volume of bank credit doubled between 1965 and 1978. The share of the 
small-scale in this (higher) total increased from 3.5 to 11%. Eastwood and Kohli (1999) 
find that in the 1960s and 1970s the supply of external finance was exogenous to the 
investment demand of small firms in India while large firms with new investment 
opportunities were able to obtain external finance at the margin. The policy of directed 
credit after the late-1960s they argue had enabled gross investment in small firms to 
overcome capital market failures.
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Continued priority allocation of credit to the small-scale sector has protected them from a 
credit crunch resulting from liberalisation in the 1990s. The share of bank lending going 
to the small-scale sector was stable throughout the 1990s. This is true whether we look at 
the State Bank of India (SBI), loss making or profitable banks (table 8.16). The small- 
scale sector has also been shielded in other ways, notably the government owned Small 
Industries Development Bank of India (SDDBI) being set up in 1990 and lending at below 
market rates to the small-scale sector (Sen and Vaidya 1997).
Table 8.16: Priority Sector Lending, 1991/92 to 1996/9782
1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97
All Public
Sector
Banks
29.6 28.6 30.9 29.3 29.6 31.1
SBI and
Associate
s
26.6 25.3 28.9 27.3 27.4 29.2
Weak
Banks
31.9 30.4 32.8 31.0 31.3 34.7
Strong
Banks
32.2 32.0 32.4 32.0 33.6 34.0
Source: (I1VF 1998:110).
3.5. The Role of the State and International Capital
This section will show that the state had a very important role with respect to 
international capital and fulfilled all the necessary theoretical roles that were outlined in 
chapter IV. During the 1990s the state co-ordinated foreign borrowing, influenced the 
end use of foreign debt, controlled the disruptive potential of short-term capital flows, 
influenced the composition of capital inflows and continued to segment domestic and 
international capital markets. The fiscal deficit remained high throughout the 1990s, by
82 Weak banks are defined as those having incurred losses in three of the past four years, and strong banks 
as those having experienced no losses in last five years (there are five banks in each category) (IMF 
1998:107).
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the end of the decade it even exceeded the 1989/90-crisis level. The state though 
carefully restructured capital inflows in a way that made them more sustainable and 
allowed itself the leeway to continue running large budget deficits.
3.5.1. The orthodox view: Stabilisation...
Many commentators argue the origins of the 1991 crisis lay in the fiscal laxity and 
foreign borrowing during the 1980s. Joshi and Little (1994:Ch7) call the period 1984/85 
to 1991, ‘the road to crisis’. The state fiscal deficit reached 10.5% of GDP in 1989/90. 
Especially after 1984/5 large current account deficits were financed by commercial 
borrowings, such as (subsidised) NRI deposits. Total external debt rose from $18.7bn in 
1980 to $56.3bn in 1989, or from 11 to 21.5% of GNP. The debt service ratio (as a 
proportion of exports of goods and services) increased from 9.1% in 1980 to 26.3% in 
1989. In September 1990, inflows of NRI deposits turned negative, foreign exchange 
reserves dipped below $lbn in Jan 1991. By June 1991 the balance of payments crisis 
had become a crisis of confidence in the government’s ability to manage the external 
sector, default became a distinct possibility.
Various authors have noted that stabilisation can have severely negative implications. 
Devaluation can be deflationary (Krugman and Taylor 1978), stabilisation can lead to 
economic collapse (Taylor 1978) or ‘overkill’ (Dell 1982), cuts in social-expenditure can 
undermine accumulation of human capital vital to sustain growth in the long-run (Ranis 
and Stewart 1999). The orthodox story finds the period of stabilisation to have been, 
contrary to such doomsayers a very successful one (Ahluwalia (1999). In November 
1991 the government of India agreed a two-year stand by arrangement with the IMF 
totalling $2.3bn. Inflation fell from 13.7% in 1991/92 to 8.4% in 1993/94. Growth 
remained positive, 0.8% in 1991/92, 5.3% in 1992/93 and 6.2% in 1993/94. Acharya 
(2002b) argues this marked one of the swiftest recoveries of economic dynamism seen 
anywhere in the world in the last twenty years. Real manufacturing growth averaged 
11.3% between 1993/94 and 1996/97, exports in dollar terms averaged 20% between
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1993/94 and 1995/95, and real fixed investment rose by nearly 40% between 1993/94 and 
1995/96. The fiscal deficit at the centre was reduced quite quickly between 1990/91 and 
1991/92. For Virmani (2003) this was a classic textbook macroeconomic response to an 
external crisis - a combination of expenditure compression through sharp fiscal 
adjustment and expenditure switching through devaluation. According to the orthodox 
view a sharp devaluation had expenditure-switching effects that quickly offset the 
contractionary effects of fiscal tightening.
3.5.2. The alternative view: Expansionary Adjustment
A closer look at the data show there was no sustained domestic macroeconomic 
adjustment. The fiscal deficit remained high throughout the 1990s eventually exceeding 
the 1989/90-crisis level. The orthodox story of macroeconomic adjustment is mistaken.
The state continued to restrict commercial borrowing in foreign currencies and 
maintained annual ceilings on the size of and interest rates on loans sought by domestic 
firms. The approval process gave priority to longer term loans and loans to priority 
sectors, it paid attention to the maturity structure and end-use of proposed loans. An easy 
interpretation would be that provided by Sen (2003) who noted that India has not 
achieved the pre-requisites for full convertibility (financial sector reforms, fiscal balance 
and a properly designed monetary and fiscal policy). The argument here is very different. 
The state restructured capital inflows in such a way that was more sustainable and 
allowed the state leeway to continue running large budget deficits and so avoid deflation. 
The effectiveness of external reforms was demonstrated by the ease with which the 
economy weathered the Asian crisis and 1998 nuclear related sanctions. The 
macroeconomic experience of India in the 1990s was in effect just the sort of 
expansionary adjustment in the face of an external loss of confidence that the IMF was 
much maligned for preventing in the aftermath of the 1997/98 Asian crisis (Wade 1998b; 
Kaplan and Rodrik 2001; Stiglitz 2002) etc.
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The level of capital inflows changed relatively little during the 1990s. Total capital 
inflow fell from $7,056bn in 1990/91 to a low of $3,876bn in 1992/93, they recovered 
quite rapidly to average around about $9-10,000bn for the rest of the decade. The biggest 
change has been in the composition of capital inflows. Except for NRIs there was a near 
absence of any private capital flows until 1992. Until 1991 official external assistance, 
grants and loans from bilateral sources comprised 75-80% of such inflows, this fell to 
below 5% by the late 1990s. In 1990/91 debt creating inflows comprised 83% of total 
inflows. Among these, external assistance (31.3%), external commercial borrowing 
(31.9%), short-term credit (15.2%) and NRI dollar deposits (21.8%) formed significant 
categories. Non-debt -creating inflows formed only 1.5% of total capital inflows. There 
was a sharp rise in non-debt-creating inflows during the 1990s. FDI rose from 1.4% of 
total capital inflows in 1990/91, to a peak of 52.4% in 1995/96, then stagnated somewhat 
but remaining above 25% for the rest of the decade. Portfolio investment rose from 0.1% 
of total capital inflows in 1990/91, to a peak of 65.1% in 1995/96, and levelled off to 
30.6% in 2000/01. The surplus on the capital account of 2.5% GDP between 1996/7 and 
1998/9 was more than necessary to neutralise the deficit on the current account leading to 
a growth of foreign exchange reserves.
The government’s cautious policy to debt flows importantly included tight controls on 
short-term borrowing. The short-term debt to reserve ratio declined from nearly 80% in 
1991/92 to about 15% in 1998/99 (IMF 2000:85). By March 2001 short-term debt was 
less than 9% of foreign currency reserves. Foreign exchange reserves increased rapidly, 
the ratios of M3/forex reserves and short-term debt/ foreign exchange reserves declined 
rapidly (table 8.17).
Table 8.17: Key Macroeconomic Indicators
% of GDP 
(Unless 
otherwise 
defined)
Pre-crisis 
(1985/96 to 
1989/90)
Crisis 1990/91 1992/93 to 
1996/97
1997/98 to 
2001/02
Forex Reserves 
($bn)
4.0 5.8 26.4 54.0
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M3/forex 
Reserves %
3694 2329 733 568
Short-term 
external debt83/ 
Forex reserves %
365 276 33 16
Source: (Pinto and Zahir 2004:1040).
4. The (Economic) Role of the State, 1991 to 2004: Production
This section starts by arguing that Neo-liberal theorists justify the need for liberalising 
economic reform to promote economic efficiency. A strong prediction of neo-classical 
economics is that trade liberalisation will raise incomes through the more efficient 
allocation of resources. The liberalisation of the Indian economy after 1991 indeed raised 
the share of trade in GDP. The evolution of the structure of trade over the 1990s has 
been in accordance with the broad predictions of comparative advantage -  production and 
exports towards labour-intensive manufactured goods and imports towards everything 
else. Techniques of production in Indian industry have generally become more labour- 
intensive. The theory of comparative advantage argues that liberalisation should increase 
the level of income, and generate a transitional period of faster economic growth. There 
is a good deal of evidence to suggest this is exactly what happened over the 1990s. There 
was a temporary boom in economic growth until the mid-1990s as output was re­
allocated to labour-intensive sectors, after which the growth rate dropped to its longer- 
term norm.
To analyse the implications for long-run growth we need to go beyond the theory of 
comparative advantage. In the long-run trade liberalisation and increased market 
competition could lead to two very different outcomes, both could be judged ‘efficient’ 
according to the neo-classical definition of efficiency. These are the low and high-roads 
of economic development. Firstly, India could react to intensified competition by trying 
to enhance its price competitiveness within its existing labour-intensive niche by 
extending hours, reducing overheads (subcontracting) and intensifying work conditions (a
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low road of competition). Secondly, India could remain with labour-intensive production 
and raising the productivity of labour (intensive growth), or upgrading to a less (price) 
competitive market niche to capture rents (a high road of competition).
In practise India’s comparative advantage remains in low-technology, labour-intensive 
production and exports. There is broad agreement that productivity (TFP) growth has 
declined over the reform relative to the pre-reform period. The software and textiles 
sectors illustrate more specifically this general point.
4.1. Neo-classical Analysis of Efficiency and Sustainability
Neo-liberal arguments for liberalisation take as their benchmark efficiency judged and 
measured in a neo-classical sense. Government intervention in the allocation of 
resources they argue will create inefficiency and the catch-all solution to enhance 
efficiency they argue is (more) liberalisation. This neo-classical concept of efficiency is 
extremely narrow and is entirely subsumed by the concept of Pareto efficiency.
Efficiency is held to be solely a static concept concerned with the efficient level of output 
of public and private goods, efficient risk sharing, the Edgeworth Box, and Walrasian 
equilibrium84. There are “three types of efficiency embodied in a Pareto optimal 
exercise” (Mas-Colell 1995:564). The first is consumption efficiency, where consumers 
have allocated their budgets to maximise their own wellbeing (utility maximisation), and 
the marginal rate of substitution between any two goods equals their price ratio. The 
second is production efficiency, where producers cannot alter the ratio of inputs to raise 
output or reduce the cost of a given volume of production and the marginal rate of 
technical substitution between any two inputs equals their price ratio. The final is 
aggregate output efficiency, where resources are allocated simultaneously to achieve both 
production and consumption efficiency. Where for example in a society of bipeds an
83 External debt with original maturity less than a year plus long-term debt falling due over the next year.
84 In Mas-Colell (1995) efficiency gets six entries in the index, the Pareto concept appears 76 times. Kreps 
doesn’t bother to separate them, “Efficiency, see Pareto efficiency” (1990:824) notes the index, Pareto
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equal number of right and left shoes are produced. According to neo-classical theory 
utility and profit maximisation will ensure consumption efficiency and the efficient use of 
inputs and composition of outputs.
The underlying assumptions of voluntary exchange and rational optimising individuals 
mean that it must by definition be the case that growth reflects individual preferences and 
hence maximises welfare in a free market. Accordingly the concept of sustainability in 
neo-classical analysis is severely emasculated. Sustainability refers usually only to a 
financial concept -  fiscal and trade deficits. The successful outcome of reform and the 
degree of implementation of liberalisation are collapsed by a-priori assumption into the 
same meaning. Neo-Classical analysis typically focuses nearly exclusively on the depth, 
pace and implementation of reforms (Ahluwalia 2002; Bajpai 2002).
4.2. Comparative Advantage
This section discusses the theory of comparative advantage and shows that its theoretical 
predictions were largely bome out in the case of India. The implications for sustainable 
growth are explored in some detail. A strong prediction of neo-classical economics is 
that trade liberalisation will lead to a shift in the structure of trade and production to 
reflect comparative advantage. Secondly, that this shift will lead to a transitional period 
of faster economic growth. There is good evidence that this occurred in the Indian 
economy after 1991.
The external sector in India has been substantially liberalised during the 1990s. India 
experienced an exchange rate depreciation between 1990 and 1993 of 60% (Sen 2003; 
Krueger and Chinoy 2004). Since 1993 the real exchange rate between the dollar and 
rupee has been approximately constant when measured in terms of consumer prices and 
slightly depreciating (less than 5%) when measured in wholesale prices. Against a basket
efficiency in its various forms appears 26 times. Also in Varian efficiency appears only as Pareto 
efficiency (1992:225). The nearest to an exception is repeated games (Game Theory).
278
of six East-Asian countries85 the rupee depreciated substantially until the mid-1990s. The 
import-weighted average economy-wide tariff fell from 87% in 1990/91 to about 30.2% 
in 1999/00, in agriculture from 70 to 17.7%, in consumer goods from 164 to 32.4%, in 
intermediate goods from 117 to 31.9%, and in capital goods from 97% to 32.2%. The 
weighted-average coverage ratio for economy-wide non-Tariff tarriers on Indian imports 
has fallen from over 95% in 1988/89 to less than 25% in 1999/00 (Pandey 2004). The 
opening of the economy to international trade after 1990 raised the share of trade in GDP. 
There was a sharp break in both imports and exports as a proportion of GDP in the 1990s. 
Imports as a share of GDP increased from 8.57% to 10.65 between the 1980s and 90s and 
exports from 5.54% to 9.08% over the same period (table 8.18). Merchandise trade 
averaged 12.6% of the GDP in the 1980s and increased significantly to an average of 
20% in the post-crisis period (Virmani 2003). Trade exposure increased from 15% in 
1989/90 to 23% in 1995/96 (Ghemawat and Patibandla 1999).
Table 8.18: The Ratio of Merchandise Trade to non-residential GDP, 1950/51 to 
1999/00 (Current Prices)._____________ __________________________________
Period Imports as a % of 
GDP
Exports as a % of 
GDP
Average Trade to 
GDP Ratio
1950/1 to 1960/1 7.82 5.84 6.83
1960/1 to 1970/1 6.27 4.03 5.15
1970/1 to 1980/1 6.58 5.30 5.94
1980/1 to 1990/1 8.57 5.54 7.05
1990/1 to 1999/00 10.65 9.08 9.86
1950/1 to 1999/00 7.95 5.96 6.95
Source: (Sivasubramonian 2004:261).
Mayer and Wood find empirical support for the theory of comparative advantage among 
a broad cross-section of countries, “differences among countries and regions in the broad 
features of their export structure are the result mainly of differences in their supplies of 
human and natural resources” (Mayer and Wood 2000:3). Specifically for the case of 
India, Wood and Calandrino (2000) note that India has one square kilometre of land per
85 Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Singapore and Thailand.
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100 workers which is similar to other south and East Asian countries and less than Latin 
America or Africa (six and ten respectively). This low ratio gives India a theorised 
comparative advantage in manufactured rather than primary exports. In 1990 a low level 
of schooling (average of four years compared to over eight years in developed countries) 
caused this comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector to be specifically in low- 
skill labour-intensive items.
The mutual effects of trade liberalisation and greater trade exposure after 1991 generate 
two strong predictions. According to the theory of comparative advantage we should 
observe a shift in the structure of exports to manufactured goods and an increase in the 
labour-intensity of exports. The opposite pattern should occur in the structure of imports. 
There are four main pieces of evidence that support these theoretical predictions in India 
after 1991.
Firstly, the pessimistic forecasts that trade liberalisation would lead to deindustrialisation 
are largely misplaced. This is in stark contrast to the argument of Wood and Calandrino 
(2000) that India in 1990 had a comparative advantage in labour-intensive manufactures. 
After a steady increase in the manufacturing share of GDP, from 14% in 1970/71 to 21% 
in 1990/91 it has remained constant in the latter half of the 1990s (Nambiar et al 1999). 
However, the share of manufacturing in total non-agricultural employment declined from 
29% in 1970/71 to 24% in 1995/96. Manufactured imports have registered a consistent 
rise, from 2% of total GDP in 1970/71 to 10% 1995/96. Net manufacturing imports as a 
proportion of manufacturing GDP has increased from negative 0.5% in 1970/71 to 16.7% 
1995/6. At first glance this may look like deindustrialisation but these figures hide an 
important shift in the structure of production and trade. It is not a process of 
deindustrialisation that has occurred, rather a shift in the structure of industrial output.
Secondly, between 1978/9 and 1989/90 India’s manufacturing export basket contained 
nearly 50% of intermediate and capital goods. The structure of exports subsequently 
shifted towards one dominated by (labour-intensive) consumer goods. The share of 
consumer goods in India’s manufacturing exports increased from 50.6% in 1989/90 to
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72.5% 1996/97, over the same period the share of intermediate goods declined from 
38.5% to 12.6%. The share of labour-intensive exports in total manufactured exports 
increased from 13% 1991/2 to 34% 1996/7. The share of resource-intensive exports in 
total manufacturing exports declined from 68% in 1978/9 to 37% in 1996/786. The 
proportion of capital goods in total manufacturing imports increased from 36.6% in 
1978/9 to a high of 62% in 1996/7. Between 1987-90 and 1993/96 labour and scale­
intensive exports from India increased their share of total exports, while the share of 
differentiated and science based exports declined. In China by contrast the pattern was 
the reverse (Tendulkar 2000:39-40). Manufactured exports responded well to reform 
averaging of 60.7% of total exports in the 1980s and 76.1% of total exports after the 
crisis. The ratio of manufactured exports to GDP in registered manufacturing more than 
doubled from a pre-crisis average of 6.4% to a post-crisis average of 13.2%.
Thirdly, the pattern of growth within the manufacturing sector is broadly in accordance 
with that predicted by the theory of comparative advantage. The low skill intensive 
sector87 has witnessed a rise, both in value added and employment from 36% to 60% and 
37% to 82% respectively (Nambiar et al 1999). There has been a corresponding fall in 
the shares of both medium and high-skill-intensive sectors. Within the manufacturing 
sector growth fell most sharply in the capital goods sector relative to earlier periods. 
Between I960 and 1965/66 25.63% of the growth of net value added by the registered 
manufacturing sector was contributed by capital goods and 5% by consumer durables. 
This was an obvious consequence of the initial planning strategy. Between 1990/91 and 
1997/98 more than half of the growth of manufacturing was accounted for by consumer 
goods, and capital goods only a little over 10%.
Fourthly, techniques of production in Indian industry have generally become more 
labour-intensive over the 1990s. The share of casual workers in large factory 
employment rose from 4.6% in 1980/81 to more than 12% in 1993/94. The mechanism
86 An exception is the increase in the share of high-tech exports from 13% in 1978/9 to 31% in 1991/2 and 
25% 1996/7. This high figure is due to software exports that are analysed separately in a later section.
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has often been increased use of sub-contracting. Subcontracting practises have been 
largely concentrated in already labour-intensive industries, and more frequent in 
industries producing consumer non-durables and in industries with plants below median 
size. The use of contract labour has shown the largest increase in, beverages and tobacco 
and non-metallic mineral industries and is increasing in new industries like food products 
and chemicals.
There is good evidence to suggest that the allocation of resources was becoming more 
efficient (by its own definition), the structure of production and exports was becoming 
more labour-intensive. However, neo-classical analysis stops here. Going beyond the 
very narrow neo-classical analysis there are numerous strands to the debate about the 
sustainability of growth. This debate has turned on two areas, the first whether this 
pattern of growth can be sustained, the second (with much less attention) to long-term 
issues of legitimacy. In terms of sustainability the debate has revolved around 
competitiveness (Kathuria 1999), the alleged deflationary bias to macroeconomic policy 
(Patnaik 1999), deindustrialisation (Nambiar et al 1999), increasing dependence of 
growth on the service sector (Acharya 2002b) and the non-dynamic structure of exports 
(Lall 1999). The discussion of long-term issues of legitimacy are few and far between, 
whether the social polarisation some argue has occurred during the 1990s is sustainable 
(Nagaraj 2000) and the potential strains that may be generated in a federal system by 
growing inter-state inequalities (Weiner 1999).
4.3. Faster Growth or a New Level of Income?
The second proposition of the theory of comparative advantage -  a higher level of 
income -  is borne out by the data. There was a (temporary) boom in growth until the 
mid-1990s as resources were being re-allocated to labour-intensive sectors, after which 
the growth rate dropped to its longer-term norm.
87 Nambiar et al (1999) use ASI data on ‘total persons engaged’, their proxy for skilled workers is found by 
subtracting workers from total persons engaged to obtain the managerial and technical staff employed by
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Growth in the first half of the 1990s (1992/93 to 1997/98) increased to 6.5% compared to 
5.8% for the second half of 1980s. This average hides an accelerating trend of industrial 
growth between 1992/93 and 1995/96 (4.4%, 6.9%, 9.3%, and 12.7%). Economic growth 
reached a rate of over 7% in 1994/95, 1995/96 and 1996/97 then fell to 5.0% in 1997/98. 
This boom was led by rapid industrial growth of 9.2% in 1994/95 and 11.8% in 1995/96, 
and service sector growth of 7% in 1994/95 and 11.8% in 1995/96. During 1997/98 
agriculture experienced negative (-1.9%) growth and GDP growth slowed to 5%. GDP 
growth revived to 6.8% in 1998/99 though this was led by a sharp (cyclical) increase in 
agricultural growth of 7.2%. Industrial growth dropped sharply after 1997 growing by 
5.9% in 1997/98, 4.0% in 1998/99 and 6.9% in 1999/00 (IMF 2000:17). Growth was 
sustained by a temporary recovery in industry 1999/00, but by 2000/01 there was a 
renewed industrial deceleration and virtual stagnation in agriculture, growth again fell to 
only 4%. Export growth in dollar terms fell from 20% p.a. in 1995/96 to 5% in 1996/7. 
There was a renewed wave of optimism in 2003 as growth soared to 8.5%. This burst of 
growth was led by a boom in agriculture, where output increased by 9.1% over the year. 
The economy was not entering a new higher growth phase but rather recovering from a 
poor harvest (output down 5% in 2001/02) and GDP growth of 4%. Growth has since 
slowed and by 2006 is forecast to drop to 6.3%.
The declining performance of the economy was general after the mid-1990s (table 8.19). 
The economy recorded slower growth in agriculture, industry, (even) services, and 
private consumption. Perhaps the most striking feature of the downturn was the collapse 
in private investment. The annual growth of private investment declined from 13.4% p.a. 
between 1992/93 and 1996/97 to only 6.6% p.a. between 1997/98 and 2001/02. The fall 
was especially pronounced in private fixed investment, growth of which slumped from 
15.3% p.a. to 3.7% p.a. over the same two time periods. The principal factor sustaining 
growth was the public sector. The growth rates of public consumption more than 
doubled, from 4.6% p.a. to 10.6% p.a. Public investment also recorded an increase in its 
growth rate, from 1.7% to 6.2%. There is an irony here, liberalisation was supposed to
industry.
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unleash the private sector. Instead the private sector became increasingly dependent on 
the public sector after the mid-1990s.
Table 8.19: Growth Rates of Real GDP and its Components (Annual Averages, in 
percent)_________ _____________ _____________ ______________
1990s 1992/93 to 
1996/97
1997/98 to 
2001/02
GDP at Factor Cost 6.1 6.7 5.3
- Agriculture 3.1 4.7 2.1
- Industry 6.3 7.6 4.5
- Services, 
excluding Govt
7.9 8.1 7.5
- Govt 6.7 3.9 9.5
GDP at Factor 
Cost, excluding 
Govt
6.0 6.8 5.1
GDP at Market 
Prices
6.0 6.5 5.4
- Private 
Consumption
5.1 6.0 3.9
- Public 
Consumption
7.2 4.6 10.6
- Private 
Investment
10.3 13.4 6.6
Of Which: Fixed 
Investment
10.0 15.3 3.7
- Public Investment 3.7 1.7 6.2
Source: (IMF 2002:10).
4.4. Optimal Growth or Dynamic Growth?
Trade liberalisation and increased market competition could lead to two very different 
outcomes, both would be judged ‘efficient’ according to the three neo-classical 
requirements but have very different implications for long-run development. These two 
are the low and high-roads of economic development.
Firstly, India could react to intensified competition by trying to enhance it price
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competitiveness within its existing labour-intensive niche by extending hours, reducing 
overheads (subcontracting) and intensifying work conditions (a low-road of competition). 
Secondly, India could remain in an existing labour-intensive production niche and raising 
the productivity of labour (learning), or upgrading to a less (price) competitive market 
niche to capture rents (a high road of competition).
Sustainability is defined here as dynamic efficiency, and examined in the context of 
comparative advantage. Some scholars have argued an evolving structure of trade and 
production based on India’s existing comparative advantage is a viable strategy for 
sustainable economic growth. “For the next two or three decades at least, our analysis 
suggests that such an expansion of exports would and should be concentrated on labour- 
intensive manufactures.” (Mayer and Wood 2000:34).
There is good evidence that the predictions of comparative advantage have, with a couple 
of empirical oddities borne true. There is however little sign of export dynamism, while 
many allocations may be (neo-classically) efficient some are more (dynamically) efficient 
than others. India is not emulating the boom in labour-intensive exports that China 
enjoyed after 1978. Nor does the Indian export basket offer much scope for future 
growth. Between 1990 and 1995 exports (in dollar terms) grew by 12.8% p.a.88. While 
creditable and above India’s long-term average and growth of world trade, in the same 
period exports grew by 20.5% p.a. in Pakistan, 28.3% in China, 34.3% in Malaysia, and 
25.4% in Indonesia (Lall (1999:1771). Lall (1999) classifies products into resource- 
based, low, medium and high technology categories (table 8.20). He demonstrates the 
shift in the structure of world trade from simple to complex technologies. The rate of 
growth of world trade rises progressively as technologies become more complex89.
88 Slower than the rapid growth of 18.2% in the five years before reform, in 1995/86 the growth rate 
slumped to only 2.6%.
89 There are of course exceptions to these neat categories, some low-technology products have skill or 
technology intensive segments, some high-technology have simple segments. Mature industrial countries 
can retain a competitive edge in low-tech products by specialising in quality and design intensive.
285
Table 8.20: The Evolution of World Manufactured Exports by Technological 
Categories _______________________________________________________
Shares (%)
1980 1985 1990 1995 1996
Resource-
Based
19.5 19.3 15.5 14 13.7
Low-Tech 25.3 23.4 23.7 22 21.3
Medium-
Tech
38.6 37.3 38.5 36.9 37.2
High-Tech 16.5 20.1 22.2 27.1 27.7
Rate of Growth (% p.a.)
1980-5 1985-90 1990-95 1995/96 1980-96
Resource
Based
2 10.1 6.4 -0.2 5.7
Low-Tech 0.7 15.3 6.9 -0.9 6.9
Medium-
Tech
1.6 15.7 7.7 3 7.8
High-Tech 6.3 17.4 13 4.5 11.6
Total 2.3 15 18.6 2.1 8.1
Source: (Lall 1999:1775).
Resource-based and low-technology products dominate India’s export structure, 
accounting for 86% of total manufactured exports in 1985 and 83% in 1996 (world 
averages 43 and 35% respectively). Between 1985 and 1996 India’s export structure the 
structure has remained static. Lall (1999) labels ‘Rising Stars’ those products in which 
India is increasing its world market share and where world trade is growing faster than 
the average for all exports. With the exception of Pakistan India does the worst in Lall’s 
reference group. Rising stars comprise 20% of Indian manufactured exports, falling stars 
nearly 2/3rds. Malaysia and Singapore have around 70% of rising stars. India’s structure 
of production and exports has evolved in a manner in accordance with its comparative 
advantage. There are no signs of the development of an indigenous technological and 
learning effort necessary to attain a dynamic export trajectory. More widely risks of 
relying on labour-intensive exports include declining terms of trade for labour-intensive 
manufactures (Mayer 2002; Athukorala 2000), a race to the bottom (Kaplinsky 1999) and 
the risk of protective measures in developed countries preventing developing countries 
collectively expanding labour-intensive exports (Cline 1982).
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The perception that India’s economy showed little sign of dynamism during the 1990s is 
borne out by studies of productivity. Save for one influential though methodologically 
mistaken study there is a broad agreement that TFP growth declined during the 1990s 
relative to the 1980s.
Unel (2003) found TFP growth accelerated between 1991 and 1997 relative to 1979 to 
1990. Unel uses two methods of estimating TFP; both show acceleration over the reform 
period, 1.8% to 2.5% and from 3.2% to 4.7%. Unel also argues that labour productivity 
and capital intensity increased after 1991, while the capital-output ratio declined. By 
sub-sectors, Unel shows that labour productivity is higher in newer industries such as 
paper, machinery and transport. Factor productivity in more traditional industries such as 
paper, wood, leather and to a lesser extent, textiles he argued declined. There are good 
reasons to doubt these findings. Unel underestimated the size of the capital stock in 
1979/80 by starting his series for fixed investment in 1970/71, so artificially inflates 
measures of capital productivity. Using a more realistic base of 1959/60 (together with 
an assumption of 5% depreciation) gives a measure of the size of the capital stock in 
accordance with other evidence90. Goldar (2004) corrects for these errors and finds that 
TFP growth was lower than Unels estimates in between 1979/80 and 1990/91 and for the 
periods 1991/92 to 1997/98, and 1991/92 to 1999/00 (table 8.21).
Table 8.21: Estimates of Total Factor Productivity Growth91
Average Annual Growth Average Annual Growth
Rate (This Study) Rate (Unel 2003)
1979/80 to 1990/91 2.14 (2.14) 2.8
1991/92 to 1997/98 1.00 (0.91) 2.5
1991/92 to 1999/00 1.57 (1.32) Not covered
Source: (Goldar 2004:5036).
90 In particular the estimate of the size of the capital stock given by the NAS.
91 Figures in parentheses based on net value added.
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The broad pattern of these findings -  a slowdown of productivity growth in the reform 
era is confirmed by other studies. Balakrishnan et al (2000) use a time dummy variable 
and find a statistically significant decline in TFP after 1991/92. Das (2003a) looks at 
TFP in 75 three-digit manufacturing industries between 1980/81 and 1999/00 (accounting 
for over 65% of total manufacturing value added). He finds that the contribution of TFP 
growth declined in the 1990s relative to the 1980s. Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) 
make two estimates of TFP with differing assumptions about the size/ composition of the 
labour force. In the first (between 1980 and 1990 and 1990 to 1999) TFP growth fell 
from 2.89% to 2.44%, and in the second from 1.28% to 0.94%. Goldar and Kumari 
(2003) find industrial TFP growth dropped from 1.89% p.a. between 1981/82 to 1990/91 
to 0.69% between 1990/91 and 1997/98. There was also a sharp fall in the rate of general 
TFP growth from 3.1% p.a. between 1992/93 to 1996/97 and 1.9% between 1997/98 and 
2001/02 (IMF 2002:22).
There is a serious lacunae in the literature. There are few studies analysing the link 
between trade liberalisation and TFP growth at firm level. Balakrishnan et al (2000) 
proclaim they are doing just that but only use a dummy variable for the period after 
1991/92 to measure the ‘impact of reforms’. Pandey (2004) comes close, he constructs 
various measures of trade orientation based on both non-tariff and tariff barriers. He does 
not relate these to specific firm-level TFP growth and only constructs correlation 
coefficients for trade orientation and growth of gross value added and price-cost-margins. 
The correlation coefficients are negligible in both cases. Goldar and Kumari (2004) is 
perhaps the only example they find that the coefficient of the NTB variable is positively 
related to TFP growth, though not significant.
Studies of FDI in India have revealed few signs that it is contributing to learning or 
diversification. Aggarwal (2002) finds no relation between foreign equity stake and 
export performance of firms in Indian manufacturing. Pantibala (2002) finds at best only 
ambiguous evidence. Both of these studies find foreign firms are conducting minimal 
R+D in India. Mani (1998) argues that spending on R+D has shown a declining trend 
since 1991, enterprise financed R+D fell to only 0.14% of GDP in 1995 (Lall
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(1999:1782). A basic problem is the nature of FDI in India. FDI in Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M and A) are poorer than Greenfield investment in terms of spill-over 
benefits, competition and efficiency and may not lead to an increase in the capital stock. 
Greenfield FDI brings with it new production, organisation and management know-how. 
MNC’s have not been using India as an export platform. Increased export intensity of 
Indian manufacturing has largely been driven by pre-existing firms becoming more 
export-intensive (Nagaraj 2003a; Poddar 2004). FDI has aimed at exploiting the 
domestic market. Between 1997-9 nearly 40% of FDI inflows into India have taken the 
form of M and A of existing Indian enterprises. Liberalisation of FDI policy and gradual 
liberalisation of the overall policy framework in the 1990s has facilitated the adoption of 
M and A. MNC related M and A are highly concentrated in consumer goods such as 
food and beverages, household appliances, and pharmaceuticals. MNC’s are using 
established marketing, distribution networks and sometimes brand loyalty. Coca-Cola re­
entered India and acquired Parle the largest domestic soft-drink firm with several 
established brands, nation-wide bottling and distribution. Pepsi acquired Duke a smaller 
soft drink manufacturer. Hindustan Lever (Indian subsidiary of Unilever) acquired 
Kwality and Milkfood to enter the ice-cream market. A large number of acquisitions 
have been made by Indian affiliates of MNC’s often using internal funds and domestic 
borrowings. Examples include the acquisition of TOMCO, Lakme, Kissan Products, and 
Kothari General Foods by Hindustan Lever. Lafarge funded its Rs 5,000m acquisition of 
TISCO Steel in Nov 1999 with Rs 2,150m borrowing from a consortium of domestic 
financial institutions. Such take-overs would have been harder in the 1980s due to the 
provisions of the MRTP Act. Following on from liberalisation of the automobile industry 
in the 1980s most leading foreign manufacturers entered the country mostly through joint 
ventures. After getting acquainted with the local market MNC’s have typically bought 
out their local partner. In the automobile sector, Daewoo has bought out (local firm) 
DCM Group from their joint venture, the same has happened between Ford and 
Mahindra, FIAT and Premier Automobiles, GM and Hindustan Motors, Mercedes Benz 
and Telco.
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Further whatever positive contribution FDI could make is limited by the very small size 
of capital inflows. Market penetration by FDI remains low. Against a government target 
of $10bn p.a. actual inflows have increased, from $127m in 1992/93 to $3.2bn in 1996/7 
and stagnated at this level thereafter. In 1991 FDI accounted for only 0.3% of gross 
private fixed capital formation rising to 1.1% by 1993. In 1996 China received FDI 
totalling $42.3bn. As a share of gross domestic investment in 1995 inward FDI totalled 
24.6% in Singapore, 6.7% in Pakistan, 8.4% in China, 6.5% in Indonesia and only 3.6% 
in India.
4.5. Case Studies
The software and textiles sectors illustrate more specifically the general point discussed 
in the empirical critique of comparative advantage. Production and exports have 
expanded rapidly in both over the reform era. Both remain stuck at the low end of the 
market.
4.5.1. Software
The software sector illustrates specifically all of the general points made in the critique of 
comparative advantage. Liberalisation has lead to rapid expansion of the industry but 
there are problems hindering efforts to raise value-added.
In 1990 India’s software exports were estimated at $13 lm, by 2001/02 they had risen to 
$7.8bn, growth exceeding 30% in most years. Currently such exports comprise 16.3% of 
total exports, 65% of total IT exports are software related. The IT industry as a whole 
represents 2.87% of GDP. Employment estimates for the IT sector vary widely, 200,000 
in 1999 (Saxenian 2001), 410,000 in 2000 (Arora and Athreye 2000), and 650,000 in 
2002/03 (Basant and Rani 2004)
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There is a debate about whether the software sector in India is acquiring ‘technological 
capability’. The fact of this debates existence takes us beyond the narrow confines of 
neo-classical economics. Neo-classical economics assumes there is no problem or cost in 
assimilating transferred technology in developed countries. All firms remain equally 
efficient and firm specific learning is unnecessary. In reality to utilise technology and 
innovations produced elsewhere firms must acquire ‘technological capabilities’ (Lall 
1992). These include; ‘Investment capabilities’, the skills needed to identify, prepare, 
obtain technology, design, train staff and commission a new facility; ‘Production 
capabilities’, ranging from basic skills such as quality control, operation, maintenance to 
more advanced such as adaptation, improvement or equipment stretching; and ‘Linkage 
capabilities’, the skills needed to transmit information, skills and technology (Lall 1992).
There is mixed evidence of the technological capability of the software sector. Some 
have argued that India’s specialisation in low-end services would limit learning (D’Costa 
2003). India provides a range of services, including programming, conversions, testing, 
debugging, installing, and maintaining while specialists in industrialised countries 
continue to write core software. This has led to concerns that the Indian software 
industry despite its apparent successes has returned to the production pattern of the 1960s 
(Heeks 1995). Foreign tie-ups, foreign brand names and access to the latest imported 
technology were again the most important considerations. Most so-called Indian 
computer companies actually just produce software for integration with imported 
hardware. This argued Evans (1995) even more pessimistically, is a reversion to an 
earlier colonial trading pattern. India is exporting inexpensive lines of code and 
importing expensive foreign software whilst being trapped at low return end of division 
of labour. The effects of heavy import dependence are striking. While the textiles sector 
was 98.5% self-sufficient on local inputs (Verma 2002) average net export earnings of 
the software sector were -$lbn on average between 1998/99 and 2002/03.
This view is too pessimistic; there is some evidence of learning having occurred in the 
software sector. A growing number of MNC’s followed the pioneers (Texas
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Instruments and Hewlett-Packard) in setting up offshore development centres in India in 
the 1990s. These now include Motorola, IBM, Microsoft, Philips and BT. Hewlett 
Packard has developed a strong linkage with the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore 
for its R+D activities. Oracle expanded its local R+D personnel to several thousand in 
the early 1990s. Motorola in the early 2000s had 1,300, three quarters of them working 
in software development and chip designing, mostly in the telecom sector. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests they have begun to take on more sophisticated design and 
programming projects jointly or independently and often as equal to their parent 
organisations (Saxenian 2001:11). In 1990 onsite sourcing (sending teams of labour 
overseas to service clients software needs and known as body-shopping) constituted 90% 
of revenue in the software sector. This figure had fallen to 38.9% in 2002/03. In contrast 
offshore (contracting of work from MNCs to specialised Indian firms) increased from 5% 
in 1990/91 to 57.9% 2002/03. Tata Consultancy Services was formed at the end of the 
1980s when 75% of its work was customising software abroad for foreign clients.
Within twenty years the firm was project managing for overseas clients. By 2005 
companies such as Wipro and Infosys have a track record that enables them to win 
consulting contracts often on a turnkey basis. More direct evidence of learning is 
demonstrated by the fact that 32 Indian firms received the prestigious SEI-CMM 
certification by the late 1990s. The certification is based on an assessment (by the 
Engineering Institute at the Carnegie Mellon University) of controlling, managing and 
improving software development projects. The sector, particularly in Bangalore is taking 
on many of the features of an industrial cluster such as technical expertise, diverse 
capabilities, and high interaction among firms. Elsewhere industrial clusters have 
assisted firms in responding collectively to external shocks (Nadvi 1999), upgrading 
production (Kennedy 1999), and diffusing learning (Morosini 2004). Growth in the 
domestic sector is increasingly based on the emergence of domestic firms and 
entrepreneurs (Parthasarthy and Aoyama 2005).
Even as the industry has expanded in terms of employment revenue per employer (a 
proxy for labour productivity) has been increasing, from $6198.5 in 1993/94 to $15,600 
in 1998/99 (Table 8.22). This may reflect the assimilation of more advanced and
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productive technology or ongoing learning, but it certainly illustrates that growth is more 
than simply extensive in nature.
Table 8.22: Employment and Revenue per Employee in the Software Sector.
Year Employment Revenue Per Employee ($)
1993/94 90,000 6198.5
1994/95 118,000 6998
1995/96 140,000 8924.5
1996/97 160,000 11,036
1997/98 180,000 15,000
1998/99 250,000 15,600
Source: (Arora and Athreye 2000:262).
Despite these positive signs there is good evidence of learning problems in the software 
sector. Despite signs of learning and productivity growth India remains producing at the 
very low-end of the market where competitive strength is based on low wages rather than 
productive dynamism. Productivity remains very low by world comparisons (Table 
8.23). India does have something of a comparative advantage in software production. 
This could though be considered as much to do with continued disappointing 
performance in the industrial sector as a service sector miracle. In the 1990s service 
sector growth was actually higher in China (9.1%) than in India (7.5%). What made the 
difference were the very rapid rates of industrial growth in China (13.6%) relative to the 
very disappointing rates in India (5.8%).
Table 8.23; Comparisons of Productivity in manufacturing and software (1995)
Country Value Added Per 
Employee in 
Manufacturing 
($’000)
Software Revenue 
Per Employee 
($’000)
Comparative 
Advantage (3)/(2)
Israel 38.30 100.00 2.61
Ireland 117.10 142.24 1.22
India 4.10 8.93 2.18
France 77.43 161.32 2.09
Finland 76.16 83.46 1.10
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USA 98.20 126.02 1.28
Source: (Arora and Athreye 2000:260)
Studies of FDI in other contexts have argued MNCs may provide spillovers to the 
domestic economy via demonstration effects to local firms (Grossman and Helpman 
1991a; Kokko 1994; Aitken and Harrison 1999). Those optimistic about the software 
sector in India include who argues that MNC entry will do just this, providing 
demonstration effects to local firms and technological and informational externalities 
(Pantibandla 2002). This optimistic case is unlikely in the Indian software sector. The 
key characteristic of the Indian software industry is the segmentation of domestic and 
export markets. Between eighty and ninety percent of domestic output is exported.
There are clear differences in the types/ levels of user need in US/ domestic markets.
This has the implication that technological learning from exports is not of immediate use 
in domestic market. Firms need to build up tacit knowledge but such knowledge is 
experience based on and heavily influenced by user needs. Off-shore production does not 
provide the proximity to users that short development cycles, and high responsiveness to 
user needs requires so perpetuates passive dependence on outside technology.
The software sector is still driven by external factors, so is still a dependent sector that 
lacks a real internal dynamism. Firms in the sector are still tiny by world standards; the 
largest Tata Consultancy Services in the early 2000s had annual sales of $352m,
Microsoft of $23bn. FDI has been driven by pull factors such as the US Internet boom 
and Y2K problem. India continues to host software FDI as service dominated developed 
economies seek to cut costs by re-locating labour-intensive aspects of IT. These now 
include call centres, debt collection, equity and bond analysis, accounting, filing income 
taxes, and clinical drug research. Such growth is determined by low wage costs 
(Chithelen 2004). Wages in the software sector have been rising by 30% p.a. from the 
late-90s eroding this competitive advantage (Athreye 2004). The history of call centres 
bears this out this concern. They moved first within the US from urban to rural areas and 
to low rent cities in the mid-west and south, then to Canada, to Ireland and now India. 
Rising wage costs could easily begin a movement elsewhere. Despite rising productivity
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India is near wholly dependent on low wages for its competitive strength, factors such as 
infrastructure are strikingly bad in India. In 1996 for example India had 15 main 
telephone lines per 1000 people compared to 395 in Ireland and 446 Israel. In the same 
year India had 1.5 computers per 1000 people, compared to 145 Ireland and 117.6 Israel.
One of the most dramatic successes has been in software-hardware embedded solutions. 
This incorporates some kind of embedded systems design and development in a 
combination of hardware and software dedicated to perform a specific task without 
human intervention. Such mechanisms are part of many consumer goods such as cell 
phones and. By 2003 there were 100 such dedicated firms. There is limited scope for 
such growth; in 2003 the entire world market in this area was worth only $21 bn. A very 
small share of the global IT industry, estimated to be worth in 1999/00 $3-500bn 
(D’Costa 2003:211). The sector also crucially depends on synergies with a hardware 
sector. Hardware revenues have been generally stagnant in India over the 1990s (Heeks 
1995, Pingle 1999).
The movement of skilled labour is an important mechanism by which skills and learning 
are diffused. There has been some reverse immigration into India, especially since the 
end of the US Internet boom. 71 of 75 MNCs in Bangalore’s software technology parks 
are headed by Indians who had lived and worked overseas. The dominant flow has 
though remains outward migration. There are about 250,000 Indian software developers 
in the US, 40-50,000 are travelling to Europe/ US every year. In 1999 55,000 Indians 
applied to work in the US on the highly skilled foreign person’s visa initiative. Far from 
disseminating skills to the rest of the economy the Indian software sector has facilitated 
skilled migration from an economy where 70% of the population are still engaged in 
agriculture. The inability to retain labour has had a severe impact on successful project 
management in the IT sector (Tschang 2001).
Despite such concerns about learning there is enormous scope for extensive growth 
within the software sector in services such as remote processing, medical transcription, 
insurance processing, payroll and human resource services, call centres, and customer
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interaction services. Even with productivity well below foreign competitors (table 8.23) 
such extensive labour-intensive growth would continue to raise average productivity 
within India. The IT sector is likely to increase its share of GDP from 3% currently to 6- 
8% within ten years (Kapur 2002).
4.5.2. The Garment Industry
By 2000 the textile and apparel industries constituted 4% of GDP, 14% of industrial 
output, and were the second largest employer (35m) after agriculture (Verma 2002). 
Despite India’s historically large and diversified production base exports were negligible 
until the 1980s. A leading tier of competitive domestic firms were able to restructure 
themselves in the mid-1980s and early-1990s build links with buyers and suppliers at 
home and abroad and increase exports rapidly. The Ludhiana kintwear cluster for 
example suffered a 21% fall in knitwear exports in 1991/92 due to the collapse of the 
USSR, its erstwhile largest market. Exports then revived very quickly and expanded by 
an average of 70% p.a. for the rest of the 1990s (Tewari 1999). By 2003 India exported 
$13.5bn in textiles and apparel, up from under $6bn ten years earlier. With an import 
intensity of only 1.5% this made the sector the largest net foreign exchange earner in 
India (Verma 2002).
Growth of exports increased rapidly after reforms to domestic textile policy in 1985. This 
was a pattern of extensive growth based on gaining greater market share in simple low- 
cost cotton based products rather than exporting higher value added products. By 2000 
India had large shares of the market in the EU and EC in a few simple products. For 
woven shirts for example the size of India’s MFA quota was already close to the size of 
the entire US market. Consequently such extensive growth began to reach limitations. 
Export growth showing a secular decline over the twenty-year period. Apparel exports 
grew by 19.3% between 1985 and 1990, 7.8% 1991 to 1995, 5.9% 1996 to 2000 and 
5.2% 2001 to 2003 (Tewari 2005a: 17). The abolition of the MFA at the beginning of 
2005 is likely to lead to opportunities for renewed extensive growth. For example in 
cotton shirts about 43% of the US market was opened to foreign competition on January
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1st 2005. It has been predicted than India will rise from a 4 to 15% share of the US 
apparel market, a rapid increase but someway behind China’s 50% share (Tewari 
2005a:2). Such renewed extensive growth was evident in 2005. Between January and 
August 2005 the growth of apparel exports to the US increased by 61% from China and 
33% from India. Low cost exports from these countries was largely displacing exports 
from higher-cost more developed countries Korea (-65.5%), Malaysia (-2.5%) and 
Taiwan (-27%) and smaller developing countries Lesotho (-7%) and Costa Rica (-7.4%).
To sustain export growth over the longer-term a shift to a more intensive growth path will 
be necessary. In East Asia the key to success in buyer driven chains was the move from 
the assembly of imported inputs to a more domestically integrated and higher value 
added form of exporting such as full-package supply or original equipment 
manufacturing (Gereffi 1999). This requires industrial upgrading to a higher road of 
competition, emphasising quality, productivity, variety, and timely delivery rather than 
just the low prices consistent with a low road of competition. There are key advantages 
to moving into higher value added stages of production, such as the easier availability 
and protection of rents and less vulnerability to declining terms of trade (Kaplinsky 
1999). For India 57% of the value added in man’s cotton shirts and 61% in man’s khaki 
trousers is added at the global retail stage (Tewari 2005b).
There has been significant forward integration by yam-makers and spinning mills into 
garments. Arvind Mills is the largest producer of blends and denim in India and has long 
been a large supplier of denim to major producers such as Gap and Levis. In early 2000 
the firm invested $3 5m to integrate into j eans and T-shirts and set up a number of joint 
ventures to produce branded labels for the domestic market. Though in the main exports 
from India remain at the low-end niche of the international market and remain dominated 
by simple cotton products. By the late-1990s 44.3% of total textile exports were 
accounted for by cotton fabrics and 26.9% by cotton yam, within garments 69.7% of 
exports were accounted for by cotton fabric. Between 1995 and 2003 there was no 
sustained increase in the average value realised on units exported. In T-shirts (in constant 
dollars per unit) this declined from 3.1 to 2.9, in women’s cotton woven blouses and
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shirts from 4.2 to 3.5, in women’s knitted cotton blouses and shirts from 3.1 to 2.5.
Men’s knitted cotton shirts rose slightly from 3.3 to 3.4, men’s woven cotton shirts 
increased sharply from 3 to 4.5. Women’s knitted nightdresses remained at 2.5, women’s 
woven trousers increased from 3.2 to 4.1. Between them these products accounted for 
around 60% of India’s total apparel exports (Tewari 2005a:31). Overall the average 
value of units sold increased from $3.61 in 1987 to $3.74 in 1997.
Upgrading remains limited in the textile/ garment sector. The level of technology in the 
Indian weaving sector is particularly low. Of the 1.6 million powerlooms installed less 
than 1% are shuttleless looms. Even in the organised mills sector only 5.8% of the total 
are shuttleless looms compared to 80% in the US, Taiwan and Korea. New shuttle and 
shuttleless looms installed in India between 1989-98 accounted for only 1.6% of installed 
capacity in 1997 compared to 41% in Mexico. Chinese firms have invested $lbn 
annually in the import of new cotton and silk processing equipment since 1985. Between 
1987 and 1996 China invested in 68,000 shuttleless looms India in only 8,000. In India 
most investments are in sewing machines. Special and processing machines that can add 
significant value account for a very small part of the total number of machines unlike 
other Asian countries such as Hong Kong and China. The textile and apparel sector 
received only $35 lm in cumulative FDI between 1991 and 2004 (Tewari 2005a). A 
proxy measure of the efficiency and reliability of the domestic supply chain are the defect 
rates on final products, in India these run somewhere between double and five times 
higher than those in China (Tewari 2005b:48). In a world where delivery times, cost and 
quality are critical in the garment sector the proximity of good quality textile production 
can be an important benefit. Further India like a very few other developing countries 
(Egypt and Pakistan) is nearly self-sufficient across the whole value chain. This 
advantage in terms of resource endowments has not been translated into a competitive 
strength. The performance of cotton yam, man-made textiles and garments in terms of 
unit cost growth has been poor. The unit cost of cotton grew by 13% p.a. and garments 
10.6% p.a. between 1989 and 1997. The price of polyester yam in India (1998/99) was 
Rs 70 per kg compared to Rs 43 per kg on the international market (Hashim 2004). Most 
damning of all is the abysmal productivity performance of the industry. Between 1989
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and 1997 average annual growth of TFP was -1.92% in cotton yam, 0.56% in man-made 
fabrics and 1.45% in garments (Hashim 2004:29). With rising unit costs and falling 
productivity the only means to sustain a competitive edge was through a low road of 
competition. India’s primary competitive strength lay in low(er) wages, one eighth of 
those in Hong Kong and South Korea. Tirrupur has been one of India’s most successful 
clusters seeing dramatic increase in indicators of turnover, sales, and employment since 
the 1970s. There has been substantial development of backward and forward linkages 
within the textile sector. This growth though has been based on an intensification of 
work through long hours, piece rates and child labour. A low road of competition is 
compensating for the need to improve productivity (Cawthome 1995). There is evidence 
this path is generally being pursued in the Indian textile industry. The fragmentation, 
ruralisation and casualisation consistent with a low road of competition has already had a 
profound impact in India. As early as the 1960s textile mills in Ahmedabad and Bombay 
began putting-out weaving work to decentralised power-loom units. Large urban cotton 
mills have declined and the industry has become mralised in smaller industrial units. 
Firms tend to be much smaller in India, an average of 119 machines compared to 698 in 
Hong Kong and 605 in China. Investment per machine in exporting firms averages $250 
in India, $3510 in Hong Kong and $1500 in China. Between 1990/91 and 2000/01 the 
share of mill production in total output of cloth actually declined, from 11 to only 4%, the 
powerloom sector (mainly using old discarded textile looms) increased its share from 57 
to 59% and the handloom sector remained at 18% (D’Souza 2004:15).
5. The Political Role of the State: Institutions
5.1. The Problem in the 1980s
Despite big election victories in 1980 and 1984 there was no restoration of the old 
Congress system. The party organisation had decayed and the authority and ability of 
Congress to mediate in local affairs had declined sharply, an institutional vacuum
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emerged in the periphery. Intense and undisciplined factionalism led to a difficulty in 
retaining power, the resort to populism and conflict shifting to street violence. Congress 
was unable to diffuse political tensions by negotiation and incorporation of the local level 
leadership. Between 1979/80 and 1989/90 higher public investment was associated with 
a massive increase in the government fiscal deficit and a sharp decline in public sector 
savings. The state in the 1980s did not have a conflict managing institution necessary to 
allocate the resulting burden of financing public investment. This occurred in 
conjunction with a continued growth in rent-seeking and unproductive rents that had 
begun after the mid-1960s. The state possessed no institution for identifying those 
requiring compensation, minimising the transaction costs associated with such transfers, 
and minimising rent-seeking by other entities. Political mobilisation in agriculture 
generated a massive growth in subsidies (rents). Subsidies increased across the board in 
numerous economic sectors, reaching 15% of GDP in 1987/88. Strike activity reached 
new peaks in the 1980s and was quickly followed by rising wages. The pattern of growth 
in the 1980s was unsustainable due to the build up of domestic and foreign debt.
5.2. Puzzles Surrounding Reform in the 1990s
There are two puzzles surrounding reforms in the 1990s. The first puzzle being how the 
government was able to push through neo-liberal reforms in the face of what 
contemporary commentators argued was a hostile majority. The second, being to explain 
the signs that the explosive growth of rents dating from the mid-1960s and accelerating 
into the 1980s was at least slowed during the 1990s. The combined indication being that 
the state was able to push through the neo-liberal agenda with less rent-seeking than had 
been expected.
5.2.1. Neo-Liberal Reforms
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There is a general consensus that 1991 marked the beginning of a fundamental shift in 
economic policymaking. State sector reservation was reduced from 18 industries to only 
three (defence related aircraft and warships, atomic energy generation and railway 
transport). Industrial licensing was abolished except for a few hazardous and 
environmentally sensitive industries. The Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practises Act 
1969 (MRTP) was abolished. Reservation for production by the small-scale sector 
covered some 800 items by the late-1970s, 14 items were removed from the list in 1991, 
and another 50 in 2002. The investment ceiling for producers to be defined as small- 
scale was raised for certain items. There was progress in trade policy liberalisation 
though at a slower rate than industrial liberalisation. Capital goods and intermediaries 
became freely importable in 1993 (subject to tariffs). This was made simultaneously with 
the switch to a flexible exchange rate regime. Progress with import protection of 
consumer goods was slower. In April 2001 QR’s were removed for agricultural and 
consumer goods. The weighted average of import tariffs declined from 72.5% in 1991/2 
to 24.6% in 1996/7 and after some increases a renewed fall to 29% in 2002/03.
These reforms generated a burst of euphoria. Reforms were clear, “the reforms are
forceful and explicit [there is] no ambiguity of intention.” (Bhagwati 1993:84).
Few people had imagined that the economy, “would be transformed in its basic 
orientation in a matter of a few years.” (Sachs et al 1999:13). It marked, “a fundamental 
transformation of India’s economic strategy.” (Varshney 1999:230). This is contrasted 
with the general consensus that reform efforts had failed under Rajiv, that there was a 
short-lived effort to liberalise the economy then a return to intervention as usual “the 
illusion of autonomy and the euphoria of a new beginning lasted about six months.”
(Kohli 1990:318).
The experience of failed reform and dramatic electoral repudiation of Rajiv by 1989 
provided a salient lesson that popular opinion was against liberalisation, “The country 
seems agreed ideologically on secularism, socialism and democracy, on the merits of a 
mixed economy” (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987:1). No democratic politician should have 
wished to be associated with a neo-liberal agenda for fear this, “might destroy the broad
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national consensus that characterised the evolution of India’s economic policy.” (Jalan 
1992:21). In summary there was a stable political economy of intervention with a,
“broad, heterogeneous and hugely formidable array of interests to oppose liberalisation” 
(Manor 1987:39).
Why did the leadership sustain liberalisation? The pattern of liberalisation/ structural 
adjustment without macroeconomic (fiscal) adjustment after 1991 was strikingly different 
from the response to previous crises. As Ghosh (1998) noted economic crises in 1965-7, 
1973-5 and 1979-81 were all headlined by the rise of the rate of inflation to over 10%. In 
all cases the government responded with short-term stabilisation (monetary and fiscal 
tightening) and not long-term structural adjustment92. A minority government sustained 
reform after 1991 while a government with a three-quarters parliamentary majority was 
unable to do so long after 1985. The 1991 crisis was after all short-lived, the Gulf War 
oil shock lasted only six months. There was a rapid recovery of investor confidence and 
subsequently a rapid rise in foreign exchange reserves. Changes of government to left in 
1996 and right in 1998 did not change the general direction of reform. Unlike previous 
crises that in 1991 wasn’t preceded by a real shock. The real economy was in a very 
healthy condition. Industrial production was growing at an annual rate of 8%, 
agricultural production was at a peak. The dollar value of exports had increased by 14% 
p.a. between 1985/6 and 1989/90. There had been slow economic growth after the mid- 
60s but no catastrophic excesses like the Chinese Great Leap Forward93 or Latin 
American lost decade. There was no discredited authoritarian regime failure to place 
blame upon, the same party (Congress) was in power in 1991 as for most of the 
Independence period. There was no attempt to galvanise the nation in support of reforms, 
to project a vision in order to change the structure of interest groups. The government 
was, “unable, or unwilling, to make a clear ideological statement in favour of market 
orientated reforms in electoral or mass politics.” (Sachs et al 1999:14). Why do we see 
the neo-liberal agenda being pursued in India long after the need for stabilisation had
92 1985 was distinct in being an episode of liberalisation/ structural adjustment not related to any short-term 
economic crisis.
93 Yang (1993) argues the catastrophe of the Great Leap created an important legacy for the psychological 
mindset of the Chinese leadership that had a profound effect on post-Mao economic reforms.
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subsided?
5.2.2. Better Control o f  Rent-seeking
The volume of politically motivated rents expanded rapidly in the 1980s. Subsidies for 
agriculture exploded in the 1980s, often in direct response to agitations. Mundle and 
Govinda Rao (1991) found subsidies accounted for 15% of GDP by 1987/88. Strikes 
reached new post-independence peaks in the early-1980s. Real wages in organised 
manufacturing and in the public sector increased by about 30% from the late-1970s to the 
early-1980s (Joshi and Little 1994:155).
There are clear signs that the growth of rents have continued at state level in India. 
Decentralisation has shifted responsibility to state governments. Various groups in 
particular caste organisations and farmers groups tend to be better organised at the state 
level. State governments have higher deficits, less efficient administration, are more 
corrupt and less stable (Weiner 1999). Few state governments have begun to reform 
State Electricity Boards (SEBs) for example, they still suffer major transmission and 
distribution losses, tarrifs do not cover costs, and farmers receive subsidised electricity 
and near free water for irrigation. Losses from SEBs increased six fold between 1985/86 
and 1994/95 (Bardhan 1984/1998). State tax revenue has not improved significantly over 
the 1990s. There remains significant evasion of excise duties on alcohol, sales taxes in 
general and urban land taxes. State level employment has continued to increase, from 6.1 
to 7.3m between 1984 and 1994 while central employment has remained unchanged 
(Weiner 1999). Local state officialdom continues to reap rents from local regulations for 
planning, factory inspections, license renewal, water and electricity services (Weiner 
1999; Jenkins 1999). Political protection can be supplied at a price to criminals, liquor 
manufacturing for example is commonly allied to local politics (Jenkins 1999). Tax 
evasion and black investment have not declined, liberalisation has shifted the location of 
rent-seeking to the market (Harriss-White 1996).
303
Liberalisation has not just shifted corruption but actually created new avenues to derive 
corrupt income (Jenkins 1999). Central government disinvestment has generated scope 
to trade on insider information, manipulate prices on the secondary market, and place 
rights issues to family members. The opening up of previously reserved sectors to 
private sector investment without lack of established rules of procedure (e.g. stock market 
regulations) has generated ample scope for politicians to benefit themselves.
Infrastructure investment by MNCs has allowed politicians scope to derive illicit income 
in foreign currency bank accounts which is far more difficult to trace. According to 
careful estimates the black economy has grown in size from 20% in 1981, 35% in 
1990/91 to 40% in 1995/96 (Kumar 1999).
Despite these tendencies there are signs that overall rents were better controlled in the 
1990s. Total expenditure by state governments fell from 12.2% of GDP in 1994/95 to 
10.7% in 1999/00 (table 8.4). Total expenditure by the central government fell from 
19.66% of GDP in 1990/91 to 16.63% in 1997/98. Over the same period directly 
budgeted subsidies fell from 1.79 to 1.30% of GDP (table 8.5). Subsidies on fertilisers 
fell from 1,11% of GDP in 1989/90 to a low of 0.56% in 1993/94. Cost recovery of 
power supply in agriculture increased, from 74.5% in 1989/90 to 82.2% in 1992/93.
Total subsidies to the agricultural sector dropped from 2.46% of GDP in 1990/91 to 
2.02% in 1993/94.
This thesis has presented three complementary hypotheses to explain how the state is able 
to both initiate and sustain episodes of growth or be constrained to an episode of 
stagnation. A key problem is that growth in a developing country is an inherently 
conflictual process. Between 1951 and 1965 the state was able to absorb dissent into an 
inclusive institution (the Congress Party) so neutralise opposition and calm conflict at 
minimal cost and allow rapid investment-led growth. With the collapse of the Congress 
system after the mid-1960s unproductive rent-seeking exploded and saw large quantities 
of resources dissipated as rents to maintain political stability rather than promote 
economic growth. In the 1980s the state added rapid growth of public investment to this 
heady brew. The economy grew rapidly as higher public investment mitigated some of
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the key constraints on economic growth (notably a shortage of power and infrastructure). 
The state was unable to impose the costs of this investment on any particular group, and 
rent-seeking more generally continued to increase. The result was that the episode of 
growth was unsustainable due to the build up of domestic and foreign debt. For the 
1990s we have three complementary hypotheses, an inclusive state, a repressive state and 
an ideological state. These are the (complementary) explanations that can explain firstly, 
how the state was able to push through a neo-liberal reform agenda and secondly, how 
this was done whilst for a time at least controlling the growth of unproductive rents.
5.3. Inclusive Institutions
After the defeat in 1977 Congress came back to power in 1980 winning 351 
parliamentary seats with 43%, and in 1984 415 seats with 49.6% of the vote (chapter 
VII). Congress attracted a broad base of support, the rich and poor, Muslims and 
Christians, scheduled castes and tribals. This was not though a restoration of the old 
Congress system. The features of the dominant party outlined by Kothari (1964) were 
conspicuous by their absence in the 1980s. The party organisation was moribund at local 
level. The authority and ability of Congress to mediate in local affairs had declined 
sharply. No longer was there a Congress system able to incorporate groups and subject 
them to party institutions of hierarchy, conflict management procedures and transactional 
negotiations. Congress had ceased to be an institution of integration and groups 
mobilised outside its weakening formal political structures. As the Congress system 
disintegrated in the late-1960s and 1970s there emerged an institutional vacuum in the 
periphery. This argues Kohli (1990) helps to explain a number of political trends - 
coalitional instability, ineffective local government, and the emergence of personal rule. 
Intense and undisciplined factionalism led to a difficulty in retaining power, the resort to 
populism and conflict shifting to street violence. The party was conspicuously 
unsuccessful at diffusing regional tensions by negotiation and incorporation of the local 
level leadership as it had been in the 1950s. Problems in Punjab and Assam festered 
during the 1980s. Congress won the national and state elections in 1980 and 1984 but
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proved unable to retain power, it lacked the organisation and networks of patronage to 
retain support doing badly in state elections subsequent to both victories. Dissenters 
regularly left the party to join opposition groupings or Congress breakaway factions.
With only a shaky hold on power Congress did not monopolise the spoils of patronage, 
there was no particular rationale for groups and patrons to remain within the party if they 
were not gaining short-term benefits. The exit option was a viable means to bargain for 
rents and increase access to resources.
Indian politics became more inclusive in the 1990s, this allowed the government to push 
through liberalisation with less rent-seeking cost that could have been expected from the 
fragmented politics of the 1980s. There are three ways in which this happened over the 
1990s. Firstly, a revival of the national party system, instead of the Congress as a 
dominant party there emerged a relatively stable two party system, the Congress and BJP. 
Secondly, between 1991 and 1996 the fear of the BJP united numerous opposition 
movements behind the Congress, they voted for liberalisation in fear of the alternative. 
Thirdly, between 1998 and 2004 the structure and organisation of the BJP was conducive 
to maintaining a cohesive and united party whilst in government.
The first general argument in this section is that the process of the fragmentation of 
Indian politics beginning in the late-1960s was partially reversed. The 1990s saw the 
emergence of a relatively stable two-party (alliance) political system. The decline of 
Congress throughout the 1990s did not herald the decline of national politics but rather 
the emergence of a relatively stable two party system (table 8.24). The number of seats 
won by Congress plummeted from 232 in 1991 to 114 in 1999 (from 415 in 1984), the 
number of seats won by the BJP showed a near equivalent increase, rising from 120 in 
1991 to 182 in 1999. The combined share of votes won by the two main parties remained 
very stable over the 1990s, from a high of 56.6% in 1991 to a low of 49.1% in 1996.
As a point of comparison in 1962 during the height of the dominant party Congress 
system, Congress won 361 seats with 44.7% of the vote. The second placed party in 
1962 was the Communist Party of India (CPI) who won 29 seats with 9.9% of the vote.
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A very different election in 1967 saw the Congress win 283 seats with 40.8% of the vote. 
The second placed party was the Swatantra Party who won 44 seats with 8.7% of the 
vote. In 1962 the two main parties secured 54.6% of the national vote (about average for 
the 1990s) and won 79% of the seats (considerably above the average for the 1990s). In 
1967 the two main parties secured 49.6% of the national vote (again, about average for 
the 1990s) and won 62.9% of the seats (slightly above average for the 1990s). The 
decline of national level politics in the 1990s is much exaggerated.
Table 8.24: Seats won and Voting Share in Lok Sabha Elections, L991 to 1999
1991 1996 1998 1999
Seats Won by 
the Indian 
National 
Congress
232 140 141 114
Share of Vote 
to Congress
36.5% 28.8% 25.9% 28.3%
Seats Won by 
the BJP
120 161 179 182
Share of Vote 
to BJP
20.1% 20.3% 25.5% 23.8%
Share of Votes 
Won by 
Congress and 
BJP
56.6% 49.1% 51.4% 52.1%
Share of Seats 
Won by 
Congress and 
BJP
64.8% 55.4% 58.9% 54.5%
Source: (Sridharan 2002:478, Authors own calculations).
The second pair of argument related to inclusion is that because of party political factors 
specific to the 1990s political support for liberalisation was easier to come by.
The episode of growth between 1991 and 2004 can be divided into two main spells, the 
early stages of reform under the Congress 1991 to 1996 and the consolidation of reform 
under the BJP 1998 to 2004. There was an inclusionary bias in both 1991-96 and 1998-
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2004 that made support for liberalisation easier to come by and so reduced the cost of 
rent-seeking.
The inclusionary bias between 1991 and 1996 was based on a widespread political 
opposition to the BJP. This explains how a minority Congress government was able to 
push through liberalising economic reforms whereas Congress with a massive majority 
between 1984 and 1989 was unable to do so. Between 1990 and 1997 the Communists, 
the lower castes and Janata Dal formed alliances with the Congress against the BJP.
Hindu nationalism was perceived to be more of a threat than economic reform. This was 
especially true after the Babri Mosque demolition in December 1992, only the CPM 
consistently voted against reforms between 1991 and 1993.
The inclusionary bias between 1998 and 2004 was based on the mobilisation strategy 
adopted by the BJP. The BJP managed to incorporate and hold together large fractions of 
Indian society. The parent organisation of the BJP, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 
(RSS) reflects an upper-caste Brahmanical view of the ideal society based on the vama 
system. The RSS has traditionally managed to attract upper castes and those wishing to 
emulate them. Conversion of low castes to Hindutva during the 1990s relied on the same 
logic as the imitation of the Brahmins, ‘Sanskritisation’. The other principle mechanism 
to broaden its support base was through social work. In January 1996 the RSS launched 
the Samarasya Sangama (Confluence for Harmony). This mandated that each RSS 
worker should adopt one village in order to contribute to its development and promote 
‘social harmony’ and ‘assimilation’. Other front organisations of the RSS such as the 
Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), and Biharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) have 
entered social work. The integrating myth that defines the nation and the ‘other’ was also 
being constructed through the education system during the period of BJP-Raj (Harriss- 
White 2003).
The BJP has certainly been widely characterised as an upper-caste urban-based party.
Such views were implicit in the critique of its 2004 ‘India Shining’ campaign for the 
general election. The victory of the Congress-led opposition alliance was likewise
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interpreted as a victory of poor, rural dwellers - those marginalised by the BJP. There is 
good reason to suppose the BJP gained the disproportionate support of certain of these 
groups. In the 1996 general election in which the BJP supplanted the Congress as the 
largest party in parliament the BJP won the bulk of forward caste votes, 50% of those in 
Maharashtra, 64% in Uttar Pradesh and 67% in Bihar. While 32% of urban India voted 
BJP only 19% of rural India did so. The BJP also won the support of 52% of graduates 
living in towns and cities. This however is too narrow a view, the BJP systematically 
expanded its support base beyond this narrow constituency. In the 1995 Gujarat state 
assembly elections for example the party won 43.3% of the vote and 122 of 182 seats, the 
Congress only 44 seats with 33.6% of the vote. The BJP won heavily among its 
traditional constituencies, 53.2% of the urban vote and 70% of upper and middle castes. 
The party also managed to spread its support, winning 41.4% of the rural vote, 39.1% of 
the tribal vote and large swathes of the OBCs -  such as the Kohlis who comprised nearly 
22% of the population. In Rajasthan history has provided scope for the Sangh Parivar to 
wed nationalism and regional identity to a broadly inclusive form of caste politics 
(Jenkins 1998). The vote share of the BJP rose from 41% in 1991 to 47% in 1996. In 
Rajasthan the BJP functions like a regional party, the emphasis is on exploiting a pre­
existing regional identity imbued with the Rajput ethic and reinventing it for its own 
purpose. Martial acumen and valour are venerated by all communities in Rajasthan but 
also closely conform to the sort of assertive nationalism that the Sangh Parivar is 
attempting to project as a homogenised version of Hinduism. The Rajput community and 
the social relations in which it is embedded are the embodiment of an ideology which 
uses the traits of honour and shame against which to measure social prestige. These can 
appeal to all sections of the (Hindu) electorate though it does highlight conflicts with 
Muslims. Instead of Sanskritisation lower caste groups in Rajasthan have sought upward 
social mobility engaged in a process of Kshatriyanisation.
5.4. Repressive State
The second (complementary) hypothesis is that of a repressive state. A lot of literature
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discussing the political economy of policy reform in India during the 1980s concluded 
implicitly that only a repressive state would be able to implement a sustained programme 
of economic liberalisation. In the Indian context this discussion has been framed within 
society centred approaches to the political economy of economic reform, analysing the 
power of different groups to push through preferred policy choices or prevent those 
reforms they oppose. Many have identified broad interest groups to which they have 
ascribed either support or opposition for liberalisation (Harriss 1987; Manor 1987; Kohli 
1990). The context of this analysis was the perceived failure of liberalisation attempts 
after 1985. The balance of power between these contending parties variously couched in 
political, rhetorical or economic terms is held to determine the outcome of attempted 
reform. Kohli (1990) provides the most comprehensive summary. He argues the 
position of business to liberalisation in the late-1980s was a mixed one, opposed by the 
import-substituting sector and welcomed by those benefiting from access to imported raw 
materials and inputs, foreign markets and the opportunity to engage in joint ventures.
The middle classes, professionals and self-employed, those who identified with Rajiv, 
computers and consumer goods also were in support. Those opposed include the 
Congress rank and file faced with the loss of patronage resources. The moderate left 
opposition argued liberalisation undermined both self-reliance and socialism. For rural 
Groups Rajiv had acquired an urban and pro-rich image. Formal sector labour, especially 
in the unionised state sector feared the loss of both employment and privileges. There 
was a broad consensus that liberalisation was opposed by a well-organised and politically 
vocal majority and hence was politically impossible.
The literature identifies a number of means by which opposition to the neo-liberal agenda 
could have been overcome. Many of these focus on the need for a more repressive and 
authoritarian state to force through liberalisation against the wishes of the numerical 
majority. Rubin (1985) focused on both the ability and will necessary to reassert the 
autonomy of ‘high politics’ from the dominant coalition opposed to liberalisation in order 
to impose upon them the costs of change. It was argued this would require a fundamental 
change in the functioning of democracy in India, “a real attempt to liberalise the economy
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probably would require the establishment of a much more authoritarian regime, able to 
ride over the powerful interests represented in the dominant coalition.” (Harriss 1987:38).
Despite the orthodox view that India has implemented large parts of a neo-liberal agenda 
over the 1990s there are no signs the state became more repressive over this period94. 
India during the 1990s has moved away from domination by a single political party. 
Religious minorities, in particular the Christians and Muslisms have been brutally 
persecuted during the 1990s though this remains only a tendency and doesn’t yet define 
the Indian polity. India’s society remains able to expose and contest such activity 
through institutions like the Supreme Court, the National Commission on Human Rights, 
and an activist media. The Indian state, while still having many of the features of the 
‘Third Actor’95 discussed by Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) is unable to regulate the larger 
part of the (informal) economy. Big business may have increased its influence over a 
withering state96 but monopoly capitalism remains unable to assert a general hegemony, 
in particular it remains unable to incorporate or subjugate the intermediate classes. The 
centralising ideology of Hindutva is actively contested in party politics where there 
remain other organising principles such as region and caste that have become 
increasingly significant. The state has been violent as never before during the 1990s — 
the (local) state sponsored massacres in Gujarat being a case in point. This violence has 
been chaotic and unfocused. State violence in the early-1950s was very different, it was 
developmental in nature - removing those groups fundamentally opposed to the creation 
of a geographically integral, democratic and secular India. These included the left-wing 
uprising in Telengana, the forcible integration of the princely states into Independent 
India, the demobilisation of the labour movement in the mid-1940s. The state violence of 
the early years of independence was concerned with enlarging the space of the state to 
promote accumulation. In the 1990s state violence was indirect, allying itself with shady 
political forces like the Shiv Sena, more brutal but also more chaotic and non-
94 The work of Harriss-White (2003) on the fascistic tendencies of the Indian state have some relevance to 
this question.
95 The state they argue through its domination of the labour movement, and its control of capital through 
large stakes in nationalised industries is a third actor, and in many ways politically more potent than the 
other two, capital and labour.
96 There are various perspectives on this point (Patnaik 1986; Byres 1997; Chibber 2003).
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developmental. Its objectives were vaguer, but could be interpreted as attempting to 
strengthen a core coalition by identifying enemies of the people, so that the core coalition 
could implement policies that may otherwise have been impossible.
There is good reason to believe that by the 1990s repression was less necessary to 
implement neo-liberalising economic reforms. Mitra (1977) and Bardhan (1984/1998) 
developed political economy frameworks in the context of what they argued was a 
relatively clear dominant coalition. Mitra arguing the dominant coalition comprised a 
rural and business oligarchy, to which Bardhan added the civil service/ professional 
classes. Both authors have since noted that there has been greater diversity, fluidity and 
fragmentation of the dominant coalition (Bardhan 1984/1998; Mitra 2005:xvii). Industry 
is less dominated by a few large houses and rich farmers are branching out into private 
trade, commerce, and small industry (particularly food processing and rice mills). The 
share of corporate paid up capital owned by private companies stopped declining trend 
relative to government companies in the 1980s and began to climb after 1987. Private 
sector capital surpassed public sector capital in 1996 for the first time since 1972 
(Pedersen 2000:268). New enterpreneurs have emerged from professional/ bureaucratic 
families (Bardhan 1984/1998). In the 1960s most private investment was controlled by 
MNCs, or by Marwari, Gujarati and Parsi enterprises. The bourgeoisie fragmented over 
the next subsequent decades as a regional business class from outside the traditionally 
dominant houses of north and north-west emerged (Jenkins 1999). In sectors such as 
sugar, textiles, steel, cement, chemicals, fertiliser regional business groups have been able 
to make substantial headway in reducing the relative presence of national big business 
groups. Newly emergent regional groups have been less focused on the central 
government in New Delhi and invested in regional political parties and entered 
partnerships with foreign capital (Basu 2000). The industrial structure has also witnessed 
the emergence of a technologically more advanced segment of small, medium and large 
industries that have grown relative to traditional industries. The Federation of Indian 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) is still dominated by eastern and Marwari 
national capital and by traditional engineering sectors. Regional capital has been 
increasing its profile in the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and Associated
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Chamber of Commerce (ACC), these federations are more technologically advanced and 
prone to technology agreements with foreign companies (Pedersen 2000).
Within the context of increasingly fragmenting dominant proprietary classes the 
collective action dilemma can be turned on its head and used to explain why organised 
opposition to reforms is difficult. When the state takes the lead in promoting reform it 
can play off interest groups against each other and use early reforms to disarm potential 
opponents. The fragmentation of the dominant coalition makes co-ordinated resistance to 
reform difficult. Early reforms of banking improved the terms and conditions of some 
employees more than others creating divisions within union ranks on the issue of 
privatisation and closure of loss making branches (Jenkins 1999). The potentially 
divisive policy of the liberalisation of industrial policy removed the role of the central 
state in deciding the location of firms. The freedom of Indian and foreign capital to seek 
locations offering the best returns has led to a proliferation of tax incentives, accelerated 
administration, and easier land acquisition at state level. Centre-state conflict has to 
some extent been replaced with inter-state conflict. The varying impact of reforms 
between states has created allies amongst those gaining and diffused the opposition of 
those losing. Another example is the reaction of state governments to central 
governments approach to freight equalisation. States close to coal and mineral deposits 
such as Bihar, West Bengal and Orissa supported the scheme from clear self-interest.
The decontrol of prices and movement of commodities has pitted surplus against deficit 
states (Jenkins 1999).
5.5. Ideology
The third hypothesis is that of ideology. This section first shows that the rise of caste 
based politics weakened the previously dominant kisan movement by undermining its 
multi-caste/ multi-caste character. The growth of material rents to agriculture was 
replaced by ideological rents to the kisan lobby. This section will then show that the BJP 
is an ideological party and has retained the allegiance of supporters to a large extent
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because of their belief in the over-riding ideology of the party. These factors have 
minimised rent-seeking and allowed the party to pursue economic liberalisation without 
engaging to the same extent in the costly and distracting task of buying off and co-opting 
opponents or the party fragmenting in opposition.
Some argue against caste remain important. Srinivas (2003) argued that the localised 
system of production of foodgrains and other basic necessities based on a caste-wise 
division of labour is fast breaking down all over rural India and likely to disappear in the 
near future. He argues the reduction of mass poverty and rapid economic growth will 
‘dissolve caste identities’ (p459). The experience of Indian political economy from the 
mid-1980s onwards reveals a very different picture.
By the late-1980s caste was becoming an alternative source of mobilisation to the rural- 
peasantry identity. The 1989 victory for the Janata Dal (JD) alliance, particularly in the 
north of India united two currents in Indian politics, the socialist and the peasant. In 
office the JD focused less on class than on caste and turned to positive discrimination as 
its main social remedy. In 1989 V.P.Singh announced his government would implement 
the recommendations of the Mandal Commission and so extend public sector reservations 
from scheduled to ‘other backward castes’ (OBCs). The changing balance of the 
governing alliance was clear. A few days after the announcement Devi Lai resigned from 
the government, Lai a leading proponent of kisan politics believed Mandal would 
undermine kisan politics by splitting the rural alliance into high caste landowners and 
lower caste tenants and agricultural labourers (Jaffrelot 2003). The political salience of 
the OBC category increased over the 1990s. Far from dissolving caste became ‘a force 
for political mobilisation like never before in Indian history’ (Harriss-White 2003:Ch7). 
The rise of the OBCs is reflected in their increased share of MPs and prominent Yadav 
leaders such as Laloo and Mulayam Singh. In Uttar Pradesh an explicitly dalit party 
challenged for power (Bahujan Samaj Party) and in 1995 its leader Mayawati became 
Chief Minister. Yadavs and Kurmis (both OBCs) increased their share to 15% of North 
Indian MPs, the same as high caste Brahmins and Rajputs (Jaffrelot 2003). In Bihar 
alone by 1991 Yadavs represented 17.3% of the MPs and by 1995 38% of MLAs. In
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1994 OBCs claimed nearly half of all ministerial posts in Bihar.
The rise of caste based politics did indeed weaken the kisan movement by undermining 
its multi-caste/ multi-caste character. Section 5.2.2 has shown that agricultural rents after 
increasingly rapidly in the 1980s declined in the 1990s. These rents were not 
mechanistically re-allocated from kisan to caste. There is little evidence of material 
benefits resulting from growing caste-based mobilisation. The rise to power of the BSP 
in Uttar Pradesh generated no evident benefits for the backward castes or even the 
Chamars, the specific constituency of Mayawati (Corbridge and Harriss 2000). Dalit 
parties have had little impact on public policies. In states controlled by Dalits there have 
been no increases in the budget for primary education (Weiner 2001). In a similar 
manner the ADMK has been successful in Tamil Nadu at mobilsing on the basis of a 
Tamil, non-Sanskritic identity but has had little impact in terms of redistribution from the 
rich to very poor (Harriss 2001). The 1990 Mandal Commission reserved 27% of posts 
in the central government and public sector for other backward castes (OBCs). The 
commission ignored calls that would have direct costs such as children’s education and 
vocational training vouchers (Corbridge and Harriss 2000). The reservations have been 
mainly symbolic. The few jobs reserved relative to the scale of unemployment were 
mainly lower grade government posts. The Mandal award is estimated to affect only 
50,000 jobs annually. By some estimates as many as 75% of the male population of India 
have been granted preferences (Weiner 2001). This was symbolic and ideological, a re­
allocation of some jobs not broad social justice. The minimal material rents that were 
created were largely re-allocated from other castes. Mulayam Singh Yadav (and 
Samajwadi Party) became Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh in 1993. His government took 
steps to implement the Mandal award, reservations were also introduced in the 
Panchayati Raj and in medical, engineering and management colleges. This led to the 
mass transfer of upper caste bureaucrats to non-essential posts. Under Singhs 
government 900 teachers were appointed, of which 720 were Yadavs. Mayawati became 
Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh in 1995 with BJP support. There were some minor 
material benefits, grants for Dalit children to attend school and an Ambedkar village 
scheme. In the main again the benefits were ideological. There were frequent name
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changes of public spaces, especially to Ambedkar. In the first 136 days of the Mayawati 
government there were 1,500 transfers of key administrative posts in Uttar Pradesh and 
eventually 20% of posts for inspectors of police were reserved for Scheduled Castes.
The multi-caste/ multi-class farmers lobby were undermined by the growth of caste 
mobilisation and kisan politics. The growth of material rents to agriculture was replaced 
by ideological rents to the kisan lobby.
The Congress and many other Indian political parties have traditionally taken shape as a 
result of aggregation and co-option. Local leaders with influence, wealth, landholdings, 
or prestige in a caste association were given political responsibility or put up as electoral 
candidates. This created a pyramid of influence. This clientelistic logic, multiplied by 
many times would give the party a large size. Congress was a vast organisation of vote 
banks, it did not mobilise so much as aggregate. To win Congress adapted itself to local 
power structures recruiting from among those with power and influence. Congress was 
not in its heyday in the 1950s and early-1960s an ideological party. Congress since the 
mid-1960s has endured chronic splits and rampant factionalism. The BJP by contrast has 
functioned since its formation in 1980 as a highly successful, disciplined party 
characterised by mass membership, several charismatic national leaders, a high level of 
ideological commitment, and a tightly knit party structure that has endured largely 
without splits. “The selection of leaders of shakhas as heads of local areas (nagars), of 
cities, and up to district level where full-time pracharaks are the organising forces, takes 
place on the basis of loyalty, of organisational capabilities displayed, and not least of 
personal relations and informal contacts with leaders higher up the hierarchy.” (Hansen 
1999:113). The primary difference is the very different nature in which the two parties 
have been constructed. The BJP is an ideologically based party.
The BJP is closely affiliated with the RSS, which was formed in 1925 as the parent 
organisation, together with the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) they are collectively 
referred to as the Jana Sangh. Currently around 70% of national level BJP officials are 
RSS members. The RSS has traditionally given precedence to building a solid network
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of activists, implanting the party at local level through social work and through 
propagating Hindu nationalist ideology. This was clearly distinctive and alternative 
model of party building to that of Congress. The party aspired to be co-extensive with 
society. RSS members within the Jana Sangh have consistently opposed the tactic of 
winning elections by co-opting local notables. The preferred technique of party building 
is long-term, relying on a network of disciplined and dedicated activists. The strategy has 
endeavoured to ensure that the parties support was a coherent constituency rather than an 
assemblage of individual followings belonging to particular notables.
The main asset of the RSS-BJP relationship lies in the dual power structure. This 
comprises the organisational leaders of the RSS and the more public BJP party members 
that stand for election to public office. The organisation members do not have to face the 
electorate or assume ministerial responsibilities. The RSS has been able to exert moral 
authority, especially when preventing factionalism in the party among the losers when 
appointments to posts of responsibility were made and contributed to the cohesion of the 
BJP in power. The apolitical tradition of the RSS has enabled them to diffuse factional 
fights between party leaders who might otherwise compete for a post or a ticket to stand 
in an election. The Jana Sangh has consistently promoted an ideology of the primacy of 
the organisation over that of individuals. The RSS-BJP arrangement explains the party’s 
tight discipline and lack of factionalism/ There is less allegiance towards personalities 
and clientelistic linkages. Building a personal network in the BJP has proved difficult; 
the party was not structured along such lines and activists are used to a majoritarian 
discipline. The predominant type of leadership was a tightly bound elite sharing a 
common doctrine and sense of discipline from the RSS. In Madhya Pradesh in the 1980s 
and early-1990s there were three rival candidates for the Chief Ministership - Patwa, 
Sakhlecha and Joshi who spent much of their time jockeying for power. It looked a little 
like factional fights within the Congress, and at times various of the three left the BJP to 
contest under another party banner. These attempts were unsuccessful, followers did not 
desert the BJP, the conflict was contained in the early-1990s and ultimately controlled by 
the dual power structure. Despite their prominence none of the three were then able to 
build a network of followers within the BJP that over-rode the discipline of the party
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organisation  (Jaffrelot 1996:C h i4).
The history of the BJP in Gujarat reveals a specific example of this general strategy of 
mobilisation (Shah 1998). The BJP captured power in the 1995 state election, they had a 
long history of pre-organisation from which they were benefiting by the 1990s. The anti- 
Muslim feelings which prevailed among the upper-caste Hindus - the Rajputs, Brahmins 
and Vania - were nurtured by the Jana Sangh in the 1960s. This tension culminated in 
large-scale communal riots in September to October 1969. During the 1970s there was a 
lull in communal riots and issues of corruption, price rises and the emergency came into 
prominence. The Jana Sangh students front - dominated by upper caste students -  the 
Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad -  participated actively in the Nav Nirman student 
movement in 1974. In the 1980s Gujarat was again engulfed by communal strife. Anti­
reservation riots in 1981 and 1985 often turned into Hindu-Muslim riots. The Jana Sangh 
had fought all elections in the 1950s though with a poor performance and less than 1% of 
the vote. The first victory in the state assembly was in 1967, this solitary seat increased 
to three in 1970 and 18 in 1975. In 1980 after the re-launch of the independent party -  
the BJP the movement sought to spread Hindutva and forge unity among Hindus. Unity 
would not be possible without mobilising OBCs. Various activities were launched to 
unite various sects such as organising Ganesh festivals and providing welfare relief 
measures among BC’s. Many BCs particularly Kolis, Machchis and several artisan 
castes have traditionally followed the path of sansrikisation. The Patidars gained land 
from Rajputs during freedom movement and encroached on Koli land, reducing them to 
the status of tenants or labourers. Both Rajputs and Kohlis needed each other, the Kolis 
aspire to Kshatriya status and Rajputs were in need of widening their support base to 
counter the dominant Patidar caste. In Gujarat there was no contradiction between the 
unity and interests of their caste and that of the Hindu religion. During the 1980s the 
BJP, RSS and VHP organised the distribution of foodgrains, medicine and clothes in 
tribal areas during 1985/6 drought. They also organised a rally on the birthday of 
Ambedkar.
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Most of the new seats the BJP won in the 1996 Lok Sabha elections came from states 
such as Madhya Pradesh where the party was already strong. Where the party made a 
real break-through was in states such as Bihar, Maharashtra and Haryana, this was done 
in alliance with regional parties. The key was for the BJP to find regional partners 
capable of acting as local interpreters of the general idiom of Hindutva, to generalise 
Hindu communalism into local vernaculars and local symbolism and had strong bases in 
the low and intermediate castes. In Maharashtra this was provided by the Shiv Sena.
This alliance broke the Congress hegemony in the mid-1980s to early-1990s and 
culminated in electoral victories in 1995 and in the General election in 1996. The 
alliance was successfully able to differentiate the Bahujan Samaj community and make it 
available to the Hindu nationalist movement. The notion of backward castes was prized 
away by the Shiv Sena from the Maratha designation that had provided the powerful 
mobilisational strategy for Congress.
The BJP is an ideological party that attempted to retain the allegiance of supporters by 
mobilizing their belief in the over-riding ideology of the party rather than through the 
distribution of payoffs alone. This strategy was less successful as the decade wore on, 
the BJP in power rapidly realised that the traditional Indian strategy of payoffs to client 
factions could not be entirely bypassed. Nevertheless, the attempt to impose a centralized 
ideological control over the party did for a time reduce the rate of growth of clientelist 
payoffs that had accelerated in India under Congress from the mid-1960s. This helped the 
central government to push through aspects of liberalization with less rent-seeking cost 
than might otherwise have been the case.
5.6. Note: A Decay of the BJP System
The unity of the BJP organisation has been under increasing strain over the 1990s 
(Jaffrelot 1998). Until 1993 the BJP in Madhya Pradesh was not marked by personality 
or factionalism. In September of that year the party did not renominate 56 ML As, a 
dozen then contested as independents. This was unprecedented in the BJP though
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common with Congress. As the party fell victim to growing indiscipline at the local level 
it became easier for state leaders to establish vertical links. The party had been in need of 
well-known local candidates in order to expand rapidly in new areas, tickets were given 
to Congress or Janata Dal members who had a personal following. These new recruits 
did not show the same discipline and commitment as RSS members. Most of those 
elected in 1990 left the BJP as soon as they were denied tickets and contested as 
independent candidates. There was a difficulty for the party in expanding its base and 
maintaining unity in its ranks. By the mid-1990s it was apparent the BJP was unable to 
expand beyond a north Indian heartland on its own. In the 1996 Lok Sabha and State 
Assembly elections the BJP won only 6% of the vote in Kerala (Chiriyankandath 1998).
As the BJP came to power in Gujarat internal power struggles within the party increased. 
Leaders within the party increasingly represented factions outside the party. Of the three 
contenders for Chief Minister (CM) Kashiram Rana represented the other backward 
castes (OBC), Keshubhai Patel the Patidar’s and Shankarsinh Vaghela the backward 
castes (BC). In March 1995 Patel became CM. By September heading dissident OBC’s 
Vaghela rebelled against the party eventually causing Patel to step down. Patterns of 
rent-seeking and rent allocation began to take forms familiar from the 1970/1980s 
Congress era. The new CM was forced to allocate rents among rivals by expanding the 
size of the Cabinet to 45 members. Vaghela left the party over complaints patronage 
resources were being denied to his followers, he formed the Rashtriya Janata Party 
eventually forming a government with Congress support. The party shifted away from its 
Hindutva agenda, softening its stance on Hindi as a national language and instead 
emphasising devolution and decentralisation of power. At other times it resorted to crude 
competitive populism, such as prior to the 1994 Karnataka state elections when the party 
offered to write off the principal and interest on all state loans to agriculture, the Janata 
had been trumped and were only offering to waive interest. The BJP seized power in 
Uttar Pradesh in October by breaking the Congress and BSP parties. They assumed 
power in the traditional way, through enticing breakaway groups from other parties 
through clientelist payoffs, money and cabinet portfolios. The cabinet of CM Kalyan 
Singh contained 91 ministers. As well as splitting other parties the BJP formed more
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official alliances with smaller regional parties. An alliance with the AIDMK gave the 
party a foothold in Tamil Nadu and likewise the Trinamool Cong in West Bengal and 
Akali Dal in the Punjab. As the BJP system began to loosen there are signs that rents 
began increasing once more. There was a generous wage increase for government 
employees with the Fifth Pay commission in 1997 at central level and 1998 at state level 
government, costs are estimated at 1% of GDP. After falling for much of the 1990s 
government expenditure began rising from the late-1990s and the fiscal deficit again 
exceeded 10% of GDP by 2000. Fertiliser subsidies reached a 1990s low of 0.57% of 
GDP in 1994/95 then began creeping up again, to reach 0.75% in 1999/00. Cost recovery 
from power supply to agriculture reached a post-reform high of 82.2% in 1992/93 then 
dropped sharply to 69.8% in 2000/01 (Gulati and Narayanan 2003).
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Chapter IX: Conclusion
1. Implications for Economic Principles and Policy
1.1. The Role of the State
The state is important in both initiating and sustaining economic growth. This finding is 
contrary to Neo-classical economics which argues economic growth is best promoted by 
reducing the economic role of the state through liberalisation and privatisation. 
Alternative works have highlighted very specific development roles for the state, 
subsidising firms (Amsden 1989) and overseeing a high-debt based corporate sector 
(Wade and Veneroso 1998). The necessary role of the state is much broader and any 
analysis needs to incorporate finance, production/ learning and institutions. Likewise the 
rigid uniformity of Neo-classical policy recommendations is fundamentally mistaken. A 
wide range of strategies exist to mobilise an economic surplus, to transfer it those able to 
invest it productively and institutions to mediate the resulting conflict. In a developing 
country the mobilisation and especially allocation of the economic surplus is a 
profoundly political question. Without a guiding role for the state there is no particular 
reason why the economic surplus should find its way into the hands of an emerging 
capitalist class. The state also has an important role in production, to promote learning 
and upgrading. Without a strong role for the state a firm/ industry/ developing country 
can seek to maintain international competitiveness in a self-destructive manner, through 
low wages, long hours and intensified labour. Such a pattern of growth is likely to be 
vulnerable to international competition and ultimately unsustainable. Competitiveness 
promoted through learning, upgrading, high wages and high productivity is likely to be 
more sustainable and also superior from a welfare perspective. The state has a crucial 
role in promoting the latter, high road of development.
What can be considered a good development strategy will change over time as an 
economy and its social structure changes and also in response to external factors. Rapid 
growth of public investment and import substitution may for example be a more
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appropriate development strategy when the state is initiating modem industrialisation but 
careful management and control of FDI may be more relevant when trying to force an 
existing industrial sector to upgrade production. Mobilising an economic surplus and 
influencing its allocation has become harder as capital has become increasingly 
globalised and short-term. The tightening of restrictions on industrial policy through 
measures such as TRIPS and TRIMs by the WTO makes it harder to implement some of 
those measures which in the past have stimulated economic growth both in India and 
among developing countries more generally. Local content regulations on FDI for 
example were crucial in China for upgrading local producers. The growing spread of a 
particular form of democracy based on competitive political parties may be undermining 
the ability of the state to constmct institutions that are repressive, inclusive or ideological.
1.2. Institutions and Conflict
Neo-classical economics does not discuss for conflict. Neo-classical economics is one of 
atomistic capitalism, where unions and firms act independently and are small in relation 
to the aggregate. These atomistic agents interact only through supply and demand which 
determines wages and prices. Exogenous shocks such as increases in taxation or the 
terms of trade do not lead to an inflationary spiral or to conflict but at the most one-off 
changes in wages and prices as that burden is redistributed and marginal equalities re­
established (Rowthom 1977). This thesis takes as a basic assumption that economic 
development is a conflictual process. The ability of the state to manage conflict is crucial 
in allowing the state to productively allocate rents. Institutions to control conflict can be 
ideological, repressive or inclusive. There is a general danger that pursuing a policy of 
liberalization and rolling back the state will weaken the institutions that control conflict. 
Reductions in subsidies for instance may violate a social contract that had previously kept 
a lid on conflict. A smaller state may be less able to support inclusive or repressive 
institutions. It should come as no surprise that measures of corruption do not decline or 
even increase following liberalisation (White and Harriss-White 1996). There are other 
dramatic and relevant examples. In the early-1990s Russia and other transition countries
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were encouraged to break up their communist parties and move rapidly towards 
democracy in the belief that this would permit a faster pace of liberalization. The pace of 
policy reform was indeed rapid, a big bang instead of gradualism - the massive state 
sector in Russia was largely privatised over two years (Nolan 1995). Such reforms failed 
to generate rapid economic growth. More recent scholarship has focused on the neglect 
of those institutions argued to be necessary for the successful functioning of a market 
economy such as property rights and a stable enforceable legal framework. The dramatic 
disintegration of the various communist parties has been neglected as a causal factor in 
the economic crises. The communist parties that had previously managed conflict and 
ensured rents were allocated according to known rules disappeared. The problem in 
Russia was not so much an increase in corruption as a fragmentation in the organisational 
structure of rent-seeking (Shleifer and Vishny 1996) and their allocation according to 
political/ criminal criteria. An even more recent example was the rapid break-up of the 
Baath-ist party, military and security apparatus of the Iraqi state following the 2003 
invasion. Iraq has mobilised massive quantities of resources via the US, and has had 
democratic elections. Unsurprisingly there has been a massive increase in conflict and a 
complete failure to allocate those resources productively.
1.3. Economic Growth and the Medium-term >
There is a missing link in economic analysis, that of growth over the medium term. 
Growth over the short-term is highlighted by Keynesian theories of stabilisation and 
demand and work on the economic cycle. Studies of foreign aid and changes in the terms 
of trade have likewise tended to focus on their impact on growth over the short-term. 
There is a growing literature looking at growth over the very long-term. This has 
included discussion of long waves (Mandel 1978) and has broadened into an effort to 
separate the proximate (accumulation, technological change) from deeper causes 
(institutions, geography, integration) of economic growth. Much of this work has 
remained within the cross-country growth regression framework but extended the frame 
of analysis from decades to centuries. The typical experience of growth in developing
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countries is however one characterized by periods of stagnation, growth spurts, structural 
breaks, volatility and instability. Long-term growth averages or a short-term focus would 
both miss this important empirical reality. A focus on the episodes of growth and 
stagnation that exist over the medium term allows us to more properly understand the role 
of the state in economic development and how that role changes over time. Considering 
the medium-term also allows us to focus on those factors which are relevant for the 
sustainability of growth. It is often forgotten how many developing countries 
experienced rapid economic growth between the 1950s and 1970s. As Rodrik (1999a) 
pointed out we talk of the East Asian miracle because that cluster of economies managed 
to sustain growth during and after the 1970s. This suggests that initiating growth is 
relatively easier than sustaining it. This thesis offers broad support for this point in 
particular through the analysis of the institutions necessary to manage conflict. The 
episodes of growth after 1951 and 1979 in India were initiated by rapid increases in 
public investment, in the earlier based on a surplus mobilized domestically and the 
second through (borrowed) international capital. The earlier growth episode was 
sustainable (it broke down through exogenous shocks) and relied on the Congress party 
as an institution to manage conflict. The creation and expansion of the Congress was a 
historical phenomenon rooted in the independence movement and Gandhi’s leadership. 
The massive and ongoing efforts of the BJP to organise and expand, which has never yet 
reaped more than 30% of the national vote or spread significantly from a north-Indian 
heartland, reveal how difficult it is to create the institutions necessary to manage conflict 
and make growth sustainable. The episode of growth after 1979 floundered for just this 
reason, the state had to borrow it lacked the institutions necessary to impose the burden of 
higher public investment on any group. As difficult as it is to build relevant conflict 
managing institutions this thesis does offer some grounds for optimism. Neo-classical 
analysts tend to focus only on democracy and property rights as institutions that fill such 
a role. This thesis has argued there are a much broader range of potential institutions. 
Khan in various works argues that the political settlement, being a function of the 
underlying balance of powers in society is the fundamental constraint on long-term 
economic growth. Pakistan for example failed to sustain economic growth after the mid- 
1960s because it unlike South Korea had politically potent intermediate classes that
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mobilized and forced the state to divert the surplus into unproductive rents. This thesis 
suggests it is possible to build institutions that can manage conflict resulting from the 
underlying balance of power(s) in society and allow the state to promote a development 
agenda. The superstructure can be manipulated to change the base.
1.4. Neo-classical Economics, the Washington Consensus and Universalism
The policies of the Washington Consensus as manifested in IMF-World Bank lending 
programmes with their various conditionalities have been criticised for being virtually 
identical across time and space. The typical package includes a mixture of liberalisation, 
marketisation, privatisation and reduction of budget and trade deficits. The austerity 
imposed on Asian countries after the crisis in 1997 was remarkably similar to that 
imposed on Latin America during the debt crisis and hyperinflation of the 1980s despite 
seemingly apparently glaring differences in their circumstances.
Neo-classical ‘analysis’ of liberalising reforms more often than not is simply comprised 
of a list of liberalisation measures with a passing mention as to whether trade and budget 
deficits have been sufficiently reduced. The successful outcome of reform and the degree 
of implementation of liberalisation are typically considered synonymous. This is 
demonstrated clearly by Neo-classical analysis of reforms in India with its peculiarly 
anaemic quality and tendency to focus nearly exclusively on the depth, pace and 
implementation of reforms (Ahluwalia 2002; Bajpai 2002).
There are very real methodological consequences of this analytical straitjacket, it is no 
accident researchers either use cross-country regressions or that the results of such studies 
generate such poor results. In order to run large cross-country regressions researchers 
tightly constrain themselves to the assumption of universalism. Conventional growth 
analysis assumes parameter homogeneity - parameters describing growth are identical 
across countries. Each individual country provides evidence that can be used to elucidate 
this one underlying universal economic relation. An increase in openness for example is
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hypothesised to have the same effect on growth in all countries. In practise there is 
strong evidence to suggest the processes and components of growth do work differently 
over time and space (Chapter II). The implication being that cross-country growth 
regressions are an intrinsically poor mechanism to analyse growth and each growth 
experience should be treated as potentially unique i.e. as a case study. And ultimately 
those policies should be tailored to the specific context of different countries.
Opening up of the assumption of universalism to greater scrutiny leaves us asking why 
the growth process may differ. Output responses to policy changes could for example 
depend on expectations, and history (Pritchett 2001:274). This thesis used the case study 
of India in the post-Independence period. The case study approach is justified in this 
thesis in part initially on the assumption and later on the empirical evidence presented 
here that growth processes is not universal. The comparison of episodes of growth and 
stagnation in the post-Independence Indian economy allows us to focus on the factors 
that influence growth and to show how their impact has changed or remained the same 
over time. Despite growth being an event that takes place over time most models of 
growth are a-historical. Historical case studies are far richer in theoretical argument and 
analysis than macro-quantitative studies. The analysis of historical sequences allows 
historians to “bring to bear a much deeper conception of the social, political, institutional 
and technological sources of growth than theoretical and empirical economists are 
usually able to incorporate in formal models.” (Temple 1999:120). The strength of 
comparative historical research is its particular ability to deal with multiple causal paths 
leading to the same outcome and different results arising from the same factor/ factor 
combination. In other words comparative and historically informed case studies allow 
researchers to question the assumption of universality rather than be forced to assume it 
true a priori. Chapters V and VII show that in both 1951 to 1965 and 1979/80 to 1991 
rapid public investment was in large part responsible for rapid economic growth. After 
1991 public investment was sharply reduced but economic growth continued at a 
relatively rapid rate. This example shows a very different starting point in 1991 (reduced 
public investment-led growth) as compared to 1951 and 1979 (increased public 
investment-led growth) led to a very similar outcome in terms of growth. Such examples
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would be missed by cross-country growth regressions and are best left to a case study 
approach. The use of historical case studies in analysing growth would be a return to 
quite a recent tradition of using case studies. Much of the intellectual artillery for the 
Neo-classical counter-revolution in economics was derived from close case studies of the 
experience of countries that had pursued strategies of import substitution in the post-war 
period. Industry was argued to be high-cost, capital-intensive and generating little 
employment. Far from achieving self-sufficient industrialisation such countries 
continued a dependence on imports of capital goods and inputs (Bhagwati and Desai 
1970; Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1975). This type of analysis provided important 
antecedents for the shift to strategies of outward orientation often as intrinsic parts of 
structural adjustment programmes from the 1980s onwards.
1.5. The Washington Consensus, Policy and Economic Growth
Orthodox Neo-classical economics has derived two key propositions about economic 
growth. The first is that policy is the most important influence on economic growth, the 
second that a particular set of policies -  neo-liberal reforms -  will generate a faster rate of 
economic growth. The first of these propositions is for developing countries an 
optimistic one. If poor economic outcomes, in particular the rate of economic growth is 
due to poor policies, changing policy will improve outcomes. The World Bank said of 
Sub-Saharan Africa,
“The main factors behind the stagnation and decline were poor policies -  both 
macroeconomic and sectoral -  emanating from a development paradigm that gave the 
state a prominent role in production and regulating economic activity.” (World Bank 
1994:20).
This first proposition, the primacy of policy distinguishes orthodox economics from the 
recent work by a wide range of other scholars focusing on factors such as whether 
countries are landlocked or have a tropical climate, the nature of the colonial state,
328
endowments of land and natural resources, power relations in society, and the unequal 
status of a developing country in the world economy. This thesis supports the orthodox 
Neo-classical view that policy is important but disagrees with the nature of what 
constitutes desirable policies. Rodrik (2004) showed how the most successful growth 
performers have followed very heterodox policies in their growth take-offs. This thesis 
takes this further and has shown how policies have changed within a single country over 
time. There is no single universal policy prescription to promote growth, even in one 
country. In India since 1951 the emphasis on mobilising resources through taxation, 
foreign capital flows and domestic savings has changed significantly over time. Just as 
the means by which resources are allocated has varied, whether through public 
investment, subsidies, state control or liberalisation of the banking system, foreign capital 
inflows, or measures to influence private sector profitability. Desirable policies are a 
question of history and political economy not a product of the universalising assumptions 
of Neo-classical economics.
This thesis shows that the other policies of the Washington Consensus and later Good 
Governance agenda have not been of first order importance in India in determining 
patterns of growth and stagnation over the medium-term. The rapid expansion of public 
ownership in the 1950s is associated with an episode of growth, the relative increase in 
the share of private ownership in the 1990s is associated with sustained not increased 
growth. Liberalisation of the domestic economy and international trade after 1991 is not 
associated with increased growth. Growth fluctuates in clear episodes of growth and 
stagnation in post-independence India despite an enduring democratic political regime 
and reasonably well-protected property rights. Rising levels of corruption after the mid- 
1960s are associated with an episode of stagnation between 1965 and 1980, but also with 
increased growth after 1979 and sustained growth after 1991 (Kumar 1999a+b). This 
supports the more general findings of Rodrik (2003, 2004) who argues episodes of 
growth are commonly associated with heterodox policy reforms, that trade openness is 
not associated with avoiding episodes of stagnation (Rodrik 1999a), and also that neo­
liberal reforms are rarely associated with an episode of growth (Hausman et al 2004; 
Chang and Grabel 2004).
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2. Extensions and What the Thesis Doesn’t Cover
2.1. Extensions and a Research Agenda
Within a large federal country such as India episodes of growth and stagnation could 
have been analysed at the state level (cross-section) as opposed to the all-India level 
(time-series). Chapter III noted that there are indeed large variations in the growth 
performance, in both averages and volatility across time and space among states in India. 
Among those interesting episodes are Kerala, where despite high levels of education and 
health (theoretical pre-requisites of growth) growth was only 2.5% between 1980 and 
1992, then suddenly jumped to over 5% p.a. during the next six years. Other structural 
breaks in growth have included Gujarat in 1973/73, West Bengal in 1982/83 and 
Karnataka in 1985/86. Sudden growth slowdowns have included Uttar Pradesh and 
Punjab in 1981/82. This thesis made only a brief note of such details, and did not 
investigate further owing to the matter of space. A future research agenda would be to 
decentralise the analysis of this thesis and focus on episodes of growth and stagnation at 
the state level.
The case study approach used here also lends itself both to specific comparisons and also 
a much broader cross-country analysis. Closer studies of episodes of growth can be 
useful in establishing the conditions that initiate such episodes. Khan (2000d) argued that 
there were more similarities than differences between the policies that generated rapid 
growth in South Korea after 1961 and Pakistan after 1958. Despite having very different 
policy environments, by the late-1960s both India and Pakistan had regressed to a ‘South- 
Asian growth norm’. Also interesting are the comparative performance of countries 
experiencing the same exogenous shock, Chile and Zambia to declining copper prices in 
the 1970s, Korea and Brazil to the 1980s debt crisis, and Indonesia and Malaysia to the
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1997 Asian crisis. As well as the microscope there is scope for stepping back and 
looking at the issue of episodes of growth and stagnation in a cross-country perspective. 
The typical growth experience of developing countries is characterised by periods of 
stagnation, growth spurts, structural breaks, volatility and instability. There are 
numerous growth accelerations worldwide since the 1950s (Hausman 2001; Rodrik 2003) 
and many specifically within Africa (Berthelemy and Soderling 2001, Mkandawire 
2001). A second research extension of this thesis would be to make a comparative 
analysis of such episodes not over time in one country (as in this thesis) but rather across 
countries.
2.2. What the Thesis Doesn’t Cover
The role of the state in fifty years of an extremely large developing country is a big topic. 
This thesis has built a political economy framework which is capable of explaining the 
reasons for growth over the medium-term, focusing on the role of the state. For each of 
the four episodes of growth and stagnation it shows how they can be better explained by 
this framework than any other existing framework. The framework comprises three key 
roles of the state -  finance, production and institutions. These three roles have significant 
explanatory power to successfully explain growth. Other factors could have been 
considered that may be of relevance in explaining episodes of growth and stagnation, but 
would have added more to the complexity of the framework than to its explanatory 
power.
Demography is not considered here. Bloom and Williamson (1998) show how East 
Asia’s demographic transition resulted in its working age population growing more 
slowly than overall population prior to 1965 and at a faster rate between 1965 and 1990. 
The demographic burden and bonus over these two periods they find contributed 
substantially to economic stagnation and the subsequent ‘economic miracle’. Weather 
and other exogenous factors could have been added as a fourth factor to the framework. 
Virmani (2004b) examines the sources of TFP growth in India and notes that his is
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probably the only study to add weather to the production function. India is a monsoon 
economy where agriculture takes up a large share of GDP, sharp fluctuations in 
agricultural output have been common. Many believe the two droughts in 1965 and 1966 
were causally related to the onset of stagnation after 1965 (Chapter VI). The (external) 
terms of trade have likewise been used to explain the onset of stagnation and growth in 
other contexts. Volatility in the terms of trade can be bad for growth (Lutz 1994) and a 
natural resource export boom can initiate more broad based growth (Sachs and Warner 
1999). Exogenous shocks were not included for several reasons. Firstly there is no clear 
theory or evidence from the literature regarding their influence on medium-term 
economic growth. Secondly, there is good reason in both theory and evidence (Rowthom 
1977; Rodrik 1999) which informs the more general argument in this thesis that it is not 
exogenous shocks so much as the quality of domestic institutions to manage the 
inevitable conflict associated with allocating the burden of adjustment that is important 
for economic growth. Various scholars have argued that the nature of the bureaucracy is 
a crucial variable (Leftwich 2000; Schneider 1999). Specifically in India it has been 
argued the autonomy of the bureaucracy has changed/ declined over time and this can 
help explain in particular slower economic growth after the mid-1960s (Bardhan 
1984/1998; Chibber 2003). The bureaucracy could have been a fourth component in the 
framework but equally can be seen to be subsumed by the other three components. A 
developmentally orientated bureaucracy would be one best able to mobilise resources 
(finance), allocate them to those willing and able to invest them productively 
(production) and manage the conflicts associated with development (institutions) (Khan 
2001b).
This thesis deals with the notion of sustainability in a very specific sense. There are three 
episodes of growth and one episode of stagnation examined here. Sustainability is 
defined as whether the structure of finance, production and institutions responsible (for 
growth or stagnation) are sustainable into the near future. The episode of growth after 
1979 was judged not sustainable because it was based on a rapid build-up of high-cost 
debt and there existed no institution capable of allocating the financial burden of 
expansion among domestic groups. An extension of the analysis would be to consider
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what makes growth sustainable over the long-term. Is it the case as Rodrik argues in 
various papers that an economy needs to converge to neo-liberal institutions such as 
protected private property rights and democracy? Or else is an inclusive political party 
such as Congress in the 1950s that successfully managed conflict a viable long-term 
proposition in a heterogeneous society such as India? Does there exist the policy space in 
the contemporary world economy for alternatives to the neo-liberal development models 
to be viable (Chang and Grabel 2004). This thesis, again because of its focus on the 
(neglected) medium-term does not draw general conclusions on how the nature of a 
viable framework (finance, production, and institutions) may change systematically 
during the course of development. It may be the case for example that the state is most 
important in mobilising resources, co-ordinating investment, providing a vision, 
managing conflict during the transition from a rural to an industrial economy (Chang 
1999). But, the state should retreat to more indirect management such as enforcing 
conditions on FDI, and promoting technological change and productivity growth as an 
economy begins to catch up with the developed world. Repressive institutions for 
example became less and democracy more viable in South Korea into the 1980s with the 
growth of an increasingly mobilised middle class. Inclusive institutions such as the 
Congress party in India may become less necessary as the social structure undergoes a 
more complete transition to that of a capitalist society. Bardhan (1984/1998) argued the 
structure' of three dominant proprietary classes he identified that made political and 
economic management so difficult in India existed specifically in the context of an 
incomplete transition to capitalism. Others have for example argued that the political and 
economic relevance of caste will disappear with capitalist economic growth (Srinivas 
2003) and others that the middle class is increasingly becoming a cultural hegemon to 
which people increasingly either belong or aspire to (Fernandes 2006). The means by 
which the state can influence or directly mobilise the surplus may also change 
systematically over time (Gerschenkron 1966). This thesis argues that an episode of 
growth will be initiated when the state is able to mobilise (finance) and allocate 
(production) the economic surplus to those able to invest it productively and can 
construct institutions to manage the conflict associated with development. This thesis is 
comprised of four case studies of episodes of growth and stagnation it does not try to
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construct a general theory of how such a viable ‘structure of accumulation’ can be created 
(an episode of growth) and how it may be undermined (an episode of stagnation). The 
social structures of accumulation approach (SSA)97 offers the basis for constructing such 
a theory. This has been done at the local level in India (Harriss-White 2003) but not yet 
at the aggregate level.
97 “The social structures of accumulation (SSA) approach provides a new way to analyze the structure and 
development of capitalist economies and societies. The term SSA refers to the complex of institutions 
which support the process of capital accumulation.” (Kotz et al 1994:1). A SSA includes all the institutions 
that impact upon the accumulation process. Among most important are the systems ensuring money and 
credit, the structure of the class struggle and pattern of state involvement in the economy. The SSA helps 
create the social stability required for investors to make reasonably determinate calculations. Without such 
stability investors may prefer financial over productive accumulation. There are various forms of class 
conflict under capitalism and also conflicts between different sections of the capitalist class, conflicts over 
the distribution of the surplus value and also conflict with capitalists and various classes abroad.
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